Insecurity In Nigeria

By Iranloye Sofiu Taiye

The crackle of gunfire shattered the night’s calm in Patigi Local Government Area last August. For hours, residents hid in terror as militants believed to be linked to the Mahmuda terrorist faction ransacked homes and farms, leaving behind a trail of displacement and despair. This wasn’t in conflict-ridden Zamfara or Borno. This was Kwara State, Nigeria’s so-called “State of Harmony”, now facing the brutal reality of spillover violence from neighbouring conflicts.

For years, Kwara has been regarded as an oasis of peace. While northern states battled insurgencies and northwestern states negotiated with bandits, Kwara’s security strategy primarily relied on these measures. This complacency is now our greatest vulnerability. As armed groups face increasing pressure in Nigeria’s northwest and the Sahel, they are seeking new territories and routes, and Kwara’s under-protected border communities present the perfect opportunity.

The data reveals an alarming trend: while Kwara recorded 70 violent incidents in 2024, representing a sharp increase from previous years, with ACLED data showing 21 fatalities signalling emerging threats. Meanwhile, neighbouring Niger State suffered 179 incidents with 514 deaths, over 2.5 times Kwara’s rate. This disparity highlights both Kwara’s relative peace and its growing exposure. Nigeria’s overall security situation has deteriorated dramatically, with the country dropping to 148th on the 2025 Global Peace Index and suffering over 2,266 deaths from banditry and insurgency in just the first half of 2025, exceeding the entire 2024 total.

The False Comfort of “Relative Peace”

Kwara’s peaceful reputation has created a dangerous paradox: the state appears secure compared to Nigeria’s raging conflicts, yet this very perception has led to critical underinvestment in security preparedness. With a meagre ₦350 million (approximately $230,000) security vote in its 2025 budget, Kwara has insufficient resources for basic border surveillance, let alone comprehensive counterinsurgency measures. This budgetary neglect reflects a fundamental misreading of the evolving threat landscape.

The nature of modern conflict doesn’t respect artificial boundaries. Militant groups operate across porous borders, exploiting governance vacuums and ethnic kinship. The emergence of groups like Mahmuda around the Kainji Lake area demonstrates how terrorist organisations establish footholds in perceived “safe havens” before expanding their operations. As security reports have noted, there have been at least 13 ISIS-Sahel-linked attacks in central Nigeria in 2025 alone, indicating a strategic southward expansion.

The situation mirrors concerning patterns elsewhere in West Africa, where jihadist insurgency has spread from the Sahel toward coastal states. The southward spillover alarmingly threatens countries like Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, which until recently had been mostly spared jihadist violence. Kwara now faces precisely this dynamic, compounded by the added vulnerability of having dismissed the threat until it arrived at its doorstep.

Recommendation: A Community-Based Solution

Some advocate for a traditional security response: deploying additional military forces along border areas, establishing checkpoints, and implementing drone surveillance. While these measures have short-term deterrent effects, they come with significant tradeoffs: escalating tensions with communities, straining federal-state relations, and diverting scarce resources from development needs.

A more effective approach combines strategic security presence with community empowerment. I recommend that Kwara State immediately establish a Community-Led Early Warning and Resilience Program (CLEWRP) to train and equip more than 5,000 local volunteers in conflict mediation, digital reporting, and response coordination. This approach recognises that security is not merely about repelling attacks but about building resilient communities capable of preventing, withstanding, and recovering from violence.

The evidence supporting community-based security is compelling. When local populations are empowered as first responders, they provide hyperlocal intelligence that external forces cannot access. They understand the terrain, recognise outsiders, and can distinguish between legitimate herders and criminal elements. As the tragic incidents in Kwara’s south communities have shown, top-down security responses often arrive too late after attacks have occurred and perpetrators have vanished into the forest corridors connecting Kwara, Niger, and Kogi states.

The proposed CLEWRP program would unfold in three phases: planning and stakeholder consultations across Kwara’s 16 LGAs; pilot implementation in high-risk areas; and statewide scaling, with continuous evaluation. The Kwara State Ministry of Homeland Security and Vigilante Affairs would lead implementation, partnering with the National Emergency Management Agency for federal coordination, local governments for ground implementation, and international organisations for training expertise.

Financing the $3-5 million USD program would require a blended approach: 60% from the state budget and 40% from federal security grants and humanitarian NGO partnerships.

A National Security Imperative

Kwara’s security crisis represents a microcosm of Nigeria’s broader challenges. The federal government’s 2025 budget allocated ₦4.91 trillion to defence and security, about 8.9% of total expenditure, recognising that without security, economic development is impossible.

The national security strategy must therefore prioritise preventing the southward spread of violence in states such as Kwara. This requires both regional cooperation and smarter resource allocation. The Accra Initiative, which promotes intelligence-sharing among coastal West African states, offers a promising model that should be expanded to include central Nigerian states facing spillover threats.

Furthermore, security funding should incentivise preventive approaches rather than merely funding reactive measures. The federal government could establish a matching-grant program for states that develop community-based security initiatives, thereby encouraging locally adapted solutions rather than one-size-fits-all approaches.

The Time for Action Is Now

Kwara stands at a precipice. The state can continue its complacent approach, hoping that violence will spare its territories, or it can acknowledge the changing threat environment and build resilient systems before the crisis becomes a catastrophe. The choice is stark: invest modestly in prevention now, or pay enormously for response later.

The CLEWRP program offers a practical, cost-effective solution that aligns with Kwara’s cultural traditions of community cooperation while incorporating modern technology and coordination methods. It acknowledges that security is not solely the government’s responsibility but a shared undertaking between authorities and citizens.

History shows that complacency amid spreading instability is a recipe for disaster. West Africa’s security landscape has deteriorated dramatically in recent years, with jihadist groups expanding their operations. Kwara cannot assume it will remain immune.

The phrase “State of Harmony” should not be a relic of Kwara’s past but a promise for its future. Preserving this harmony requires honest acknowledgement of emerging threats, courageous investment in preventive measures, and collaborative implementation across government and communities. The time for action is now, before the next attack becomes a full-blown crisis.

Iranloye Sofiu Taiye is a Policy Analyst specialising in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution, Digital Governance, and Service Delivery, and can be contacted via iranloye100@gmail.com.

By Aliyu Ya’u

His Excellency, Dikko Umar Radda’s position on rural banditry has provoked considerable reactions, with some questioning his resolve to confront bandits rather than seek a peace agreement.

Given that he lacks control over the paramilitary and armed forces present in the state, it is fair to say that he has taken commendable steps by establishing the state’s community policing group and encouraging the civilian population to engage in self-defence. 

I fully empathise with his frustration, especially in light of the constant criticisms and pleas from victims suffering due to the terror of rural banditry. Understandably, his excellency may feel disheartened and powerless to prevent these criminals from continuing their activities. 

Further, everyone, especially the civilian population, would welcome a peace accord in a real conflict situation. In such situations, all parties’ demands are tabled and deliberated, and sustainable solutions are found and implemented. 

However, in the case of an unorganised and unregulated group like rural bandits of the North-western and North-central Nigeria, who wreak havoc daily without reasonable justification. 

The question lies not in the society respecting the peace accord, but in the modalities employed to guide the peace settlement. Another question is whether the peace accord is sustainable, using historical parameters to assess the credibility and reliability of the commitment of the violent party involved. 

Any peace accord between a government, society, and an armed group should be based on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). 

According to the United Nations Peacekeeping operation unit, DDR is “a process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society.”

The question is whether the militias or bandits are ready to surrender all their weapons, demobilise from their dens, and reintegrate into the larger society. Unless the government can confirm these terms with the bandits’ leaders, mediators, and sureties, it will not be obligated to build a wall of ash blocks. 

Other questions include, How strong and convincing are the commitments laid down or presented by the militias? How committed is the leadership to the pact? What are the demands? How cogent and soluble are they? Do they have a unified command structure? Is the command structure capable of issuing an effective directive that will be respected by various dens and groups committing heinous bandit crimes? 

These armed groups are often small; in most cases, a group comprises 10 or fewer bandits who act autonomously, unless they need to cooperate against a sedentary enemy community. The absence of a centralised governing body makes it difficult to build an effective peace agreement with the groups. How could a peace accord with hundreds of bandit groups roaming the regions’ thick and interconnected forests that span hundreds of kilometres and access many states be possible? 

Another aspect deserving the government’s focus is the scope of Katsina state’s peace accord. What areas will it encompass? Will the armed bandits responsible for heinous crimes in Katsina state prevent others from neighbouring states from crossing into the area to commit banditry? It’s crucial to recognise that we are not dealing with an insurgent group, a separatist movement, or an ideological terror organisation; rather, the state is confronting multiple disorganised criminal entities. 

The focus should be on the following: The state’s primary concern is achieving lasting peace, not a temporary ceasefire. The bandits should establish a reliable leadership structure that is known and accessible, and willing to take full responsibility if they breach the agreement. They should clearly specify what sets their current commitments apart from those made with previous governments. Additionally, they should submit their complaints for the state’s review and assessment. The sureties must first confiscate or disarm the bandits before any peace accord is signed.

Aliyu Yau holds an M.Sc. in Defence and Strategic Studies and is a public policy and conflict analyst based in Kaduna.

By Zayyad I. Muhammad

On Saturday, November 1, 2025, U.S. President Donald J. Trump made his famous “guns-a-blazing” remark and described Nigeria as “the now disgraced country.”

On Sunday, November 2, he repeated that the United States could deploy troops to Nigeria or launch airstrikes to stop alleged killings.

In what appears to be a reaction to Trump’s comments, terrorists and bandits in Nigeria have intensified attacks, especially the mass abduction of pupils, students, and worshippers.

On November 17, bandits abducted 25 female students from Government Girls’ Comprehensive Secondary School, Maga, Kebbi State.

On November 18, daredevil gunmen attacked Christ Apostolic Church, Oke-Isegba, Eruku, kidnapping 38 worshippers during an evening service.

On Friday, November 21, gunmen raided St. Mary’s School in the Papiri community of Niger State’s Agwara District, abducting 215 pupils and 12 teachers.

That same day, after Trump appeared on Fox News and declared, “I think Nigeria is a disgrace,” reports emerged that ISWAP fighters had abducted 13 teenage girls working on farmlands in Askira-Uba, Borno State.

Armed groups across Nigeria have long understood the symbolic power of their targets. But the timing and composition of these attacks suggest deeper motives:

Three separate days. Four mass kidnappings. Hundreds of victims. Mostly female victims. This is not a coincidence. This is a strategy.

Observers cite four major reasons:

1.  To escalate the situation and attract international attention. Nothing provokes global outrage like the mass abduction of schoolgirls or worshippers. Terrorists crave visibility, especially when a powerful international figure has threatened intervention.

2.  To instil fear and embarrass the government , psychological warfare, so to speak. Targeting female students and worshippers strikes directly at the heart of communities. Schools and places of worship are supposed to be sanctuaries; when they are violated, society trembles.

3.  To use abducted victims, especially girls, as human shields. If the U.S. were ever to conduct air strikes, the bandits and terrorists understand the protective value of having dozens of young female hostages in their custody.

4.  Ransom opportunities: To exploit heightened international interest as leverage for ransom or negotiation. Heightened American interest increases the “value” of hostages. Criminal groups see an opportunity to negotiate for large payouts.

President Trump’s threats have become a local weapon for the terrorists. To be fair to President Trump, he may not intend it, but his sensational remarks have become ammunition in the arsenal of Nigeria’s armed groups. They interpret his words as an opportunity or a provocation and recalibrate their tactics accordingly.

Also, to be fair to President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, he or his government cannot control the statements made by foreign leaders. Still, they can control how prepared the country is for the consequences. This moment demands urgency. The Nigerian delegation to the US, led by Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, is engaged in sterling diplomatic work. Thus, apart from local efforts, this visit indicates to the Nigerian leadership that a well-planned diplomatic strategy can prevent reckless foreign commentary from escalating domestic crises.

Local and international efforts must work together!

Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja via zaymohd@yahoo.com.

Dear Nicki Minaj,

As the latest spokesperson in America speaking on Nigeria, I must clarify that the script provided to you by internal actors back home in Nigeria and their collaborators in the United States is biased and one-sided. You might not fully understand the complexities of insecurity in my country, and you have been fed false lies about fictitious claims of ongoing Christian genocidal attacks.

Here is the reality:

1. In North West Nigeria, banditry devastates the region, with Muslims frequently killing fellow Muslims.

2. In North East Nigeria, Boko Haram and ISWAP, both Muslim terrorist groups, mainly kill fellow Muslims in Borno and Yobe.

3. In North Central Nigeria—Plateau, Southern Kaduna, Taraba, Benue—farmer-herder conflicts, caused by land disputes, are often wrongly seen as religious wars. These conflicts affect both Christians (farmers) and Muslims (Hausa-Fulani herders).

4. In South East Nigeria—Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia—IPOB terrorists, who are Igbo Christians, are killing fellow Igbo Christians in their bid for secession.

Dear Nicki, insecurity in Nigeria impacts Muslims, Christians, traditionalists, and atheists equally. The narrative you received is incomplete and misleading.

Nicki Minaj, the Muslims being killed in Nigeria, and other heinous crimes being perpetrated against them do not get to the headlines of international media for you and others to see and understand. The Muslims back home in my country bury their loved ones killed in silence, for they do not believe in using dead bodies for propaganda or to attract sympathy or donations from international organisations.

If you care about speaking for Nigerian Christians, I urge you also to speak for Black Americans facing police brutality. Just as you highlighted Nigeria’s challenges, you can bring the reality of racial injustice in the US to global attention.

Just like you are calling for global international attention on what has been tagged as ongoing Christians’ genocidal attacks in Nigeria, kindly also call global attention to the silent, ongoing police brutality against your fellow Black Americans and the racial discrimination they are facing.

If Nigerian Christians’ lives matter to you, then let the lives of your fellow Black Americans matter as well.

Thanks.

Mustapha Gembu is a Nigerian citizen and a proud advocate for peace, unity, and harmonious coexistence among my fellow Nigerians.

By Lawan Bukar Maigana 

The growing hunger among media organisations and young people to publish exclusive news has created a climate where speed is valued more than truth and its consequences. Many rush to break stories without verifying details, flooding the digital space with noise and carelessness.

This reckless chase is more dangerous than it appears. Insurgents and criminal groups quietly monitor social media ecosystems. They sit behind screens, study posts, and gather intelligence that was never meant for them. A single careless update becomes an open door for those who wish to harm the nation.

The tragedy of Brigadier General Mohammed Uba stands as a painful reminder of how information can be weaponised. His initial capture, his escape, and the later recapture that ended with his execution reveal how ruthless these criminal networks have become. While many sympathised with his ordeal, few understood how online chatter influenced the events.

These groups constantly scan conversations, comments, and reactions. They interpret patterns and extract clues from citizens who treat every issue as content. The story of General Uba should teach the country a life-saving lesson. Silence is sometimes safer than speed. Enemies are listening and active online, and every careless post strengthens their hand.

They learned from social media chatter that he was still in the bush after escaping. Thoughtless updates provided them with clues. They mobilised fighters, tracked him again, recaptured him, and executed him. This is the heavy cost of posting without restraint.

Security matters require silence more than spectacle. Media organisations must recognise that operational secrecy protects lives. Sensational updates during crises do not inform, but they endanger. The right to know cannot outweigh the need to safeguard ongoing operations. 

This protection is not just for soldiers but also for citizens. Insurgents study community movements, market patterns, celebrations, and tragedies. Careless information helps them identify the weakest points. 

If anyone must share information during sensitive times, the only safe place to do so is with the authorities. Security spokespeople exist to process information responsibly. They verify claims, filter sensitive information, and ensure that outsiders cannot track anything that could compromise national security.

Despite these realities, many still chase virality with reckless boldness. A recent incident exposed this trend when a fabricated story circulated about a young lady in  Gubio Local Government Area of Borno State, who allegedly took her life because she was forced into marriage. Influencers shared it widely without verifying a single detail from her family or the authorities.

The emotional weight of the story carried it across timelines. People blamed parents, culture, and religion. The story was false, yet the damage was already done. The truth moved more slowly than the lie. Later, those who invented the news were arrested, and they confessed that they had shared the information without any verification after a whole LGA had been demonised.

This incident reflects a troubling social habit. People now prefer drama to accuracy. They prefer emotional reactions to factual clarity. They prefer virality to responsibility, at the expense of people’s lives, especially among northern netizens. 

This culture feeds insecurity and weakens the nation’s sense of truth. When false alarms dominate the digital space, real warnings become harder to identify. When emotion overshadows fact, society becomes vulnerable.

Young people must understand that social media is no longer a playground; it is a battlefield for attention and a monitoring ground for criminals, organisations, and individuals with exclusive access who read everything posted online.

Editors and influencers must rise above the chaos and set a standard. They must insist on verification before publication and accuracy before speed. Their platforms should become places where truth is valued and rumours are filtered out. If they uphold responsible reporting, their followers will learn to do the same.

They must also use their influence to educate the public. People should understand that clicks are not worth the life of a soldier or a citizen, and shares are not worth the shame of an innocent family. Only through responsible reporting can society rebuild trust, strengthen security, and protect the dignity of those whose stories are too important to be mistreated or used to strengthen news agencies’ visibility.

Lawan Bukar Maigana wrote via lawanbukarmaigana@gmail.com.

By Muhammad Sulaiman

Security experts have long warned that Nigeria’s porous borders are a major threat to national stability. This concern was echoed again when Dr Bulama Bukarti, a security researcher, lamented how almost anything can be smuggled into the country due to ineffective border control.

In reaction to Bukarti’s remarks, Dr Aliyu Yakubu Yusuf of Bayero University, Kano, shared a firsthand account that underscores the depth of the problem.

Dr Yusuf narrated that on a trip from Damagaran in the Niger Republic to Kano earlier this week, he sat in the front seat of a commercial bus and witnessed what he described as “a chain of extortion masquerading as security.”

According to him, as the bus approached the Babban Mutum border on the way to Ɓaɓura, he observed “so many annoying checkpoints,” sometimes only a few meters apart. Police officers, soldiers, immigration officials, road safety personnel, and customs operatives were all stationed along the route. Yet, none conducted any meaningful inspection.

“Each time we reached a checkpoint, the driver would simply pull out a one-thousand-naira note and hand it to an officer, then we would move on,” he said. Some officers even addressed the driver by name, apparently familiar with him as a regular traveller.

Dr Yusuf said the driver disclosed that there are 35 checkpoints between Damagaran and Kano, and at each one, he must part with between ₦500 and ₦2000, depending on the officials present. He estimated that drivers spend at least ₦30,000 during a single trip.

“Throughout the four-hour journey, not a single officer asked the driver to open his boot,” he added, expressing disbelief that such laxity exists despite Nigeria’s ongoing fight against insecurity.

His account reinforces concerns that many checkpoints serve as avenues for bribe collection rather than effective security screening—leaving the country vulnerable while motorists bear the financial burden.

“We are jokers, wallahi,” Dr. Yusuf concluded.

By Hadiza Abdulkadir

The Department of State Services (DSS) has announced the arrest of Musa Abubakar, believed to be a major supplier of arms to criminal groups in Plateau State and northern Nigeria. The operation was based on intelligence reports leading to his detention on November 12, 2025.

A DSS source confirmed that Abubakar admitted to producing and distributing high-calibre weapons and ammunition used in violent attacks across Plateau and neighbouring regions.

The arrest followed a targeted raid on his weapons manufacturing facility in Mista Ali, Bassa Local Government Area, Plateau State. Authorities reportedly found Abubakar with IED components, chemicals, and manufacturing equipment, all seized by DSS operatives.

This development comes days after the recapture of Abdulazeez Obadaki, alias Bomboy, a prison escapee linked to the Owo and Deeper Life Church attacks. DSS headlined recent successes in counterterrorism efforts, including the detention of nine high-profile suspects involved in incidents in Plateau and Benue states.

Among those detained is Timna Manjol, 46, who pleaded guilty to firearms charges related to the attacks, according to court documents. Manjol is affiliated with First Baptist Church in Mangu, Plateau.

Security analysts view these arrests as part of the DSS’s ongoing crackdown on violent extremism in the region.

By Muhammad Sulaiman

A group of prominent Nigerian citizens has condemned recent threats by U.S. President Donald Trump to relist Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern (CPC)” and possibly take military action to protect Christians, describing the move as an affront to Nigeria’s sovereignty.

In a statement issued in Kaduna, the group — comprising Dr Bilkisu Oniyangi, Professor Usman Yusuf, Dr Ahmed Shehu, Dr Aliyu Tilde, Dr Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, and Barrister Kalli Ghazali — warned that such rhetoric from Washington could inflame religious tensions and “turn Nigeria into a pawn in global geopolitics.”

The signatories emphasised that while the concerns of friendly nations such as the U.S., China, the U.K., and Russia are welcome, threats and external pressure are counterproductive. “This is our problem as Nigerians, and it will be solved by us,” the statement read.

The group urged President Bola Tinubu to directly address Nigerians, prioritise national security, and suspend foreign travels until the crisis is resolved. They also called on the U.S. to withdraw its threats and instead assist Nigeria through strategic cooperation and capacity building against terrorism and banditry.

They further appealed for unity among Nigerians, noting that “every life taken, every kidnapping or assault anywhere in Nigeria matters equally.”

Reaffirming faith in Nigeria’s resilience, the statement concluded: “Our independence and unity have been tested many times, and this too shall pass — but only if we act together as one people.”

By Haroon Aremu Abiodun

“Any country where lawmaking is more lucrative than law enforcement, there must be insecurity.”

That was the piercing submission of veteran Nollywood actor Kanayo O. Kanayo in a podcast interview. This quote still lingers in my mind like a haunting prophecy. Sadly, Nigeria appears to be a textbook example of that paradox.

This raises a chilling question: can we ever be safe in a nation where those crafting the laws live like kings, while those enforcing them die like pawns?

The roads tremble with fear, and villages sleep with one eye open. From Abuja to Zamfara, from the creeks of the Delta to Anambra, to the rocky hills of Birnin Gwari, the word “insecurity” has become a national refrain. 

In whispered conversations and on trending hashtags, Nigerians continue to ask: Can banditry, kidnapping, and terrorism ever truly end in Nigeria?

While President Bola Ahmed Tinubu continues to pledge security reforms, and National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu issues strategic statements, the reality on the ground often contradicts this. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa, may be leading an army of patriots. Still, their valour is constantly undermined by systemic inequality, in which the pen is paid more than the gun.

I Witnessed the Truth

In early June, I attended a deeply insightful citizenship engagement forum hosted by Voice of Nigeria (VON). Dignitaries, including the Minister of Information, NSA Ribadu, the Chief of Defence Staff, and other notable figures,were present. But one story shared by the Chief of Defence Staff froze the air.

He recalled a young bandit who surrendered. The military, adopting a “soft approach,” chose not to brutalise him but instead treated him humanely. He was given food, a warm bath, and, for the first time in his life, a mattress.

This wasn’t just about physical comfort. It was symbolic. The boy, barely old enough to vote, said he had never lain on a mattress before. That was his first taste of civilisation, and it came not from a school or community, but from an army barracks. The boy had joined a group of killers not out of hatred, but out of hopelessness.

The Root of the Rot: 3Es

With what the Chief of Defence Staff said, I was able to conclude that part of the root of Nigeria’s security crisis lies in the absence of the “3Es”: Education, Exposure, and Enlightenment. These are not luxuries; they are necessities. And in the North, where banditry has gained a more frightening foothold, their absence is glaring.

It is time for Northern governors to rise beyond rhetoric. The federal government cannot win this war alone. State leaders must begin by reforming their education systems, investing in enlightenment campaigns, and introducing programs that truly expose their youth to life beyond the confines of their communities. Kano State has led the way in propagating and championing this initiative among the northern states, but efforts should be intensified.

Can we save Nigeria? Yes, but not with a centralised, top-down approach. What we need is collaborative security. Community policing must be revived with village chiefs and family heads forming the first line of surveillance.

Security consciousness must be made more crucial and integrated into school curricula and public messaging. Employment generation must become more than a campaign slogan. A graduate left idle is one WhatsApp message away from recruitment into darkness.

“If community policing is fully implemented, it will become far easier to identify and expose those secretly sponsoring or benefiting from terrorism right from the grassroots. Local vigilance, trust networks, and community-driven intelligence can expose hidden collaborators who often conceal their activities behind political or economic influence. Such a system not only strengthens national security but also empowers citizens to take active ownership of their safety and future.”

This is to say, the fight against terror will not be won by guns alone, but by communities standing as the first line of defence

The Role of Institutions

The Ministry of Education and the National Orientation Agency (NOA) must now take centre stage. It is no longer enough to teach arithmetic and grammar; we must now teach security literacy. The young must understand the real consequences of crime. They must be exposed to alternatives.

This encompasses school tours, street theatre, online campaigns, community mentorship, and genuine partnerships between public and private stakeholders.

There is hope. There are patriots in uniform. There are children yet untouched by corruption. There are teachers still driven by conscience. However, all their efforts will be for nothing if lawmakers continue to earn more than those who risk their lives.

The EFCC may chase funds across Iceland and Dubai. The DSS may foil plots in Lagos and Maiduguri. However, until we address the imbalance and make justice more rewarding than crime, we will remain trapped in this cycle.

Let us not wait until another child lies on a mattress in a military cell to realise what he has never had.

Let that mattress be our wake-up call.

So, to President Tinubu, to the NSA Ribadu, to the Defence Chief, and to every governor who still believes in this country: The war will not be won on the battlefield alone; it will be won in the classroom, in the family compound, in the village square, and in the heart of every Nigerian.

Before we talk about weapons, let’s talk about mattresses.

Haroon Aremu Abiodun, An Author, public Affairs Analyst, PRNigeria fellow and wrote in via exponentumera@gmail.com.

By Uzair 

President Bola Tinubu has reiterated that the creation of state police is inevitable in addressing Nigeria’s worsening insecurity.

Speaking at the Presidential Villa in Abuja on Tuesday during a courtesy visit by prominent Katsina indigenes led by Governor Dikko Radda, Tinubu assured that his administration is determined to confront the menace of banditry and other security threats.

He directed security agencies to review their strategies in Katsina, which has recently witnessed a surge in banditry, and announced plans to deploy advanced military equipment and surveillance technology. 

The president also disclosed that newly recruited forest guards in the state would receive enhanced training and support.

Tinubu acknowledged Nigeria’s security challenges, including porous borders and long-standing weaknesses, but stressed that with determination and a strategic approach, they could be overcome.

“The security challenges we are facing are surmountable. Yes, we have porous borders. We inherited weaknesses that could have been addressed earlier. It is a challenge that we must fix, and we are facing it,” he said.

He revealed that the federal government had approved the acquisition of additional drones and instructed him to receive daily updates on security operations in Katsina.

“I am reviewing all aspects of security; I have to create a state police. We are looking at that holistically,” Tinubu added.

The president reassured Nigerians that insecurity would be defeated, emphasising the need to protect children, places of worship, and livelihoods from criminal intimidation.

He reminded the delegation that in February 2024, the federal government established a committee to develop a framework for state policing, which has since garnered widespread support. 

However, by March, 20 states were yet to submit their reports, according to Vice-President Kashim Shettima.

Tinubu also paid tribute to former President Muhammadu Buhari, praising him for leaving behind a legacy of success.

Governor Radda and other members of the delegation, including former Governor Aminu Masari and Ibrahim Ida, the Wazirin of Katsina, commended Tinubu for his commitment to security and infrastructural development in the state. 

Ida urged the federal government to prioritise upgrading the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport and bolstering security in southern Katsina.