Opinion

By Muhammad Sagir Bauchi

It has been three years since I last put pen to paper for public reading. That last article, published in July 2023, examined the new economic policies of the present administration: subsidy removal, exchange rate unification, and student loans, through the lens of Keynes’ warning that “in the long run, we are all dead.” I argued then that these reforms, though painful, could pay off over time, while cautioning that fairness in how the pain and the palliatives were distributed would determine whether Nigerians trusted the process. Three years on, I return to ask the question those reforms were always going to face: has the long run arrived, and for whom?

Six years ago, I wrote an article titled, “Nigeria At 60: A Moment Of Joy Or A Moment Of Sober Reflection?” In it, I reflected on our journey since independence, the challenges we had faced, and the questions surrounding our progress as a country. Six years later, Nigeria is 66, and the question remains almost the same: is this a moment of joy, a moment of sober reflection, or perhaps both?

Since independence, Nigeria has gone through different political administrations, military interventions, democratic transitions, economic reforms, and countless attempts to solve the problems confronting it. We have built universities, colleges, hospitals and roads. Millions of Nigerians have acquired education and gone on to make meaningful contributions to the country and the world. There is certainly a lot to celebrate. But while celebrating our achievements, we must also have the courage to ask where we have failed, where we are today, and where we are heading.

A country can record economic growth while millions of its citizens continue to struggle with the cost of living. Economic reforms may be necessary, but that does not mean we should ignore the short-term hardship they create. Government may point to improving figures, but ordinary Nigerians are equally justified in asking when those improvements will begin to show up in their daily lives. Why celebrate GDP growth or falling inflation on paper while paying little attention to the struggles of the ordinary man whose reality reflects neither? Economic growth should not only be measured by what the figures say; it should be reflected in what people can afford, the jobs they can find, the businesses they can sustain and the quality of life they can provide for their families.

It is no longer news that petrol sells for about ₦1,400 per litre in parts of Lagos and around ₦1,500 in parts of the North. This is no longer a figure in newspapers or a talking point on social media; it is a living reality Nigerians are struggling to adapt to. Today, even people fortunate enough to own a car are becoming careful about where and when they drive. Some now choose the inconvenience of public transport not because they lack a vehicle, but because fuelling it has become too costly. A car that was once a convenience has, for some families, become an expense they must calculate before every journey.

Since the removal of the petrol subsidy, several policies have been introduced to cushion the effects of the reform. Yet from the perspective of the ordinary citizen, it is difficult to point to a corresponding drop in hardship. Nigerians are not asking for suffering to be eradicated overnight; they are asking for a meaningful reduction in the burden they carry daily. The real question is not whether the reforms were necessary, but whether the people bearing their immediate cost are beginning to see the promised benefits. A reform can be economically necessary and still be socially painful, and when that pain continues without improvement in people’s standard of living, government must expect citizens to ask hard questions.

Since independence, Nigeria has also built numerous institutions of learning, and millions of Nigerians have benefited from them. To follow the path of developed nations, the concept of education loans was introduced. In an ideal society, this can be a smart move, shifting the burden of financing higher education from parents to government, with students eventually repaying the cost. But what pushed us here in the first place? The same government policies that have left many parents living hand to mouth, with little or nothing to save for their children’s education. What they earn is often barely enough to cover food, shelter and other basics- things people now struggle to afford rather than plan for.

Can we truly celebrate a policy that pushes parents deeper into poverty while leaving them unable to afford their children’s education? More importantly, how many graduates can be certain there will be jobs waiting for them, jobs that let them repay what they borrowed? What happens when a graduate leaves school with a degree and a loan but no employment opportunities? What happens when companies close because policies make it hard to do business, or when entrepreneurs are forced to shut their doors because of low sales and rising costs?

Education loans may provide access to education, but access alone is not enough. There must also be an economy that gives graduates decent opportunities to work, earn, and repay. Otherwise, are we simply shifting the burden from parents who cannot afford education to graduates who may never find the jobs needed to carry it?

This brings us back to leadership. Six years ago, I argued that one of Nigeria’s major problems was how political leadership was perceived and exercised, a system where public office could become a means of personal advancement rather than service. Six years later, that question remains just as relevant. Leadership is not only about making policy; it is about understanding how policy affects the people who must live with it. The ordinary citizen does not experience an economic reform as a policy document; he experiences it through the price of food, transport, school fees, rent and electricity. Leadership must go beyond celebrating figures and ask whether its policies are producing a society in which ordinary Nigerians can live with dignity.

One issue I raised six years ago was vote buying. It is easy to condemn citizens who accept money during elections, but perhaps we should ask a harder question first. When people who once fought a previous administration on grounds of incompetence are now in government, defending the very policies that have subjected Nigerians to severe hardship, can we genuinely expect citizens to reject ₦5,000 or ₦10,000 when many are struggling to put food on the table? This is not an argument for vote buying; it is a question about the conditions that make it possible. A citizen who cannot afford food, medicine or transport is more vulnerable to financial incentives at the polls. That does not make vote buying right, but it should push us to examine the poverty that allows it to thrive. If we want citizens to make truly independent choices, we must build a society where poverty does not make those choices easier to manipulate.

Corruption remains one of Nigeria’s oldest struggles. We have created institutions, passed laws and established agencies to fight it, yet the perception that public resources are sometimes diverted for personal or political gain continues to shape public trust. What makes this worse is our own double standard: when a politician from the opposing party is accused, we demand accountability; when someone from our own camp faces the same allegation, the conversation quietly changes. We cannot build a strong country by applying different standards to the same behaviour based on political affiliation. Accountability cannot be selective.

Insecurity, too, was already a major concern six years ago, and it remains one today; its nature and location may shift, but the consequences are just as painful. Families are displaced, businesses suffer, farmers cannot operate freely in some areas, and young people grow up with insecurity as part of everyday conversation. A country cannot achieve sustainable development when its citizens constantly worry about their safety; security is directly tied to agriculture, education, business, investment, and general well-being.

Nigeria has one of the largest youth populations in Africa, an enormous potential advantage that becomes a burden when the economy cannot provide enough opportunity. Every year, thousands of graduates leave school hoping to find work, and many spend years searching, turning to entrepreneurship, migration or whatever else they can find. The rising desire among young Nigerians to leave the country, popularly called “Japa”, should make us ask why so many feel their future lies elsewhere. It is not enough to tell them to stay and build the country; we must create conditions that make staying a realistic, attractive choice.

Education remains one of the most important investments any country can make, yet Nigeria continues to face disruptions, prolonged strikes, and other setbacks that affect students and institutions. We cannot claim to be developing while young people spend years moving in and out of classrooms over problems that better planning, funding and dialogue could resolve.

So, are we better off than we were at independence? In some areas, certainly. We have more institutions, more educated Nigerians, greater access to technology, a larger private sector, and Nigerians making remarkable contributions around the world. But progress should not blind us to what remains broken. Nigeria is not a complete failure, just as it is not a complete success story; our story is more complicated than either label. We have achievements worth celebrating and failures that demand honest reflection. We celebrate Nigerians’ resilience, but we should also ask why they need to be so resilient just to survive.

Patriotism doesn’t mean defending every government policy, and criticism doesn’t mean hating one’s country. Sometimes, asking difficult questions is itself an act of patriotism.

As Nigeria marks 66 years of independence, we should celebrate what we have achieved, remember how far we have come, and, most importantly, have the courage to confront what still holds us back. The Nigeria we want will not be built by government alone. It requires responsible leadership, accountable institutions, an active citizenry, and a society that values merit, justice and equal opportunity.

At 66, Nigeria has every reason to celebrate. But it also has every reason to reflect.

By Isyaka Laminu Badamasi

As the gratuity payments commence, as approved and directed by His Excellency, Governor Bala Abdulkadir Mohammed, some critics of his administration find it difficult to appreciate what they have long asked the governor to do. This is especially true since the beneficiaries have spent their lives serving the state and are in dire need of their hard-earned entitlements.

As much as criticism remains the beauty of democracy, they should be happy that their loud voices were heard, the governor acted, and the retired civil servants will now get paid. Instead, they have resorted to cheap blackmail, arguing that the payment is delayed and that the governor deserves no applause because it’s long overdue, even though he inherited these huge burdens from previous administrations dating back to 2013.

While they have an inalienable right to hold an opinion and express it, anyone who does something worthy of applause deserves commendation and a standing ovation. They should also raise other important aspects of governance that they feel require His Excellency’s attention. By doing so, they will turn into partners in progress rather than mere critics.

This is how criticism works in sane democracies: critics and opposition figures matter, playing a key role in providing checks and balances so government stays on track while earning applause from its supporters. His Excellency’s response to the voices of wisdom suggests our democracy has matured and begun embracing constructive feedback, as shown by the payment of gratuities.

While congratulating our retired civil servants, I also commend His Excellency for making this important day a reality.

Isyaka Laminu Badamasi writes from no 555 Ajiya Adamu Road, Bauchi, Bauchi State.

By Prof. Abdelghaffar Amoka Abdelmalik

I was invited to conduct an external examination for three postgraduate students (1 PhD and 2 MSc) at an institution about 87 kilometres from my university. The three theses were sent days before the scheduled examination for me to read page by page, contribute to improving the work, prepare questions, and then schedule a date to travel to examine the students.

I did not drive there.

I had an instinct that whatever mileage they would pay would not cover my fuel costs. I wasn’t prepared to spend my own money to finance an examination for which I had already done several days of intellectual work. You don’t want to know the honorarium for the several days of intellectual work.

So I took a bike to the park, boarded public transport, and travelled to the institution. To make the journey comfortable, I paid for two seats. The two seats cost ₦5,000. The examination lasted 6 hours without a break because it had to be concluded that day. At the end of the day, they brought me a claim to sign, and the mileage was ₦40 per kilometre. They quoted the distance to be 74 kilometres. That meant I was entitled to ₦2,960 for travelling to an institution approximately 87 kilometres away. That’s the worth we placed on ourselves. I laughed very hard, not because it was funny but because it was absurd and ridiculous.

Then, I asked them: So academics sat down and agreed that the cost of travelling one kilometre for a professor conducting a postgraduate external examination is ₦40? That was the moment I decided that this would be my first and last time honouring a postgraduate examination invitation from that institution.

I was lamenting this experience, and what I see as the self-normalisation of poverty in our universities, to a colleague. His response shocked me. He told me that, as a postgraduate coordinator, he does receive phone calls from senior colleagues asking to be considered for external examinations. They were not invited. They were calling to ask for the opportunity. That is when I began to think more deeply about self-normalisation of poverty.

Self-normalisation of poverty is the process by which people gradually begin to accept poverty, deprivation, and poor living conditions as normal, inevitable, or even acceptable. Poverty initially produces frustration. Prolonged poverty produces adaptation. Prolonged adaptation produces acceptance. And acceptance has eventually produced defence of the very conditions that created the poverty.

The danger is not merely that lecturers become poor. The greater danger is that poverty becomes normalised by the very people who should be challenging the conditions that produced it.

Meanwhile, I got an interesting response to my last piece from a professor who is proudly saving ₦500,000 per month. I must applaud the professor for sustaining his family and all his needs with an amount equivalent to the 2025 salary that ASUU thought was not enough for him. He was able to save from his pre-CATA salary, add it to the new CATA and professorial allowance, and save ₦500k every month. Seriously, saving ₦500,000 every month in Nigeria today is not a small achievement.

Within 2 years and with consistency, the professor will be able to save about ₦12 million, ignoring interest and unforeseen circumstances. But the reality is that the current value of that 10 million is about the same as the value of ₦700,000 that an Assistant Lecturer saved within 2 years from 2005 to 2007. A 15-year-old car that cost between ₦700 and ₦1m in 2007 costs about ₦10m now. 

So what exactly are we celebrating? The fact that a professor said he can now save ₦500,000 every month?

Or the fact that it takes a professor two years of disciplined saving to accumulate money whose purchasing power may resemble what a much more junior academic could accumulate much earlier?

For a lecturer celebrating a professor achieving in 2026, what an Assistant Lecturer could achieve in 2007 is a testament to the self-normalisation of poverty.

Let’s remember where we are coming from.

When I was employed in 2005, an Assistant Lecturer’s net salary was about ₦37,000. At the exchange rate of the time, that was roughly $280. In 2006, it rose to about ₦57,000, approximately $445. By 2009, during the Yar’Adua administration, the net salary of AL increased to around ₦110,000, approximately $738.

By 2022, ₦110,000 was worth only about $246 at the prevailing exchange rate. After subsidy removal in 2023 and naira devaluation, ₦110,000 dropped to as low as $73. By 2026, an Assistant Lecturer’s salary rose to roughly ₦250,000. That’s about $180. That is what we are celebrating. 

What happened to Nigerian professors? 

In March 2012, I purchased a London-Abuja British Airways round-trip ticket for £552.09 (₦138,574.59). In 2012, a professor’s salary was about ₦460,000 (£1,832.7). That means that by May 2015, a professor at the bar could afford a week’s holiday in London with his one-month salary. The ticket cost less than one third of the salary, and the remainder would comfortably cover the living expenses. 

From comfort to survival.

Since 2015, after Buhari came to power, the comfort that Obasanjo, Yar’Adua and Jonathan gave to university lecturers was taken away. Buhari’s 2022 strangulation of Academics is still very fresh. Then, Tinubu crushed that comfort in May 2023 (₦416,000, worth 277 USD for a professor at the bar) by withdrawing fuel subsidies and devaluing the naira, before a raise in 2026 to about ₦1m (750 USD) for a professor. But the value is still less than what Buhari left it at: ₦416,000 (930 USD) for a professor at the bar.

The Stalin Chicken. 

This is where the Joseph Stalin-Chicken metaphor becomes powerful. A chicken is being plucked. It is painful. It is losing its feathers. It has nowhere to go. Then the same hand that has been plucking its feathers throws a few grains of food in front of it. The chicken follows the hand.

Not because the hand has stopped hurting it. But because survival has become more important than resistance.

That is what poverty can do to human beings. It can make people grateful for crumbs from the very system whose structure has impoverished them. And I fear that some academics have become so desperate for survival that they follow the very hand that has caused their suffering, simply because that hand is now offering them crumbs.

The application of the Stalin Chicken model, especially on academics, is a brilliant one from PBAT.

I will excuse those relatively young academics who do not know where we are coming from. They cannot compare what they have with what existed before they entered the system.

Of course, we are grateful to God for our current situations. We should also be grateful for the improvements that have occurred. But gratitude should not kill critical thinking. Real academics are not supposed to become professional worshippers of crumbs. We should interrogate systems. We should ask questions. We should challenge policies. We should understand the difference between survival and progress.

However, as more senior academics mobilise for endorsement, don’t go in with self-normalised poverty in academia. Ensure that you negotiate for an endorsement package that can at least change your car. Don’t go for crumbs.

Best wishes!

By Hamisu Adamu Dandajeh

Electric vehicles (EVs) are often called “inevitable”. The only question, we’re told, is timing. Nevertheless, the data says otherwise. Even the world’s most electrified economies remain overwhelmingly combustion-powered on the road. Nigeria’s constraints run deeper still. They are not only rooted in physics, minerals and money, but also on political willpower.

Start with Norway. It is the closest thing the world has to a completed EV transition. Battery-electric vehicles made up 96–97% of new car sales in 2025. Decades of tax breaks, toll discounts and bus-lane access built that number. But look at the cars actually on Norwegian roads, not the ones sold this year. Only a third of the total fleet is electric. That is the highest share in the world. And it still leaves two-thirds of Norway’s cars running on combustion. Sales dominance and fleet electrification are not the same thing. That gap is the central fact of this entire debate.

Other countries make the point harder. China crossed 50% EV sales penetration in 2025. Its road fleet is still only about 13% electric. Germany’s EV sales share collapsed from 29% to 19% when subsidies were cut, then recovered to 28% once they returned. Adoption moves with subsidy, not momentum. The US sits at roughly 10% of new car sales, stalled since federal tax credits expired. Japan’s EV sales share fell from 3% to 2% in 2025.

Globally, the EV fleet reached about 116 million units in 2026. The world’s total car fleet exceeds one billion vehicles. China alone holds 61% of all EVs on earth. A 30% sales share this year still means a fleet penetration of five to seven per cent. Cars last fifteen to twenty years. Old stock does not disappear because new sales shift. This is steady progress. It is not imminent replacement.

Nigeria’s problem is a different category of constraint. The national grid serves over 220 million people. It generates between 4,000 and 4,800 megawatts on a good day. That is about 20 watts per person. Pakistan manages 180. Indonesia manages 250. The United States manages 3,530; 176 times Nigeria’s figure. You cannot charge an EV fleet on a grid that cannot keep the lights on. Nigeria’s grid still collapses outright. Generation crashed to 20 megawatts nationwide in January 2026.

Nigeria’s Energy Transition Plan targets 60% EV fleet share by 2050. Today, EVs are under 1% of the country’s vehicles. That is a few tens of thousands of cars; by industry estimate, no official figure exists. Import duty waivers pushed nearly 4,000 more EVs into the country in the first half of 2026. They are landing in a market where the grid runs at 30% of installed capacity. Barely half the population has a grid connection at all. Public charging stations number around a dozen nationwide.

Here is the telling part. Nigerian charging operators now run diesel and petrol generators to keep their own chargers working when the grid fails. The EV system depends on the fuels it is meant to replace. A car charged from a diesel generator is not a clean-energy solution. It is a combustion engine with an expensive extension cord.

Electric two- and three-wheelers are the exception. They are gaining real ground, often paired with solar charging. They already beat petrol bikes on lifetime cost. But a solar-charged motorcycle and a grid-dependent passenger car are different problems. Confusing the two is where much of the optimism about Nigeria’s EV transition breaks down.

Four structural constraints hold the combustion engine in place even in wealthy, grid-secure economies. Minerals come first. The cobalt supply gap is projected to widen from 15% to over 25% by 2040. Lithium demand is set to more than triple. The real bottleneck is refining, not mining. China controls most of that capacity, regardless of where the ore comes from. Battery supply chains are nearly as exposed as the oil trade they aim to replace.

Grid capacity is the second constraint, and it is not just a developing-world problem. The US grid faces simultaneous demand growth from data centres, reshored industry, building electrification and EV charging. Data centre demand alone is forecast to more than double by 2035. Ninety per cent of US charging operators cite grid limits, not construction cost, as their biggest obstacle. Lagos and Chicago differ in degree, not in kind.

Fleet turnover is the third. Cars stay on the road for over a decade. Fleet electrification always lags sales electrification. Norway proves it: a third of its fleet is electric, compared with 97% of its sales. Even a Nigeria that hit 100% EV sales tomorrow would run a majority-combustion fleet well into the 2040s.

Heavy-duty transport is the fourth. Electric truck sales more than doubled in 2025. They still make up barely one in ten trucks sold worldwide, and mostly in China. Long-haul freight, shipping, aviation and heavy equipment remain unsolved. Battery energy density per kilogram still trails diesel and jet fuel by a wide margin. These are the vehicles moving most of the world’s freight.

None of this argues against electric vehicles. Norway’s numbers are real. China’s manufacturing scale is real. The direction of travel is toward more electrification. But “more” is not “complete replacement,” and only the first claim survives contact with the data.

Nigeria’s real constraint is a 4,000-megawatt grid serving a quarter-billion people. That leaves meaningful EV penetration limited, for now, to solar-charged two- and three-wheelers and isolated pilot fleets. The industrialised world faces a different but equally real constraint: a mineral supply chain that cannot yet support the scale being promised, a grid under pressure from EVs and data centres at once, and a vehicle stock so large that even a fully electrified sales market takes a decade or more to become a fully electrified road.

The honest forecast is not replacement. It is long, uneven coexistence. EVs will take a growing share of new sales where grids and supply chains allow it. Combustion engines will keep doing the heavy lifting for the existing fleet, and for the jobs battery technology still cannot do. Anyone promising a firm end date for the petrol or diesel engine is selling a story the numbers do not support.

Hamisu Adamu Dandajeh is an Associate Professor of Sustainable Fuels, Energy and Climate Change, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria. Email: hadandajeh@gmail.com

By Salmanu Isah Darazo

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), is entering another important phase in its monetary-policy reform journey, with the Monetary Policy Committee’s latest decision to reset the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) at 23 per cent and recalibrate the Standing Facilities Corridor marking a significant operational adjustment in the way monetary policy is transmitted across the Nigerian financial system.

At its 307th meeting held on September 21 and 22, 2026, the MPC approved a corridor of +50/-300 basis points around the MPR, while retaining the Cash Reserve Requirement at 45 per cent for Deposit Money Banks, 16 per cent for Merchant Banks and 75 per cent for non-TSA public-sector deposits. The CBN says the measures are designed to strengthen monetary-policy transmission and reinforce the MPR as the principal signal of monetary policy.

The significance of the decision goes beyond the headline 23 per cent rate. At the heart of the latest move is the CBN’s attempt to correct a structural weakness that had emerged between the official policy rate and prevailing market rates. According to the MPC, this divergence had weakened the effectiveness of monetary-policy transmission. The Bank’s ongoing repair of its monetary-policy implementation framework, including the adoption of the Nigerian Overnight Funding Rate (NOFR) as a transaction-based operational benchmark, is intended to make money-market operations more transparent and ensure that the MPR carries greater influence over financial conditions.

This is therefore less about simply moving an interest-rate number and more about strengthening the machinery through which the CBN implements monetary policy. The Committee was explicit that the corridor recalibration should not be interpreted as a change in the underlying monetary-policy stance. Rather, it described the move as an operational realignment intended to improve transmission and support Nigeria’s transition towards an inflation-targeting framework.

The timing is equally important. The CBN is making this adjustment against the backdrop of improving macroeconomic indicators. Headline inflation fell marginally from 15.43 per cent in July to 15.39 per cent in August 2026, while food inflation declined from 20.31 per cent to 19.57 per cent. Core inflation also fell significantly, from 14.97 per cent to 13.29 per cent. The 12-month moving average of headline inflation has now moderated for 20 consecutive months, according to the MPC.

For the CBN, perhaps more important than the individual monthly figures is the broader direction of travel. The Committee linked the moderation in inflation to the effects of earlier monetary-policy tightening, exchange-rate stability and improved inflation expectations. That assessment suggests that the Bank believes previous policy measures are increasingly feeding through into the wider economy, creating room to concentrate more heavily on improving the efficiency of its policy framework.

The real economy is also providing the CBN with a stronger platform for this recalibration. Nigeria’s real GDP expanded by 4.43 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, compared with 3.89 per cent in the first quarter. Both oil and non-oil sectors recorded stronger performances, while the Purchasing Managers’ Index climbed to 52.7 points in August from 51.1 points in July, pointing to continued expansion in business activity.

Perhaps the strongest evidence of improved external-sector conditions is found in the country’s reserves and balance-of-payments position. Gross external reserves stood at US$55.25 billion as of September 18, 2026—the highest level in 18 years and equivalent to approximately 11.3 months of import cover. Meanwhile, the balance-of-payments surplus increased to US$3.51 billion in the second quarter from US$2.38 billion in the first quarter, while the current-account surplus rose by 67.92 per cent to US$7.54 billion.

Taken together, these indicators explain why the CBN sees sufficient “headroom” for the operational reset. The Bank is effectively trying to consolidate gains already made in inflation, foreign-exchange stability, external reserves and financial-system resilience while making its monetary-policy transmission mechanism more coherent and predictable. The successful recapitalisation of the banking sector, which the MPC says has strengthened capital buffers and banks’ capacity to finance long-term projects, forms another important component of this evolving architecture.

The recalibration also comes at a time when the CBN is placing greater emphasis on coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities. The communiqué highlights the Memorandum of Understanding on fiscal-monetary coordination between the Federal Government, represented by the Ministry of Finance, and the CBN. The stated objective is to provide a structured framework for policy harmonisation towards achieving low and stable inflation.

That coordination could prove particularly important because the CBN’s outlook is not without risks. The Bank identifies prolonged geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, elevated global energy prices and election-related spending as potential sources of renewed inflationary pressure. Globally, growth is projected at 3.0 per cent in 2026, down from 3.5 per cent in 2025, while supply-chain disruptions, commodity-price pressures and trade fragmentation continue to pose risks to the global inflation outlook.

The emerging picture, therefore, is one of a CBN seeking to move from emergency-style monetary tightening towards a more structured and rules-based monetary-policy framework. The 23 per cent MPR is only one part of that story. The deeper story is the effort to ensure that the policy rate actually performs its intended function as the principal monetary-policy signal, with market operations, benchmarks and standing facilities working around it in a more transparent and effective manner.

For Governor Olayemi Cardoso and the CBN, the latest MPC decision consequently represents another chapter in the broader institutional rebuilding of Nigeria’s monetary-policy framework. The immediate challenge will be implementation: whether the recalibrated corridor succeeds in improving transmission without disrupting the disinflation process, while maintaining exchange-rate stability and supporting economic expansion.

The MPC has committed to evaluating the effectiveness of the new corridor and keeping future decisions data-dependent. Its next meeting is scheduled for November 23 and 24, 2026. The direction of monetary policy from that point will provide another important test of whether the current combination of easing inflation, stronger external buffers, expanding output and improved market transmission can be sustained.

Ultimately, the September 2026 decision is best understood not simply as another MPC rate announcement, but as an attempt by the CBN to make Nigeria’s monetary-policy system work more precisely. With inflation moderating, reserves strengthening, output expanding and the financial system undergoing recapitalisation, the Bank is using the present macroeconomic window to recalibrate the machinery of monetary policy—placing the MPR more firmly at the centre of the framework and laying another institutional foundation for a more effective inflation-targeting regime.

Salmanu Isah Darazo is a publisher, analyst and editor. He can be reached via Salmanudrz@gmail.com

By Lamara Garba

For years, the menace of drug abuse has remained one of the most troubling challenges confronting Nigerian society, particularly its young population. What begins with substance use can develop into addiction, broken family relationships, school dropout, unemployment, violence and criminality. In many communities, the consequences are no longer hidden.

The problem has assumed an even more worrying dimension in Kano, where drug abuse has increasingly been linked with street violence, gang activities, thuggery popularly known as DABA, phone snatching and other social vices.

Available national data indicate the enormity of the challenge. The International Centre for Investigative Reporting, citing data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, reported that about 14.4 per cent of Nigerians aged 15 to 64, representing more than 14.3 million people, use psychoactive substances non medically, while more than three million suffer from severe drug use disorders. The same report, citing National Drug Law Enforcement Agency data, put Kano’s prevalence at about 16 per cent, making it one of the most affected states in the North West.

It is against this disturbing background that the Kano State Government, under Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, moved to establish a multi agency response to the problem.

On 22 July 2026, the Governor inaugurated the Kano State Multi Agency Task Force on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, with Barrister Muhuyi Magaji Rimin Gado as Chairman. The initiative brought together security, law enforcement, health, traditional, religious and civil society stakeholders in a coordinated effort to confront drug abuse, illicit trafficking and their associated criminal activities.

Two months later, the emerging record of the Task Force presents a picture of an intervention that has moved rapidly from policy declaration to field operations.

Addresing the Media to Mark the two Months of operation on Tuesday 22nd September, 2026 the Chairman of the Task Force Alhaji Muhuyi Magaji Rimin Gado aaira more than 380 suspects have been arrested, while over 230 convictions have been secured, according to the Chairman’s latest briefing.

For a state battling a problem as complex as drug abuse, these figures are more than statistics. They offer a glimpse into the scale of criminal activity taking place around drug markets, while also showing the extent of the enforcement response that has been mobilised.

The operations have taken the Task Force into locations identified as drug joints and criminal black spots, including Race Course, Filin Idi, Filin Mahaha, Tashar Rami, Kawo and other areas within the metropolis and beyond.

The approach has been to dislodge the gathering points where drug users, dealers and suspected criminals converge, rather than simply wait for individual offenders to appear elsewhere.

Earlier operations had already shown the breadth of the challenge. In August, the Task Force carried out raids in Rimin Gado and Doka communities, arresting 28 suspects and recovering assorted illicit substances. The Chairman said the operations would extend beyond the metropolis to all 44 local government areas of the state.

By September, the scale of the operations had increased. Another operation involving Gandun Albasa, Kasuwar Rimi, Fagge and railway areas resulted in the arrest of at least 70 suspected drug users and others allegedly involved in related activities. The Task Force also announced a target of removing 10,000 vulnerable youths from the streets for rehabilitation, skills acquisition and reintegration.

Behind these operations is an understanding that the drug problem does not exist in isolation.

It is connected to a wider ecosystem of criminality. The Task Force Chairman says some drug joints serve as meeting points for individuals who later engage in DABA, phone snatching and other forms of street violence. The decision to combine drug enforcement with action against gang related activities therefore represents an attempt to address some of the consequences surrounding substance abuse at the same time.

Several suspected gang members have been arrested and convicted, including individuals identified as Abdullahi Ahmad, popularly known as Horror, Abubakar Sada, known as Daburi, Abdullahi Sani, known as Sarki Ale, and Umar Aliyu.

The message from the Task Force is that drug abuse and associated criminal behaviour will no longer be treated as ordinary street activities.

But perhaps the most disturbing dimension of the campaign is the vulnerability of children.

In one of the cases that has attracted considerable attention, 43 underage children were rescued after investigations indicated that some of them, while engaged in street scavenging, were allegedly supplied with rubber solution and other intoxicating substances instead of receiving appropriate payment for their services.

Two men, Kabiru Isa, popularly known as Mada, and Usman Hamisu, known as Mani, were subsequently convicted. Each received a cumulative nine year prison sentence without an option of fine, according to the Task Force and reports of the court proceedings.

The case is significant because it exposes another face of the drug crisis.

Children who should be protected from intoxicating substances were allegedly being drawn into a cycle of exploitation and substance abuse. For such children, intervention cannot end with the arrest of those responsible.

They need medical attention, counselling, family support, education and protection.

The 43 children rescued have undergone medical checks and are receiving counselling and treatment, while efforts continue to identify their families. Some have already been reunited with their relatives.

This combination of enforcement and protection is becoming a defining feature of the Task Force’s intervention.

The campaign has also exposed concerns around the diversion of controlled medicines from legitimate supply chains.

The Task Force says it seized about 870,000 capsules of Pregabalin from a pharmaceutical company in the state over suspected diversion for illicit use.

The concern is not limited to street dealers. It raises questions about the integrity of the pharmaceutical supply chain and the responsibility of companies, pharmacy managers, superintendent pharmacists and other personnel to ensure that controlled medicines do not find their way into illicit markets.

The Chairman has consequently called on pharmaceutical stakeholders to strengthen their internal controls and cooperate with inspections and investigations.

The scale of controlled medicine seizures in Kano has also been reflected in separate NDLEA operations. In September, the agency reported the seizure of 785,000 Pregabalin capsules weighing more than 669 kilograms in Sabon Gari, Kano, in an operation that resulted in the arrest of a 20 year old suspect.

Such developments demonstrate that the drug problem is not simply a matter of individuals consuming substances on the streets. It also involves supply networks, distribution channels and access to controlled medicines.

The Task Force has therefore adopted a broad enforcement approach that brings together several agencies.

Police, NDLEA, DSS, NSCDC, Correctional Service, Hisbah, KAROTA and other stakeholders are participating in the operations.

The multi agency character is important because no single institution possesses all the powers, intelligence, personnel and facilities required to tackle a problem of this magnitude.

The Kano Government has also provided operational support to strengthen the campaign. In August, five new vehicles were handed over to the Task Force to enhance mobility, field operations and intelligence coordination.

Yet, perhaps the most important shift in the strategy is the recognition that enforcement alone cannot end drug abuse.

A person addicted to drugs may be arrested, prosecuted or convicted, but if the underlying problem remains untreated, another vulnerable young person can take his or her place.

The Task Force has therefore combined enforcement with prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration.

Its sensitisation campaign has taken the anti drug message into communities, schools, markets, religious institutions and other public spaces. The objective is to prevent young people from entering the cycle in the first place.

At the same time, individuals already affected by drug abuse are being referred for rehabilitation.

About 125 people have been referred to the Kano Reformatory Institute in Kiru for treatment and rehabilitation.

The growing demand for rehabilitation has, however, created another challenge. The Kiru facility has reportedly reached capacity as more families voluntarily seek help for relatives affected by drug abuse.

Rather than viewing this only as a problem, the Task Force sees the increasing demand for rehabilitation as an indication that families are becoming more willing to seek assistance.

The Kano State Government has consequently provided an additional facility in Tofa Local Government Area to expand rehabilitation services.

The new facility is expected to provide space for more people requiring treatment and rehabilitation.

But recovery is only one stage of the process. What happens after rehabilitation may determine whether the intervention produces lasting results.

A young person who leaves rehabilitation without employment, skills, family support or a productive means of livelihood can easily become vulnerable to the same environment that contributed to the original problem.

This is why the Task Force is now engaging industrial stakeholders and other partners on employment, skills acquisition and economic reintegration.

The stated target is ambitious: to take 10,000 youths off the streets, rehabilitate them, equip them with useful skills and reintegrate them into society.

The plan represents a shift from seeing drug users only through the lens of enforcement to recognising that some require medical, psychological, social and economic intervention.

Recent reports indicate that the Task Force’s rehabilitation proposal includes medical detoxification, structured rehabilitation, vocational training and support for economic reintegration. The Chairman has identified trades and practical skills as part of the strategy for helping beneficiaries become economically productive.

This approach also places an important responsibility on the wider society.

Government can provide facilities. Security agencies can make arrests. Courts can determine cases. Health professionals can provide treatment. Trainers can provide skills.

But communities must provide acceptance and support for those who successfully complete rehabilitation.

Families must be willing to participate in the recovery process. Employers and businesses must be prepared to provide opportunities. Religious and traditional institutions must continue to educate communities. Civil society organisations must support prevention and reintegration.

The media, too, has an important role to play.

Reporting the number of arrests and seizures may communicate the scale of enforcement, but sustained public education requires deeper storytelling about prevention, treatment, recovery and the consequences of drug abuse.

The first two months of the Kano Task Force therefore tell two stories at once.

The first is the disturbing magnitude of the problem.

More than 380 arrests, over 230 convictions, the dismantling of drug joints, the recovery of illicit substances and weapons, cases involving vulnerable children, alleged diversion of controlled medicines and the disruption of phone snatching and gang networks all point to a challenge that extends well beyond individual drug consumption.

The second story is the emergence of a coordinated response.

The Task Force has brought enforcement agencies and other stakeholders together, moved into identified black spots, pursued prosecutions, rescued vulnerable children, expanded sensitisation, referred affected individuals for rehabilitation and begun planning for skills acquisition and reintegration.

The journey is still at an early stage.

Two months is not enough to declare victory over a problem that has developed over many years. Indeed, the scale of the arrests and seizures suggests that the challenge remains substantial.

What the first two months demonstrate is that the response has moved from concern to organised action.

The real measure of success in the months ahead will not only be the number of arrests or convictions. It will also be whether fewer young people enter the cycle of substance abuse, whether vulnerable children are protected, whether rehabilitation produces sustainable recovery, whether former users find productive livelihoods and whether communities become safer.

For Kano, therefore, the next phase may be even more important than the first.

The foundations of enforcement have been laid. Rehabilitation facilities are being expanded. Prevention activities are reaching communities. A target of 10,000 youths has been set.

The challenge now is to sustain the momentum, strengthen coordination and ensure that every intervention, from the street corner to the courtroom and from the rehabilitation centre to the workplace, contributes to the same objective.

A drug free society cannot be created by arrests alone.

It requires prevention before addiction, intervention when addiction occurs, justice where criminality is established, rehabilitation for those who need it and opportunity for those seeking a second chance.

That is the larger test facing Kano’s anti drug campaign.

Two months into the operation, the Task Force has shown that the state has begun confronting the problem on several fronts.

The months ahead will determine how far that coordinated response can transform the lives of those caught in the drug crisis and restore confidence in communities that have long lived with its consequences.

Lamara Garba, mnipr, is a member of the Multi Agency Task Force on Drugs Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.

By Muhammad Umar Shehu

I have always believed one of the oldest tricks in politics is convincing people that temporary relief is evidence of good governance. It is a carefully managed performance. First, create uncertainty. Allow fear and anxiety to spread. Watch public frustration build. Then step in with what appears to be compassion. The same government that created the tension suddenly presents itself as the rescuer. Many applaud, forgetting who created the problem in the first place.

This is how propaganda works.

Propaganda is not always about telling outright lies. Sometimes it is about controlling public emotions. It is about deciding what people focus on and, more importantly, what they forget. It shifts attention from the real problems to carefully staged moments that create the illusion of responsive leadership.

One technique often seen in politics is card stacking, where only information that benefits those in power is highlighted while inconvenient facts are pushed aside. Another is glittering generalities, where attractive slogans and emotionally appealing catchphrases are repeated so often that they begin to replace serious conversations about policy. 

There is also transfer, where every government action is wrapped in patriotic language, encouraging citizens to equate support for those in power with love for the country. Add to that bandwagon, which creates the impression that everyone supports a particular government or policy, making dissent appear unreasonable or even unpatriotic. When these techniques are combined with carefully timed announcements and an aggressive media campaign, public attention shifts from measurable results to carefully managed political narratives.

Nigerians should understand this strategy because it has become increasingly common. Instead of addressing the structural problems affecting millions of citizens, government communication often focuses on managing public perception. The objective is not necessarily to improve people’s lives but to improve the government’s image.

While citizens celebrate temporary gestures or reassuring announcements, inflation continues to erode purchasing power. Food prices remain beyond the reach of many families. Businesses struggle to survive. Young people face unemployment and uncertainty. Public institutions continue to weaken while public confidence in government steadily declines.

This is why every Nigerian should ask a simple question whenever government suddenly presents itself as the people’s defender. What created the hardship in the first place? What lasting solution has been provided? Has anything fundamentally changed, or has public attention simply been redirected?

A government that genuinely puts citizens first does not depend on carefully timed public relations campaigns to maintain popularity. It develops policies that reduce hardship before people are pushed to the edge. It strengthens institutions instead of relying on media narratives to defend every controversial decision.

Unfortunately, propaganda has become a substitute for performance. Press statements are becoming more frequent than measurable achievements. Political branding is taking precedence over policy outcomes. The goal appears to be shaping perception rather than changing reality.

History teaches us that governments often become more confident when they believe public opinion can be managed rather than earned. Once citizens accept political theatre as leadership, accountability weakens. Leaders no longer feel compelled to deliver meaningful reforms because they discover that effective messaging can sometimes produce the same political reward as effective governance.

From my perspective, it is part of the trick. Once they secure a second term, they may feel less restrained and more willing to pursue policies that place even greater burdens on ordinary Nigerians. Nigerians should carefully examine the APC administration’s record before deciding its future. Those advocating another Tinubu term should also explain why they believe the country’s present direction deserves another mandate.

Tinubu has not demonstrated a convincing plan to rebuild Nigeria or strengthen the country’s institutions. My concern is that a second term could further weaken democratic accountability and concentrate even more power in the presidency. Whether Nigerians agree or disagree with that assessment, they should examine facts, policies and outcomes rather than political slogans and carefully managed publicity.

Democracy survives when citizens question narratives instead of accepting them at face value. Governments should be judged by the condition of the people, not by the quality of their communication strategy. A well-written press release cannot reduce inflation. A polished speech cannot put food on people’s tables. A sophisticated propaganda campaign cannot substitute for sound governance.

The greatest propaganda is not convincing people that everything is fine. It is convincing them that carefully managed political gestures are proof of good leadership.

Nigeria deserves more than slogans.

Nigeria deserves more than political theatre.

Nigeria deserves leaders who solve problems instead of managing perceptions.

Muhammad Umar Shehu wrote from Gombe and can be reached via umarmuhammadshehu2@gmail.com.

By Jessica Jummai Ayuba

The consumption of traditional medicine has become a widespread phenomenon in Nigeria, with many people resorting to it as an alternative to orthodox medicine. However, the unregulated nature of the traditional medicine industry has raised serious concerns about the safety and efficacy of these medicines. It is high time for the government to take decisive action to regulate the consumption of traditional medicine in Nigeria.

The traditional medicine industry in Nigeria is a multi-billion naira market, with thousands of practitioners and sellers operating across the country. However, the majority of these practitioners and sellers are operating unlawfully, without obtaining the necessary licenses and permits from the government. This lack of regulation has created an environment in which quacks and charlatans can thrive, putting the lives of millions of Nigerians at risk.

One of the major concerns about the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria is the lack of standardization and quality control. Many traditional medicine practitioners and sellers are using untested and unproven remedies, which can have serious side effects or even be fatal. Furthermore, many of these remedies are being prepared in unsanitary conditions, which can lead to contamination and infection.

The government has a critical role to play in regulating the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria. The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is the primary agency responsible for regulating the industry, but it has been struggling to keep up with the sheer number of practitioners and sellers operating in the country. The government needs to provide NAFDAC with more resources and support to enable it to effectively regulate the industry.

Another major concern about the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria is the lack of transparency and accountability. Many traditional medicine practitioners and sellers are making exaggerated claims about the efficacy of their remedies, and some are even using fake or forged certificates to convince their customers. The government needs to take action to protect consumers from these unscrupulous practitioners and sellers.

The regulation of the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria is not just about protecting consumers; it is also about promoting public health. Many traditional medicine remedies are being used to treat serious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, but these remedies are often ineffective or even counterproductive. The government needs to take action to ensure that traditional medicine practitioners and sellers are providing safe and effective remedies.

To effectively regulate the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria, the government needs to establish clear guidelines and standards for the production, sale, and use of traditional medicine remedies. The government also needs to establish a system for monitoring and enforcing compliance with these guidelines and standards.

Furthermore, the government needs to provide support and resources for traditional medicine practitioners and sellers who are willing to operate within the law. This could include training programs, loans, and other forms of assistance. By providing support and resources, the government can encourage traditional medicine practitioners and sellers to operate safely and effectively.

In addition to regulating the traditional medicine industry, the government also needs to educate the public about the risks and benefits of traditional medicine. Many Nigerians are unaware of the potential risks associated with traditional medicine remedies, and they need to be educated about how to use these remedies safely and effectively.

The government also needs to work with traditional medicine practitioners and sellers to develop new and innovative remedies that are safe and effective. This could include supporting research and development programs, as well as providing funding and resources for the commercialization of new remedies.

In conclusion, the regulation of the traditional medicine industry in Nigeria is a critical issue that requires immediate attention. The government needs to take decisive action to regulate the industry, protect consumers, and promote public health. By working together with traditional medicine practitioners and sellers, the government can develop a safe and effective traditional medicine industry that benefits all Nigerians.

Jessica Jummai Ayuba, Department of Masss Communication, University of Maiduguri.

By Jessica Jummai Ayuba

Road crashes have become one of the deadliest yet most overlooked public health challenges in Nigeria. Every week, headlines carry grim reports of accidents that claim the lives of students, professionals, traders, and breadwinners, leaving countless families devastated. These accidents disproportionately affect people in their most productive years, robbing the nation of valuable human capital and entrenching poverty in households suddenly stripped of their providers.

The scale of the crisis is staggering. According to estimates, thousands die annually on Nigerian roads, with many more injured or permanently disabled. Yet, the recurring nature of these accidents has made the tragedies seem normal, almost inevitable. This complacency is dangerous because road accidents are not acts of fate—they are largely preventable with the right policies, infrastructure, and enforcement.

The causes of road accidents in Nigeria are painfully familiar. Poorly maintained roads riddled with potholes turn every journey into a gamble. Reckless driving habits, including overspeeding, drunk driving, and blatant disregard for traffic laws, continue to fuel crashes. Added to this are poorly serviced vehicles, particularly commercial buses and trucks that should not be on the highways. The danger is compounded by the menace of heavy-duty vehicles and petroleum tankers, whose accidents often lead to catastrophic explosions.

Unfortunately, government response has been inconsistent and insufficient. While aviation safety receives enormous resources and strict oversight—despite being used by a fraction of the population—road safety, which affects millions daily, is treated with neglect. This imbalance underscores a lack of political will to confront the issue of road carnage with the seriousness it demands.

The Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), the primary agency tasked with promoting road safety, remains overstretched and underpowered. For years, it has operated with inadequate manpower, limited funding, and logistical constraints. Its absence in many Local Government Areas means that enforcement of traffic rules and rapid response to emergencies remain weak in vast parts of the country. Without a comprehensive presence across all 774 LGAs, the FRSC cannot effectively fulfil its mandate.

To reverse the trend, strengthening the FRSC must become a national priority. This requires increased budgetary allocation, recruitment of more personnel, and provision of modern tools to aid monitoring and enforcement. Beyond resources, the agency must also be given stronger legal authority to prosecute offenders swiftly and decisively. Reckless drivers must no longer escape accountability because of political influence or weak enforcement structures.

At the same time, state governments cannot remain passive. States without road traffic management agencies must establish them immediately. Those already in existence must work hand-in-hand with the FRSC, creating a coordinated framework for road safety enforcement. The collaboration between federal and state agencies should be backed by data-sharing, technology, and joint patrols to make the roads safer.

Public enlightenment is another critical tool in reducing accidents. Campaigns to educate drivers about safe road practices, dangers of overspeeding, and the importance of vehicle maintenance must be sustained and intensified. The culture of reckless driving thrives partly because many drivers are either unaware of the risks or dismissive of them. Changing attitudes will require persistent education and visible enforcement of penalties.

Equally, Nigeria’s dilapidated road infrastructure demands urgent attention. The poor state of highways and rural roads is a major contributor to road crashes. Massive investment in road rehabilitation, construction of safer highways, and proper signage is essential. Roads must be built with standard safety features such as barriers, lighting, and pedestrian crossings. Without safe infrastructure, even the best enforcement efforts will yield limited results.

Technology should also be embraced as a game-changer. Surveillance cameras, speed detectors, and digital monitoring systems should be deployed on major highways to track offenders and improve accountability. In addition, the creation of a centralised database for drivers and vehicles would help identify repeat offenders and ensure that penalties are enforced consistently.

The private sector can contribute significantly to tackling this menace. Insurance companies, transport unions, and vehicle manufacturers all have a stake in safer roads. By partnering with government in awareness campaigns, driver training, and vehicle inspection initiatives, the burden of road safety can be shared more effectively.

It is equally important to empower first responders and medical facilities. Many accident victims die not from the crash itself but from delays in accessing medical care. Equipping local health centres near highways and training paramedics can drastically reduce fatalities. Quick intervention can mean the difference between life and death.

The economic toll of road accidents is often overlooked. Beyond the human tragedy, crashes cost billions annually in healthcare expenses, lost productivity, and property damage. Nigeria cannot afford to keep losing lives and resources to problems that are largely preventable. Safer roads are not just a moral imperative but an economic necessity.

Nonetheless, the solution lies in political will. Government at all levels must stop paying lip service to road safety and treat it as the national emergency that it is. Every life lost on the highways is one too many, and the time has come to act with urgency and commitment.

Road crashes are not natural disasters; they are preventable tragedies. With the right policies, better infrastructure, strict enforcement, and collective responsibility, Nigeria can drastically reduce the number of lives lost on its roads. The message is simple but powerful: enough of preventable deaths. The government must act now—firmly and decisively.

Jessica Jummai Ayuba, Department of Masss Communication, University of Maiduguri.

By Salmanu Isah Darazo

Three years after Olayemi Cardoso assumed office as Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the apex bank has undergone a period of extensive institutional and policy reforms, with the emphasis increasingly placed on financial-system resilience, market transparency, stronger regulation and the modernisation of Nigeria’s financial architecture.

Mr. Cardoso assumed office on September 22, 2023, at a particularly demanding period for Nigeria’s monetary and financial system. His tenure has subsequently been marked by a succession of reforms designed to strengthen the banking sector, deepen the foreign-exchange market, modernise payment infrastructure and reinforce confidence in the financial system. The fact sheet documenting his tenure also notes commendation from President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and international recognition, including the Central Bank of the Year Award by Central Banking, London.

Perhaps the most consequential development has been the completion of the banking-sector recapitalisation exercise. By March 31, 2026, 33 banks had met the revised minimum capital requirements, collectively raising approximately ₦4.65 trillion in fresh capital. About 72.55 per cent of the funds were sourced domestically. Beyond the headline figure, the exercise represents an attempt to create a banking system with greater capacity to withstand shocks and provide stronger support for economic activity.

The reform agenda has also extended into corporate governance and financial inclusion. New succession requirements introduced for Domestic Systemically Important Banks were designed to strengthen leadership continuity and governance, while the CBN’s approval of the Bank of Industry’s Non-Interest Banking Window opened another channel for alternative and potentially more inclusive financing. These measures indicate that the reform programme is not limited to capital adequacy but also addresses institutional continuity and the diversity of financing options available within the economy.

On the foreign-exchange front, the CBN has pursued a more structured and transparent market framework. The fourth edition of the Foreign Exchange Manual, launched in May 2026, was designed to improve transparency, efficiency and credibility in FX operations while reinforcing market-driven principles. At the retail end, licensed Bureau de Change operators were given structured access to foreign exchange through authorised dealer banks, backed by an FX BDC Purchase Tracker intended to strengthen compliance and real-time oversight.

Other FX reforms have targeted the flow and monitoring of foreign exchange from major sources. International oil companies were permitted to repatriate 100 per cent of export proceeds through authorised dealer banks, while new settlement requirements for International Money Transfer Operators were introduced to improve the transparency and traceability of diaspora remittances. Additional crude-oil export terminals were also allocated to strengthen monitoring and compliance across the oil and gas export chain.

The payments ecosystem has equally become a major front in the CBN’s reform programme. The Payments System Vision 2028, launched in June 2026, provides a strategic roadmap built around interoperability, security, inclusion, innovation, trust and collaboration. Alongside this broader strategy, revised agent-banking guidelines, Point-of-Sale geo-fencing and dual-connectivity requirements, as well as enhanced instant-payment security measures, have sought to improve reliability, consumer protection and the security of Nigeria’s rapidly expanding digital-payment environment.

Consumer protection and the fight against financial fraud have also received greater regulatory attention. The revised cash policy introduced new withdrawal thresholds while removing restrictions and charges on cash deposits. Financial institutions were directed to withdraw misleading advertisements, while banks were required to strengthen rapid-response mechanisms against electronic fraud. The strengthened BVN and watch-list framework, the Cybersecurity Self-Assessment Tool and automated standards for monitoring money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing further demonstrate the Bank’s attempt to move financial-system supervision toward more proactive and technology-driven enforcement.

Another important dimension is the modernisation of Nigeria’s financial markets. The introduction of the Nigerian Overnight Financing Rate in April 2026 created a transaction-based overnight benchmark intended to improve price discovery, market transparency, monetary-policy transmission and risk management. Reforms to fixed-income trading and settlement infrastructure, alongside changes to discount-window and liquidity-market arrangements, have similarly sought to make financial markets more efficient and strengthen the transmission of monetary policy.

The reserve position provides another significant marker in the reform story. In 2026, locally sourced gold refined to international LBMA Good Delivery standards was added to Nigeria’s external reserve assets, providing another layer of diversification. More significantly, external reserves crossed the US$50 billion threshold — described in the fact sheet as the highest level in approximately 17 years. The development represents a stronger external buffer and is presented as part of the broader improvement in foreign-exchange-market conditions.

Taken together, the reforms suggest that the Cardoso era at the CBN has been defined less by a single headline intervention than by an attempt to rebuild several interconnected parts of Nigeria’s financial architecture. Banking recapitalisation addresses institutional resilience; FX reforms target market transparency; payments reforms respond to digitalisation; cybersecurity and consumer-protection measures address emerging risks; while financial-market reforms seek to improve the machinery through which monetary policy operates.

The significance of the three-year milestone, therefore, lies not simply in the number of policies introduced but in whether these reforms can be sustained and translated into durable economic outcomes. A stronger banking system, deeper financial markets, more transparent FX operations, safer digital payments and larger external buffers provide important foundations. The next phase will ultimately be judged by how effectively those foundations support investment, credit, financial inclusion and broader economic stability.

Three years into Cardoso’s tenure, the reform agenda has clearly moved beyond crisis management toward institutional rebuilding. Its enduring test will be implementation: whether the new rules, systems and capital buffers become embedded strongly enough to make Nigeria’s financial system more resilient, transparent and capable of supporting long-term economic growth.

Salmanu Isah Darazo is a publisher, analyst and editor. He writes from Bauchi, and can be reached via Salmanudrz@gmail.com