Infidelity: Court ends marriage after husband threatened to commit suicide
By Muhammad Sabiu
By Muhammad Sabiu
By Salisu Uba Kofar-Wambai
By Mohammed Zayyad
The debate that the presidency moves to the South in 2023 has gained momentum. Also, presidential hopefuls from the North, like Atiku Abukar, Sule Lamido, Senator Bala Mohammed, Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, are also effectively playing their games.
The calls for power to shift to the South have further triggered permutations and realignments in the polity. Both the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) have strong candidates from the South. But these candidates have their respective baggage, and the parties have internal squabbles that must be resolved.
The APC has its stronghold in the Northwest, Southwest, Northeast and Northcentral – four of the nationâs six geopolitical zones. The PDP has strong structures in the six zones with a stronghold in the Southeast and Southsouth. However, the APC has moved into the Southeast in full force. Before the 2015 elections, nobody had ever thought that the APC would someday have even a ward councillor in the Southeast. But, today, the party has two state governors, senators, House of Representatives members, state house of assembly members, local council chairmen, councillors and formidable party structures in all the five southeastern states.
Come 2023, the APC has no reasons to retain power in the North, but there is strong politicking by some governors and other bigwigs to maintain power. This will mean the APC contravening the unwritten agreement between the North and the South on power rotation. In any case, the APC does not have a strong presidential candidate from the North. This is a big plus to the presidential hopefuls from the South, or Southeast, in particular. Furthermore, the Southeast has a strong case to present based on a plank that the Southeast is the only geopolitical zone in the South that has not produced a President or vice president on any political party platform since 1999.
If APC picks its presidential candidate from the South, especially Southwest, the PDP may attempt to outwit this by looking to the North for its presidential candidate. This, as well, will put the PDP in a catch-22 situation on how to explain this to the South, especially the Southeast and the South-South, why the North again, after eight years of the North being in power.
PDP has good candidates in their own ârightsâ from the Southeast and South-South. Enugu State Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, Peter Obi from Southeast and Governor Nyesom Wike from the South-South. Obi does not have friends in the North and has never tried to pull an appeal from the region, directly or by proxy. His deportation of other Nigerians to their states when he was governor of Anambra state was used against him in the North during the 2019 campaign, and it worked.
For Wike, his words, âRivers is a Christian stateâ will be used against him in the North like Governor El-Rufaiâs Muslim-Muslim ticket in Kaduna can be used against him (El-Rufai). This is how local politics impact a candidateâs wider political opportunities. Some young people in the north are also campaigning for  Enugu State Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi. Still, the IPOB issue will be a significant hindrance in the North, but it is not insurmountable. Advocates of secession appear not to understand Nigeria. There are massive inter-marriage, friendships, business links and political alliances, among other ties, between many northerners and many Igbos.
Some nationalistic politicians from the Southeast have started to convince other Nigerians to support the region to produce the Nigeria president of Southeast extraction in 2023. The bigwigsâ forefront presidential hopefuls are Governor David Umahi, Orji Uzor Kalu, Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, Rochas Okorocha, Chris Baywood Ibe, Ken Nnamani, Minister of State for Education, Dr Chinedu Nwajiuba, Sen Osita Izunaso and many others. Of course, these politicians have their political baggage and controversies. However, people like Chris Baywood Ibe are new faces without any political baggage and controversy-free.
A thorough understanding of how Nigerian politics works is paramount in achieving the political goals of a group, a region, or individuals. There are so many conflicting interests in Nigeria. Still, there are always windows for alliances, give-and-take, a hand of friendship, and convincing others to support a particular political cause or an individualâs.
For the 2023 presidency, the Southeast should present a candidate with a new face, no controversies, no political baggage and who has friends and is well-known across the Niger. For both the APC and the PDP, it will be an opportunity to reunite Nigeria and rekindle the historical political alliance between the north and the southeast while maintaining the partysâ current national. The Igbo presidency is possible through the spirit of one Nigeria.
Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja. He can be reached via zaymohd@yahoo.com.
By Sumayyah Auwal Ishaq
Governor Nasir El-Rufai of Kaduna State has unveiled a draft budget of 233 billion for the 2022 fiscal year that reflects the governmentâs commitment to sustainable growth, promoting equal opportunity, accelerate human capital development, and attain fiscal viability.
The governor noted that “when approved, is projected to have the capital to recurrent ratio of 63%:37%. The 2022 estimates are slightly smaller than the proposed 2021 budget estimates of N237.52bn, of which N157.56bn was capital and N79.96bn recurrent expenditure, a 66% to 34% capital to recurrent ratio,” he said.
By Muhammad Sabiu
By Sumayyah Auwal Ishaq
Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir Ahmad El-Rufa’i, on Thursday carried out a major cabinet reshuffle in the state executive council.
A statement issued by the Special Adviser to the Governor on Media and Communication, Mr. Muyiwa Adekeye, said that “the reshuffle is designed to help harness fresh energy for the governmentâs final lap, bring new insights and enable the commissioners to have more rounded experience of the government.”
The affected ministries include Environment, Public Works and Infrastructure, Education, Agriculture, Local Government, Budget and Planning, Business, Innovation & Technology, and Sports Development.
The Governor, according to Mr. Adekeye, added that “following the passage of the law creating metropolitan authorities to manage Kaduna, Kafanchan and Zaria as organic cities, Governor El-Rufai has nominated the following cabinet-rank administrators: Balaraba Aliyu-Inuwa Administrator, Zaria Metropolitan Authority, Muhammad Hafiz Bayero Administrator, Kaduna Capital Territory and Phoebe Sukai Yayi Administrator, Kafanchan Municipal Authority”.
By Wiebe Boer
In February 2021, Juliet Ehimuan, the Director of Google West Africa discovered Usman Dalhatu, a university student and the CEO of Dalsman Tech who had developed an innovative solar-powered maishayi kiosk.
After a successful application, Usman Dalhatu was accepted into the All On and The Rockefeller Foundation funded Nigeria Climate Innovation Centerâs 2021 off grid energy incubation programme.

During the Nigeria Climate Innovation Center pitch session for the twenty finalists in the 2021 cohort earlier this week, Dalsman Tech was selected as one of the eight winners of the $10,000 start-up grant. The funds will be used to scale up the production of the solar-powered kiosks for distribution to kiosk franchise owners in Kaduna, Kano, FCT, and Abuja.
This brilliant innovation is highly scalable and can lead to a much cleaner energy source for tens of thousands of maishayi stands across Nigeria.
This is one of many examples of clean energy innovations developed by young Nigerian entrepreneurs that will help drive the countryâs energy transition from within.
Wiebe Boer, PhD, is the CEO of All On.
By Aminu Nuru
 âThe most dangerous untruths are truths moderately distortedâ. – George Lichtenberg
It is not uncommon that some public commentators and analysts could be mischievously deceptive in their narratives and analyses of history to accomplish an end. They could quote historical facts, mix them with fiction, and frame narratives to promote a single story. In some cases, they deliberately relegate and ignore some significant events or points to suit the writerâs bias. Recent writings on the origin and rise of Boko Haram demonstrate how some writers distort facts to frame narrative and promote bigotry.
For instance, if one can closely study the framing of Boko Haram and how it is brazenly becoming one-sided, then one can say that the whole history is rewritten to massage and satisfy the ego of some groupâs bigotry. It is not farfetched to say that some of these bigots will soon claim that the generality of the Muslim North endorsed and supported Boko Haram and Nigerian Christians were the only targets and victims of the groupâs deadly attacks. Why would I make such a sweeping projection with every sense of finality? To respond to this question, letâs go back to 2013.
While speaking at the 14th meeting of the Honorary International Investor Council (HIIC) held at the Banquet Hall of the Presidential Villa on June 22, 2013, former Nigeriaâs President, Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, disclosed that the Boko Haram sect had killed more Muslims than Christians in Nigeria. This is not just hearsay but a verifiable fact that is naked in vision to people that are not be-clothed with hatred, ethnic and religious jingoism.
However, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) couldnât swallow this fact and, therefore, issued a statement to disagree with him vehemently. In a press statement credited to the Northern chapter spokesperson, Elder Sunday Oibe, CAN said that Jonathanâs assertion was âmisleading and unacceptableâ. They further stated that,
âWe want to believe that the president was misquoted; we donât want to believe that with the security apparatus and report from security intelligence network at his disposal, he made this assertion. If it is true that Mr President actually made this assertion, then, we are highly disappointed and sad at this veiled attempt to distort the fact as it concerns the activities of the Boko Haram sect. The purported statement by the President is highly disappointing considering the facts that Christians, churches and their businesses have been the major targets of Boko Haramâ (Sahara Reporters, June 23, 2013. http://saharareporters.com/2013/06/23/northern-can-disagrees-jonathan-says-boko-haram-has-killed-more-christians-muslims)
For CAN, the Boko Haram crisis was/is âreligious by natureâ â the familiar we-versus-them religious clashes and conflicts in Nigeria, although in different outlooks and techniques; it is a plot by some Muslims to reduce the populations of Christians in Nigeria and crackdown their businesses. Since then, CAN sympathisers subsequently frame their narrative of Boko Haram from this angle. An article titled âCornflakes for Jihad: The Boko Haram Origin Storyâ by David Hundeyin, widely shared on social media in the last few days, aimed to promote this kind of narrative. Unfortunately, the author skillfully filled the article with half-truths and a mixture of facts and fiction to push the CANâs sentiment. Hundeyin is practically siding with his former religion.
Firstly, Hundeyin makes an effort to link Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi with the origin of Boko Haram. Many people think that Hundeyinâs âCornflakes for Jihadâ is the first futile effort by an âinvestigativeâ journalist, analyst, historian or whatever to make this manipulative effort. However, Andrew Walkerâs thesis, âEat the Heart of the Infidels: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haramâ (Oxford University Press, 2016), preceded it in that exercise. Therefore, it is not likely to be a false accusation if it is argued that Hundeyin copied the idea of featuring Gumi in discussing Boko Haram, almost verbatim, from Walker. From the arguments of Sheikh Gumiâs âinfluenceâ in the âpoliticalâ realm of Nigeria to his âfriendship with Ahmadu Belloâ, to pioneering the âpropagation of Wahabismâ in post-independent Nigeria, to his contribution in the creation of Izala and his âSaudi connectionâ are equally and loudly echoed in Walkerâs thesis.

For both Walker and Hundeyin, Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi championed the Sunni/Salafi/Izala movement in Nigeria. Therefore, any account of the origin and rise of Boko Haram â a so-called Sunni/Salafi-fundamentalist terrorist group â must be traced back to him. Albeit impliedly, their submissions suggest that there would be no Boko Haram if Gumi did not âdisruptâ the Sufi order and influence of Qadiriyya and Tijjaniya in Northern Nigeria. They claim that Gumiâs campaign of a corrupt-free practice of Islam inevitably gave birth to the radical movements in Northern Nigeria. This is to say, although without explicitly stating it in their works, every Sunni/Salafi-based movement in Nigeria, whether moderate or violent, must have had their inspirational source from Gumi. On the link between Boko Haram founder, Muhammed Yusuf, and Sheikh Gumi, Walker writes: âThe title of Yusufâs book deliberately echoes the titles of similar treatises by Sunni preachers, like Sheikh Gumiâs âThe Right Faith According to the Shariaâ, perhaps in order to lend his ideas credenceâŠthe two clerics share a revulsion for secularism..â (Walker, 2016:144).
This line of argument is even less faulty in logic and spirit of âbalanced storyâ than what Hundeyin further orchestrated in his article. According to Hundeyin, Sheikh Gumi admonished Muslims, particularly his Sunni/Salafi followers, to reject a non-Muslim as a leader and advocated âfor insurrection against a Christian Nigerian Presidentâ and, of course, his Christian followers. In the successive paragraphs that supported this claim, Hundeyin apprises his readers on the âconsequenceâ of Gumiâs propagation; he states that after Gumiâs death, a Sunni/Salafi-indoctrinated group, which bears the name âBoko Haramâ, toed to the path of his admonishment to carry weapons against Nigerian Christians, killing and bombing them in their churches. He wittingly makes reference to the bomb blast at âSt. Theresa Catholic Churchâ, Madalla that âkilled 37 peopleâ, and other subsequent âkillings of Christiansâ in Jos and Damaturu.
The implication of this narrative on an outsider, who does not know the context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, is that s/he would begin to see Sheikh Gumi as âproblematicâ and a source of Boko Haramâs inspiration and violent extremism. Secondly, a non-pragmatic reader may also assume that the group only targets Nigerian Christians in their series of attacks in the country. Hundeyinâs article aims to peddle that twisted narrative for no reason other than the writerâs hatred for the Muslim North (Arewa) and their Islamic culture. In one of his previous tweets, he heedlessly says that: âThe world will be a significantly better place when Arewa culture completely dies off and is replaced with something fit for human civilisationâ (David Hundeyin/Twitter, November 29, 2020).
In the spirit of fair analysis, it is expected that an impartial analyst would compare the socio-religious ideas Gumi propagated in his lifetime and the ideologies of Boko Haram. But this would not sell out Hundeyinâs bigotry, and so he ignored that vital aspect. The core centre of Boko Haram dogmatic tenets is a war against âwestern-styledâ education, democracy and civil service. On the other hand, Sheikh Gumi was both a product and proponent of western-styled education; he worked with the government as a civil servant and received salaries from the state resources. As he proudly opined in his autobiography, âamong [his] children were army officers, civil servants, medical doctors, an engineerâŠlawyers, teachers and workers in finance houses and private businesses. There was hardly any profession in which [he] did not have representation from [his] familyâ (Gumi with Tsiga, 1991:202).
Gumi was also pro-democrat, as evidence from his recorded preaching suggested so. He is famously quoted to have said, âsiyasa tafi sallahâ, which could loosely mean âpolitics is more significant than prayersâ. This was the extent Gumi had gone to support democracy in Nigeria, and believe me, Shekau would not hesitate to call him âtaghutâ â an idolatrous tyrant. He had also worked closely with the Christian Head of States. They had a cordial relationship and respect for each other: Ironsi invited him to lead a delegation to North Africa and the Middle East to carry goodwill messages of his new regime; Gowon appointed him Chairman of the Nigerian Pilgrims Board and gave him âall the necessary support, although he himself was a Christianâ; with Obasanjo, he could âfreely talkâ and express his mind on relevant socio-political issues (Gumi with Tsiga, 1991:203). However, Hundeyin willfully refuses to draw this analogy to give a sense of what Achebe called âa balanced storyâ. Instead, he purposely portrays Sheikh Gumi on the wrong page in the book of terrorist origin in Nigeria.
Contrary to the insinuation of Hundeyin moreover, the truth of the story is that Boko Haram did/do not target Christians only. In fact. Nigerian Muslims suffer(ed) more causalities than Christians in the Boko Haram conflict. Hundeyin refuses to mention the main enclaves of Boko Haram activities and the population ratio of Muslims and Christians there. Stating this factual data will indeed not favour his intended, warped story. The reality is that Muslims have the predominant population in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Arguably, the cumulative of all Boko Haram killings of innocent people would show nothing less than 70% of Muslim casualties.
On a specific, direct attack on religions, Hundeyin only mentions the bomb blast at St. Theresa Catholic Church, ignoring similar incidents on August 11, 2013, at a mosque in Konduga where 44 people were killed and on November 28, 2014, at the central mosque in Kano where 120 people were killed (BBC Hausa, 2013, 2014). It is understandable if Hundeyin re-echoes the bomb blast at St. Theresa Catholic Church in his article; it is a show of solidarity to his ex-religion. However, what is faulty and even worrisome is the selective exemplification of the direct attacks on religions by the Boko Haram insurgents. A reader who is unacquainted with the details of Boko Haram attacks on places of public worship would feel that churches and Christians were the only victims.

To further promote this half-truth, Hundeyin moves on to tell us how a Salafi/Sunni preacher was directly linked with the funding of Boko Haram. I will neither attempt to exonerate Sheikh Yakubu Musa nor believe those serious allegations in toto without reading or hearing the Sheikhâs version of the story. However, my problem here is with Hundeyinâs failure, which is intentional, to mention the Salafi/Sunni preachers that fought Boko Haram vehemently and even paid the ultimate price with their lives. It is on record that at the early stage of the Boko Haram crusade, Salafi scholars debated Mohammed Yusuf. In Bauchi, for instance, Ustaz Idris Abdulaziz Dutsen-Tanshi, a Salafist to the core, invited and challenged Muhammed Yusuf at his mosque and in the presence of his followers; so also a young Isa Ali Pantami â the then Imam of ATBU Jumaâat mosque.


These Salafists continued to be critical of Muhammed Yusuf and his sect. They consistently delivered lectures to denounce his fatwa. Sheikh Jaâafar Mahmoud Adam, an unapologetic Salafist, was particularly vocal in his public censure and condemnation of Boko Haram. Unlike Hundeyin, Walker states this fact in his book:
âIn 2007, Yusuf âs former teacher, Sheikh Jaâafar Mahmud Adam, himself an ardent Salafist, had gone on record to denounce the group and warn that these ideologues were heading for a violent confrontation with the stateâ (Walker, 2016:148).
For many, Sheikh Jaâafar was the spiritual successor of Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi. Some influential people requested and later attempted to transfer his annual Ramadan Tafseer to Gumiâs preaching base, Sultan Bello Mosque, Kaduna. He conducted his annual Ramadan Tafseer in Maiduguri, the early and central territory of Boko Haram terrorism. During his Tafseer sessions, Sheikh Jaâafar was not reluctant to criticise Yusuf and his new sect. On April 13, 2007, a day to general elections in Nigeria, and barely 48 hours after delivering a talk in Bauchi on Islamic views on thuggery, violence and widespread killing of innocent souls, Sheikh Jaâafar was murdered in Kano while observing Subh prayer and âit is thought to be members of Yusufâs sectâ (Walker, 2016:148).
Another prominent voice among Salafists in the fight against Boko Haram was Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani, Zaria. But, unfortunately, he was also killed in cold blood. In a video released to the public, Muhammed Yusuf successor, Abubakar Shekau, took responsibility for the assassination (Sahara Reporters, February 20, 2014, http://saharareporters.com/2014/02/20/bo-haram-leader-claims-responsibity-killing-kaduna-cleric-sheikh-albani-threatens).
Hundeyin has ignored all these facts about Salafi preachers in Northern Nigeria but brought a single dubious claim to frame a narrative that would deceive an uncritical, vulnerable audience. His motive is clear: he wants to rebrand the entire population of Salaaf and the Muslim North as pro-terrorist, supporting the killings of Christians in Nigeria. It is rather unfortunate that this is where the discussion is heading, and it is a wake-up call to those of us that witnessed and had a first-hand experience of the Boko Haram crisis to begin to write our counter-narrative. If we donât write it, others will write for us. And before we retrieve our consciousness, we will be afloat in a sea of half-truths and stereotypes on Boko Haram, Islam and the North.
Aminu Nuru wrote from Bauchi. He can be contacted via aminuahmednuru@gmail.com.
By Hussaina Sufyan Ahmed