Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam

Isma’il Hashim Abubakar, PhD

Being one of the followers and now among proponents (perhaps pioneers) of Jafarology, an ongoing hypothetical intellectual formulation of a school of thought that seeks to document, survey and study the scholarly legacies of Shaykh Ja’far Mahmud Adam from multiple angles and diverse approaches, I ought to blindly oppose, like many fellows, anything favourable connected to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. The reason for this is apparent: Shaykh Ja’far, my favourite scholar, had a bitter polemical engagement with Sanusi, and the duo exchanged hot tirades that escalated to the use of deregulatory labels and scathing monikers to attack each other. 

As someone who always aspires to operate objectively and dispassionately, in addition to having conducted a broad investigation on the pros and cons of the dispute between the two prominent figures, I feel it a duty-bound and personal responsibility to reveal what many people are oblivious of, mainly as thousands of people rely on the recorded and widely circulated sermons of the late Shaykh Ja’far against Sanusi to not only point to the latter’s lack of competence to rule the Islamic society of Kano but to go to the extent of excommunicating him.  

My decision to join issues with Sanusi’s critics on this saga, most of whom I believe are sincere, was informed by the desire to clear many misconceptions and set the record straight. Perhaps it will sound shocking if I boldly suggest that were Shaykh Ja’far alive today, having witnessed the many transformations in Sanusi’s career and the onerous memorable developments witnessed as a result of his adventurous capacity in the various roles he served, including as the 14th Emir of Kano, the late prominent cleric would have hailed and applauded Emir Sanusi in the same degree, if not higher than, he praised a few traditional figures. 

During his reign before the government of the day’s interruption, Emir Sanusi presided over a lively empire that revived, to a greater degree, the culture of intellectual debate and involvement of scholars and luminaries in various fields in the decision-making exercise. Sanusi’s leadership in prayer, his daily free-feeding scheme for the poor and regular comments on the goings-on, which were sometimes controversial, were all rendered dormant by his dethronement. Therefore, in as much an admirer of Shaykh Ja’far criticises Sanusi relying on the positions of Shaykh Ja’far on the former in some respects, one cannot help but align with Sanusi for epitomising what Shaykh Ja’far had been preaching, perhaps more than many of his peers who served similar roles as his. 

Having conducted my PhD research and written the thesis on the career, thoughts and ideas of Shaykh Ja’far and awarded a doctoral degree in July 2023 by Mohammed V University, Rabat, I present below a section in which I examine the engagement between the cleric and Sanusi, a social analyst by then. Enjoy.

Ja‘far had a bitter engagement with Sanusi Lamido Sanusi for the latter‘s critical view of the Shari‘ah project and other issues associated with Islam and Muslims in Nigeria. In one Friday sermon, the content of which was partly reflected in a newspaper interview by the Weekly Trust with the late Shaykh, Ja‘far depicted Sanusi as (a nominal) Muslim who imbibed some features of hypocrisy, which then informed his criticism of Islamic values and Shari‘ah, while attacking Muslim governors who were committed to the return and implementation of Shari‘ah. Ja‘far argued that Sanusi, who was then residing in Lagos, did not, conversely, pen a single essay to condemn the massacres of Muslims by the OPC in the Southwest. Ja‘far further expressed disappointment over what he regarded as a brazen act of Sanusi, who paraded himself as a social critic and intellectual, only to rubbish northern Muslim leaders who, in their effort to resist the marginalisation of Muslims by President Obasanjo, held meetings in Kaduna on the issue.

Ja‘far‘s dismay over Sanusi‘s rubbishing of Muslim leaders who complained of marginalisation of Muslims by the Obasanjo administration was a reference to Sanusi‘s article in which he argued that having fewer Muslims in the executive arm of the federal government was nothing scary, as scholars like Ja‘far and the northern leaders were ―needlessly – crying out. In the words of Sanusi, to reduce Obasanjo‘s crime to the number of members of the Muslim elite he has appointed-or rather not appointed – to key positions and to pretend that if we had more Muslim appointees,then Muslims would be better off automatically, to say this, is to speak from an ethically blind perspective (https://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi48.htm).

Sanusi‘s concern that there was virtually no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of performance and citizen-concerned leadership was, to a large extent, correct. Ja‘far himself mostly criticised Muslim politicians who, in some regimes, dominated the echelons of power but failed to solve the myriad problems of their people, while in some occasions, he indirectly upheld the records of some non-Muslims who did better than their Muslim counterparts in some capacities. Nevertheless, equitable representation and centralisation of power are important ingredients of democratic dispensation, the absence of which has the potential of throwing political entities into chaos. Sanusi‘s criticism came at a time when sentiments among Muslims over marginalisation were heightening. Not only that, but it came at a time.

Obasanjo was convening a national constitutional review conference, which was seen as a robust chance to further shut out Muslims in the scheme of things. After all, despite being in the minority, Christians were given slots for delegation,which outnumbered Muslim delegates, hence the too much anxiety from the Muslim quarters.

When he took a swipe at Sanusi about Shari‘ah, Ja‘far was obviously referring to Sanusi‘s arguments in some of his writings where he portrayed the Shari‘ah as a tool for politicians to promote their popularity, while in essence, not applying the Shari‘ah to themselves but limiting it to the poor. Similarly, Sanusi had intensely criticised some rulings of Shari‘ah courts, which passed hudud verdicts over convicted criminal cases like flogging in the case of fornication, stoning for adultery and amputation for thievery. This had, at the time, led many Muslims in the country to conclude that Sanusi was a secularist Muslim or even a Marxist pursuing an anti-Shari‘ah agenda. But at the same time, he earned accolades and commendations from the Southern press and intellectuals who hailed him as an enlightened, progressive, reformist, modernist Muslim, etc. 

Ja‘far‘s Friday sermon and newspaper interview were greeted with Sanusi‘s ripostes in which he challenged Ja‘far‘s view of him and descended on the Kano-based scholar‘s personality. Sanusi dismissed Ja‘far as “an unknown quantity that rides on the back of religious fundamentalism to gain social relevancy” but also described him as “a Nigerian who was educated on the charity of Saudi Arabia and whose mosque and school – his source of livelihood – are funded by Arabs (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi49.htm). 

This attack opened floodgates of defensive rejoinders from supporters of both Ja‘far and Sanusi, with some accusing the latter of pontificating about his “privileged background” and someone who “can tangle with the Karl Marx‘s of this world but not Qur‘an and Sunnah”, hence he “could not contribute to his society and religion as Sheikh Ja‘far does”. Although he admitted that Sanusi‘s response was too offensive for a respected scholar like Shaykh Ja‘far, one defender of the then-Kano prince observed that Sanusi‘s arguments were “not entirely bereft of its merit and sound judgment”, particularly his call for the adoption of “national identity”, rather than clinging onto ethnic and geographic proclivities.

Whatever the case, Sanusi seems to have developed an ambivalent position toward the Shari‘ah project in Nigeria, either because of the persons involved in the project or due to some personal interpretations of his on the Shari‘ah codes which might differ from the mainstream conception of Shari‘ah. As an independent thinker and intellectual, a quasi-Islam scholar, Sanusi is sometimes a complex person who is too difficult to predict. As opposed to Ja‘far‘s allegation that there was not a single instance in which Sanusi mounted a public discourse in defence of Islam, some other developments showcased Sanusi siding with Shari‘ah and championing the cause of some 

fundamental aspects related to it. In one conference held in London in 2005, Sanusi not only defended the Shari‘ah but also juxtaposed it against Western legal values, pointing out the defects and hypocrisy in the normalisation of free sexual relationships with multiple women while ridiculing polygamy, the myopic legal protection of a murderer by not subjecting him to the same death process, etc (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi51.htm).

Similarly, in one other article, Sanusi countered the growing sentiments from Christian quarters about the potential of Shari‘ah controversy to plunge Nigeria into crisis, arguing that it was the portrayal of Shari‘ah in a bad light, that was an “attribute of injustice, this tendency to give a dog a bad name in order to hang it that will destabilise Nigeria, and not introduction of sharia”. Exonerating the Zamfara State government from some unfounded stories related to Shari‘ah implementation, Sanusi accused Christian leaders of threatening peace in the country by convening conferences to propagate anti-Shari‘ah rumours, calling on Christians to “judge Shari‘ah by what the Shari‘ah is” while arguing that “the historical church is no yardstick for measuring Islam”. Sanusi boldly declared that if “Christians fear intolerance from Shari‘ah, or accuse Islamic law of being barbaric, therefore, it is because their knowledge of Shari‘ah is limited to the bible and their experience under catholic popes which led to rebellion and secularism” (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi8.htm).

 Therefore, Sanusi advised one Christian-owned newspaper, the Guardian, to listen to the Zamfara state government. It is time to know that the Qur’an and Sunnah enjoin creating a just and honest society and protecting freedom of religion and conscience. It is time to ask those who feel there are legal problems to go to a court of competent jurisdiction. Alhaji Ahmed Sani has repeatedly said his priorities are good government, education, poverty alleviation, and moral rebirth. He has assured non-Muslims of the full protection of their rights. He has never declared Zamfara an Islamic state (see http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi8.htm).

Above all this, as detailed in chapter two, it was when Sanusi served as the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria that Muslims finally got the approval for non-interest banking and financial transactions, otherwise known as the Islamic banking system, to operate despite the vehement rejection by Nigerian Christians. Sanusi, who was once hailed by Christians and upheld as “progressive” in the Southern press, had quickly transformed into an agent of Islamization of Nigeria and was labelled with different dismissive names. Sanusi was subsequently promoted in the Muslim milieus as a hero and champion for Muslims and Islam, particularly as Christians united against him, calling for his removal from his post as CBN governor.

Interestingly, although this development was realised in 2012, five years after Ja‘far‘s assassination, Ja‘far‘s public discourses were full of advocacy and agitation as early as the late 1990s for the introduction of interest-free, Islamic-compliant banking and financial transactions.

Furthermore, when Sanusi became the emir of Kano in 2014, he transformed into a religious scholar who not only closely related with scholars, some of whom were members of Ja‘far‘s circle, but he uniquely led religious functions like serving as an imam and giving a weekly sermon, addressing the topic of public concern, much tallying with the way Ja‘far had been advocating for Muslims rulers. Sanusi built a reputation as one of the few traditional chiefs who used to boldly challenge the policies of governments, a move that largely contributed to his deposition in 2020 by the Kano State Government. As shown elsewhere in this chapter, Ja‘far gave special emphasis on the role he envisaged Muslim rulers to play in defending the interests of their subjects and uplifting them in multidimensional spheres of life, and this seemed to be one of Sanusi‘s priorities as the emir of Kano. It is safe, therefore, to trace some fundamental areas of convergences between the two fearless figures, born nearly the same year and at some point both went to Sudan and studied at the OIC-funded International University of Africa, Khartoum. 

If Ja‘far were alive when Sanusi navigated the later developments that catapulted his prestige among religious leaders and ordinary Nigerian Muslims, Ja‘far would have been most outspoken in celebrating the achievements recorded by Muslims through Sanusi. Interestingly, as two informants have revealed to me and later confirmed to me by Sanusi himself, before Ja‘far died, a meeting was arranged by Sanusi‘s mother where the duo had reconciled, understood each other and sheathed their swords.

Isma’il writes from Rabat and is reachable via ismailiiit18@gmail.com.

By Muhammad Abdurrahman

In this interview with The Daily Reality, Ismail Hashim Abubakar, who finished his doctoral program at Mohammed V University, Rabat, in the Kingdom of Morocco, gives a synoptic picture of his PhD thesis titled “Contemporary Islamic Thought in Northern Nigeria: Shaykh Ja’far Mahmud Adam as a Case Study”. The thesis, which appears in 4 volumes, was written in both Arabic and English. Enjoy: 

At the beginning and as a background, the reader would like to know what propelled you to embark on academic research in this area and to select this topic with the personality of Shaykh Ja’afar as your case study.

I was propelled to undertake this research by many factors. Perhaps the most current and academically engaging factor was the aftermath of the 2009 Boko Haram uprisings when documentation of the saga started outflowing in different forms, including academic studies and media reportage. I observed that the Boko Haram saga was used by many writers – local and international – to, in the process of researching the evolution, growth, ideological base and all other issues associated with the insurgency, direct their attention on the late Shaykh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam and devote some portions in their works on the relationship between Shaykh Ja’afar and the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf.

While I acknowledge that these writers have relevant information and facts regarding this dynamic, I can confidently assert that many facts have been twisted, distorted and misrepresented. In fact, too much attention on Ja’far’s interaction with the leader of Boko Haram would certainly swerve readers’ attention to the grand reform mission Ja’afar had carried out in his career that spanned about two decades.

Furthermore, some writers made absurd and explicit allegations that should not be allowed to pass without a solid, verifiably intellectual response. Besides, the career of Shaykh Ja’afar was full of captivating and interesting episodes that would add up to the history of postcolonial Islam, contemporary religious movements, the interplay of Ulama with civil society and authorities in northern Nigeria and the Hausa-speaking world in general. In other words, if you like, confining the career of Shaykh Ja’afar to an engagement with an estranged disciple is an act of cruelty and tyranny to history.

If this is the case, how does your work differ from the previous works on Boko Haram, and what do you particularly object in them?

In my thesis, I review the representation of Ja’afar and his engagement with Boko Haram as cited in studies and reportages. I endorse what appears to be true and verifiable, while I counter what is a distortion of facts. For example, I tackle the question of Muhammad Yusuf’s studentship and mentorship under Ja’afar; here, there are two visible opinions. One opinion suggests that Yusuf was the mentee, star, protege and possible successor of Ja’afar, while the other view objects to the point of almost debunking any teacher-student relationship between the two men. I seek to stand in between these positions. Based on fieldwork I carried out in Maiduguri in 2019 and in addition to the literature I consulted, I draw a conclusion that Yusuf had, of course, studied under Ja’afar.

Nonetheless, as confirmed by several informants, Yusuf was never punctual during Ja’afar’s lessons; in fact, he did not study a complete book under Ja’afar. Consequently, I re-examined the assertion of the closeness of the two men; it manifested to me that Yusuf was never formally or informally considered Ja’afar’s heir, nor was he considered intellectually capable of taking over from Ja’afar.

Meanwhile, I make reference to Yusuf’s ideological trajectories and terminals of religious activism, starting as an ambitious young man looking for fame. As such, he took a leading position in Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’atu Tajdid al-Islam, before finally joining the Izala, which he would also break from within a couple of years. Finally, on this point, I compare Ja’afar and Yusuf, what the two figures represent to Nigerians and the legacies each one has left behind. 

What else do you address besides the Boko Haram phenomenon in your project?

Hmmm. Like I said initially, Boko Haram is a small (though most popularised) aspect of Ja’far’s career. I set a background where I give a snapshot of the state of Islam and Muslims in postcolonial Northern Nigeria, highlighting the engagement of Muslims in politics and governance while appraising the debates of Shari’ah implementation and discourse on secularism which characterised the Nigerian public sphere after the turn of the 21st century.

I also look at the relations between Muslims and Christians, pointing to the areas of divergence, which are quite many, but also the few areas where Muslims and Christians united in pursuit of a common goal. I also survey the fragmentation of Islamic society along sectarian lines by first tracing the emergence of major and minor religious sects, groups and movements and their major views and arguments. I also illuminate the interplays between these two groups and what brings/brought them together to speak in one voice. All these are meant to give much insight into the religious and landscape sociopolitical contexts in which the figure of my study lived and conducted his mission. This represents the first significant section of the work, which, as you can see, represents the first epithet in the thesis title. 

I supply a relatively detailed biography of Ja’afar, focusing on his family background, the phases of his knowledge acquisition and the factors that contributed to his public visibility as a young man, all before his sojourn to the Islamic University of Madina. 

The work dwells on Ja’afar’s reunion with the Da’awah arena after his study at Madina and how unlike before, he concentrated on the transmission of knowledge and cultivation of disciples while minimising open-air preaching. In this regard, I supply comprehensive information on the major sites and centres of Da’wah, which used to host and coordinate Ja’far’s public engagement and private study circles.

In Kano, for instance, I reserve sections in which I discuss in detail the majalis of Ja’afar, such as the Triumph Mosque in Fagge, the Beirut Road Mosque, Usman Bin Affan Mosque, Gadon Kaya, Almuntada Mosque in Dorayi and the majlis in Ungogo Road. I explicate all the activities Ja’afar conducted, such as leading prayer, teaching for open and private audiences and presentations of sermons, lectures and seminars.

In Bauchi, I make reference to sites that hosted Ja’far’s mission, such as Gwallaga Jumaat mosque, Shaykh Awaq mosque at Old GRA, Baban Godi Mosque in Mallam Goje Street and Women Centre of Bauchi located at Gombe Road. Moreover, in about thirty pages, the thesis unpacks the mission of Ja’afar in Maiduguri, with a particular reference to the activities he conducted within the Indimi Mosque, hinting at the challenges Ja’afar confronted at the beginning and the strategies he adopted in the process of consolidating his Da’wah. The work here emphasises the Qur’anic interpretation exercise Ja’afar led during Ramadan at the mosque and how it became an annual conference that attracted audiences from different parts of northern Nigeria.

But Ja’far’s mission was also characterised by other features: teaching, presenting lectures and seminars and rigorous engagements in civil and political issues. Does your work take a look at this also?

Yeah, of course. I dedicate a full and lengthy chapter that surveys and appraises Ja’far’s interactions and engagements with some events that affected Nigerian contemporary developments, Islam and Muslims, and Ja’afar’s relations with various government and public figures, religious groups and individuals. It focuses on Ja’afar’s role in the return of Shari’ah in northern Nigeria, how he collaborated with religious leaders of other groups, and how this resulted in the implementation of Shari’ah in some northern states. It also refers to Ja’far’s participation in the implementation of the Shari’ah process in Kano.

The chapter further lays bare Ja’far’s engagement with Nigerian politics, governance, politicians and public figures, taking a look at his criticism of General Obasanjo’s administration and different political and government institutions, including Kano state, his base, but also figures such as Muhammadu Buhari, Atiku Abubakar, Ahmed Yarima, Ibrahim Shekarau, Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso, Ahmed Adamu Muazu, Ahmed Makarfi, Abubakar Habu Hashidu, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Baba Impossible, among others.

The work also relates Ja’afar’s interplay with traditional institutions, which connects to his position on the royal fathers of the northern emirates and how they disagreed with some and collaborated and had cordial relationships with others. Still in the chapter, Ja’afar’s engagement with religious groups is narrated, beginning with Salafi networks to which he belonged, the Sufi brotherhoods with whom he disagreed most of the time and the peripheral groups like the Shia, Boko Haram and others. 

As a complement to a cleric biography, the chapter categorises Ja’far’s disciples and followers into four tabaqat, just as it mentions some of his colleagues, teachers and role models. It also provides insightful information relating to Ja’afar’s assassination, including the events that preceded the tragedy and what followed it, such as the posthumous attraction of the Muslim public toward the legacy and mission of the murdered cleric. 

The final chapter in the thesis extracts the thoughts, ideas and philosophical views and visions of Ja’afar on a plethora of issues such as education, economy, sociocultural topics, marriage and women issues, politics, global politics and international affairs, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and the prospects of peaceful coexistence. The chapter presents at the end what the researcher believes is the central position of Ja’afar on Jihad, which further unravels the extent to which he conceived violent extremism in a world and time when Islamophobia was rising high.

But how have you encountered all this stuff, which appears to involve huge materials you had to engage?

Yes, I gathered my data through multiple sources. First, I laid my hands on the available recordings of Shaykh Ja’afar, including cassettes and online content. I listened to his entire Tafsir tapes, available Friday sermons, and many of his lectures and public and private lessons on Islamic texts. I also conducted fieldwork where I travelled to many states in Northern Nigeria and met about a hundred informants. Needless to say, I consulted a great deal of literature that ranged from published books, journals, newspapers and magazines, and reliable internet pages.

What challenges did you face while undertaking this research?

A lot of daunting challenges, but a researcher must always be ready to confront them. It suffices to say that one has to be away from family to a distant land to carry out this task. But before then, I faced challenges as regards accessing some informants. For example, although the work discusses Boko Haram, I could not interview any Boko Haram members to hear some things from him directly. But the most appalling of all the challenges was the lack of positive cooperation from some of Ja’afar’s colleagues and disciples. While some of them delayed, procrastinated and even cancelled my appointments with them, some of them even avoided me and refused to give me any audience at all. Paradoxically, I got positive responses and warm accommodation from personalities who might be well counted among Ja’afar’s rivals and competitors, including Sufis and Shiites.

Which plan do you have now for this work after you have been awarded a doctoral degree?

I just remembered that the work is bilingual and in four volumes, or if you like, two volumes in Arabic and two in English. My ambition is to publish it as a book or as two books. I will be glad to edit the Arabic version and publish it in a press in an Arab world like Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar or any other country, while the English version is to be hopefully published by a Western (preferably university) press.

Is there any point you disagree with Shaykh Ja’afar in your work?

Of course, there are. I can count almost ten. 

Can you give an example?

Certainly! During one of his lessons to women at Gadon Kaya, a woman asked if it was permissible for her to make a supplication – a prayer – to ask God to prevent her husband from marrying a second wife. Shaykh Ja’afar answered that it was not permissible since marriage is lawful, and no one has the power to make unlawful something that was made lawful by God. My argument here is that in a situation where women have turned adding a second wife into their earthly hell, so much so that they go to any extent, including dangerously deadly means to thwart their husbands from the second marriage, giving a fatwa with the permissibility of praying against this wish seems to be safer for all the parties involved. If God wishes, he would answer, and if He doesn’t answer, the woman would accept fate like that. 

Are there journal articles that have been published out of this thesis?

Yes, two articles have been published so far. One was published in a journal at an Islamic University in Uganda. I examined the thoughts and ideas of Shaykh Ja’afar on education. It is available here.

The second one was published in an Indonesian journal, and it talks about Ja’far’s views on women, marriage and family institutions. It can be accessed via this link.

I expect to publish two more before the end of the year, in sha Allah. One of them presents a contextual analysis of a sermon that Ja’afar delivered at Almuntada Mosque in Kano in the aftermath of the OPC massacre of northerners in Southwestern Nigeria. In the essay, I argue that the sermon, despite its strident nature and use of highly harsh language, served as one of the rhetorical instruments that calmed frayed nerves and tensions amid the possibility of reprisal attacks. The second essay examines Ja’afar’s engagement with Boko Haram and violent extremism. 

What are your concluding remarks?

I will conclude by stressing that the clerical career of Shaykh Ja’afar has provided one of the most interesting and attractive pages in the history of Islamic activism in contemporary Nigeria and Hausa speaking world. With millions of followers and his ideas circulating within public domains, Ja’afar’s mission is worth reading and researching. I proposed in my work what I call “Jafarology”, which refers to the process of studying the legacies of Ja’afar in different dimensions and from different perspectives.

I will close by expressing my immense gratitude to all the people who supported me in one way or the other. I must thank my parents for putting me through this path early. I thank my mentor Professor Salisu Shehu, to whom I dedicate this work. I still recall his visit to Morocco in June 2022 and consider it a fatherly concern that gave some moral comfort to a son away from home. In the same vein, I thank Professor Alexander Thurston, who read my chapters and offered me invaluable suggestions and recommendations. My success in this work owes greatly to his mentorship. The same gratitude goes to Dr Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido, whose mentorship and frank counsel encouraged and motivated me to delve into this research area. I also thank a colleague of mine here, Osho Iskil Kehinde, who has greatly supported me.

I also use the medium to appreciate the Federal University Gusau management for releasing me to undergo this program. In this vein, I must thank Dr Abubakar Masama, the Dean, Faculty of Arts; Dr Qasim Badamasi, the former HOD, Islamic Studies; Malam Abdallah Bashir Bakori, Dr Ja’far Agaji, the present HOD, and all the colleagues within the Department of Islamic Studies and Faculty of Arts of the University.

Last, I must reiterate my thanks to Dr Anas al-Shaykh Ali, the Director of the IIIT London Office. Sister Shiraz Khan, a coordinator at the Office, the Director of the Institute of Epistemological Studies Europe (IESE) in Brussels, Dr Beddy Ebnou al-Murabity and Dr Naima Daoudi for being of great help to me. It was these institutions that sponsored my entire studies here in Morocco.

By Muhammad Sabiu

The daughter of the late Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, Zainab, has been appointed as the new leader of a JIBWIS women body, also known as Nisa’us Sunna.

Delivering her acceptance speech after she was named the leader of Nisau Sunna, Malama Zainab expressed her gratitude to the Almighty Allah for making the event a reality.

She said, “I am grateful for being given this opportunity not because we are better than anybody, but for the simple reason that trust has been vested in us, with the thought that we will try our level best. And we hope the Almighty will spare us from disappointing (you), and may He grant us the opportunity to discharge the good expected of us.

“We, therefore, seek their [our leaders’] guidance in different aspects—in the aspect of praying for us as our parents, and on the part of commanding us.”

She also stressed the importance of the inclusion of women in areas that have to do with community development, adding that women are of great importance in any effort of bringing development.

The naming of Malama Zainab as a women’s leader went viral, thanks to the prominence and influence of her late father, Sheikh Ja’afar.

Recall that the late cleric was murdered in 2007. However, no culprit had been brought to justice even though a former leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, claimed responsibility for his killing on several occasions.