Murja Ibrahim Kunya

By Isma’il Hashim Abubakar, PhD

In my previous article, which predated and possibly heralded the public announcement of the voluntary and, of course, short-lived resignation of Shaykh Aminu Daurawa from his post as the Commandant-General of the Hisbah Board, I challenged what many people alleged to be a political romance between the Kano State Government and Murja Kunya, a rising TikToker who achieved notoriety through her lecherous utterances, unblushing gyrations, and licentious dances that not only defy moral codes but also corrupt the norms and values of Muslim society in northern Nigeria.

In that write-up, described by some as extremely blunt and overly radical, I chronicled a brief history of Hisbah and marshaled the unequal clout the morality police institution used to wield during previous Hisbah commandants and the immense sacrifices each of them made, which ultimately reinforced Hisbah and made it the most enduring and impactful religious bureaucracy established by the government since the return of Shari’ah at the turn of the century. I juxtaposed the achievements of Hisbah during previous leaderships against the commitment of the current command under Daurawa and concluded that the cleric was changing the course of how things used to be before his ascendancy as the Board’s head.

This view gains legitimacy through some of the Shaykh’s public confessions that, unlike during his predecessors’, he has modified and limited the ground operations of Hisbah such that he commands his guards to avoid storming and chasing elites, powerful figures, and places owned by influential personalities, while restricting their raids and arrests to the poor and weak masses who have no one to intervene and secure their release. This, to me, sounds counterproductive and explains why Murja Kunya nearly defeated Hisbah after she was arrested and jailed while awaiting trial, before her mysterious escape from prison.

To be candid and honest, Daurawa’s arrest of Murja was a courageous and commendable move, although certainly itself an act of defiance of a theory he formulated, which showed that he perhaps underrated Murja, and that was why he thought she belonged to the class of powerless masses, the supposed target of Hisbah’s wrath.

Meanwhile, the sudden announcement of Daurawa’s voluntary resignation after Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s public speech, which Daurawa and thousands of listeners received with dismay and interpreted as an authoritative demoralization of Hisbah, was ironically, based on the development that followed the resignation, a blessing in disguise. This awakened not only stakeholders but also remote audiences to the essentialness of the existence and backing of institutions like Hisbah. Having earlier decried Daurawa’s “soft” approach and selective application of his mandate, his resignation should be welcomed by me and those who have reservations about his policies.

However, like many pro-Hisbah fellows, I ironically found his sudden resignation shocking, albeit trying to live by the dictates of my admonition in my previous essay, thanks to the circumstances through which he almost vacated his seat. I spent the whole day after listening to the short clip of the scholar announcing his resignation, contacting and discussing with friends, and deliberating on who might be the right candidate to succeed Daurawa. Some of the names I heard allegedly being peddled and imposed on the conscience of Governor Abba sincerely scared me a lot.

One of those candidates is even a crony and closest representative of an infamous scholar who almost ignited a war in Kano due to his poisonous and blasphemous preachings before he was finally convicted by the court and is now still languishing in jail. It suddenly dawned on me, as it did to thousands of the audience, that Daurawa’s resignation would hardly lead to the reform of Hisbah we crave and the brave and intrepid posture and outlook that we aspire for the head of Hisbah to wear and maintain. In fact, whoever would have succeeded Daurawa would merely do the bidding of the Governor and avoid unleashing Hisbah’s wrath on people connected with the Governor’s political victory, even if they are as worthless as Murja Kunya.

It was this similar feeling and the fear of the decline of Hisbah’s influence that virtually alerted concerned Muslims to wade into the matter and, at different levels, embarked on calls and campaigns to have an understanding between the Governor and his cleric appointee to recant the resignation and to have a rethink on the position and function of Hisbah amidst growing disappointment at how immorality is holding sway in cyberspace and social media domains within the region. The mission for reconciliation sponsored, led, and facilitated by the Coalition of Ulama in Kano, besides the calls for Governor Abba to make peace with the Hisbah boss that stormed different quarters from various constituencies, has been very fruitful.

Sincere happiness and celebration for the triumph of Hisbah are now the stuff that spectators have to feast on these days, with pre- and post-reconciliation group photographs of the Governor, Daurawa, and the peacekeeping team flooding social media from all angles. Daurawa himself expressed happiness that the worries and reservations he earlier nurtured, which likely but also partly justify his diplomatic approach, will now be a thing of the past since there is a renewed commitment from the government to support, empower, and stand with Hisbah.

Daurawa’s recent efforts to synergize the function of Hisbah, mobilize, and secure more support for Hisbah from various groups and levels of people, as expressed in his public address and illustrated by his recent visits to important arms of government, including the Grand Khadis, are chiefly commendable moves.

The gaps created by Murja’s illegal escape from prison, which will hopefully now be checkmated, and the subsequent resignation of Daurawa all evince the previous lack of a commensurate and strong network that Hisbah ought to have had, which would have made its work easier. With the Sultan of Sokoto, the highest Muslim royal figure in Nigeria; top business moguls; prominent Islamic clerics across different sectarian divides; senior government officials; technocrats; academics and intellectuals; as well as the overwhelming majority of concerned Muslims within northern Nigeria all backing Hisbah and pledging unanimous allegiance to its commandant, the Board now has adequate authority to tackle and contain immorality on a larger scale and without, in the slightest sense, any class discrimination.

There is no better time than now to expand the scope of Hisbah and extend its activities to other Muslim states within the region. Sheikh Daurawa will be a very good asset, particularly as he reviews some of his previous approaches, to spearhead an advocacy movement to institute a unified Northwestern Hisbah command or zonal network, officially and legislatively endorsed by state governments in order to effectively counter the rising challenge of immorality that is spread largely on social media platforms.

The approachability, broadmindedness, and openheartedness that informed Governor Abba Kabir’s swift acceptance and accommodation of criticism and correction have restored some hope to the public of having a governor who would combine the leadership qualities of decisiveness, intrepidity, hard work, foresight, wisdom, and clemency at one time—the principal behavioral dispositions, part of which define Engineer Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso and his longtime political counterpart, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau. These are expected to come into play in Abba’s expected commitment toward and prioritization of Hisbah activities, particularly by reforming the administrative aspects of the Board, by first appointing a formidable governing council peopled with members who will be devoted to their job ahead of considering it a political favor through which to get material gratification. The best pool to draw on will be the same peacekeeping team that ensured the reconciliation between the Governor and Hisbah commandant.

Previous senior Hisbah officers as well will be of great importance as part of the governing council. An upward review of the monthly allowance from ten thousand Naira for Hisbah guards, such that it triples their current take-home pay, will be a visible indication that the Governor is now in full support of Hisbah. The Governor will be wiser if he takes singular caution by distancing himself from the pseudo-cleric he appointed as a religious adviser. The opportunist appointee, who is rubbishing Hisbah’s mission by advising his boss to reward Murja Kunya and integrate her into his cabinet, seems to be on a mission to drag the Governor into an unnecessary but suicidal fight with the religious constituency. With elements like this in the corridors of power, the sudden triumph of Hisbah will remain incomplete unless Murja Kunya faces the severe wrath of the law.

Isma’il writes from Rabat, the Kingdom of Morocco and can be reached via ismailiiit18@gmail.com.

By Ibrahiym A. El-Caleel

Resignations are normal in the corporate world. Corporate culture makes employees understand that they work for their bosses, not really the organization per se. Your deliverables are the deliverables of your boss. If you achieve them, he will achieve his. If you fail, he fails. This is why bosses hold employees with high sense of accountability.

As such, employees leave bosses. They don’t really leave organizations. Whenever it goes sour between you and your boss beyond reconciliation, then you look for another job! Take a bow and go. It’s very normal there. That’s what they do. In fact I have met a high performing CEO of one of Nigeria’s beverages companies who told me that he spends a maximum of 5 years in any organization that hires him. And he leaves whenever the ovation is high. Within 15 years of starting his career, he is already an MD/CEO!

It’s only in civil service and public service that people think resignation is a big deal. In corporate world, it’s part of the culture. It is okay for both employee growth and corporate efficiency and effectiveness. An organization does not deserve an employee who is not happy with his job, or who believes his boss is frustrating his job. It impacts corporate performance. You cannot get anything significantly great from an employee who is not motivated to deliver.

Shaikh Daurawa’s resignation from Kano Hisbah is both good for him as an individual, and perhaps Hisbah as an organization. Had he stayed, he will feel tied down by the public condemnation he received yesterday from his boss, Gov Abba Kabir Yusuf. He will not be able to give Kano Hisbah his very best again. He would be an apathetic leader, who no longer cares about how TikTok’s Murja is corrupting the moral upbringing of Kano adolescents. He will now be very doubtful of every single operation he is going to make. What will be the reaction of my boss, Gov Abba? Will he be happy or not? Will he publicly lash me? These questions will always ring a bell in his heart.

Now that he has resigned, he has saved his image and mental peace. It also opens doors for him to greater job opportunities because his next boss will know that the man cannot compromise on his work ethics. It will be part of his discussion with his next boss. And if there’s a governor who truly has interest in moral policing, he would be happy to employ Shaikh Daurawa.

For Kano Hisbah, perhaps Gov Abba will have time to reflect on what he truly wants the organization to be doing under his tenure. Chase alcohol only? Or cut the hair of youth who styled them badly? This resignation gives the governor an opportunity to re-define how the enforcement agency will function in his tenure.

If you ask me, Shaikh Daurawa did very well by resigning. I could have done the same. I wish him the very best in his next job. I also wish Kano Hisbah the very best in getting their next Director-General.

Ibrahiym A. El-Caleel writes from Zaria, Kaduna State.

Isma’il Hashim Abubakar, PhD

If there is one government institution that citizens of Shari’a states in Northern Nigeria ought to regard as their personal property which cannot be politicised and subjected to jeopardy and machination due to its direct relevance and importance in preserving Muslim norms and values, that institution will undoubtedly be the Hisbah Board. 

In other words, by virtue of being Muslims, all Muslims in these states and, of course, in the rest of northern Nigeria are expected to regard themselves as natural and bona fide members of Hisbah, even if they do not wear the Board’s uniform, are not participating in its anti-immorality patrol and of course not in the payroll of government. This, therefore, underscores the collective and societal support and endorsement that Hisbah is supposed to enjoy since its creation and transformation during the tenures of Engineer Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (1999-2003 and 2011-2015) and Malam Ibrahim Shekarau (2003-2011).

During the administration of Shekarau, the time when Hisbah was entirely transformed and formally mainstreamed into government bureaucracy, representing one of the major arms of Shari’a implementation agencies established by the state government, Hisbah Board confronted daunting challenges and opposition from all angles that only a sincere political will, uncommon determination and superior commitment would have saved it from being scrapped.  

Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s President (1999-2007) who opposed the transformation of Hisbah, sought to use all the presidential powers at his disposal to not only thwart the Hisbah from undertaking its task of sanitising the moral climate of Kano but also to proscribe it and mischievously label it as a terrorist organisation. Obasanjo’s wrath on Hisbah was merely a manifestation of his unsuccessful struggle to sabotage the implementation of Shari’a, whose winds had blown with an unprecedented force in 12 northern states. Even Obasanjo’s resort to legal machinery could not abort the Shari’a project. He, willy nilly, oversaw a federal government that had to allocate grants to states whose main priority was to promote moral values and eradicate vices that bedevilled the society, the hallmarks of the Shari’ah program as advocated by its proponents at the turn of the 21^st century.

Obasanjo ultimately banned Hisbah through an announcement by his Inspector General of Police, who also shamelessly alleged that Hisbah guards were trained in Libya, and ordered the arrest of the Hisbah commandant, the late Shaykh Yahaya Farouk Chadi and his deputy Malam Rabo Abdulkarim. The Kano State Government headed by Shekarau gathered all its strength and entered into a decisive battle with the federal government, irrespective of whether this could culminate into a funny, fruitless and audacious fight between a rat and an elephant, leaving no one with a doubt as to where the victory and defeat ordinarily lied. 

After all, Shekarau was pushing for his second term as general elections were approaching, which explains how the attention of Shekarau and his government would be divided. This scenario could be juxtaposed with the climate of anxiety that befell the current governor, Abba Kabir Yusuf, who almost lost hope after the first and second rulings of the tribunal and appeal courts in favour of his opponent, Nasiru Yusuf Gawuna. The development necessitated a momentary pause in regular government activities. It brought about a wild and arbitrary push of things that could be interpreted as valedictory stages of a short-lived tenure. Stability was restored in the psyche of the government and its supporters only after the Supreme Court issued a final verdict that annulled the rulings of both the tribunal and appeal courts and affirmed victory for Abba Kabir Yusuf.

The Shekarau-led government, which, before institutionalising Hisbah, had followed the legislative procedures to get the Board appropriately legalised and signed into law, summoned enough courage to sue the federal government in court. The legal battle ended in favour of the Kano State Government after the court, in March 2007, a few weeks before the elections, described the arrest of the two top heads of Hisbah as illegal and forced the federal government to pay them damages. Nonetheless, allegations had gained currency in Kano by that time that Farouk Chedi, who died in 2010 after a protracted illness that made him look too frail and emaciated, was a consequence of an intravenous poisoning applied to him while in detention. This gradually ravaged him and eventually took his life.

Like Chedi, Chedi’s successor, Shaykh Ibrahim Maibushra, was also a professor at Bayero University, Kano. He built on the intrepid pedestal chartered by his predecessor and the government that recruited him. Maibushra displayed extreme gallantry by, as I was told by a Hisbah guard, going to the extreme of jeopardising his job when he detained an elite belonging to a royal family who was caught committing a crime. 

Maibushra’s zealousness to discharge his duty was, as evidenced by the report above, not limited to the poor whom his guards frequently chased but rather knew no discrimination between the poor and the elite or between the weak and the strong. The suspect remained in Hisbah’s custody, and even after the interference of bigwigs within and outside the royal family, Maibushra stood on his ground and refused to release the man. With the endorsement of the then patriarch and the most respectful royal figure within Nigeria and beyond, Maibushra continued to retain his detainee and treated him the way every Tom, Dick or Harry was ideally treated once he fell into the hands of Hisbah. 

Maibushra, I was told, was so fearlessly courageous to chase and catch not only low-ranking soldiers but also high-ranking officers like army colonels. Of course, needless to say, without the support of the government of the day, the Hisbah commandant would have been in greater trouble. However, it was likely that Maibushra would not have performed contrarily, regardless of whoever held the reins of power at the time.

When Shaykh Aminu Daurawa emerged as the new commandant of Hisbah after the election of Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso in 2011, only ‘pessimistic’ people would doubt his competence and preparedness to at least show equal sacrifice, even if not outshine his predecessors. After all, Daurawa was one of the most outspoken voices who denounced their membership in Shekarau’s Sharia-related committees, criticised the mode of Shari’a implementation of the Shekarau administration and rallied around Kwankwaso, culminating in the latter’s victory against Salihu Sagir Takai, the candidate of the then ruling ANPP. 

There were high hopes that Daurawa would build on Hisbah’s achievements and improve in the areas he criticised in the past administration. Interestingly, although Kwankwaso did not primarily campaign on the Shari’a mantra, the Islamic clerics within his circles, including Daurawa himself, had assured electorates that Kwankwaso would be more forthrightly supportive toward Shari’a implementation since he was believed to be more no-nonsense, fearless and invincible than his predecessor. 

Although there was a relative shortage in the money allocated to Hisbah for running costs and operations, Kwankwaso deserved commendation for reportedly giving Hisbah’s leadership adequate autonomy to carry out operations with little interference. A source from Hisbah confided in me that Kwankwaso admitted being callow about Shariah and Islamic knowledge in general and, as such, gave Islamic clerics within his circle enormous power to decide on any matter relating to religion, including issues affecting public religious institutions to whose leaderships Kwankwaso assigned the various clerics who campaigned for, supported or backed his election bid. With an intrepid head of government like Kwankwaso and with zero challenge from either the federal government or any other visible quarters, Daurawa was expected to leverage the available power and resources of government to improve in areas he unleashed censures on the past administration. 

Of course, mass wedding (auren zawarawa) was one of the main notable projects and inputs which Daurawa’s Hisbah championed. At the same time, all other ground operations and patrols were conducted not better than what was obtained in the Hisbah under the leadership he inherited. Meanwhile, Daurawa was behind the decline in sacrifice in the model of Chedi’s leadership or Maibushra’s flat and indiscriminate approach toward criminals and their cronies among influential partners. 

It was Daurawa who appeared in one video, which still circulates on social media and confessed that as Hisbah commandant, he deliberately avoided arresting the elite and concentrated on the poor because, according to him, the poor are powerless and easy to deal with, unlike the elite who could use their influence to manipulate his sack from the job. In my opinion, this public confession of weakness and a thirst to remain politically relevant, which Daurawa made, partly set the foundations of what Hisbah is going through at this trying moment. 

Daurawa has been the longest-serving Hisbah commandant since its institutionalisation. He served between 2011 and 2015 during Kwankwaso and was reappointed by Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje, serving for more than four years. Even as relations between Kwankwaso and Ganduje worsened, Daurawa, who belongs to Kwankwaso’s camp, was retained at the time. Politicians with political loyalty to Kwankwaso were not carried along. 

Similarly, after resting for only four years throughout the second tenure of Governor Ganduje, which distanced him from the corridors of power, Daurawa successfully reunited with his seat immediately after the emergence of Abba Kabir Yusuf as Ganduje’s successor in May 2023. Although it is an uncomfortable truth that cannot be denied, Daurawa has got so engrossed with his rank in Hisbah more than being too courageous enough to live by the dictates of his old credentials or even at least to maintain the tempo of his predecessors, one of whom had even lost his life in the cause of his Hisbah. In contrast, the second would have lost the job entirely had he not got a superior intervention.

It is precisely this stand and posture that Daurawa is expected to display when tired of the massive campaigns to turn the Muslim north immoral by impolite TikTokers, the Hisbah resorted to preaching and interacting with TikTokers a few months ago with the hope that they shun promoting lewdness and vices which contribute to moral degeneration of northern Muslim society. That was a good move since it would serve as a warning that would justify applying force in bringing TikTokers to order and sanitising the too much spoiled social media space. 

The recent arrest by Hisbah of Murja Ibrahim Kunya, a prominent TikToker, had restored some hope that Hisbah leadership did not only want to, at the time its activities are most needed, remain a timid institution principally different from how it used to be 20 or so years ago. Murja Kunya was taken and presented before the court. It was a relatively good move. Still, it would have been safer and better if she was presented to the court within Hisbah, and of course, this would have saved Hisbah from further disgrace and wanton defeat that resulted from what unfolded later. People woke up on a certain morning in February 2024 with the news that Murja, who was detained in prison and awaiting trial, was arbitrarily released in mysterious circumstances.

Whatever the case and whoever was responsible for her release, someone with even the slightest inkling of the sensitivity of the Hisbah Board and the foundations upon which the institution was set up would never expect a mere arrest of an immoral TikToker would attract the interest of some influential figures within the circle of Kano State Government. Most people rejoiced after Murja’s arrest that the development would mark the end of the ascendance of an empire of vulgarity and obscenity that has taken the grip of northern Muslim social media. 15 or 10-year jail term for Murja, which religiously inclined and Islamic-compliant people prayed Murja would be served with, would have deterred hundreds of TikTokers receiving inspiration from her from treading along her path. 

The release of Murja represents one of the most shameful artificial calamities that Hisbah would witness in its two decades of operation; unless all stakeholders, including the remaining figures in the past administrations and all concerned Muslims, have risen to this big challenge, the decline of Hisbah would be one of the last phases of the fall of Shari’a which started at the turn of the century and reached peak, only to fall to this too low level. Who is Murja Kunya, and how can one ever imagine that she would be an obstacle to Hisbah?  It is disheartening and regrettable that a responsible government in the past would challenge, fight and successfully defeat the Obasanjo-led federal government in a legal battle on Hisbah, but a different, less committed Hisbah leadership cannot fight a mere gullible TikToker.

Daurawa has, during one of his interviews with the press in the aftermath of Murja’s illegal escape from prison, commented that Hisbah has done all within its power, implying that it has no business whatsoever with what transpired afterwards. Although this is partly true, it is altogether unacceptable; Daurawa would have used every means possible to register his protest against the sabotage of Hisbah by a fifth columnist within the government that appointed him. 

There are two reasons for Daurawa’s protest, even though a voluntary resignation would have been a decent solution. Daurawa criticised the Shari’ah implementation process in the past because he was dissatisfied with the government attitude of the day. Now that he was put at the helm of affairs, it would only be reasonable if Hisbah’s principles and values were protected or if he took his leave. Secondly, continuing to remain in a government that has less commitment to eradicating immorality and vices, as illustrated by Murja’s release, would be equal to prioritising one’s position over preserving ideals that one has been preaching for decades.

Finally, although the ugly picture of the fate of Hisbah painted in this essay seems to be discouraging, Hisbah is yet the most visible of all government machinery that has been symbolically and, of course, practically reminding Muslims that Kano and other sister states are still legislatively covered by Sharia. A political will, which we hope will be revived by Kano power brokers, can anytime restore the tempo and spirit of Sharia and decisively tackle and fight the social media agents who have been hell-bent on depriving Muslims of their norms and values. Although very painful to admit, one can say that for now, immorality is gradually winning the war against morality in a society that used to prefer death rather than surrender to a violation and corruption of norms and values. 

One of the most cogent ways of tackling social media immorality, which I hope relevant government agencies like Hisbah will adopt, is having a unified network of a joint task force within Hisbah and similar institutions in some northern states and, if possible, to sign this into law after passing necessary legislative process. This would make it easy for Hisbah to detain criminals everywhere in these states without struggling with issues of arrest warrants and areas of jurisdiction.

Dr Ismail wrote this piece from Rabat, the Kingdom of Morocco and can be reached via ismailiiit18@gmail.com. 

By Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu

I was tagged in a Facebook thread lamenting the perceptions of Hausa popular culture studies by Muhsin Ibrahim on how such a course of action is looked down upon. Indeed, he related personal bad experiences on his encounter with what one might call ‘culture purists’ who do not see anything worthwhile studying about contemporary popular culture. I feel that my response should be enlarged beyond the one I gave in order to reach wider audiences and stimulate debate.

‘So, what exactly is ‘popular culture’? Without being bogged down by technicalities, it is simply what people like. Often referred to also ‘mass culture’. Which differentiates from the ‘elite culture’ preferences of the high order of the society. Elite culture is often favoured because it is seen as cultural representative due to its historical purity. For instance, Shata is an elite culture, while Rarara is a popular culture. Both are singers. But while Shata was a griot whose lyrics represent the historical antecedents of his society and culture, Rarara is a singer whose lyrics represent his pocket.

Thus, everything people do can come under the purview of popular culture – fashion, food, literature, cyberculture, sports, architecture, theatre, drama, films, music, art, you name it, it is popular culture. It is the dominant culture. Some of the universities that teach popular culture in the world include Harvard, Cambridge, MIT, and Stanford, to name some of the top ones, plus thousands of others.

So, why study popular culture? There are many reasons, but one of the most compelling is social awareness. Such a study makes us aware of important social issues. You may not follow Hausa TV show operas, but they illuminate critical tensions within communities, and some reflect the ideals of the political culture; Ado Ahmad Gidan Dabino’s “Kwana Casa’in” is a case in point. Mediated popular culture gives creators opportunities to be creative.

Thus, popular culture can raise awareness about important social issues. TV shows, films, and music often address topics like discrimination, environmental concerns and mental health, sparking discussions and encouraging positive change. For instance, in Kano in early 2023, AA Rufai Bullgates [sic], an individual with mental health issues, became a popular culture media celebrity due to his delusions of grandeur; at one stage, he bought Kano State for ‘gangaliyan’ naira – his coinage. It took social media to make people aware of the extent of his illness – and stop exploiting his guile.

The contempt with which we approach studies of Hausa popular culture – or, let me modify, modern/contemporary culture – allowed a big room for others to be experts on us. In this way, researchers such as Mathias Krings, Carmen McCain, Novian Whitsitt, Brian Larkin and Graham Furniss came to dominate the documentation of Hausa popular culture.

In 2007, I was a visitor to Graham Furniss’s house in London for lunch, and I was blown away by a bookshelf covering a whole wall devoted to his documentation of Hausa romantic (soyayya) fiction containing over one thousand volumes. In Kano, we refused even to acknowledge such novels existed, and at one conference, I heard a University librarian describing them as ‘trash’. Now, if you want to study the earlier novels in the genre, you can only find them in the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, courtesy of Graham Furniss – while they are not available at Bayero University, Kano.

Novian Whitsitt, an American, became an expert on the feminist ideologies of Bilkisu Salisu Ahmed Funtuwa and Balaraba Ramat Yakubu – two wonderful and brilliant female writers we ignored. He made a name out of researching their novels – and he had to learn the Hausa language first before he could even read the novels. In Kano, where we speak Hausa, we looked down on these writers. Now, if you want any reference to the works of these ladies, you have to go to Amazon for his books, for he is considered an expert on Hausa feminist writers.

Matthias Krings collected more Hausa cinema tapes than any European researcher and established a vibrant Hausa film reference library at Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, Germany, where he is based. In Kano, we refused even to acknowledge that Hausa film is worth studying – until we gave the study a shove and held an international conference on Hausa films in 2003 – the first of its kind in the whole of Africa in studying an indigenous African language film industry. Even the practitioners – filmmakers, producers, directors – don’t see the value in studying their works, believing that such is done to denigrate them rather than a critical analysis of their art. When I established Yahoo! Groups social network in 2001 – long before Facebook – those who entered the group were constantly fighting us for studying their art.

In any event, it was Brian Larkin from New York who even opened up the doors in 1997 with his brilliant paper, “Indian Films and Nigerian Lovers: Media and the Creation of Parallel Modernities.” Soon enough, he became the only reference point on the emergence of modern-mediated Hausa popular culture. I could go on, but you get the point.

As for music, no one cared – until the Talibanic censorship regime from 2007 to 2013 in Kano favourably enabled the separation of Nanaye soundtrack music from Hausa films, creating an independent Hausa Afropop music genre. It also led to the emergence of Rap music among young Hausa lyricists in 2013 – the year of creative freedom for Hausa popular culture. Billy-O produced the biggest hit Hausa Afropop hit of the year with ‘Rainy Season’, producing a brilliant Engausa song accompanied by Maryam Fantimoti.

No attempt was made to internationalise the study of the emergent music genres by anyone. They were all obsessed with studies of the songs of griot acoustic musicians, believing that the Afropop genre was a passing fad. Seeing a room for documentation, I entered into the field. In any event, I was considered a loose cannon in the whole Hausa ‘adabi’ canon. Luckily for me, my foray into Hausa popular culture, or ’Adabin Hausa’ as they often call it (while I prefer ‘Nishaɗin Hululu as the Hausa term for popular culture), was from the prisms of Stuart Hall (Birmingham School) and Frankfurt School critical theory perspectives.

Most importantly, I was analysing popular culture as a mass-mediated communication, rooting myself firmly in communication theories. I was not interested in etymology, morphology, syntax, grammar, pragmatics, stylistics or other branches of the study of literature in my analysis (I profess ignorance of these branches). My focus was that something was happening; it was providing a stethoscope on the social awareness pulse. We need to document it. It was no longer acceptable to let others become experts on us.

Thus, studying or even debating mediated popular culture was definitely frowned upon in northern Nigeria. I believe I am one of the few flying the flag of the discipline – such that it has now crept its way into a university curriculum. Next semester (December 2022/23), I will be teaching M.Sc. Popular Culture in the Department of Mass Communication – one of the very few Departments in the country courageous and bold enough to do so. It’d be a fully interactive class, touching all aspects of what gives us social awareness through mediated popular culture.

Now, to the question of Murja Ibrahim Kunya, a TikTok influencer who speaks at more than 100 km per second. She is important enough to have a Wikipedia page. Dr. Muazu Hassan Muazu was one of the lecturers teaching the EEP 4201 – Venture Creation and Growth course in the School of General and Entrepreneurship Studies (SGES), Bayero University Kano. We once taught the course together. In the first semester (2022/2023) examination, question #5 went like this: “Murja Kunya and Me Wushirya are bloggers who trend by causing scandalous contents on their social media handles, for that reason, they are given advertisement jobs. If they do that, they become – (a) influencer marketers, (b) brand ambassadors, (c) trading agents, (d) marketing managers.” Students are to choose one which they believe was the correct answer.

What drew attention was the focus on the activities of TikTokers – activities not taken seriously, especially those of Murja Kunya, who elicited different reactions from different people. One posting on Facebook even labelled her a mental health patient. And yet, here, a university is asking academic questions about their activities. The entire 70-item question paper included references to various brands – KEDCO, Rufaidah, Salima Cake, A.A. Rano, L&Z Yoghourt, Sahad Stores, MTN, Chicken Republic, and so on. All these are marketing HUBS. Why not TikTokers?

Marketers are looking for audiences – notice how those silly and irritating videos pop up on news sites on your device to attract your attention. Dr. Mu’azu’s inclusion of cyber popular culture in his course – and Chicken Republic, dealing with food, IS part of popular culture – to me, is a brilliant acknowledgement of popular culture and its social relevance. Crazy, drugged, attention-seeker or not, people follow Murja Kunya. That means audiences, that means market – making her a perfect vehicle to advertise products. So, what’s wrong with that? If a woman frying ƙosai by the roadside has the same level of audience attraction, we should also acknowledge her as a marketing potential. That does not mean we endorse what they do – it means we are interested in reaching out to their audiences to buy our products.

Without pop culture, we wouldn’t be able to understand generations, so knowing gives us all a better understanding. Overall, a critical analysis of pop culture and media can help to shed light on the ways in which media interacts with society and can help to promote a more informed and nuanced understanding of media’s role in shaping our world.

Now, print Ale Rufa’is Bullgates gangaliyan note and purchase your village.