Abubakar Shekau

Boko Haram commanders surrender in Borno

By Muhammadu Sabiu 

Four prominent members of Jam’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihd, popularly known as Boko Haram, have turned themselves into Nigerian forces in Borno State.

Commanders Mala’ana (Khalid), a Governor, Abu Dauda (Munzir), Modu Yalee (Commander), and Bin Diska (Nakif) submitted to Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK) soldiers on December 12, 2022, when they were patrolling the state’s Gwoza local government area.

This fresh intelligence reveals that the insurgents have emerged from the Sambisa forest where they had been hiding and are now waging terror attacks against the state, according to Zagazola Makama, a Counter-Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region.

They once served as leaders at the Njimiya camp under Abubakar Shekau. 

Nevertheless, during the invasion of the Sambisa Forest in May 2021, they disarmed and joined ISWAP at Lake Chad, which finally led to Shekau’s demise.

The four Commanders later abandoned ISWAP and fled to Sambisa, where they established a camp and started acting independently.

They were forced to surrender out of fear of being wiped out on the battlefield by a combination of a protracted, increased bombardment on terrorist hideouts and rivalry strikes.

Meanwhile, 83,000 Boko Haram fighters had been captured and were being treated for rehabilitation in Borno State, according to Major General Christopher Musa, the OPHK Theatre Commander.

Shettima: The facts and fallacies of Boko Haram linkage

By Lawan Bukar Maigana

The emergence of Senator Kashim Shettima as the running mate to the All Progressives Congress  (APC) presidential aspirant, Ahmed Bola Tinubu, has continued to generate reactions from all corners of Nigeria.  

Most worrisome is the puerile attempt by some ill-intentioned social media influencers to link the former governor of Borno State to Boko Haram terrorism.

What could have influenced the attempt to link Shettima with Boko Haram?

While the paid and unpaid agents behind this vile propaganda have not provided any evidence to link the Senator to terrorism, it is necessary to examine some facts from the apparent fallacies of the opposition and separate the wheat from the chaff.

For instance, while travelling to Gamboru Ngala for a rally ahead of the 2019 presidential and National Assembly elections, Shettima’s convoy was attacked by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) members and three of his loyalists were killed. Many others sustained various degrees of injuries.

Characteristically, ISWAP claimed responsibility for the attack the following day. However, the then Special Adviser on Communications and Strategy, Malam Isa Gusau, confirmed the identities of the deceased, including a brave soldier and two staunch politicians.

According to Gusau, the attack aimed to attract global media attention to sustain the terrorists’ agenda of instilling fear in citizens and reducing the morale of the gallant troops.

The leader of the Boko Haram terrorists, Abubakar Shekau, who was later killed in an alleged suicide bombing, had threatened Shettima and top government officials in a 56-minute video where he ordered his members and foot-soldiers to kill them wherever and whenever they found them. Could Shettima have a link with Boko Haram, yet he would be the number one on their hit list?

In the video, Shekau boasted as follows: “You, former governor Kashim [Shettima], you present governor [Babagana] Zulum, listen – do not be deceived by your walking without shoes – be careful! If you sing these things we mentioned [Nigeria’s national anthem, national pledge, and the NYSC anthem], you are a disbeliever even if you recite them jokingly.”

It was not surprising that Shettima and Zulum were mentioned in the video because both personalities have consistently spoken against the evil of Boko Haram and worked assiduously with security agents and other stakeholders to decimate them. They have also been supporting Internally  Displaced Persons (IDPs) to recover from the damage the terrorists had done in their lives and relocate them to their respective, original communities.

It should also be noted that Shettima didn’t just stop at appealing to the Federal Government to intensify efforts aimed at eradicating terrorism. He committed enormous resources to support the military with security equipment and dozens of vehicles to ease mobility during operations. Is that a governor that has a link with Boko Haram terrorists?

Born and brought up in Maiduguri, I can authoritatively confirm that Shettima adequately funded the Volunteer Vigilante Youth Groups, popularly known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 2013, who were later trained in counter-terrorism operations, to strengthen the fight against Boko Haram terrorists.

He also provided adequate welfare and logistic support to over 20,000 CJTFs to strengthen the fight against Boko Haram elements. The motivation enhanced the crucial role of CJTF in intelligence gathering, easy identification, and arrest of suspected insurgents, among others. Could Shettima have a link with Boko Haram fighters and yet fund their tormentors?

Before the expiration of Shettima’s tenure as governor of Borno State, he was relentlessly calling for the deployment of military personnel and equipment to curb the threat of the terrorist group in the Northeast.  Considering the cost of the war on terror, Shettima was among the few personalities who persuaded state governors of the necessity of approving the sum of $1 billion from the Excess Crude Account for the counter-insurgency campaigns. He also defended the Federal Government’s plan to ensure the judicious utilization of the fund for the intended purpose.

Could Shettima have a connection with terrorists yet support counter-terrorism financing?

When Boko Haram terrorists destroyed churches in Borno, Shettima provided funds to reconstruct the places of worship and ensured adequate security protection of the areas.

In his testimony to this, the Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Borno Chapter, Bishop Mohammed Naga, said: “During Shettima’s visit to these areas, he released N100 million for the rebuilding of some of these churches. A committee was set up for that purpose. I was a member of the committee headed by a permanent secretary, Mr Justus Zare, as Chairman, and I am happy to inform you that presently we have used that money to rebuild 11 key churches which our people are now using. I am surprised to hear some people saying why don’t we rebuild all the churches. We cannot do that because there are many places that are still unsafe.”

Would church leaders praise Shettima if he had a link with Boko Haram fighters!?

In a nutshell, Shettima is neither an ethnocentric leader nor a religious bigot. On the contrary, he is a charismatic personality who believes in equity, justice, and fairness. Moreover, from his engagements and pronouncements, he has consistently advocated peaceful and harmonious relationships among different tribes and religions.

Therefore, it is unfair and unreasonable to link him with Boko Haram terrorism when he, in reality, has been their number one enemy and a prime target for years.

Lawan Bukar Maigana writes from Wuye District, Abuja. He can be reached via Lawanbukarmaigana@gmail.com.

That essay, Cornflakes for Jihad!😃

By Ibrahim A. Waziri

To most non-Muslims researching and writing about Boko Haram, the problem generally begins with Muslims and Islam in Northern Nigeria and, to some degree, across the globe.

To them, BokoHaram is synonymous with the issues of ontology and epistemology of Islam. That is why their narrative of it can encircle Shehu Dan Fodio, Late Sheikh Mahmud Gumi or even Ahmadu Bello Sardauna, the Premiere of Northern Region, during Nigeria’s first republic. They also do find its bits of ideological nuggets in the earliest of the Islamic literature!

But to most Muslims or their sympathisers, Boko Haram is a persistent story of fringe, rebellious elements among the larger Muslim population across history. These elements are primarily rigid and resistant to any contemporary interpretation of the Islamic canons, which goes with the present circumstances and gives maximum peace, harmony and cooperation among Muslims; and between them and non-Muslims.

The non-Muslim researchers generally point to Islam as the source of the problem. The Muslims point at Khawarijism (rebellion) against any Muslim broad social consensus (like Nigeria as it is presently constituted), at a particular point, as the problem.

The non-Muslims argue that the problem is profoundly historical. So they travel back the archives and exhume positions, at one time, of individuals, such as Sheikh Daurawa, Sheikh Gumi, Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, Sheikh Auwal Albani, Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud, etc., to drive home their points.

While the Muslims are inclined to reject such a notion, arguing that social consensus is a transitional thing by nature, and Muslims embody the concept of Transition Personalities most. [Transition person as a concept is sufficiently delineated by Stephen Covey, in his, The Seven Habit of Effective People].

That, it is embedded in Muslims traditions and part of their essential social jurisprudence, that what is a norm today may not necessarily be the norm tomorrow. And that, the internal problem of the Muslim communities are those fringe elements who do not reflect the power of transition and acknowledge the value of consensus building, with new variables that new situations always present.

The very recent article by a certain David Hundeyin making waves through social media, Cornflakes for Jihad, also reflects the usual sentiments identified with many non-Muslims types of research about BokoHaram.

Apart from the basic factual errors it contains – which Abdulbasit Kassim diligently pointed out – it also concluded with logic barren childish conspiratorial arguments that send us millennia backwards in our struggle searching for the appropriate problem definition, analysis and solution recommendations on the issues of BokoHaram.

Contrary to the essay’s claims against Ahmed Idris Nasiruddeen (NASCO), Nasiruddeen has lived a life of a pious Muslim who was using his wealth to help Muslim friends, associates and organisations.

Of course, as any other friend or associate one might have helped, they too are naturally transitioning personalities (not necessary in the positive sense) living in a transitional world. One can help a person or an organisation, for a specific general reason or objective, only later in life for them to shift their objectives, metamorphosing into something different.

The fact that the NASCO conglomerate was once allegedly accused of financing terrorism (by whoever) does not mean it intentionally did that. Likewise, Sheikh Yakubu Musa was once allegedly accused of funding terrorism (by whoever) does not mean he is guilty.

Until we begin to look at the ontology and epistemology of issues around BokoHaram in this kind of light, our analysis about it will always leave undesired dangerous results born of misdiagnosis. We may begin to indict people like Alhaji Aliko Dangote and Abdussamad Isiyak Rabiu (BUA) because we are likely to find that the Imams, Mosques or organisations now or in the future they have once helped are enmeshed in terror wave of related accusations. Then we will begin to write warped essays like Cement or Sugar for Jihad.

Writing informed public commentaries or being a sound public intellectual is beyond the ability to flawlessly and flowerily write essays, making endless references to a large swathe of literature and records. No. It requires multidisciplinary insights, a great deal of patriotism, a deep sense of intuitive social measurement, appreciation of people and cultures from both etic and emic perspectives, history, and sound ability in social system projections.

Indeed, one cannot have a Nigeria of great value today or in future if they have a large heart sufficient enough to accommodate Ahmadu Bello, Sheikh Gumi, President Buhari, BokoHaram founder, Muhammad Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, lumping them as the same people, who worked or are working, to turn Nigeria into an absolutely imaginary Islamic state.

Ibrahim A. Waziri writes from Zaria, Kaduna.

Who is behind the NDA invasion?

By Abdulhaleem Ishaq Ringim

The invasion of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) is indeed embarrassing and extremely unsettling. But what is more unsettling is the fact that this high-level security breach is said to be orchestrated by “bandits”. While I had never underestimated these bandits’ lethality and offensive capacity, I still find it hard to believe they planned this attack. 

And here is why: 

Although most of us are unaware of the very nuanced categorisation of bandit groups operating in Northwest and Northcentral Nigeria, still, whenever we hear the word “bandit”, our minds go to the Fulani militias that have been meting out mayhem on innocent civilians. 

Channels TV reported that “The bandits who came in a vehicle were said to have passed through the security gate into the academy, disguised in military uniforms, after which they proceeded to the officers’ quarters.”

And this is where the question mark is. 

A Fulani person is the most recognisable of all the ethnic groups in Nigeria by his physique, phenotype and accent. And with the high level of stereotypes and profiling of members of this ethnic group as even innocent Fulanis on the streets get harassed, it makes it hard to believe that a vehicle full of bandits (of Fulani extraction) passed through the gates of NDA without being recognised and raising the suspicion of the guards. The press statement released by the academy also described the invaders as “Unknown Gunmen” instead of “Bandits”. 

However, this is not only the reason that informs my suspicion. 

The Nigerian terrorism network has been very volatile lately owing to the recent escalation of the rift between the two major terrorist organizations in Nigeria —the late Shekau-led Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Al-Barnawi-led Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) — who were initially a single entity until they split in 2016 due to certain ideological differences and have been fighting each other since then. This rift, escalation of which has been attributed to the Nigerian Armed Forces Operation Hadin Kai spearheaded by the late Chief of Military Defense Brig. Gen Abdulrahman Kuliya was what consumed Abubakar Shekau in May 2021 and rendered his faction rather defenceless. 

Following this incidence, it was reported that more than a thousand JAS fighters have surrendered to the Nigerian Army – a gesture most people believe to be a positive sign and a product of enhanced military offensives against the terror groups. 

However, that is hardly the case, for, after Shekau’s death, ISWAP received some JAS commanders and fighters that pledged allegiance to their leader Al-Barnawi and then issued an ultimatum to those who refused while assuring them of continuous attacks. This is actually what motivates them to surrender to the Nigerian Army to leverage on the Nigerian Government’s amnesty program, the Operation Safe Corridor, and escape ISWAP’s wrath. But even before this incidence, defection from JAS to ISWAP was common among commanders and fighters, as in the case of Adamu Bitri in 2019. 

In December 2020, I explained in an article titled “Insecurity in North-West: Armed Banditry or Boko Haram Expansionism” the operational dynamics of all the three terrorist groups — JAS, ISWAP and Ansaru — in the Northwest and the possibility of them executing expansionist agenda in North-West Nigeria through infiltration, training, assimilation and arms supply. Before the fall of Shekau, reports suggested that the JAS and Ansaru groups had closer ties with bandit gangs in North-West. Adamu Bitri, for example, while he was with JAS, was instrumental in forging an alliance between JAS and bandit groups. He later moved to ISWAP before he died. It is believed that he might have shifted the allegiance of some of the bandit gangs he was in contact with to ISWAP. 

With Shekau’s death and the subsequent carpet-crossing of his commanders (some of whom are the keepers of the link between JAS and the bandit gangs in the North West just as Adamu Bitri) to the ISWAP side, there is a high possibility that bandits who were initially aligned to JAS are now under ISWAP’s control. Also, some JAS fighters who refused to surrender to both ISWAP and the Nigerian Army might consider joining bandit gangs in the northwest, just as it was the case for some fighters who fled ISWAP to join bandit groups before this recent incident. 

With the possible control ISWAP might have gotten over a greater number of bandit groups in the North-West due to recent events, the NDA invasion makes me wonder if it is just ISWAP’s way of signalling their newest expansionist achievement and presence in the North-West by staging such an operation in usual “bandit” territory perhaps with the help of the bandits, for the attack was done in usual ISWAP style of attacking military bases. And whether it is indeed purely a “bandit” affair or ISWAP’s or both, it signals a failure of our government, a serious increase in security vulnerability in the country and calls for renewed strategic action against bandits, the broader terrorism network in Nigeria and their expansionist tendencies. 

Abdulhaleem Ishaq Ringim is a political and public affairs analyst. He writes from Zaria and can be reached through haleemabdul1999@gmail.com.