Muhammadu Buhari

By Usman Shehu

It seems to me that there is some kind of realignment, knowingly or unknowingly, against Atiku Abubakar, the ADC presidential candidate and one of the leading opposition contenders. But, as they say, there is no smoke without fire.

I have followed with awe and listened carefully to politicians, activists, and experts on different platforms explaining, with conviction, why Atiku should not contest the presidency on the grounds of power rotation. Their main argument is that since former President Muhammadu Buhari, who is from the northern part of the country, spent eight years in office, it is only fair to allow the South to complete its own eight years before power returns to the North. Initially, this was not worrisome. But the argument has gathered momentum and continued to unfold in unanticipated ways.

I was struck by the extent to which the debate over regional rotation has come to dominate the political conversation, with several parties fielding southern candidates and influential voices insisting that the South should retain the presidency until 2031. Some argue that this arrangement could strategically benefit Atiku by making him the only strong candidate from the North. Others believe that it could make his ambition considerably more difficult.

Whatever the calculations, the question remains: Are these political actors genuinely motivated by fairness and national cohesion, or are some of them only pursuing their personal interests?

Even among northerners who have traditionally spoken about integrity, fairness, and democratic choice, there appears to be considerable support for the argument that the South should complete its turn. Everyone seems to be talking about power rotation, while relatively little attention is being paid to the competence, capacity, character, and policy choices of the candidates.

In their effort to counter this argument, Atiku’s supporters have pointed out that, since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the distribution of presidential power between the North and the South has not been as straightforward as some advocates of rotation suggest. This is a legitimate point.

Olusegun Obasanjo governed from 1999 to 2007, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua from 2007 to 2010, Goodluck Jonathan from 2010 to 2015, and Muhammadu Buhari from 2015 to 2023. Bola Tinubu assumed office in 2023. The death of Yar’Adua and the subsequent completion of his term by Jonathan make any simple calculation of regional entitlement more complicated.

Should we, therefore, count the entire period since 1999, or should we treat Buhari’s eight years as the beginning of a new political cycle that the South must now complete? And who determines the rules by which this rotation should be measured?

There is a Hausa saying that goes, “In ka san na faɗa, ba ka san na mayar wa ba,” which roughly means, “You may know what to say, but you cannot predict the response.” This proverb captures the difficulty of the present debate. Every argument invites a counterargument, and every political arrangement creates expectations that others may interpret differently.

But perhaps we are spending too much time debating which region should produce the next president and too little time asking what the next president should actually do for the country. Power rotation has its merits. In a country as diverse as Nigeria, it can help build trust, encourage inclusion, and reassure different parts of the country that they will not be permanently excluded from the highest office. Those are legitimate concerns that should not be dismissed.

However, power rotation is an informal political convention, not a constitutional requirement that bars a qualified Nigerian from contesting the presidency because of where he comes from. More importantly, a convention intended to promote fairness should not become an end in itself, divorced from the quality of leadership it produces. A southern candidate is not automatically competent because the South is entitled to its turn. Neither is a northern candidate automatically disqualified from offering a better alternative because it is not his region’s turn. The question should be whether regional rotation is a guiding principle to be balanced with other considerations or a rule that overrides every other consideration, including the will of the electorate.

The more important question is whether the arguments being advanced can withstand scrutiny independently of the interests of those making them. Would the same people defend the principle of rotation if it worked against their preferred candidate or political allies? Would they insist on it even if voters overwhelmingly preferred a candidate from another region? These are legitimate questions in a political environment where principle and ambition can sometimes be difficult to separate.

Yet the debate should not be reduced to an accusation that everyone advocating rotation has a hidden agenda. Some people sincerely believe that respecting the South’s claim to eight years in office is necessary for national cohesion. Others may believe that opening the contest to candidates from every region offers a better chance of producing competent leadership. Both positions deserve to be examined on their merits. The real issue arises when a principle meant to promote inclusion becomes a means of narrowing democratic choice without a corresponding commitment to good governance.

If democracy is to function as it should, the preferences of political elites must not be allowed to substitute for the will of the people. Parties may establish conventions, negotiate alliances, and consider regional sensitivities, but the ultimate purpose of an election is to allow citizens to choose their leaders. That choice, however, is not made in a political vacuum.

Political elites control party structures, raise campaign funds, negotiate alliances, influence public debate, and often determine which candidates have a realistic chance of competing. They can shape the choices available to voters long before election day. Religious leaders, traditional institutions, business interests, and local political networks can also influence how people understand their interests and exercise their votes.

This is why the debate over 2027 cannot be understood simply as a contest between the masses and the elite. The two are interconnected. Voters may support a candidate backed by powerful politicians because they genuinely believe in that candidate, because they expect material benefits, because of regional or religious loyalties, or because they see no credible alternative.

The challenge is to determine when popular support reflects an independent assessment of a candidate and when it is being shaped by patronage, inducements, misinformation, or the absence of meaningful alternatives.

The Economist recently published an article whose headline captured an important contradiction in Nigerian politics: Nigerians may dislike their president and still re-elect him. That possibility should make us cautious about assuming that widespread dissatisfaction will automatically translate into electoral defeat for the incumbent.

A government can become unpopular without its opponents becoming more credible. Citizens can be frustrated with economic hardship and insecurity while remaining divided over which alternative to support. They can want a change of government but disagree profoundly about the person or party best suited to replace it. This is one of the most important questions facing the opposition in 2027.

For Atiku Abubakar, the challenge is therefore twofold. He must answer those who argue that a northern presidency would violate the spirit of regional rotation, but he must also persuade Nigerians that he offers a credible alternative to the incumbent government. It is not enough to argue that the Constitution permits him to contest or that the historical distribution of power does not justify excluding him. Those arguments establish his right to compete; they do not, by themselves, establish why Nigerians should elect him.

Atiku has criticised the economic consequences of petrol subsidy removal and proposed a different approach that would support domestic refining and make petroleum products more affordable. The proposal raises an important question about how government can reduce the cost of living while encouraging domestic production. But voters are entitled to ask how much such a policy would cost, how it would be funded, how eligibility would be determined, and what safeguards would prevent a return to the opacity and waste associated with the previous subsidy regime.

The same scrutiny should apply to his wider economic programme. What specific measures would he adopt to create jobs, expand electricity supply, improve education and healthcare, and strengthen the purchasing power of ordinary Nigerians? How would he finance these commitments without creating unsustainable fiscal pressures? What would he do differently from the current administration, and how would Nigerians measure the results?

His experience as a former vice-president may count in his favour, as may his familiarity with government and national politics. But experience alone does not guarantee good leadership. His record, proposals, political alliances, and capacity to build a government that serves the public interest should all be open to examination. The same standards must apply to Bola Tinubu and every other presidential contender. Incumbency, regional identity, political experience, and campaign promises should not exempt any candidate from questions about competence, integrity, feasibility, and accountability.

The opposition also faces a practical problem. Even when many Nigerians are dissatisfied with the government, their votes may be divided among several candidates. If opposition parties cannot build effective cooperation, agree on a credible programme, and mobilise voters across regional boundaries, the incumbent may benefit from their fragmentation.

A successful electoral challenge requires more than public anger. It requires an alternative that voters can understand and trust, an organisation capable of reaching them, and a strategy that converts dissatisfaction into votes. It also requires credible commitments on electoral integrity and a willingness by political actors to respect the outcome of a legitimate contest.

This is where the role of the political elite becomes especially important. Their networks and resources can either help create a credible alternative or prevent one from emerging. They can mobilise citizens around public policy, or they can mobilise them around ethnic loyalties, regional grievances, personal ambition, and the distribution of political favours. The question is not whether elites will influence the election. They inevitably will. The question is whether their influence will strengthen democratic competition or undermine it.

Nigeria is not terminally ill, and the defeat of an incumbent president is not without precedent. The country has demonstrated that political power can change hands through elections. Yet the political terrain in 2027 presents its own difficulties. Economic hardship and public dissatisfaction may create an opportunity for the opposition, but opportunity is not the same as victory. A divided opposition, an incumbent with extensive political networks, and a campaign dominated by arguments over regional entitlement could all prevent voters from focusing on the substantive issues that matter most to their lives.

Meanwhile, ordinary Nigerians continue to grapple with the cost of food. As Sule Lamido wrote in his book Being True to Myself: “On the economy, whatever the government may say, to the ordinary man, the health of the economy is the measure of ingredients in his cooking pot.” For many families, this and other concerns are more immediate than whether the next president comes from the North or the South.

That does not mean questions of regional fairness are irrelevant. It means they should be considered alongside the practical demands of governing a country in which millions of people are asking for security, opportunity, affordable living, and a government that responds to their needs. Ultimately, the legitimacy of a president cannot rest on regional entitlement alone. It must also rest on the quality of leadership, the credibility of the mandate, and the ability to deliver results.

As the 2027 election approaches, the political elite will come bearing their alliances, influence, inducements, and promises. Some will appeal to fairness and national unity; others will invoke experience, competence, or the need for change. Some will mobilise voters through established political networks, while others will seek to build new coalitions around public dissatisfaction.

The question is whether Nigerians will have credible alternatives and sufficient freedom to judge these competing claims on their merits. Will they be able to distinguish promises from realistic programmes, political patronage from public service, and regional entitlement from genuine capacity to govern? Will they vote according to their assessment of the country’s needs, or will the choices available to them once again be shaped primarily by the preferences and interests of the political elite?

Perhaps the more fundamental question is this: when Nigerians go to the polls in 2027, will they possess the information, credible alternatives, political organisation, and freedom necessary to translate their preferences into an electoral outcome that reflects their collective interests?

That is the real test of Nigeria’s democracy. Not simply whether power rotates between the North and the South, or whether a particular candidate succeeds in his presidential ambition, but whether the people can meaningfully influence who governs them and hold that person accountable for what follows.

Usman M. Shehu writes from Kano State, Nigeria, and can be reached via usmanmujtabashehu@gmail.com.

By Sabiu Abdullahi

The National Industrial Court (NIC) in Lagos has directed the Nigerian Army to reinstate 70 soldiers who were convicted by courts-martial in 2014 but later received an unconditional presidential pardon from the late former President Muhammadu Buhari.

Justice Sanda Yelwa delivered the judgment on July 20. The court held that the presidential pardon granted under Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution nullified the soldiers’ convictions, prison sentences and dismissals from service. The ruling stated that the pardon restored their legal status and entitled them to return to the Nigerian Army.

The judgment followed a suit filed by the 70 soldiers against the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The case, marked NICN/LA/54/2023, challenged the military authorities’ failure to reinstate them despite the presidential pardon.

A statement issued on Monday by Tayo Soyemi of Falana & Falana Chambers, counsel to the claimants, said the soldiers sought declarations that the pardon invalidated their convictions and dismissals. They also asked the court to compel the Nigerian Army to reinstate them and pay their outstanding salaries and allowances from December 17, 2014.

The soldiers had faced trial before different courts-martial in 2014 over allegations of conspiracy and mutiny. They were initially sentenced to death, but the sentences were later reduced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

After completing their prison terms, Buhari granted them an unconditional presidential pardon through the Instrument of Grant of Pardon, 2022, which appeared in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette dated July 29, 2022.

According to the statement, Falana & Falana Chambers wrote to the Chief of Army Staff on November 7, 2022, to request the soldiers’ reinstatement and payment of their entitlements. The legal firm said the letter was acknowledged, but the Army did not act on the request.

Funmi Falana, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), argued on behalf of the claimants that the presidential pardon removed every legal consequence of the convictions, including their dismissal from service.

The Federal Government, represented by Omobolanle Aina, opposed the suit. It argued that although a presidential pardon forgives an offence and restores civil rights, it does not erase the fact that a conviction occurred or automatically qualify a beneficiary for reinstatement.

The statement also noted that the Chief of Army Staff neither entered an appearance nor filed a defence before the court.

In his judgment, Justice Yelwa held that the official gazette was sufficient proof that all 70 soldiers benefited from the presidential pardon. He also ruled that the Nigerian Army failed to challenge the evidence presented or explain why the request for reinstatement was ignored.

The court found that the soldiers’ dismissal resulted directly from their convictions by the courts-martial. It held that the dismissals could no longer stand after the presidential pardon.

Justice Yelwa stated that although the process of reinstatement remained an administrative responsibility of the Nigerian Army, the soldiers had acquired an enforceable legal right to return to service because the constitutional obstacle to their employment no longer existed.

However, the court rejected the claim for salaries covering the period between December 17, 2014, and July 17, 2022. It ruled that the soldiers could not claim salaries for the period they were imprisoned because they did not perform official duties. The judge also noted that the instrument granting the presidential pardon did not provide for retrospective salary payments.

The court subsequently ordered the immediate reinstatement of the 70 soldiers with effect from July 18, 2022. It also directed the defendants to pay all salaries, allowances and other entitlements due to the soldiers from that date until they are formally reinstated.

By Nasiru Ibrahim 

Nigeria’s debt situation has become more confusing and concerning in recent years. After removing fuel subsidies, which had always been used to justify heavy borrowing, many expected a change in direction. But surprisingly, debt has continued to rise—and sharply. 

In less than two years, Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration has added over ₦62 trillion to our total debt. This comes on top of Muhammadu Buhari’s already heavy debt legacy. Yet if you check the 2025 budget, it still carries a huge deficit. This is despite relatively stable oil prices and a slight improvement in crude oil production. So, something is clearly not adding up.

How can a country that has removed one of its biggest expenditures—fuel subsidies—still be borrowing more than ever? Is it that the revenue reforms aren’t working, or is this a deeper issue with how we manage our economy? These are real questions that need honest answers. The reality is that Nigeria’s current borrowing trend is worrying not just because of the amount, but also because of the manner in which it’s happening and what it reflects.

According to the Debt Management Office, as of March 31, 2025, Nigeria’s public debt stood at ₦149.39 trillion. Tinubu alone has added ₦62.01 trillion to that figure in under two years. Now, let’s compare that with previous administrations: Goodluck Jonathan borrowed ₦5.9 trillion in five years. Buhari borrowed ₦74.78 trillion in eight years—including the controversial “Ways and Means” borrowing from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). That’s how bad things have gotten.

“Ways and Means” are short-term loans from the Central Bank to the Federal Government, intended to cover urgent expenses such as paying salaries or addressing unexpected shortfalls. Think of it like an overdraft facility. But the law is clear—the CBN Act, 2007 (Section 38) states that the Federal Government can only borrow up to 5% of the previous year’s revenue from the CBN, and it must be repaid in the same year. Under Buhari, this law was ignored. His government borrowed ₦22.7 trillion through Ways and Means, without obtaining proper approval from the National Assembly.

This ₦22.7 trillion had not been reflected in official debt figures for a long time. It only became part of Nigeria’s domestic debt record in May 2023, when Buhari’s government securitised it—basically converted it into long-term bonds. That move alone caused the total public debt to jump from ₦44.06 trillion at the end of 2022 to ₦87.38 trillion by June 2023. That’s a massive increase in just six months.

Now, some economists argue that Tinubu’s debt figures appear worse primarily due to the exchange rate. That argument is simple: Nigeria borrows in foreign currencies, such as the dollar, euro, or yuan, but records the debt in naira. So when the naira weakens, the same dollar loan becomes much bigger in naira terms.

Let’s look at the exchange rate across administrations. Under Jonathan, the exchange rate was around ₦ 157 to $1 in 2015. Under Buhari, the exchange rate was ₦770/$ in 2023. And under Tinubu, the exchange rate is now approximately ₦1536/$ as of 2025. So when you convert the same external loan, the naira value explodes as the currency weakens. Just this exchange rate movement has added ₦29.75 trillion to Tinubu’s external debt and ₦5.9 trillion to Buhari’s.

To properly check if the debt spike is mainly due to FX changes, let’s fix the exchange rate at ₦157/$ for all the administrations and see how much was actually borrowed. The formula is simple:

Old Dollar Debt × New Exchange Rate – Old Dollar Debt × Old Exchange Rate.

Using the DMO’s external debt figure of $38.81 billion in 2023:
$38.81bn × ₦770 = ₦29.85 trillion
$38.81bn × ₦1536 = ₦59.63 trillion
₦59.63 trillion – ₦29.85 trillion = ₦29.78 trillion

So, if the exchange rate had remained at ₦157/$, Nigeria’s external debt of $42.46 billion in 2025 would have been approximately ₦6.6 trillion. Under that fixed exchange rate, Jonathan’s total external borrowing would have been approximately ₦1.07 trillion over five years. Buhari’s about ₦4.48 trillion in eight years.

Tinubu’s about ₦1.12 trillion in under two years. This means if Tinubu continues at this pace, he’ll hit Buhari’s figure—₦4.48 trillion—in about eight years. Yes, the exchange rate plays a significant role. But that’s not the whole story.

Others argue that Tinubu’s debt problem is not just about FX. It’s also about spending discipline. Unlike Buhari, Tinubu removed fuel subsidies and slightly increased oil production (1.5–1.6 million barrels per day, compared to Buhari’s average of 1.2–1.3 million barrels), and customs and tax revenue also improved. Buhari faced more challenging conditions—global oil crashes, two recessions in 2016 and 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, and high subsidy payments—during his early years. So, Tinubu had more room to save, but instead, borrowing has increased.

The 2025 budget projects a deficit of ₦13.08 trillion. It assumes oil at $77.96 per barrel and production of 2.06 million barrels per day. However, in reality, March production was only 1.65 million barrels per day, including condensates. And as of July 8, Brent crude was $70.20 and WTI was $68.42—both below the assumed price. That means revenue projections may fall short, and the government will likely borrow even more.

Tinubu has already requested $21.6 billion in new loans. In May 2025, Reuters reported that he also asked the National Assembly to approve loans of €2.2 billion, ¥15 billion (approximately $104 million), and an additional $2 billion in domestic loans. That’s not all.

The Federal Government also secured a $747 million syndicated external loan to fund Phase 1, Section 1 of the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway—from Victoria Island to Eleko Village. At ₦1536/$, this loan adds ₦1.147 trillion to the debt. The lenders include Deutsche Bank, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Afreximbank, and Zenith Bank, among others. The Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC) is providing insurance. That brings Tinubu’s total borrowing to about ₦63.157 trillion in under two years.

This highway is being built under a Public-Private Partnership using an EPC+F model. The road is over 70% complete and is designed using CRCP technology—concrete with a 50-year lifespan and low maintenance requirements. While the loan adds to debt, it shows some confidence from global investors and introduces a financing model that shares risk between the government and private firms.

Now to the bigger picture. As of 2024, Nigeria’s debt-to-GDP ratio is around 25.1%, based on ₦144.67 trillion in debt and a nominal GDP of about $375 billion. That means debt accounts for about one-quarter of the economy—not yet alarming, but becoming risky if borrowing continues at this rate. What’s more worrying is the cost of servicing debt.

In 2024, debt service took up 4.1% of GDP—up from 3.7% in 2023 (AfDB report). That’s a lot. Imagine 4.1% of the entire economy going towards just paying off debt, instead of building schools, roads, or hospitals. Even worse, the debt service-to-revenue ratio rose from 76.86% in 2023 to 77.4% in 2024 (APA News). This means more than three-quarters of government revenue is now used to repay debt. That leaves very little for anything else. That’s not sustainable.

As Economics graduates, the way forward is clear. First, we need to depoliticise how we manage public finances. Countries like Chile, Sweden, and the UK have independent Fiscal Councils that enforce rules like debt limits and balanced budgets. Nigeria needs something like that to restore discipline and rebuild investor trust.

Second, loans must be tied to development goals—not used for consumption. Borrowing should be used for essential services like roads, electricity, and digital infrastructure, rather than paying salaries or covering bloated administrative costs. Rwanda and Ethiopia have shown how debt used for infrastructure can boost exports and growth. A cost-benefit analysis should accompany every loan.

Third, we must cut waste and off-budget liabilities. That includes fuel subsidies, failing state-owned enterprises, and unauthorised bailouts. Ghana passed a Fiscal Responsibility Act in 2018, capped its deficit at 5% of GDP, and ran audits that exposed massive leakages. Nigeria can cut borrowing by 30–40% just by following that path.

Fourth, improve tax collection—not by harassing small traders, but through fairness and the use of technology. Indonesia raised its tax-to-GDP ratio by digitising filing, automating risk detection, and linking tax IDs with national identity numbers. Nigeria can do the same—target high earners and multinationals instead of informal workers.

Fifth, public-private partnerships and syndicated loans, such as the Lagos-Calabar road, shouldn’t be used to conceal debt. They should help us attract private capital, share risks, and deliver real development. Countries like Morocco and Kenya make their PPP contracts public. Nigeria should also strive for greater transparency.

Finally, if things get out of hand, we can consider debt restructuring—but only as a last resort and if tied to fundamental reforms. Ghana restructured its debt in 2023 by extending maturities and cutting interest under IMF guidance. But what made it work was reform—cutting subsidies and improving tax systems. Without reform, restructuring solves nothing.

This is the time for Nigeria to act. If we continue on this path, we are only postponing a more profound crisis. But with the right decisions, we can still change direction.

Ibrahim is a graduate of Economics from Bayero University, Kano. He can be reached via nasirfirji4@gmail.com.

By Uzair Adam

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has announced the renaming of the University of Maiduguri in honour of former President Muhammadu Buhari, who passed away at the age of 82.

The Daily Reality reports that the institution will now be called Muhammadu Buhari University, Maiduguri.While presiding over a special session, President Tinubu delivered an emotional tribute, describing the late leader as a man of discipline, moral strength, and patriotism.

He acknowledged that Buhari was not without flaws but maintained that his legacy of integrity, restraint, and honourable leadership would endure.

Speaking before cabinet ministers and other top government officials, Tinubu praised Buhari’s austere style and his resistance to the temptations of power.

He noted that the former president “stood always ramrod—unmoved by the temptation of power, unseduced by applause, and unafraid of the loneliness that sometimes comes to those who do what is right rather than popular.”

Reflecting on their political partnership, Tinubu recalled how their alliance helped achieve Nigeria’s first peaceful democratic transition of power in 2015.

He described Buhari’s leadership during that period as dignified, adding that he carried the burdens of office with grace and humility.

While recognising that every legacy will face scrutiny, Tinubu emphasized that Buhari’s incorruptibility and patriotic service must serve as a benchmark for future leaders.

“The incorruptible standard he represented will not be forgotten,” he reaffirmed.The Federal Executive Council session concluded with prayers and a moment of silence.

Across the nation, tributes from political figures, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens continued to pour in, honouring Buhari’s life of service.

According to President Tinubu, renaming the university in Borno State is both symbolic and strategic, as the region was central to Buhari’s counter-insurgency and rebuilding efforts during his presidency.

By Sabiu Abdullahi

Respected columnist and political analyst, Farooq Kperogi, has claimed that former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and his wife, Aisha Buhari, were divorced before the former leader’s death.

In a piece titled “Aisha Buhari, Divorce, and Forgiveness Claim,” Kperogi wrote, “What I do know is that before Buhari’s death, he and Aisha were no longer married. They had divorced, and Aisha reverted to her maiden name, Aisha Halilu.”

According to Kperogi, signs of their separation had been evident since Buhari left office. He noted that Aisha did not accompany Buhari to Daura after his retirement and was absent when he later moved to Kaduna.

“If you paid close attention, you would notice that Aisha didn’t go to Daura when he retired to the town after leaving office. Buhari was also alone when he later relocated to Kaduna,” he stated.

He also revealed that when Buhari’s health declined in London, Aisha initially hesitated to travel to him.

“She reportedly hesitated because she was no longer his wife. She eventually went in the last few days before he died, but only after intense persuasion,” Kperogi claimed.

Commenting on the days following Buhari’s death, Kperogi noted that Aisha appears uncertain about her place in the ongoing mourning.

“Even now, during this period of mourning, she seems understandably conflicted about her role,” he said.

Neither Aisha Buhari nor the Presidency has responded to the claims, but the statement has stirred public interest in a part of Buhari’s life that remained largely shielded from public view during his presidency.

By Anas Abbas

Saudi Arabia’s leadership has extended heartfelt condolences to Nigeria in the wake of the death of former President Muhammadu Buhari.

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, along with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, both conveyed their sympathies through formal messages to Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu.

Their messages reflect deep sorrow over the loss of the former leader.

In a statement released on Monday, King Salman expressed his “deepest condolences and sincere sympathy” to President Tinubu, the Nigerian populace, and Buhari’s family.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman echoed these sentiments in a separate message, emphasizing the enduring respect and historical connections between Saudi Arabia and Nigeria.

He stated, “I extend to Your Excellency, the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the family of the deceased my deepest condolences and sincere sympathy.”

The Crown Prince commended Buhari for his decades of public service, particularly noting his role in enhancing Nigeria’s political stability and national security.

Muhammadu Buhari, who served as Nigeria’s president from 2015 to 2023 and previously led as a military ruler in the 1980s, passed away on Sunday at the age of 82 following a brief illness.

Known for his staunch anti-corruption measures and efforts to combat insurgency in northeastern Nigeria, Buhari leaves behind a legacy characterized by strong governance and national pride.

President Bola Tinubu, who succeeded Buhari, referred to him as a “patriot and statesman who prioritized national interest above all else.” In honor of the former president, the Nigerian government has declared a period of national mourning.

A state funeral is set to take place on Tuesday in Buhari’s hometown of Daura, Katsina State, with dignitaries and representatives from around the globe anticipated to attend.