By Iranloye Sofiu Taiye
The crackle of gunfire shattered the night’s calm in Patigi Local Government Area last August. For hours, residents hid in terror as militants believed to be linked to the Mahmuda terrorist faction ransacked homes and farms, leaving behind a trail of displacement and despair. This wasn’t in conflict-ridden Zamfara or Borno. This was Kwara State, Nigeria’s so-called “State of Harmony”, now facing the brutal reality of spillover violence from neighbouring conflicts.
For years, Kwara has been regarded as an oasis of peace. While northern states battled insurgencies and northwestern states negotiated with bandits, Kwara’s security strategy primarily relied on these measures. This complacency is now our greatest vulnerability. As armed groups face increasing pressure in Nigeria’s northwest and the Sahel, they are seeking new territories and routes, and Kwara’s under-protected border communities present the perfect opportunity.
The data reveals an alarming trend: while Kwara recorded 70 violent incidents in 2024, representing a sharp increase from previous years, with ACLED data showing 21 fatalities signalling emerging threats. Meanwhile, neighbouring Niger State suffered 179 incidents with 514 deaths, over 2.5 times Kwara’s rate. This disparity highlights both Kwara’s relative peace and its growing exposure. Nigeria’s overall security situation has deteriorated dramatically, with the country dropping to 148th on the 2025 Global Peace Index and suffering over 2,266 deaths from banditry and insurgency in just the first half of 2025, exceeding the entire 2024 total.
The False Comfort of “Relative Peace”
Kwara’s peaceful reputation has created a dangerous paradox: the state appears secure compared to Nigeria’s raging conflicts, yet this very perception has led to critical underinvestment in security preparedness. With a meagre ₦350 million (approximately $230,000) security vote in its 2025 budget, Kwara has insufficient resources for basic border surveillance, let alone comprehensive counterinsurgency measures. This budgetary neglect reflects a fundamental misreading of the evolving threat landscape.
The nature of modern conflict doesn’t respect artificial boundaries. Militant groups operate across porous borders, exploiting governance vacuums and ethnic kinship. The emergence of groups like Mahmuda around the Kainji Lake area demonstrates how terrorist organisations establish footholds in perceived “safe havens” before expanding their operations. As security reports have noted, there have been at least 13 ISIS-Sahel-linked attacks in central Nigeria in 2025 alone, indicating a strategic southward expansion.
The situation mirrors concerning patterns elsewhere in West Africa, where jihadist insurgency has spread from the Sahel toward coastal states. The southward spillover alarmingly threatens countries like Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, which until recently had been mostly spared jihadist violence. Kwara now faces precisely this dynamic, compounded by the added vulnerability of having dismissed the threat until it arrived at its doorstep.
Recommendation: A Community-Based Solution
Some advocate for a traditional security response: deploying additional military forces along border areas, establishing checkpoints, and implementing drone surveillance. While these measures have short-term deterrent effects, they come with significant tradeoffs: escalating tensions with communities, straining federal-state relations, and diverting scarce resources from development needs.
A more effective approach combines strategic security presence with community empowerment. I recommend that Kwara State immediately establish a Community-Led Early Warning and Resilience Program (CLEWRP) to train and equip more than 5,000 local volunteers in conflict mediation, digital reporting, and response coordination. This approach recognises that security is not merely about repelling attacks but about building resilient communities capable of preventing, withstanding, and recovering from violence.
The evidence supporting community-based security is compelling. When local populations are empowered as first responders, they provide hyperlocal intelligence that external forces cannot access. They understand the terrain, recognise outsiders, and can distinguish between legitimate herders and criminal elements. As the tragic incidents in Kwara’s south communities have shown, top-down security responses often arrive too late after attacks have occurred and perpetrators have vanished into the forest corridors connecting Kwara, Niger, and Kogi states.
The proposed CLEWRP program would unfold in three phases: planning and stakeholder consultations across Kwara’s 16 LGAs; pilot implementation in high-risk areas; and statewide scaling, with continuous evaluation. The Kwara State Ministry of Homeland Security and Vigilante Affairs would lead implementation, partnering with the National Emergency Management Agency for federal coordination, local governments for ground implementation, and international organisations for training expertise.
Financing the $3-5 million USD program would require a blended approach: 60% from the state budget and 40% from federal security grants and humanitarian NGO partnerships.
A National Security Imperative
Kwara’s security crisis represents a microcosm of Nigeria’s broader challenges. The federal government’s 2025 budget allocated ₦4.91 trillion to defence and security, about 8.9% of total expenditure, recognising that without security, economic development is impossible.
The national security strategy must therefore prioritise preventing the southward spread of violence in states such as Kwara. This requires both regional cooperation and smarter resource allocation. The Accra Initiative, which promotes intelligence-sharing among coastal West African states, offers a promising model that should be expanded to include central Nigerian states facing spillover threats.
Furthermore, security funding should incentivise preventive approaches rather than merely funding reactive measures. The federal government could establish a matching-grant program for states that develop community-based security initiatives, thereby encouraging locally adapted solutions rather than one-size-fits-all approaches.
The Time for Action Is Now
Kwara stands at a precipice. The state can continue its complacent approach, hoping that violence will spare its territories, or it can acknowledge the changing threat environment and build resilient systems before the crisis becomes a catastrophe. The choice is stark: invest modestly in prevention now, or pay enormously for response later.
The CLEWRP program offers a practical, cost-effective solution that aligns with Kwara’s cultural traditions of community cooperation while incorporating modern technology and coordination methods. It acknowledges that security is not solely the government’s responsibility but a shared undertaking between authorities and citizens.
History shows that complacency amid spreading instability is a recipe for disaster. West Africa’s security landscape has deteriorated dramatically in recent years, with jihadist groups expanding their operations. Kwara cannot assume it will remain immune.
The phrase “State of Harmony” should not be a relic of Kwara’s past but a promise for its future. Preserving this harmony requires honest acknowledgement of emerging threats, courageous investment in preventive measures, and collaborative implementation across government and communities. The time for action is now, before the next attack becomes a full-blown crisis.
Iranloye Sofiu Taiye is a Policy Analyst specialising in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution, Digital Governance, and Service Delivery, and can be contacted via iranloye100@gmail.com.