Politics

By Zayyad I. Muhammad 

President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s decision to retain Vice President Kashim Shettima as his running mate for the 2027 presidential election is both a political and strategic calculation. Rather than introducing uncertainty into an already established political partnership, the President has chosen continuity, a decision that reflects the realities of Nigeria’s electoral politics, geopolitical balancing, and coalition-building.

Politics, particularly presidential politics in Nigeria, is rarely driven by sentiment. It is fundamentally about numbers, alliances, regional interests, and electoral strategy. Every major decision is weighed against one overriding objective: securing the broadest possible coalition needed to win an election. Viewed from that perspective, retaining Shettima was arguably the most pragmatic option available to the President.

One of the most immediate advantages of the decision is that it effectively closes the chapter on the controversy surrounding the Muslim-Muslim ticket. Ahead of the 2023 presidential election, the APC’s decision to field two Muslim candidates generated widespread debate, especially among many Christians who expressed concerns about religious inclusion and national balance.

However, after more than three years in office, that issue has largely lost its political intensity. While differing opinions remain, the fears that dominated public discourse during the 2023 campaign have, to a considerable extent, subsided. By retaining Shettima, President Tinubu has denied political opponents the opportunity to revive an issue whose electoral potency has significantly diminished.

Beyond the religious debate lies an even more delicate consideration: Nigeria’s geopolitical balance. Had President Tinubu replaced Shettima with another politician from the North-East, the North-West, the country’s largest voting bloc, could have interpreted the move as another instance in which its political aspirations were overlooked, potentially reigniting debates about equity and representation.

Conversely, choosing a replacement from the North-West would almost certainly have generated discontent in the North-East. Having produced the incumbent Vice President, the region would naturally expect to retain the position. Removing Shettima without any compelling political or governance justification could have alienated key stakeholders and weakened support in a region that remains strategically important to the APC.

Some time ago, a number of individuals campaigned for the selection of a northern Christian as the Vice President, arguing that a Muslim-Christian ticket would be more politically acceptable. While the proposal appealed to those seeking religious balancing, it overlooked the practical realities of Nigerian presidential elections.

For a southern Muslim presidential candidate seeking the presidency, pairing with a northern Christian is not necessarily the most pragmatic electoral formula if the objective is to maximise support across Northern Nigeria. Presidential elections are rarely won on symbolism alone. They are won through careful coalition-building, political structures, regional alliances, and voting strength. In Nigeria, electoral success is driven as much by geopolitical realities and numbers as it is by perception.

President Tinubu has built his political career on strategic calculation rather than emotional decision-making. Over several decades, he has demonstrated an ability to assemble winning political coalitions by focusing on electoral arithmetic, regional dynamics, and long-term political stability. His decision to retain Shettima is consistent with that political philosophy.

There is also the question of continuity. Since assuming office in 2023, Tinubu and Shettima have worked together to lead the administration, build relationships across government, and strengthen the APC’s political structures nationwide. Replacing a sitting Vice President without a compelling reason could have created unnecessary speculation about internal divisions and handed the opposition a fresh political narrative.

By retaining Shettima, President Tinubu has instead projected stability, confidence, and consistency. The decision preserves an established partnership, reassures party supporters, and allows the APC to approach the 2027 election with a united front.

Ultimately, successful presidential campaigns are built not on emotion but on careful political judgment. Difficult decisions are inevitable, but experienced politicians choose the option that minimises political risk while maximising electoral advantage.

Judged against Nigeria’s electoral realities, geopolitical sensitivities, and the imperative of preserving a broad national coalition, President Tinubu’s decision to retain Vice President Kashim Shettima was not only the least controversial choice,it was the most politically strategic.

Zayyad I. Muhammad writes Abuja via zaymohd@yahoo.com.

By Uzair Adam

Kano State Governor, Alhaji Abba Kabir Yusuf, has inaugurated a committee chaired by Dr. Aminu Magashi Garba to draft the blueprint for his 2027 governorship campaign, with the mandate of reviewing the implementation of the administration’s 2023 manifesto, My Commitment for Kano, and producing a new policy document, Blueprint 2.0, to guide a possible second term.

The Daily Reality reports that the announcement was contained in a statement signed by the Director General, Media and Publicity, Government House, Kano, Sunusi Bature Dawakin Tofa, on Friday.

He said the committee would work under the close supervision of Governor Yusuf and his deputy, Alhaji Murtala Sule Garo, to develop a comprehensive policy framework for the administration’s next phase.

According to the statement, Dr. Magashi will serve as chairman of the committee, while the Executive Chairman of Strategic Governance and Policy Coordination, Dr. Yusuf Ya’u Gambo, will serve as secretary.

Other members of the committee are Dr. Ibrahim Musa, Special Adviser on Health Services and Personal Physician to the Governor; Mallam Haladu Muhammad, Technical Adviser on Education Reform; Muhammad Nazir Halliru, Director General of the Kano State Investment Promotion Agency (Kan-Invest); Nana Asma’u Jibrin, Director General of Research and Documentation; Dr. Bashir Abdu Muzakkar, Director General of the Kano State Information Technology Development Agency (KASITDA); Dr. Farouk Kurawa, Managing Director of the Kano Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (KNARDA); Kabiru Sani Yakubu, Managing Director of the Kano Agricultural Supply Company (KASCO); Dr. Abdulhadi Zubairu Chula, Executive Chairman of Ajingi Local Government Council; Engr. Yesmin Mukhtar, Senior Special Assistant on Women Education; Dr. Halima Umar Sani of Bayero University; Dr. Kabiru Shehu; Barr. Musa Lawan Abdullahi; Dr. Nasiru Alasan Kabo; and Dr. Kabiru Ibrahim Getso.

Dawakin Tofa said the committee had been tasked with reviewing the implementation of the 2023 blueprint, identifying areas that had yet to be fully executed and incorporating them into Blueprint 2.0.

“The committee is mandated to review the implementation of the 2023 blueprint, My Commitment for Kano, identify areas yet to be fully implemented and incorporate them into Blueprint 2.0,” he said.

He added that the committee would also articulate Governor Yusuf’s priorities and strategic vision for a second term spanning 2027 to 2031.

According to the statement, the committee is expected to engage stakeholders from both state and non-state sectors to generate innovative ideas and policy recommendations for a comprehensive and inclusive blueprint.

“The blueprint will consolidate the gains of the present administration and accelerate Kano State’s development through a people-driven policy framework,” Dawakin Tofa said.

By Sabiu Abdullahi

The Presidency has dismissed claims by former Anambra State Governor Peter Obi that he may not be alive to participate in the 2027 general election. It described the remarks as an attempt to gain public sympathy.

Peter Obi, the presidential candidate of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), made the statement during an interview with Chude Jideonwo. He alleged that the Federal Government was frustrating his means of livelihood and targeting opposition figures. He also claimed that his activities were being deliberately obstructed.

“The way they are going… not even as a candidate, I might not even be alive. I’m telling you,” Obi said.

Reacting in a statement posted on X on Wednesday, the Special Adviser to President Bola Tinubu on Information and Strategy, Bayo Onanuga, rejected the allegation. He described Obi’s remarks as false and politically motivated.

“His claim that he may not be alive for the January 2027 election and that people are being pressured not to invite him to social events is nothing more than a fabricated narrative, a page from his book of lies and propaganda,” the statement reads.

Onanuga also argued that the claims were intended to shift public attention away from internal challenges facing Obi and his political platform.

“These claims lack substance and are designed to attract undue sympathy and deflect attention from his credibility deficit and the problems faced by his SPV and his adopted political association, the NDC.

“It is important to note that Mr Obi has a substantial interest in Fidelity Bank. The institution continues to thrive as a result of the current administration’s robust economic reforms.

“The government is certainly not targeting the bank. Rather than being “haunted” by the government, Mr Obi appears to be grappling with the consequences of his litany of unfounded statements.”

The presidential aide further stated that President Tinubu remains committed to implementing his administration’s reforms and is not distracted by what he described as Obi’s claims.

According to Onanuga, the President is “fully focused” on consolidating his reforms and does not have time for “Obi’s self-serving narratives and lies”.

By Ibraheem A. Waziri

Moses E. Ochonu, Boko Haram: The Past of the Present Upheaval, University of California Press, Oakland, 2026.

There are books that inform, books that provoke, and, rarer still, books that compel you to interrogate not merely their subject but the assumptions through which it has long been misread. Moses E. Ochonu’s Boko Haram: The Past of the Present Upheaval belongs, in large measure, to this last category. It is a serious, learned, and often illuminating work. It is also, at a foundational level, a work that mistakes genealogy for inheritance. In a region where the stakes of historical narrative are measured in mass graves rather than academic citations, that error deserves honest reckoning.

Let me be clear from the outset: Ochonu is no lightweight, and no serious reviewer should pretend otherwise. His central argument, that Boko Haram did not emerge in a historical vacuum but must be situated within a long tradition of Islamic reform, dissidence, and theological contestation in Northern Nigeria, is not only defensible but necessary. His four-phase map of postcolonial Muslim dissidence, from Sheikh Abubakar Gumi’s pragmatic shiga a gyara (enter to reform) politics, through the revolutionary “Islam Only” radicalism of the 1980s, to the Salafi fence-sitting of the 1990s, to the full-blown jihadism of Muhammad Yusuf, is genuinely useful. His insistence that Boko Haram be studied as a rational, calculating actor rather than dismissed as inexplicable barbarism reflects an intellectual courage sorely needed in the debate. All of this deserves acknowledgement. 

But respect for a scholar’s craft does not require silence about where it occasionally leads him astray. After sustained engagement with this book, I find that Ochonu’s historical genealogy – meticulous and intellectually compelling as it is – ultimately commits the cardinal error of confusing proximity with equivalence. That the Fodiawa jihad and Boko Haram invoke similar texts, deploy similar vocabulary, and emerge from overlapping cultural landscapes does not make them participants in the same civilisational project. Resemblance is not identity. And a genealogy is emphatically not a pedigree.

The fact that Boko Haram claims Dan Fodio does not mean Dan Fodio claims Boko Haram. Throughout history, movements of radically different character have invoked the same ancestors. Revolutionary France invoked Rome. Such invocation tells us about the claimant; it tells us nothing reliable about the legacy claimed.

The Missing Dimension: What the Genealogy Leaves Out

Ochonu’s framework operates almost entirely along the axis of theological and political dissidence, the reformist impulse, the grievance against corrupt rulers, and the appeal to textual authority. What it leaves almost entirely out of view is the civilisational dimension of Northern Nigerian history: the long, patient, and extraordinarily durable process by which the Hausa-speaking world built not only political orders but also moral architectures, shared systems of meaning, obligation, hierarchy, and dignity that survived dynasties, empires, conquest, and colonial transformation alike.

That moral architecture did not originate with Dan Fodio. It was already ancient when the Fodiawa arrived. The old Hausa city-states and the Kanem-Bornu, which Ochonu himself acknowledges as a sophisticated Islamic civilisation predating Sokoto by centuries, had already created the conditions for a complex society organised around recognisable concepts of hierarchy, obligation, and social responsibility. The Fodiawa did not create this order. They found it, deepened it, gave it sharper Islamic articulation, and codified it in law and administrative structures. This is the real achievement of the nineteenth-century jihad, not that it overthrew the existing order, but that it built upon and consolidated what was already there. The Caliphate succeeded because it was, in the deepest sense, continuous with the civilisation it reformed.

At the centre of that civilisation lies a concept absent from every reformist movement Ochonu analyses, whether in the Fodiawa corpus, the MSSN anthems, or a single Boko Haram sermon. It is the concept that the late Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene famously described in his landmark essay, “Mutumin Kirki: The Concept of Good Person in Hausa.” Mutumin Kirki, The Good Person, is the civilisational ideal at the heart of Hausa moral order.

The Mutumin Kirki ideal captures something no purely theological analysis can adequately convey: that social legitimacy in Hausa society derives not from ideological purity or reformist credentials, but from kirki, the cluster of virtues encompassing mutunci (dignity), kunya (shame as a moral conscience), responsibility, restraint, and recognition of one’s obligations within the social order. The framework placed duties on Sarakuna and Malamai alike, gave meaning to the roles of Attajirai and ordinary farmers, and even extended its logic to those society defined as marginal. Everyone knew where they stood. Everyone knew what was expected. Dignity required discipline. Power required restraint. And knowledge without wisdom was understood to be incomplete, even dangerous.

Colonialism, for all its violence and extractive logic, largely preserved the structure within which this framework operated. Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria worked precisely because the existing institutions already possessed legitimacy. The Emirates, the Alkali courts, and the hierarchies of office were incorporated into, and in some respects reinforced within, the colonial administrative framework. The resulting order was imperfect, as every historical product is. But it remained broadly legible to the moral universe the Kirki framework had constructed over centuries. In this sense, each successive political order, from Kanem-Bornu to the Sokoto Caliphate to colonial administration, can be understood as a successive tenant of the same civilisational operating system, adapting it, straining it, but ultimately operating within its logic.

The Verdict: Why Boko Haram Is Different, Categorically

Against this backdrop, the comparison between Boko Haram and the Dan Fodio jihad does not merely strain; it collapses. The Fodiawa jihad, whatever its human costs, was oriented towards institution-building. It produced a legal system, an administrative hierarchy, an educational network, a scholarly tradition, a literary culture, and a deepened moral framework that placed obligations on rulers and ruled alike. It expanded the universe of the Mutumin Kirki ideal; it did not attack it.

Boko Haram has done the exact opposite, systematically. It has attacked schools, murdered scholars, destroyed markets, abducted children, and reduced entire communities to rubble. It has not built a single institution that a future generation will inherit with gratitude. It has not produced a single scholar whose work will outlast the insurgency. It has not deepened the social hierarchies in which dignity and obligation are mutually reinforcing; it has weaponised those on the margins of society and enslaved those it was supposed to protect. Whatever else this represents, it is a direct assault on the civilisational operating system that both Kanem-Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate spent centuries constructing.

Ochonu acknowledges this divergence; he explicitly notes that Boko Haram’s positions “directly contradict major aspects of the Fodiawa reformist creed and statecraft.” Yet within his framework, these divergences occupy a subordinate position. Structurally and rhetorically, the main assertion is the connection. And it is that connection, Boko Haram as participant in Northern Nigeria’s reformist DNA, that lingers in the mind and provides precisely the legitimacy Boko Haram’s ideologues have always craved. This is not a small risk. It is the central vulnerability of an otherwise admirable intellectual project.

Those of us who have observed Northern Nigerian politics, society, and intellectual life across decades, including pundits and commentators who know this civilisation not only from the archive but from the inside, find this framing, however sophisticated its execution, essentially uninitiated. It reads like the work of someone who has mastered the grammar of Northern Nigerian Islamic history with enormous care but has not quite absorbed its spirit: the civilisational confidence, the deep institutional memory, and the quiet but unmistakable recognition shared by virtually every segment of Northern Nigerian society not affiliated with Boko Haram that this movement does not belong to the tradition it claims. It is not reform. It is rupture, a specifically anti-civilisational rupture that the region’s history has not witnessed in any comparable form.

A movement may quote the same texts as its predecessors and still negate them. The Dan Fodio movement built what endured. Boko Haram destroys what was built. That distinction is not a footnote to the history of Northern Nigeria. It is the history of Northern Nigeria.

Final Reckoning: The Question History Is Actually Asking

Ochonu’s book asks: Where did Boko Haram come from? It is a vital question, and the book answers it with real skill. But the deeper question, the one the civilisational history of this region most insistently raises, is: What does Boko Haram’s existence reveal about the resilience of the moral architecture it attacks?

The long view of Northern Nigerian history suggests this: the Kirki operating system has survived before. It survived the disorder preceding the Fodiawa jihad. It survived the internal rebellions of the post-jihadi Caliphate period. It survived British conquest and the dismantling of the Sokoto political order. It survived the postcolonial state’s repeated failures to honour the obligations the Caliphate tradition placed on rulers. It did so because it is not merely a political arrangement or a theological position. It is a civilisational inheritance, embedded in culture, language, social practice, and moral imagination, that no single insurgency, however violent, has yet to erase.

Moses Ochonu has given us an important, serious, and deeply researched book. He has expanded our understanding of the landscape in which Boko Haram emerged, and he has done so with intellectual integrity. But genealogy, to repeat, is not pedigree. The real story of Northern Nigeria is not the story of rebellion. It is the story of civilisation, the long, patient construction of a moral society anchored in dignity, responsibility, learning, and character. Measured against that standard, Boko Haram appears not as the culmination of Northern Nigerian history but as its most violent recent attempt at self-erasure.

And on that measure, the verdict of civilisation itself remains, as it has always been, clear: this is not our inheritance. This is our wound.

By Sabiu Abdullahi

Minister of State for Defence, Dr. Bello Muhammad Matawalle, has expressed confidence that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu retains strong political support across the North-West and remains on course for victory in the 2027 presidential election.

Matawalle made the remarks in a statement released on Thursday through his Personal Assistant on Media, Ahmad Dan-Wudil.

His comments followed recent discussions about the President’s popularity in parts of the North-West amid concerns over economic challenges and security issues. The debate intensified after a NoiPolls Government Approval Survey reported a 30 per cent approval rating for the Tinubu administration after three years in office.

The African Democratic Congress, ADC, reacted to the survey and argued that the findings reflected growing dissatisfaction with the administration over economic hardship, unemployment and insecurity.

In a statement, ADC spokesman Bolaji Abdullahi said, “The tragedy is that after three years in office, the government can no longer claim that these challenges were inherited.”

Responding to the criticism, Matawalle accused opponents of the administration of ignoring security improvements and development efforts, particularly in the North-West. He said some critics were focusing on isolated security incidents in an attempt to create fear among Nigerians.

According to the minister, the Federal Government has achieved notable success in combating insecurity through a coordinated and intelligence-based approach, especially in Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna and Kebbi states.

He said the strategy had resulted in the neutralisation of several notorious bandit leaders, the dismantling of criminal camps and the return of relative peace to many communities previously affected by violence.

“The opposition is uncomfortable with the visible progress being recorded in the fight against insecurity and the ongoing developmental strides across the country,” Matawalle said.

The minister praised members of the Armed Forces and other security agencies for their commitment to national security, noting that many personnel had lost their lives while serving the country.

He also pointed to progress in the fight against insurgency in the North-East and efforts to address communal and criminal violence in parts of the North-Central region.

On the economy and development, Matawalle said the administration’s Renewed Hope Agenda was producing positive results in sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, social investment and economic reform.

He highlighted government projects in Northern Nigeria, including road rehabilitation, agricultural support programmes, food security initiatives, rail and energy developments, as well as empowerment schemes for youths and women.

Matawalle said residents of the region were already seeing the impact of these interventions and would reflect that support at the polls in 2027.

“The people of the region understand the efforts being made to improve their security, livelihoods and overall well-being. They are witnessing the results firsthand,” he said.

The minister maintained that political attacks and misinformation would not overshadow the administration’s achievements. He added that President Tinubu remains focused on governance, national development and improving the welfare of citizens.

Matawalle also urged political leaders to prioritise national interest and support initiatives aimed at strengthening peace, security and development across the country.

He expressed confidence that the achievements recorded under the Renewed Hope Agenda would further boost public support for President Tinubu’s re-election bid in 2027.

By Muhammad Muhammad Salisu Esq.

As Nigeria approaches the 2027 elections, the alliance between the Kwankwasiyya and Obidient movements is attracting significant attention. On paper, it looks like a powerful partnership. Kwankwasiyya has a strong following in Kano and much of the North, while the Obidient movement enjoys significant support among young people and urban voters, especially in the South.

Together, they could become a formidable political force. But there is a problem.

Both movements have increasingly developed a reputation for attacking critics, insulting opponents, and treating disagreement as betrayal. Politics is a game of persuasion, not intimidation. A movement that insults everyone outside its camp may excite its loyal supporters, but it will struggle to attract the undecided voters needed to win national elections.

The situation worsened when some Kwankwasiyya supporters recently made comments perceived as disrespectful toward the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. For many Northerners, the Sardauna is not just a historical figure. He is regarded as one of the architects of modern Northern Nigeria, a leader who championed education, institution building, economic development, and regional unity.

Attacking such a widely respected figure is politically damaging. It alienates many Northerners who might otherwise be sympathetic to the movement and raises questions about the judgment of those involved.

This is why Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso needs to clearly distance himself from such attacks. In politics, silence is often interpreted as approval. A simple and firm defence of the Sardauna’s legacy would reassure many people that the movement respects Northern history and values.

The larger lesson is straightforward. No political movement can build a successful national coalition through insults, bullying, hostility, or attacks on respected historical figures. Winning elections requires discipline, maturity, tolerance, and respect for people who hold different opinions.

The Kwankwasiyya-Obidient alliance has the potential to become a serious national alternative. But potential alone is not enough. If both movements continue down the path of intolerance and political hostility, they risk pushing away the very voters they need.

The choice before Kwankwasiyya is simple: either grow into a movement capable of governing Nigeria or remain trapped in a cycle of unnecessary controversies and self-inflicted political wounds.

In the end, political movements are remembered not for how loudly their supporters shout, but for the wisdom, discipline, and judgment they display when it matters most.

Muhammad Muhammad Salisu Esq. wrote via muhammad.writes01@gmail.com.

By Abbas Datti

Effective representation in the House of Representatives is measured not by a lackadaisical approach and empty promises, but by tangible results delivered to the people. 

Unfortunately, Hon. Garba Diso, the current Gwale Member of the House of Representatives, has fallen short of expectations, particularly in the critical areas of sponsoring bills, raising motions, and youth development, educational support, and economic empowerment. That’s why Gwale youths rally for a vibrant young Dr Shu’aibu Abdul, urging him to contest for the Gwale House of Representatives in the National Assembly during the forthcoming 2027 general elections. 

Over the years, Gwale constituents have witnessed limited investment in the future of young people. There have been few visible scholarship opportunities, job opportunities, and inadequate empowerment initiatives for both young men and women. Unemployment and lack of access to higher education remain pressing challenges; this absence of proactive representation has left many youths without direction or meaningful support.

In contrast, Dr Shu’aibu, the aspirant currently vying for the seat, represents a refreshing shift toward people-centred leadership. Known for sponsoring youth to pursue tertiary education, he has demonstrated a clear commitment to education as a pathway to development.

 Dr Shu’aibu Abdul, a senior lecturer at Maryam Abacha American University and President of the Nigerian Youth Progressive Movement (NYPM), has been recognised in community circles for initiatives supporting young people, including sponsorship programs that help students pursue tertiary education. 

Beyond education, Dr Shu’aibu has also prioritised empowerment programs that benefit both men and women. Through skills acquisition initiatives, small business support, and mentorship opportunities, youths are being equipped with the tools needed to achieve financial independence and community growth.

Abbas Datti writes from Gwale L. G. A of Kano State, via comradeabbasdatti@gmail.com.

By Dr. Saifullahi Shehu Imam

As Kano State marks the third anniversary of Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s administration, the evidence of purposeful leadership is visible across every corner of the state from the bustling metropolitan center to the remotest rural communities. Today, the popular expression #ABBAISWORKING is no longer a mere political slogan; it has become a verified reality, supported by over 1,000 major achievements that have fundamentally reshaped the developmental trajectory of Nigeria’s most populous state.

Perhaps no sector reflects Governor Yusuf’s vision for human capital development more than education. His administration has fundamentally transformed education in Kano by declaring a State of Emergency and allocating an unprecedented 30–31% of the annual budget, the highest in the nation. This historic fiscal commitment was sustained through the subsequent fiscal cycles, securing education as the primary pillar of governance. Across all 44 Local Government Areas, the administration has directed over ₦1.9 billion through the Community Re-orientation Committee (CRC) to renovate thousands of primary classrooms, plus an additional ₦2.9 billion to build new classroom complexes, decongesting urban schools and constructing modern administrative offices. Over 80,000 sets of three-seater desks have been supplied, rescuing more than 240,000 students from learning on bare floors. The government has hired and integrated over 14,000 permanent, pensionable teachers, including thousands of former BESDA volunteers.

Financial barriers have been lowered by providing free textbooks and uniforms for primary students, slashing tertiary registration and tuition fees by 50% at state-owned institutions, and funding examination fees for hundreds of thousands of secondary candidates. The state’s strict targeted funding model has borne immediate fruit, propelling Kano to the top of the national performance chart in the 2025 NECO exams. Furthermore, the revival of the 1,001 Foreign and Domestic Postgraduate Scholarship Scheme has cleared multibillion-naira arrears for stranded medical and engineering scholars in Cyprus and sponsored new cohorts to India and across Nigeria. This holistic investment in infrastructure, teacher welfare, and global scholarships represents the largest commitment to public education in Kano’s recent history, ensuring today’s students become tomorrow’s leaders.
In healthcare, the administration has achieved monumental, system-wide progress by matching robust institutional investment with deeply compassionate public policy.

This vision is explicitly backed by an aggressive fiscal strategy; for the 2025 fiscal year, over ₦90 billion amounting to an impressive 16.5 percent of the state’s total budget has been earmarked for healthcare development. This substantial investment underscores the administration’s unwavering commitment to making healthcare a cornerstone of its governance, moving far beyond basic audits and surveys into real, well-funded structural transformation. A landmark triumph of this commitment is the recovery, comprehensive modernization, and recommissioning of the Hasiya Bayero Pediatric Hospital, a vital 86-bed facility that had been controversially sold, now restored to provide specialized care for Kano’s children. In tandem, the administration has completely remodeled and equipped the critical accident and emergency section of the Murtala Muhammad Specialist Hospital (MMSH) and extensively renovated the Bamalli Nuhu Maternity Hospital to drastically combat maternal and infant mortality rates. To institutionalize these health safeguards, the Governor signed the pioneering Kano State Centre for Disease Control and Prevention Law alongside a mandatory Premarital Health Screening Law to shield future generations from preventable illnesses. These structural transformations ensure that high-quality healthcare is no longer a luxury reserved for a privileged few, but an accessible, everyday right for all Kano citizens.

In the realm of agricultural transformation and food security, the administration has shifted Kano from a reliance on subsistence farming to a powerhouse of agribusiness. Championing a multi-billion naira input initiative, Governor Yusuf flagged off the historic distribution of 79,200 bags (132 trucks) of highly subsidized fertilizers from the Al-Yuma Fertilizer plant in Madobi Local Government, slashing procurement costs by a massive 50% for local farmers across all 44 LGAs. This was bolstered by an additional ₦1 billion worth of free NPK fertilizers distributed via the Kano Agricultural Supply Company (KASCO) specifically targeting smallholder, female, and disabled farmers.

To expand year-round farming capacity, the administration has expanded farmlands and successfully rehabilitated major irrigation schemes across 11 Local Governments, bringing over 1,250 hectares under active development. A crown jewel of this infrastructural strategy is the approval of ₦6.8 billion for the massive Dansoshiya Dam and Irrigation Infrastructure Project in Kiru LGA, designed with a projected storage capacity of 3.1 billion liters of water to empower up to 3,000 farmers in its initial phases alone. These deliberate investments have reduced cultivation overheads, multiplied crop yields, and fortified the regional food supply chain.

Youth empowerment and self-reliance form another vibrant pillar of the Kano Renaissance. Rejecting the old paradigms of political exploitation, Governor Yusuf launched a comprehensive master plan to empower 50,000 young people. The administration began by systematically reviving eight specialized entrepreneurship and vocational institutes that had been abandoned by the previous administration. Highlighting this return to functional capacity, a single cohort of 2,260 graduates recently completed training across these institutes including the Informatics Institute, the Horticultural Institute, the Driving Institute, and the Poultry Institute. These youths left the Government House not just with certificates, but with critical operational assets ranging from laptops, tablets, and toolkits, to livestock and feed, alongside financial seed capital to seamlessly launch their commercial journeys.

On the security front, proactive, intelligence-driven governance has kept Kano State remarkably peaceful and stable despite intense national security challenges. Governor Yusuf has aggressively reinforced the state’s security architecture by assenting to the law establishing the state’s independent Kano State Security Neighborhood Watch, bringing community policing directly to the grassroots. To maximize operational efficiency and response times, the administration recently boosted the Joint Task Force (JTF) operations by distributing dozens of new vehicles and motorcycles across frontline Local Government Areas.

This sustained tranquility stands as an absolute testament to a leadership that deeply understands that the first, most non-negotiable duty of government is the absolute security and welfare of its people.

As the people of Kano celebrate these remarkable achievements, there is a growing consensus that continuity will be essential to consolidate the gains already recorded. The transformation witnessed across the state has inspired renewed confidence in leadership and strengthened public optimism about the future. It is therefore understandable that many citizens, stakeholders, professionals, traditional institutions, and community leaders increasingly look toward 2027 with the hope that Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf will be granted another mandate to deepen ongoing reforms and complete the noble work he has begun.

May Almighty Allah continue to grant His Excellency wisdom, strength, good health, and divine guidance in the service of Kano State. And may the overwhelming achievements of the past three years pave the way for a successful re-election in 2027, ensuring that the Kano Renaissance continues uninterrupted for the benefit of present and future generations.

By Ismail Bello Darazo 

Competence has become a problem in the Nigerian political system. It is quite unfortunate to witness how political office-holders are replaced by incompetent politicians, all in the guise of loyalty, who cover their records while in office without any consequences and who also have the ability to influence policymaking even after leaving office. However, the successor would remain dependent, and his deliberations would be centred on serving his Godfather’s interests rather than providing better representation and good governance to his people, should this happen. He would end up dancing to the puppet masters’ orders, godfathers.

Nevertheless, good representation can be achieved when the right people hold political office, but this practice has become a thing of the past, especially during the consensus period being postulated by the ruling APC. The best leadership that tremendously transformed Nigeria occurred in the past, and it was not achieved through consensus; rather, it enabled people to produce those who could wake up to their collective development.

You’ll see an outgoing governor vouching for someone who lacks the credibility and qualifications to deliver good governance, yet he imposes that candidate on his people despite having better options among the contestants.

One million dollar questions are: When handpicking the competent candidates for any elective positions, why consider less competent aspirants that would make it difficult for the party to win an election? Or why are better options ignored? Lo and behold! Is the handpicking in the interest of the generality? Or is competence no longer a priority, or who, after all, benefits from the selection? These questions, nevertheless, have kept ringing in my mind.

My submission to power shapers or moulders is: always do your best, and it will come back in an unexpected way. Give your people the leadership they deserve, not your personal interest. In my undergraduate days, I learnt from the qualities of a good leader that “Public interest supersedes personal interest.” Give good people the opportunity to change the narrative, not those who will drag us backwards.

Ismail Bello Darazo writes from Bauchi State via Ismailbello054@gmail.com.

By Abubakar I. Hamisu

There is a peculiar cruelty in self-inflicted wounds. The African Democratic Congress entered the 2026 political season as perhaps the most consequential opposition force Nigeria has seen in years. Buoyed by the defection of high-profile figures, widespread disillusionment with the ruling establishment, and a genuine public appetite for an alternative, the party had accumulated a reservoir of goodwill that most Nigerian political parties can only dream of. Then came the primaries.

What unfolded in Kaduna State on 25th May 2026 — and in the disputed conduct surrounding it — offers a sobering case study in how a political party can, in a single act of institutional recklessness, begin to squander the very things that made it credible. The ADC must reckon with this honestly, because the consequences of continued evasion are not merely uncomfortable — they are potentially catastrophic.

I.  The Weight of Expectations

To appreciate the gravity of what is at stake, one must first understand what the ADC represented to millions of Nigerians before these primaries. Here was a party that loudly and repeatedly distinguished itself from the culture of impunity that has long characterised Nigerian party politics. Its guidelines for the conduct of primaries — detailed, comprehensive, and impressively structured — reflected an institutional seriousness rarely seen. Its rhetoric promised transparency where there had been opacity, fairness where there had been manipulation, and internal democracy where there had been imposition. Nigerians, understandably exhausted by the status quo, believed it.

That belief is now under acute stress. And the stress was entirely preventable.

II.  What Went Wrong in Kaduna

The documented record is damning. A formal petition filed by Prof. Muhammad Sani Bello, a cleared governorship aspirant, alleges the deployment of armed thugs at voting centres, systematic compromise of accreditation procedures, multiple voting by the same individuals, deliberate delays that disenfranchised legitimate party members, and partisan conduct by electoral officials. These are not vague grievances — they are specific, numbered allegations supported by agents’ reports, documentary evidence, and video recordings.

More significantly, none of this was unforeseeable. Malam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai, the Kaduna State ADC leader, wrote an urgent letter to the party’s national leadership five days before the election, specifically warning that the composition of the Electoral Committee was compromised, that it included individuals aligned with particular interests, and that proceeding on that basis would produce rejection, division, and avoidable conflict. He recommended a restructured committee with equal representation of all aspirants and a neutral chairman. The party leadership ignored him.

This is not a mere procedural lapse. It is an institutional failure of the highest order — the failure to heed a timely, well-reasoned, written warning from a senior leader. When the predicted crisis materialised, the party had no defence of ignorance to fall back on.

III.  The Structural Contradictions

Beyond the specific allegations, the post-primary period has revealed structural contradictions that compound the problem. The ADC’s own Guidelines, issued under document reference ADC/NWC/PE/001/2026, prescribe a five-member Governorship Election Appeal Committee. The committee actually constituted for Kaduna State has only three members. This means the very body now tasked with adjudicating the petition may itself be improperly constituted under the party’s rules — a fact that could render any decision it makes susceptible to further challenge.

The Guidelines also specify that the Appeal Committee chairman must be a legal practitioner. Whether this requirement was met is a matter that deserves scrutiny. And critically, the Electoral Committee, whose conduct is under challenge, and the Appeal Committee now hearing the challenge, were both appointed by the same National Working Committee whose judgment El-Rufai had already called into question. The structural independence that credible adjudication requires is, at minimum, compromised in appearance, even if not in fact.

These are not technicalities. In a party whose entire brand proposition rests on institutional integrity, such contradictions between prescribed standards and actual practice are deeply corrosive.

IV.  The Broader Danger: Goodwill Is Not Infinite

Political goodwill operates on a logic similar to financial credit — it takes considerable time and consistent behaviour to build, and can be destroyed with alarming speed. The ADC’s current wave of support is real, but it is also fragile, because it is largely aspirational. People have not yet seen the ADC govern; they have invested hope in what it promises to be. That makes its conduct of internal processes not less important but more so, because right now, how the party treats its own members and aspirants is the only tangible evidence voters have of how it will treat citizens if it wins power.

A party that deploys thugs at its own primaries, that ignores the warnings of its own leaders, that constitutes committees in violation of its own guidelines, and that then routes complaints through an Appeal Committee of questionable constitution — that party is not offering voters an alternative to what they already know. It is offering them a more eloquently packaged version of the same thing.

If this perception takes hold, and it is already forming, the consequences will be severe. The ADC’s most valuable assets — the defectors from other parties, the civil society goodwill, the international attention, the young voters mobilising for the first time — are all conditional on the party remaining what it claims to be. Many of these stakeholders have alternatives. They can return to where they came from, or simply disengage entirely. A mass exodus triggered by disillusionment is not a dramatic possibility; it is a rational response to evidence.

V.  The Kaduna Dimension

Kaduna State deserves particular emphasis because it is not simply one state among many. It is a bellwether. It carries the political profile of El-Rufai, whose national name recognition and credibility were among the factors that drew attention to the ADC in the first place. A perception that his influence was marginalised — or worse, that the primary was conducted in a manner designed to sideline his preferred candidates — goes far beyond Kaduna. It sends a signal nationally about who actually controls the ADC’s machinery and whose interests it truly serves.

Kaduna is also a fiercely contested political environment where the ADC had genuine prospects for 2027. Those prospects depend entirely on the party presenting a united, credible front. Disputed primaries, unresolved grievances, and aspirants who feel wronged do not produce united fronts. They produce parallel campaigns, strategic withdrawals of support, and the kind of internal sabotage that Nigerian political parties know all too well.

VI.  The Legal Quagmire

If the internal appeals process fails to deliver justice — either because the Appeal Committee is improperly constituted, or because its decisions lack credibility, or because aggrieved parties escalate externally — the ADC risks entering a web of litigation that will dominate its pre-election period. Court injunctions against the use of a candidate’s name, challenges to the validity of the primary itself, and INEC-related complications arising from disputed results could paralyse the party’s 2027 campaign machinery at the state and national level simultaneously. Nigerian political litigation moves slowly enough that cases filed today can remain unresolved on election day — and an unresolved cloud over a governorship candidate is a gift to opponents.

The ADC’s own Guidelines warn against this explicitly, noting that internal disputes that escalate to court will distract from the electoral mission. That warning is now prophetic.

VII.  What the ADC Must Do

The path forward is not mysterious. The Appeal Committee must act with courage and genuine independence, not as an instrument of ratification for a flawed outcome. If the evidence supports the allegations — and the documented record suggests it substantially does — the committee must say so, clearly and without equivocation. A fresh, properly supervised primary must be ordered.

Beyond Kaduna, the NWC must conduct an honest national audit of how primaries were conducted across other states, and address systemic lapses before they become the subject of additional petitions, legal challenges, and media narratives. The party’s monitoring teams, whose reports must exist, should be scrutinised to understand how these irregularities were either missed or not acted upon.

Most fundamentally, the party must demonstrate — through action, not rhetoric — that its institutional promises are real. Every grievance left unaddressed, every irregular committee decision left standing, every warning from senior leaders left unheeded, chips away at the one thing that no political party can afford to lose and easily regain: the presumption that it is different.

Conclusion

The ADC is at a crossroads that is more consequential than it may yet fully appreciate. The 2027 general elections represent a genuine opportunity to reshape Nigerian politics in ways that matter. But opportunities of this kind are not permanent. They expire. They expire when the public concludes that a party promising change is, in its internal conduct, indistinguishable from what came before.

The clumsy handling of the Kaduna gubernatorial primary is not merely an administrative embarrassment. It is a test of institutional character. Nigerians are watching — not just the outcome of the petition, but how the party responds to it. The ADC still has time to show that its guidelines are not decorative documents, that its leaders’ warnings are not ignored, and that its members’ votes are not disposable commodities. But that time is not unlimited, and it is running.

Sources & References

This essay is an independent commentary based on the following documents: ADC Guidelines for the Conduct of Primary Elections (April 2026, Ref: ADC/NWC/PE/001/2026); Petition by Prof. Muhammad Sani Bello against the conduct of the Kaduna State Governorship Primary Election (27th May 2026); Urgent Message to ADC National Leadership by Malam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai (20th May 2026, ICPC Detention Day 94); ADC Process and Procedure Guide to Electoral Committee Members issued by the National Organising Secretary; State Electoral and Appeal Committees for Kaduna State issued by the ADC National Publicity Secretary.