Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu
With a single stroke, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has upended Nigeria’s constitutional order, suspending Rivers State Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his deputy, and the state legislature under the guise of a state of emergency.
This unprecedented and legally questionable move raises urgent questions: Has Nigeria’s democracy just been hijacked? If a sitting president can summarily remove elected state officials without due process, what stops Abuja from toppling any governor who falls out of favor?
The political crisis in Rivers has been simmering for months, with intense factional battles within the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) leading to threats of impeachment against the governor. But was the situation truly dire enough to warrant a presidential intervention of this magnitude?
Under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, a state of emergency can only be declared in cases of war, imminent danger of invasion, total breakdown of public order, or natural disasters. Even then, such a declaration requires National Assembly approval.
More importantly, the Constitution does not grant the President the power to suspend a sitting governor, deputy governor, or members of the state legislature.
By single-handedly ousting a duly elected state government and replacing it with a military figure, Tinubu has overstepped his constitutional bounds, effectively staging what many legal experts are calling a “constitutional coup.”
If this move is allowed to stand, it raises a troubling question: which state is next? Today, it is Rivers; tomorrow, it could be any other state where the President or ruling party faces political opposition. The implications are chilling—no governor, regardless of electoral mandate, would be safe from federal interference.
Would this have happened in Lagos or Kano? Would a northern state be subjected to such federal strong-arming? The answer is clear. Rivers, an oil-rich and politically volatile state, is an attractive target.
But what happens when this dangerous game of executive overreach extends beyond Rivers? If Tinubu can remove Fubara this easily, then Nigeria’s entire federal structure is under threat.
Beyond the political chaos, a more pressing question emerges: Is this really about governance, or is it about controlling Rivers’ oil wealth? History has shown the federal government’s keen interest in oil-producing states—from the militarization of the Niger Delta under past administrations to the strategic placement of federal loyalists in key oil-rich states.
The pattern is all too familiar. Could this move be less about political stability and more about tightening Abuja’s grip on Rivers’ vast economic resources?
With the Constitution clearly violated, all eyes now turn to the judiciary. Will the Supreme Court rise to the occasion and declare this move unconstitutional? Or will the courts bow to political pressure, allowing a dangerous precedent to take root?
The judiciary must recognize that this is not just about Rivers—it is about safeguarding Nigeria’s fragile democracy from the creeping shadows of authoritarianism. If this unconstitutional takeover is not reversed, no state governor in Nigeria will ever govern with full confidence in their electoral mandate again.
Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Governor Siminalayi Fubara is now the third sitting governor to be suspended by a Nigerian President under a democratic setting. In 2004, former President Olusegun Obasanjo suspended Plateau State Governor Joshua Dariye and the State Assembly over ethno-religious violence in Jos and other parts of the state, appointing Maj. Gen. Chris Alli (rtd.) to take charge.
Two years later, Obasanjo removed Ekiti State Governor Ayo Fayose and his deputy over political crises and impeachment controversies, installing Brig. Gen. Tunji Olurin (rtd.) as the new head of the state.
In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States in response to Boko Haram’s escalating insurgency. However, unlike his predecessors, Jonathan did not suspend the sitting governors; instead, he allowed state governments to continue operating alongside increased federal military intervention.
Now, in 2025, Tinubu has declared a state of emergency in Rivers State, citing political crisis and governance breakdown. But his move goes even further—suspending Governor Fubara, his deputy, and all members of the House of Assembly for six months.
While past interventions were carried out under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, the legality and necessity of removing elected officials have always been controversial. The Constitution outlines a clear procedure for declaring a state of emergency: the President must issue a proclamation, publish it in the official Gazette, and submit it to the National Assembly for approval.
Yet, in Rivers, Tinubu has acted unilaterally, preempting legislative approval and exceeding constitutional limits by removing elected officials.
As these events unfold, one thing is certain—2027 is shaping up to be a defining moment for Nigeria’s democracy. Will the courts uphold the rule of law, or will this be remembered as the moment Nigeria’s democracy took a dangerous turn?
The Nigerian people, civil society, and democratic institutions must resist this unconstitutional move by all legitimate means. If left unchecked, this will mark the moment when the line between democracy and dictatorship in Nigeria blurred beyond recognition.
Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu- an NYSC serving corps member, writes from Center for Crisis Communication (CCC) in Abuja.