Nasir El-Rufa’i

A PARTY AT THE CROSSROADS: How ADC’s Handling of Its Primary Elections Threatens to Undo Its Greatest Political Asset

By Abubakar I. Hamisu

There is a peculiar cruelty in self-inflicted wounds. The African Democratic Congress entered the 2026 political season as perhaps the most consequential opposition force Nigeria has seen in years. Buoyed by the defection of high-profile figures, widespread disillusionment with the ruling establishment, and a genuine public appetite for an alternative, the party had accumulated a reservoir of goodwill that most Nigerian political parties can only dream of. Then came the primaries.

What unfolded in Kaduna State on 25th May 2026 — and in the disputed conduct surrounding it — offers a sobering case study in how a political party can, in a single act of institutional recklessness, begin to squander the very things that made it credible. The ADC must reckon with this honestly, because the consequences of continued evasion are not merely uncomfortable — they are potentially catastrophic.

I.  The Weight of Expectations

To appreciate the gravity of what is at stake, one must first understand what the ADC represented to millions of Nigerians before these primaries. Here was a party that loudly and repeatedly distinguished itself from the culture of impunity that has long characterised Nigerian party politics. Its guidelines for the conduct of primaries — detailed, comprehensive, and impressively structured — reflected an institutional seriousness rarely seen. Its rhetoric promised transparency where there had been opacity, fairness where there had been manipulation, and internal democracy where there had been imposition. Nigerians, understandably exhausted by the status quo, believed it.

That belief is now under acute stress. And the stress was entirely preventable.

II.  What Went Wrong in Kaduna

The documented record is damning. A formal petition filed by Prof. Muhammad Sani Bello, a cleared governorship aspirant, alleges the deployment of armed thugs at voting centres, systematic compromise of accreditation procedures, multiple voting by the same individuals, deliberate delays that disenfranchised legitimate party members, and partisan conduct by electoral officials. These are not vague grievances — they are specific, numbered allegations supported by agents’ reports, documentary evidence, and video recordings.

More significantly, none of this was unforeseeable. Malam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai, the Kaduna State ADC leader, wrote an urgent letter to the party’s national leadership five days before the election, specifically warning that the composition of the Electoral Committee was compromised, that it included individuals aligned with particular interests, and that proceeding on that basis would produce rejection, division, and avoidable conflict. He recommended a restructured committee with equal representation of all aspirants and a neutral chairman. The party leadership ignored him.

This is not a mere procedural lapse. It is an institutional failure of the highest order — the failure to heed a timely, well-reasoned, written warning from a senior leader. When the predicted crisis materialised, the party had no defence of ignorance to fall back on.

III.  The Structural Contradictions

Beyond the specific allegations, the post-primary period has revealed structural contradictions that compound the problem. The ADC’s own Guidelines, issued under document reference ADC/NWC/PE/001/2026, prescribe a five-member Governorship Election Appeal Committee. The committee actually constituted for Kaduna State has only three members. This means the very body now tasked with adjudicating the petition may itself be improperly constituted under the party’s rules — a fact that could render any decision it makes susceptible to further challenge.

The Guidelines also specify that the Appeal Committee chairman must be a legal practitioner. Whether this requirement was met is a matter that deserves scrutiny. And critically, the Electoral Committee, whose conduct is under challenge, and the Appeal Committee now hearing the challenge, were both appointed by the same National Working Committee whose judgment El-Rufai had already called into question. The structural independence that credible adjudication requires is, at minimum, compromised in appearance, even if not in fact.

These are not technicalities. In a party whose entire brand proposition rests on institutional integrity, such contradictions between prescribed standards and actual practice are deeply corrosive.

IV.  The Broader Danger: Goodwill Is Not Infinite

Political goodwill operates on a logic similar to financial credit — it takes considerable time and consistent behaviour to build, and can be destroyed with alarming speed. The ADC’s current wave of support is real, but it is also fragile, because it is largely aspirational. People have not yet seen the ADC govern; they have invested hope in what it promises to be. That makes its conduct of internal processes not less important but more so, because right now, how the party treats its own members and aspirants is the only tangible evidence voters have of how it will treat citizens if it wins power.

A party that deploys thugs at its own primaries, that ignores the warnings of its own leaders, that constitutes committees in violation of its own guidelines, and that then routes complaints through an Appeal Committee of questionable constitution — that party is not offering voters an alternative to what they already know. It is offering them a more eloquently packaged version of the same thing.

If this perception takes hold, and it is already forming, the consequences will be severe. The ADC’s most valuable assets — the defectors from other parties, the civil society goodwill, the international attention, the young voters mobilising for the first time — are all conditional on the party remaining what it claims to be. Many of these stakeholders have alternatives. They can return to where they came from, or simply disengage entirely. A mass exodus triggered by disillusionment is not a dramatic possibility; it is a rational response to evidence.

V.  The Kaduna Dimension

Kaduna State deserves particular emphasis because it is not simply one state among many. It is a bellwether. It carries the political profile of El-Rufai, whose national name recognition and credibility were among the factors that drew attention to the ADC in the first place. A perception that his influence was marginalised — or worse, that the primary was conducted in a manner designed to sideline his preferred candidates — goes far beyond Kaduna. It sends a signal nationally about who actually controls the ADC’s machinery and whose interests it truly serves.

Kaduna is also a fiercely contested political environment where the ADC had genuine prospects for 2027. Those prospects depend entirely on the party presenting a united, credible front. Disputed primaries, unresolved grievances, and aspirants who feel wronged do not produce united fronts. They produce parallel campaigns, strategic withdrawals of support, and the kind of internal sabotage that Nigerian political parties know all too well.

VI.  The Legal Quagmire

If the internal appeals process fails to deliver justice — either because the Appeal Committee is improperly constituted, or because its decisions lack credibility, or because aggrieved parties escalate externally — the ADC risks entering a web of litigation that will dominate its pre-election period. Court injunctions against the use of a candidate’s name, challenges to the validity of the primary itself, and INEC-related complications arising from disputed results could paralyse the party’s 2027 campaign machinery at the state and national level simultaneously. Nigerian political litigation moves slowly enough that cases filed today can remain unresolved on election day — and an unresolved cloud over a governorship candidate is a gift to opponents.

The ADC’s own Guidelines warn against this explicitly, noting that internal disputes that escalate to court will distract from the electoral mission. That warning is now prophetic.

VII.  What the ADC Must Do

The path forward is not mysterious. The Appeal Committee must act with courage and genuine independence, not as an instrument of ratification for a flawed outcome. If the evidence supports the allegations — and the documented record suggests it substantially does — the committee must say so, clearly and without equivocation. A fresh, properly supervised primary must be ordered.

Beyond Kaduna, the NWC must conduct an honest national audit of how primaries were conducted across other states, and address systemic lapses before they become the subject of additional petitions, legal challenges, and media narratives. The party’s monitoring teams, whose reports must exist, should be scrutinised to understand how these irregularities were either missed or not acted upon.

Most fundamentally, the party must demonstrate — through action, not rhetoric — that its institutional promises are real. Every grievance left unaddressed, every irregular committee decision left standing, every warning from senior leaders left unheeded, chips away at the one thing that no political party can afford to lose and easily regain: the presumption that it is different.

Conclusion

The ADC is at a crossroads that is more consequential than it may yet fully appreciate. The 2027 general elections represent a genuine opportunity to reshape Nigerian politics in ways that matter. But opportunities of this kind are not permanent. They expire. They expire when the public concludes that a party promising change is, in its internal conduct, indistinguishable from what came before.

The clumsy handling of the Kaduna gubernatorial primary is not merely an administrative embarrassment. It is a test of institutional character. Nigerians are watching — not just the outcome of the petition, but how the party responds to it. The ADC still has time to show that its guidelines are not decorative documents, that its leaders’ warnings are not ignored, and that its members’ votes are not disposable commodities. But that time is not unlimited, and it is running.

Sources & References

This essay is an independent commentary based on the following documents: ADC Guidelines for the Conduct of Primary Elections (April 2026, Ref: ADC/NWC/PE/001/2026); Petition by Prof. Muhammad Sani Bello against the conduct of the Kaduna State Governorship Primary Election (27th May 2026); Urgent Message to ADC National Leadership by Malam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai (20th May 2026, ICPC Detention Day 94); ADC Process and Procedure Guide to Electoral Committee Members issued by the National Organising Secretary; State Electoral and Appeal Committees for Kaduna State issued by the ADC National Publicity Secretary.

Beyond Political Party Affiliation 

By Mohammed Usman (Noble-pen)

Let’s talk beyond political party affiliation. Let’s tell ourselves the brutal truth.

Believing that all these people under the shade of one political party, ADC, and many more to move into it, are after the interest of the poor, the masses, instead of themselves, is the gravest mistake one will ever make. 

All these people have their own vested and individual interests, which spurred them to cross-carpet into the party, which seems to them promising, full of potential, and offering vistas for achieving those interests. And you know what? The poor, the masses, are the last thing they think of. Let alone the country’s future. 

Let me give you a practical, relatable elaboration on this by picking the few and the major points among them. Maybe, that way, you will understand what I am trying to say here.

1. Atiku Abubakar 

This person has been investing heavily and persistently in his ambition to become the country’s president. He never reneged since he started. He had been spending billions of naira on it. Therefore, do you sensibly think working for the poor, the masses, will be his top priority when he attains the power he has been so adamantly vying for, instead of looking for a return on his financial and material investment for years before? Don’t forget, he is a business-oriented person. And you should know what I mean. 

2. Nasir El-Rufai 

This person was once one of the cocks of the work of the current brutal government under the auspices of the APC. They entrenched it with their sweat and blood. And he never felt sorry for the poor suffering under the coarse, clueless policies of the government until the government, headed by Tinibu, betrayed him and denied him the opportunity he was dying for: a ministerial post and a place at the driving force of the government. That marked the genesis of his enmity towards the government and turned him into one of its most blunt and fierce foes. Hence, his decision to move to SDP, which refused him, then to ADC. His mission is purely to take vengeance on the government which made him an outcast rather than to save the poor masses from the bondage and shackles of poverty and insecurity, which they have been grappling with for donkey’s years.

3. Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso 

Just like El-Rufai, Kwankwaso is being driven by the force of spite and vendetta over the betrayal he suffered at the hands of his once political apprentice accomplice, Abba Gida Gida. His mission is driven solely by the quest to uproot the government of Abba Gida Gida, rather than by the welfare of the people of Kano State. However, he is a politician with very, very good antecedents. No one can deny that. But he is not into ADC for the masses. No. 

4. Nasiru Gawuna 

This was once an accomplice to the current merciless APC government, who fought a political battle—over his inspiration for the Kano state gubernatorial office—with Kwankwaso and his boy, Abba Gida Gida, but lost to them. He was once their worst enemy. But today, he and the Abba’s boss kwankwaso have leagued up as sweet friends in another political party (ADC) each with different and individual vested interest: kwankwaso to dislodge the assumed betraying government of Abba Gida Gida as well as to occupy an influencial office in the presidency; while Gawuna, to use it as an opportunity to become the kano state governor which he failed to in his previous opposition party APC. 

4. Peter Obi 

This person has the worst political andecedent, being the former governor of Anambra State and has—allegedly— a strong affiliation to IPOB, being the terrorist and outlawed political group in Nigeria, which had been perennially insurgent and rebellious to successive Nigerian governments with their impossible mission of dividing the country and taking their own share, which they aimed to call BIAFRA. So Peter Obi might clearly have this scheme hidden in his mind to, when he tapped the supreme power —presidency—become instrumental for the IPOB to finally make it possible to see the last light —they have been dying and killing people for—at the end of the tunnel, and reach their daydreamed-promised land. Polarising the country is the plot of his horizon. 

Likewise, if you pay very close attention to the other people who will be cross-carpeting into the party, ADC. You will notice that they were once fundamental figures in the previous governments who failed the masses and never took concrete, robust action to save their lives and property. Let alone improving their welfare and standard of living. Tell me, when did they change to be trusted with our mandates and entrusted with our lives once again, simply because they moved into another political party? The same applied to the others who are beneficiaries of the current APC government and are now quitting it for the shining party of the day, ADC.

Let me wrap up by telling you the secret of these Nigerian politicians. 

The fact is, they are always the same set of people.  They only switch color and identity by jumping from one political party to another— using the very public funds they looted while occupying the public offices they were once either elected or appointed into — with romanticized manifestations to sway the minds of the poor masses and pave a wider way for themselves to achieving their vested and selfish interest; increasingly impoverish the already poor masses, steal their future and the future of their children and grandchildren; while enriching themselves, their children and grandchildren, making their lives and future always the brighter.

And mind you, they switch political parties based on their analysis of which political party the poor masses lean their attention and hope towards. This means that it’s always the previous, unchanging enemies the masses mistake for their beloved ones and the beacon of hope, revolution, and transformation. 

Therefore, until the poor citizens of Nigeria understand these Nigerian politicians’ Machiavellian formula and devise a way to dismantle it—instead of continuing with their primitive thinking that their problems lie with one political party and that the solutions are in another—they shall continue to live in bondage, suffering, humiliation and destitution.

Mohammed Usman (Noble-pen) is the Author Of “Butterfly’s Wings.”

El-Rufai, Ribadu and the politics of mutual destruction

By Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu

Nigeria has seen political fallouts before, but few are as unsettling as the growing public rupture between Nasir El‑Rufai and Nuhu Ribadu. What makes the moment troubling is not merely the personalities involved, but what their dispute threatens to do to national cohesion, public trust and the already fragile boundary between politics and security.

If two men who once symbolised reformist zeal and institutional courage now choose a path of mutual destruction, they should pause and reflect—on their faith, their region, and the national interest. Because stripped of rhetoric and television soundbites, this is no longer about governance, security reform or leadership ethics. It is the bare-knuckle politics of succession, alignment and survival ahead of the next election cycle.

There was a time when this clash would have been unthinkable. Both men emerged from the same political generation shaped by the reformist moment of the early 2000s under Olusegun Obasanjo. El-Rufai, the outspoken technocrat as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, and Ribadu, the dogged anti-corruption crusader as Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, were once celebrated as “Obasanjo’s boys”—symbols of a new order that promised discipline, accountability and institutional renewal.

They shared proximity to power, similar access to the president, and a reputation for fearlessness. Their friendship appeared not only political but personal—jolly, confident, mutually reinforcing. That such men could become open adversaries a decade later is not just strange; it is genuinely shocking.

What, then, went wrong? Part of the answer lies in the nature of Nigerian elite politics, where alliances are often forged by circumstance rather than conviction. Power rearranges loyalties. Ambition redraws friendships. And as the political terrain shifts, yesterday’s allies can quickly become today’s obstacles.

But there is a deeper, more consequential problem. When elite rivalries migrate into the realm of security narratives and intelligence insinuations, the damage goes far beyond the individuals involved. Allegations and counter-allegations—especially those touching on surveillance, coercion or misuse of state power—can corrode public confidence in institutions that should remain above partisan struggle.

This is why the current El-Rufai–Ribadu episode deserves sober national reflection, not cheering from partisan sidelines. Nigeria is a country where trust in institutions is already thin. Security agencies operate in an environment of suspicion, insurgency and widespread fear. When senior political actors publicly weaponise security claims—whether substantiated or not—they risk weakening the very structures holding the state together.

It is also important to situate this dispute within the broader northern political landscape. Both men command followings. Both are seen, rightly or wrongly, as voices of influence in the region’s political future. Their feud therefore does not remain personal for long; it reverberates across communities, factions and aspirations. In a region already grappling with insecurity, poverty and political fragmentation, elite infighting of this nature sends the wrong signal.

Faith, too, imposes restraint. Public officials who openly profess moral and religious values must recognise that conduct matters, not just intent. Politics may be a rough trade, but there are lines that, once crossed, are difficult to redraw. The public expects elders of the political class to rise above personal grievances when national stability is at stake.

None of this is to deny that grievances can be real, or that power can be abused. Whistleblowing has its place. Accountability is essential. But there is a difference between principled dissent and public escalation that inflames tension, invites speculation and drags sensitive institutions into political theatre. Mature democracies resolve such disputes through discreet inquiry and institutional processes, not media duels.

Perhaps the most sobering lesson here is how quickly reformist legacies can be overshadowed by personal wars. History is rarely kind to public figures who allow ambition to consume perspective. Nigerians may forget policy details, but they remember conduct—especially when it appears reckless or self-serving.

As the country edges closer to another election cycle, the temptation to settle scores early and loudly will grow. That is precisely why restraint is needed now. The question is not who wins this clash, but what Nigeria loses if it continues.

El-Rufai and Ribadu have both served the Nigerian state at critical moments. Their names are etched into recent political history. They owe the country—and perhaps themselves—something better than mutual ruin. Because when elephants fight, it is not the elephants that suffer most, but the grass beneath them.

Nigeria cannot afford to be that grass.

Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu is a journalist and syndicate writer based in Abuja.