Northern Nigeria

By Muhammad Sulaiman

A regular contributor to The Daily Reality’s opinion section, Aisha Musa Auyo, has successfully defended her PhD dissertation in Educational Psychology at Bayero University, Kano (BUK).

Dr Auyo’s doctoral research, titled “Influence of Achievement Motivation, Academic Self-Concept, Emotional Regulation and Locus of Control on the Academic Achievement of Public Secondary School Students in Kano and Jigawa States of Nigeria,” marks a significant contribution to the study of learning behaviour and student performance in northern Nigeria.

Her achievement comes after six years of rigorous academic work and dedication. Described by her husband, Dr AC Abdullahi Maiwada, as “an authentic product of BUK,” Dr Auyo was born, raised, educated, and married within the university community, where she obtained all her degrees.

Academia also runs deep in her family. Her parents, Prof. Musa Auyo and Dr Hadiza Umar, both serve in BUK’s Department of Library and Information Science, while her husband, Dr Maiwada, holds a PhD in Mass Communication. Her parents-in-law are also accomplished academics, making the Auyo-Maiwada family one deeply rooted in scholarship.

The Daily Reality congratulates Dr Auyo on her outstanding achievement and wishes her continued success in her academic and professional pursuits.

By Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu

I rarely discuss politics, policy, or religion at any level on social media. These three are totally beyond my modest capabilities. However, the Educationist in me stirred when it became news in November 2025 that a bill was being proposed in the Kano State House of Assembly, titled the Kano State Mother Tongue (Hausa Language) Education Enforcement Bill. It was introduced by Musa Kachako, a member representing Takai under the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP). 

The Bill seeks to ensure that all instruction in primary and secondary schools in Kano (presumably those under Local Education Authorities) is conducted in the Hausa language. According to online reports, when presenting the bill during plenary, Kachako stated that the initiative followed global best practices in education, citing countries such as China, Japan, and India, which he noted had made significant strides in science and technology by teaching children in their native languages from an early age. Kano State can do this because Education, being on the Concurrent Legislature, gives room for any policy variation of Education from that of the Federal Government’s Exclusive list. 

Certainly, the idea of teaching all subjects in Hausa springs from a noble intention — to enable children to learn in the language they understand best, and to reaffirm local identity against the long shadow of colonial linguistic domination. I witnessed this during my tenure as a Teaching Practice Supervisor in various schools in Kano. Students tended to understand language lessons more fluidly than those in other languages. And we are talking about over 40 years ago. Along the line, I even came up with how to use Hausa proverbs to teach science, based on over 30 curated Hausa proverbs with scientific content (e.g. gravity in “komai nisan jifa, ƙasa zai dawo”) and trained dozens of teachers in Jigawa (ironically enough, Kano was not interested at the time!) on this much later.   

Yet, the success of such a language policy depends on its contextual intelligence — its ability to strike a balance between local comprehension, national unity, and global relevance. In all cases of such debates, the examples of China, Japan, and India are the most commonly cited as best practices that have worked. With its virtual monolingual Hausa population (perhaps the only State in the Federation with this attribute), elevating Kano as “Little China” certainly sound, albeit contradictorily, post-colonially romantic. This all sounds inspiring. But, without taking the shine off it, how realistic is it?

There is a certain merit to the idea, but only to a certain extent. Research everywhere agrees: children learn faster and think better when taught in their native language. Even UNESCO and Nigeria’s own education policy support this approach for the first few years of primary schooling, where community languages are encouraged, rather than metropolitan languages. Let’s look at some cases.

Ethiopia is perhaps the only country in Africa with a continuous mother-tongue education system. The country did not suffer the horrors of colonisation on the same scale as the rest of Sahelian African countries, as it was only briefly occupied by Italians between 1936 and 1941. It uses regional languages (Amharic, Tigrinya, Oromo, Somali, etc.) as the medium of instruction in primary and secondary education. In universities and higher education, Amharic or English is used depending on the region and field. Thus, Ethiopia’s system is perhaps the closest to continuous mother-tongue instruction, although English dominates technical and postgraduate studies.

In Tanzania, Swahili is the dominant language in primary schools, but English is introduced from secondary schools up to universities, especially in fields such as science, medicine, and law. In Rwanda, the medium of instruction in schools was switched from French to English in 2008, while Kinyarwanda remains the mother tongue in early primary education. In Mozambique, Portuguese dominates in secondary and tertiary education, and local languages such as Makhuwa, Sena, and Tsonga are used in early primary school. 

This pattern is repeated in other African countries, such as Ghana (Twi/Ewe in early schooling, English later), Senegal (local languages in the early years, French later), and Kenya (Kikuyu, Luhya, Dholuo in early schooling, English later). Thus, no colonised African country has fully implemented mother tongue instruction from primary through university, rejecting colonial languages entirely.

In Kano, where everyone speaks Hausa, the policy could genuinely improve comprehension and reduce dropout rates. Pupils won’t have to struggle with English before grasping basic concepts in classrooms. That’s a win. However, there is a catch, and it lies in the regular comparison with China, Japan, and India, as if Kano is a nation, rather than a State within a nation that has 400 languages. Let us look at the language policies of these countries closely.

China has between 281 to 305 languages and dialects. However, it took decades — from the early 1900s to the 1950s — to standardise Mandarin (Putonghua), reform writing, and establish a comprehensive teacher-training and translation system, enabling everyone to be educated in one language. 

Japan is relatively homogeneous, but still has dialect diversity with 16 living languages. Although Japanese is the dominant language of instruction, there is no law declaring it the official language of the country. In fact, a school could use other languages. There are now a few schools that use English to teach science and mathematics classes. Japan created a national standard (based on the Tokyo speech) during the Meiji era (late 1800s) — alongside massive investment in textbooks, printing, and teacher training. India, on the other hand, is multilingual by law — it has 22 official languages and hundreds more in daily use. Each state uses its local language for early schooling, but keeps English for higher education and technology. 

So, what worked for these three was not language alone, but long-term state planning, standardisation, and bilingual balance. Each of these countries went through a long, continuously sustainable process of deliberate policy strategies that ensured the success of their language policies in Education, backed by political stability. In Kano, policies are routinely changed with new regime changes, regardless of their merit. Let us look at the obstacles. 

English remains the principal language of science, technology, and international communication. A policy that sidelines it completely in early and middle education could restrict students’ ability to compete globally and to access higher education resources. Unless a bilingual model is adopted, the system may produce students with strong local literacy but limited global mobility.

Nigeria’s labour market — in public service, academia, commerce, and technology — operates primarily in English. Graduates from a Hausa-only system would face difficulty transitioning into these environments without adequate English proficiency. This could widen inequality rather than close it. Unless there are expectations that students from Kano, who will be the products of this policy, will never work in any Federal government agency in the country. 

Nigeria’s educational bureaucracy is highly centralised. Curriculum design, examination systems (NECO, WAEC), and tertiary entry assessments (JAMB) all operate in English. Switching Hausa to the medium of instruction at primary and secondary levels, without corresponding policy alignment at higher levels, would isolate Hausa-medium students from tertiary education pathways. Thus, despite Education being on the concurrent list, centralised examinations are under the Federal Exclusive list. Kano cannot create its own WAEC, NECO, and JAMB examination boards; it must use Federal agencies for this purpose. These agencies are in Nigeria’s official language, which is English.  

Next would be concerns about teachers. Currently, and without being aware of the timeline for implementing the Bill, if it is passed successfully, there are not enough trained teachers in Kano with adequate linguistic competence to teach science, mathematics, or social studies effectively in Hausa. 

Moreover, curricular materials, textbooks, and terminologies for specialised subjects (such as chemistry, ICT, or physics) are largely underdeveloped in Hausa — except for some pioneering efforts by the Northern Nigerian Publishing Company and NTI Kaduna in the 1980s–1990s, and more recently by a few authors. For instance, the Centre for Research in Nigerian Languages, Translation, and Folklore at Bayero University, Kano, has produced eight Science textbooks in Hausa for students of primary, junior, and senior secondary schools in northern Nigeria. 

Written by Mika’ila Maigari Kashimbila of the Department of Physics, Bayero University, these are Kimiyya Da Fasaha Don Makarantun Firamare Books One to Three, Lissafi Don Kananan Makarantun Sakandare Books One to Three, Kyamistare Don Manyan Makarantun Sakandare, and Fizis (Physics) Don Manyan Makarantun Sakandare. He had earlier written Lissafin Makaratun Sakandare Na 1. 

I was even part of the committee set up by Bayero University Kano to “launch” these books, although things faltered, and I don’t think the launch ever took place. Wonderful as these books and efforts are, I believe they would serve as supplementary readers to the core textbooks, where they help to deconstruct the more esoteric prose of the English textbooks. 

Other concerns are sociological. For instance, making Hausa the exclusive medium in primary and secondary education in Kano risks political backlash from non-Hausa-speaking communities. In a multilingual federation, such a policy could be perceived as linguistic imperialism, deepening ethnic tensions and further alienating minorities. It may also entrench regionalisation rather than national integration — the very problem English was meant to solve.

Additionally, if Hausa becomes the sole instructional language, students from Kano may face difficulties participating in the global economy, digital platforms, and higher education, which remain English-dominated. True, the increasing use of Artificial Intelligence might alleviate some of these fears – but that is not the same as captive learning. A purely Hausa-medium system would require parallel translation of scientific and technological vocabulary to prevent intellectual isolation — a task that even developed monolingual nations struggle with.

On the positive side, a well-planned Hausa-medium system could revive indigenous literacy traditions, encourage the translation of modern science into local epistemologies, and restore pride in local knowledge systems. It could also expand Hausa publishing, radio, and digital content industries — thereby democratizing access to learning for those currently excluded by the dominance of English.

But the devil is in the details. Policy flip-flops reflecting a lack of consistency are the biggest danger. As antecedents have shown, this particular political climate might favour this move, complete with a law backing it. The next political class might very well destroy it simply because it was not its idea. This has always been the central characteristic of Kano politics. 

By Abdussamad Umar Jibia 

Finally, you are there. Your “brother” from America has spoken. He is coming to “your disgraced country” to wipe out your enemy, an enemy who has lived above your pettiness. This enemy does not give attention to your blackmail, an enemy in whose presence you always feel inferior. That enemy is I, the Muslim Northerner. Out of your inferiority complex, you have given me different names, the most widely used of which is Hausa-Fulani.

I am Hausa-Fulani, even if I am Kanuri, who can speak no single word of Hausa or Fulfulde. I am Hausa-Fulani even if I was born to one of the minority tribes of Gombe, Bauchi, Kogi or, in fact, a Birom. To qualify as a Hausa-Fulani, I require only to be a non-Yoruba, non-Igbo Northerner who prays five times a day. 

At last, I have caught the attention of your big brother, who has never been to Nigeria, a person who has no respect for a black man like you and me. All you are now waiting for are his bombs and rifles to make you greater than the Hausa-Fulani, to make your presence arouse hate and fear in others, just like you feel when I am around. Congratulations. 

Your hatred towards me has a history which cannot be ignored. You and I have lived side by side for centuries. This is where our creator has decided to place us, just like He placed the Chinese in China, the Indians in India, the Arabs in Arabia, etc.

Living together always generates experiences, sweet and bitter. You have always emphasised the bitter experiences of living with me as the reason for disliking me. For example, you believe that before the coming of the British, you were oppressed by me through my emirs, who carried regular raids on your villages to catch slaves; slaves they sold to Arabs and your newfound brothers in Europe and America.

When the British came as colonisers, they no longer needed slaves. So, even though they ruled you through my emir, they banned slavery the way it was done at that time. However, because they sensed no wisdom in you, they taught you that the worship of one God, as done by your neighbour, was wrong. They taught you about three gods that can be considered as one. Depending on who taught you Christianity, you believe that these three gods (or parts of God) are the Son, the Father and the Holy Ghost or the Son, the Father and the holy ghost. Even if it didn’t make sense, it was handy. At least, you now had a religion just like the Hausa-Fulani had one. 

This raises one question. Are you a Christian because you genuinely believe in Christianity, or are you in Christianity because you want to compete with me? Actions are said to speak louder than words. Your later actions would answer this question.

For example, even before Europeans arrived in this part of the world, we travelled to Makkah, now located in Saudi Arabia, for the annual pilgrimage. To date, we have saved our money to go on Hajj without waiting for the Government. Even without Government agencies, we would continue to go on Hajj on our own because it is an article of our faith. Don’t worry, I know how your mind is working. You would be happy if your American brother would bomb the place we go to annually. To your chagrin, that wouldn’t change anything. We shall still perform hajj even if the Kaába is demolished. Islam has provided for that possibility.

Unfortunately, Christians do not have an organised system of worship that provides for an annual pilgrimage. Out of ignorance, you thought Israelis are your brothers because their grandfather is mentioned in the Bible. You thus put pressure on the Government to create diplomatic ties with Israel so that you can go there for pilgrimage, just like Muslims go to Saudi Arabia. So, you annually come back to tell stories about Israel just like Muslim pilgrims share their experiences in Saudi Arabia.

One thing you have forgotten is that Israelis do not even believe in Christianity. As far as they are concerned, Jesus Christ is an illegitimate child of an adulterous woman, and Christians are idol worshippers. Yet, you still believe that Israelis are better than you because they are the “God-Chosen”. I don’t even know which god chose them. Is it the God they claim to have killed, or is it another God? In any case, you need a solution to your slave mentality. 

You are very unlucky to be a tiny minority; otherwise, I would have been cleansed long ago. Your record of violence against Muslims in the few areas you control is well established. In some cases, like Tafawa Balewa, Zangon Kataf and Saminaka, you wiped off/displaced entire Muslim communities. In many other cases, you killed as many as you could by intercepting Muslim travellers, attacking them during prayers, etc., as you did many times in Plateau state.

You were enjoying your violence and playing the victim with the support of the Christian press when the Fulani herders conundrum began. The word “herdsmen” is a misnomer used to avoid ethnic profiling. The correct words are criminals, armed robbers, or bandits. These groups of people have no respect for human lives and property. The least they do is to drive their cattle into farms to devour crops, and when farmers react, they fight them without mercy.

In the extreme, they attack a village, hamlet or innocent travellers and kill, rape, maim, steal and/or kidnap for ransom. Thank goodness, the ‘’herdsmen’’ kept you in check as they always return whatever fire you release with multiples of it. Both of you are criminals, but they are more vicious and sophisticated. This is even as it is in record that your youth allegedly received training in Israel to fight Muslims.

In any case, you would agree with me that I have suffered from banditry more than you did. The whole thing began in Zamfara and spread to Katsina, Sokoto, Niger and Kaduna before it reached Plateau and Southern Kaduna. Yet, you go about lying that your fellow criminals are Muslims carrying out genocide against Christians. Your shamelessness is awful.

Once more, accept my congratulations. Your lies have paid. You may, however, be disappointed to know that Americans have never solved any problem. Whichever country they enter, they would be worse off after leaving it, except in Afghanistan, where they were shamed out. Should they come in here, we are determined to resist and drive them out like they were driven out of Afghanistan. We shall die honourably or triumph with grace, in sha Allah. For us, submission to the enemy is not an option.

Finally, let me note that there are many exceptions to the above. I have respect for peace-loving Christians from the North, and there are many of them.

Abdussamad Umar Jibia wrote from Kano, Nigeria, via aujibia@gmail.com.

By Muḥammad San

I have read the PhD thesis of the Emir of Kano, and just like in his Gamji days, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (now Muhammadu Sanusi II) remains forthright in expression and uncompromising in his quest to balance Shari’a.

Some may dismiss contributions like mine as disturbing or argue that we are too little academically to weigh in on the Shari’a debate. But this is a debate that dominated Nigeria at the turn of the millennium, and Sanusi himself was at its centre. Having read his papers, watched his TED talk, and reviewed the recent compendium of his essays, I can say I have at least a fair understanding of his intellectual outlook.

Sanusi has always been controversial. His now-famous remark that a wife should slap back or retaliate against an abusive husband is a good example. That boldness, perhaps, was the same energy that pushed him to the University of London to produce a doctoral thesis on Islamic family law, using Morocco and Kano as his comparative space.

The Emir is an ardent advocate of girl-child education, but this passion seems to have narrowed his focus, leaving him blind to the ordeals of men under the same system. While women’s marginalisation has been widely documented, men, too, are now facing a new wave of vulnerabilities. The cases are there for anyone who cares to look.

The infamous Maryam Sanda case, in which a woman brutally murdered her husband, remains etched in public memory, yet the debate around it was clouded by sympathy. In 2021, a young wife in Kano was convicted of poisoning her husband after repeated disputes. In 2022, another woman fatally stabbed her husband during a quarrel over financial neglect. These are not isolated events. They highlight the rise of what can be called “feminine defence,” but they also expose the growing fragility of men trapped in broken family systems.

Sanusi himself points to Morocco as a model. “What did they do in Morocco? They built schools and invested in transportation so that girls could be moved from villages to the nearest schools. They also invested in school feeding and provided financial support to the poorest families ready to send their sons and daughters to schools,” he said in an interview with Time Africa Magazine. Yet the contrast is sharp. In Kano, the state government spends millions on lavish emirate ceremonies, while journalists like Dan Bello continue to expose the dire state of public schools in the very heart of the metropolis.

To be fair, Sanusi’s thesis tackled the historical marginalisation of women in Islamic family law with rigour and depth. But in amplifying women’s rights, it failed to defend men or acknowledge their growing vulnerabilities in a rapidly changing society. By leaning heavily on the Moroccan Moudawana, itself a product of feminist activism, the work framed men only as a dominant class to be restrained. Missing were the struggles many men face: unemployment, the crushing demands of polygamy, and the relentless pressure to perform as patriarchs without resources.

This omission is striking. In Kano today, the rise of wives killing their husbands is not just a crime. It is a signal of imbalance in the family system, a warning that reform is incomplete. Without addressing male fragility alongside female empowerment, Shari’a reform risks becoming a zero-sum game. Sanusi’s thesis suggests that empowering women alone can resolve family crises. But true reform, as Shari’a itself demands, must be a balanced restructuring that preserves the dignity and well-being of both men and women.

Muḥammad Sani is a freelance and public policy writer from Zaria. Can be reached via muhdusman1999@gmail.com.

By Uzair Adam

Malam Aminu Kano International Airport (MAKIA) on Thursday marked a century since the first aircraft landed in Nigeria, highlighting Kano’s pivotal role in the country’s aviation history.

The three-day celebration, organised by the Caliphate Aviation Training Centre, kicked off with exhibitions, panel discussions, and an airshow designed to inspire the next generation of aviators.

Okikiri Musa, Regional and Airport Manager of MAKIA, described the centenary as a proud moment for both Kano and the nation.

“This milestone is significant for all of us, especially Kano,” Musa said. “Being the site of Nigeria’s first aircraft landing is something to celebrate. 

“Aviation has grown immensely, and Kano continues to be a key hub in air transport. We pray that Allah continues to bless Kano and strengthen Nigeria’s aviation sector.”

Hassan Abdulhamid, Director of Administration at Caliphate Air Services, noted that the event not only commemorates history but also encourages young Nigerians to explore careers in the aviation industry.

Celebrating 100 years since the first aircraft landed in Nigeria, here in Kano, gives students hands-on experience in aviation — from ticketing and boarding to meeting pilots and engineers. We hope this inspires a lifelong passion and guides them toward aviation careers,” Abdulhamid said.

He explained that the first two days of the event are focused on secondary school students, while university students and lecturers will later present research to address data gaps in the aviation sector.

“There is limited data on aviation in this region. By involving universities in research, we aim to generate insights that will benefit the industry,” he added.

Transport historian Dr Yusuf Madugu of Bayero University, Kano (BUK), recalled that the first aircraft to land in Nigeria touched down in Kano on November 1, 1925.

“The flight, led by Lieutenant Arthur Cunningham, came from Egypt via Khartoum and N’Djamena. It landed at the Kano Racecourse, now the Polo Club, as there was no airport at the time. Smoke from a fire was used to guide the pilot,” Dr Madugu explained.

He emphasised that Kano’s status as a commercial and religious hub made it the ideal destination for the historic flight.

“Kano was the commercial nerve centre of Northern Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa, which is why the colonial authorities chose it as the first point of air entry into the country,” he said.

The centenary celebration included a historical exhibition on aviation in Nigeria, discussions on the sector’s economic impact, and tributes to pioneers of the industry. 

Other highlights featured a static airshow, kiting competitions for children, and live aerial demonstrations.

Organisers said the event aims to renew public interest in aviation and reaffirm Kano’s role as the cradle of Nigeria’s air transport history.

By Muhammad Abubakar

Efforts to strengthen vaccine delivery systems across northern Nigeria received a major boost as the All Babies program, implemented by New Incentives – All Babies Are Equal (NI-ABAE), convened a two-day Roundtable Meeting of Cold Chain Stakeholders in Kano.

Held at Tahir Guest Palace from October 24 to 25, the meeting brought together 35 participants from state and zonal cold chain offices, development partners, and the Kano State Primary Health Care Board. The focus was on improving coordination, data management, and logistics in vaccine distribution across 14 northern states.

During the technical session, program officials presented encouraging results from the third quarter of 2025. Katsina and Zamfara states recorded the sharpest declines in zero-dose infants, each achieving a 40-percentage-point reduction, while Kaduna saw a 15-point drop. So far, All Babies has enrolled over 5.6 million infants, supported 7,128 clinics, and facilitated more than 85 million vaccinations through conditional cash transfers to caregivers.

Stakeholders at the meeting resolved to improve real-time vaccine data reporting through Nigeria’s OpenLMIS platform, enhance coordination between state and local levels, and push for increased transportation funding via the Association of Local Governments of Nigeria (ALGON) to ease vaccine movement to remote areas.

Niger State’s Cold Chain Officer, Abubakar Hussaini, praised the program’s impact, saying, “All Babies has done a great job increasing vaccination awareness and turnout. We hope the program expands nationwide so every child benefits from these life-saving vaccines.”

The roundtable ended with a joint communiqué reaffirming partners’ commitment to ensure that every child, regardless of location, receives timely and essential vaccines.

By Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido 

When Nigeria first introduced Islamic banking more than a decade ago, a section of the public, especially some Christian leaders, cried foul. They labelled it an attempt to Islamise the nation. The word Islamic became synonymous with suspicion. Yet, history has since given its verdict. The same Islamic banking and finance that was once denounced as a tool for religious expansion has now become one of the most credible components of Nigeria’s financial system. Today, the government of Nigeria, regardless of faith or political party, routinely issues Sukuk (Islamic bonds) to finance national infrastructure, build roads, and other developmental projects. 

If Islamic banking did not Islamise Nigeria, how on earth will the halal economy, a trade-based development initiative, suddenly do so?

Unfortunately, some commentators continue to see through the fog of prejudice rather than the lens of global economics. The recently developed Nigerian National Halal Economy Strategy is not a religious project. It is an economic vision. It seeks to position Nigeria within a rapidly expanding global market that respects ethics, transparency, environmental responsibility, and product integrity; values shared by all civilisations, not by Muslims alone.

Globally, the halal economy is estimated at USD 2.3 trillion, excluding Islamic finance. It is growing at an annual rate of around 20 per cent, making it one of the fastest-expanding consumer markets in the world, valued at about USD 560 billion each year. The halal industry, initially rooted in food and beverages, has long transcended its traditional boundaries. It now spans pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, health products, toiletries, medical devices, and even service sectors such as logistics, marketing, media, packaging, branding, and finance. With rising affluence and awareness among global consumers, it has further extended to halal tourism, hospitality, fashion, and lifestyle services.

This development is not driven by Muslims alone. Indeed, the modern halal market is non-exclusive. Increasingly, non-Muslim consumers associate halal with ethical consumerism, animal welfare, environmental stewardship, and quality assurance. The label “halal” has evolved into a global mark of trust, symbolising cleanliness, safety, and ethical production.

Countries far removed from Islam, such as the United States, the Netherlands, Russia, China, and South Africa, are already major players in the halal economy. In the United States, the halal market is worth USD 12 billion annually, with halal food sales growing by more than 70 per cent since 1995. Over 90 per cent of U.S. dry dairy ingredient manufacturers now produce halal products, primarily for export.

In the Netherlands, where Muslims are barely a tenth of the population, non-Muslim Dutch consumers spend approximately USD 3 billion annually on halal food. In the United Kingdom, six million people consume halal meat, three times the Muslim population. These figures prove one thing: halal has gone mainstream. Even Russia is experiencing explosive growth in its halal sector, with domestic demand rising by 30-40 per cent annually. The country now produces around 65,000 tonnes of halal meat each year and hosts major expos such as the Moscow Halal Expo and KazanHalal.

China, with its 23 million Muslims, records 10 per cent annual growth in its halal industry, with trade worth USD 2.1 billion and export products valued at USD 10 million annually from the Ningxia region alone.

Africa, too, is awakening to this opportunity. South Africa—with only two per cent of its population being Muslim—is now one of the five largest producers of halal products globally, thanks to a robust certification infrastructure. Kenya, with a fast-growing halal certification regime, already has more than 150 certified companies serving local and regional markets.

Nigeria, with its vast agricultural resources, strategic location, and large Muslim population, stands at the crossroads of opportunity. The halal economy offers three immediate advantages:

1. Export Expansion: By developing credible halal certification and production infrastructure, Nigeria can unlock access to markets worth over USD 2 trillion, exporting beef, poultry, processed foods, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and other halal-compliant goods. Nigerian products can enter Middle Eastern and Asian markets that strictly demand halal certification.

2. Job Creation and SME Growth: The halal economy stimulates employment across value chains—from farm to factory, logistics, certification, branding, and export marketing. It empowers micro and small enterprises while ensuring compliance with ethical standards that appeal to both local and international consumers.

3. National Image and Ethical Standards: Halal certification ensures higher hygiene, traceability, and environmental protection. It is compatible with international standards like ISO and HACCP, thereby enhancing Nigeria’s global competitiveness. In essence, promoting halal is promoting quality, sustainability, and integrity—values that no religion should reject.

The critics who fear the halal roadmap as a step toward Islamisation fail to recognise that halal is an economic term before it is a theological one in this context. It stands for what is wholesome, safe, clean, traceable, and socially responsible. These values are not confined to Islam. They are embedded in Christianity, Judaism, and secular ethics alike.

The halal economy represents a fusion of faith and fairness, ethics and enterprise. It provides a model for a more responsible economic system—precisely the kind of moral economy the world craves in the aftermath of global financial and environmental crises.

When the debate over Islamic banking first arose, the same fear-mongering dominated the headlines. Yet, today, Islamic finance has built roads, schools, and hospitals across Nigeria through Sukuk and other Shari’ah-compliant financing. Christian engineers, contractors, and civil servants have benefitted immensely. The country’s Christian-majority states have received as much as the Muslim ones. No mosque was built, no church destroyed, and no constitution rewritten.

If Islamic banking did not Islamise Nigeria, how will halal exports do so? On the contrary, the halal economy promises to diversify Nigeria’s trade, create jobs, enhance foreign exchange earnings, and promote industrial standards that protect all consumers, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Nigeria cannot afford to watch from the sidelines while other nations—Christian, secular, and atheist alike—harvest the fruits of the halal economy. The world is shifting toward ethical consumption, sustainability, and traceable production. The halal brand, far from being divisive, is a passport to global markets.

The Nigeria National Halal Economy Strategy is not about religion; it is about relevance. It is about integrating Nigeria into the trillion-dollar value chain that prizes quality, fairness, and responsibility. Those who see crisis where there is opportunity risk being on the wrong side of history, just as those who once opposed Islamic banking and finance, now benefit from Sukuk-financed roads.

The celebration of the halal economy is not the planting of tomorrow’s crisis; it is the harvest of tomorrow’s prosperity for every Nigerian, regardless of faith. It is time we remove the caps of emotion and prejudice and wear the lenses of reason, tolerance, and progress. Nigeria must embrace every opportunity that promises shared prosperity, job creation, and national development. The halal economy is not about division—it is about direction. It is about placing our nation on the map of global relevance, productivity, and ethical growth. So help us God. 

Amir Lamido wrote from Abuja via lamidomabudi@gmail.com.

By Ibraheem A. Waziri

My essay, Against Shaykh Masussuka: A Qur’anic Case for the Reliability of Hadith, stirred more interest than I anticipated. While many readers agreed with my central thesis, a number of them raised a pointed concern: why did I not address what is often called the “Hadith problem”? By this, they meant those reports that, at first glance, appear to contradict the Qur’an, or else propose rulings not congruent with Islam’s basic principles. Some go further, suggesting that certain hadiths diminish the Prophet’s sanctity or undermine the very values the Qur’an upholds. Others, from the opposite direction, are said to elevate hadith to a position of near-supremacy over the Qur’an itself, much as common law sometimes treats judicial interpretation as weightier than the statute it interprets.

To my mind, the reason I did not write directly about this so-called “Hadith problem”, but instead focused on why we must agree primarily on the existence of hadith as a legitimate vehicle for obtaining the correct principles of the deen, is simple: the problem is not new. No community, secular or religious, has documented and curated its tradition more carefully, rationally, and continuously than Muslims have with hadith. As such, Muslim scholarship has wrestled with these questions beautifully and intellectually more than a millennium ago. Much of what trends today on social media is only an echo of debates settled centuries earlier. My earlier essay, The Eternal Quartet: Understanding the Hadith Debate in Northern Nigeria, already sketched how the primary Sunni schools, both juridical and theological, addressed questions of hadith authenticity and authority. The framework they produced is so robust that it continues to guide our practice today.

The Method, Not the Myth

When a hadith seems to contradict the Qur’an, the real issue is not substance but method. Classical scholars approached every report through layers of scrutiny. First came the isnād: if a report’s chain of transmission was weak or fabricated, the discussion ended there. Second was Qur’anic alignment: no solitary report could overturn what the Qur’an had decisively established. Third was the Prophet’s sanctity: any report that appeared to impugn his character was re-read against the sīrah and the Qur’an’s testimony to his moral standing. Fourth came the tools of uṣūl al-fiqh: harmonising general and particular, weighing abrogation only with proof, and applying great maxims such as no harm and no reciprocating harm. Finally, scholars asked about context: to whom did the Prophet speak, in what situation, with what effective cause?

Regarding the sanctity of the Prophet of Islam, a deeper interpretation even suggests that each authentic hadith that seems to cross the Prophet’s moral standing should be understood as teaching something different, excluding the Prophet himself, even if he appears as the reference point. For example, the authentic hadith that says the Prophet’s parents are in Hell should not be read as condemning them personally, but as teaching that whoever dies in disbelief faces that fate. Likewise, the hadith of Umm Haram is not to be taken as evidence of inappropriate closeness but as a lesson on boundaries with one’s mahrams.

This is why many supposed contradictions dissolve under discipline. A hadith regulating a temporary abuse does not become a timeless principle. A narration that seems to permit harm is reined in by the Prophet’s own maxim forbidding it. The method resolves what appears chaotic.

Qur’an First, Sunnah Beside

Another anxiety is the claim that the hadith has been placed above the Qur’an. But this is more perception than reality. The Qur’an is always first in rank. The Sunnah explains and operationalises it. The Qur’an itself gives the Prophet that mandate: “We revealed to you the Reminder so that you may explain to people what was sent down to them” (16:44). It calls him “an excellent example” (33:21), insists that “whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah” (4:80), and commands: “Whatever the Messenger gives you, take it; whatever he forbids you, abstain” (59:7). These verses do not set up rivalry between Qur’an and Sunnah but complementarity. To say the Sunnah explains the Qur’an is no more than to rank it higher than to say a manual outranks the constitution. Both are necessary, each in its domain.

The Eternal Quartet

Why, then, do sincere scholars differ? Because difference is built into the system. Sunni Islam produced four major theological orientations — Muʿtazilī, Ashʿarī, Māturīdī, and Atharī — and paired them with four juridical schools — Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī. This “eternal quartet” explains why equally devout scholars may reach different conclusions about solitary reports, analogy, or custom. Some demand mutawātir reports for theology, others accept sound solitary ones. Some lean on the practice of Madina, others on text alone. Yet all remain within the same qibla.

This plurality is not a weakness but a civilisational strength. No other intellectual tradition has institutionalised difference in this way while maintaining unity. Where others splintered, Islam built a square strong enough to hold its four corners together.

Empires on the Quartet

These paradigms sustained real societies. The early ʿAbbāsid caliphate ran on a Ḥanafī–Muʿtazilī synthesis during the miḥna era. The Seljuks, Timurids, Mughals, and Ottomans all thrived on Ḥanafī–Māturīdī orthodoxy, the Ottomans for nearly seven centuries. Across the Maghrib and the Sahel, Mālikī fiqh and Ashʿarī creed underpinned the Almoravids, the Marīnids, the Songhay under Askia Muhammad, and the Sokoto Caliphate. The Shāfiʿī–Ashʿarī pairing defined the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks in Egypt, spread to Yemen and the Horn of Africa, and later carried Islam to Aceh and Malacca. Meanwhile, Atharī–Ḥanbalī frameworks underpinned the First and Second Saudi states and continue to inform the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today.

No other religious-intellectual system has produced such enduring political architectures across continents and centuries.

Survival Through Shock

Even more impressive is how these paradigms survived colonial disruption. Islamic institutions such as awqāf, market regulation, and family law provided continuity, enabling Muslim societies to withstand conquest and modern upheaval. The frameworks built centuries ago still help communities navigate modernity.

Take finance: much of today’s Islamic banking rests on Ḥanafī tools such as istiḥsān (juristic preference), ḥiyal (legal stratagems), and the use of custom. Mālikī reliance on maṣlaḥa (public good) grounds policy and governance contributions. What looks like accommodation is, in truth, tradition applying timeless principles to new realities.

Nigeria’s Sahelian Inheritance

Closer to home, Nigeria’s Muslim communities have drawn heavily on this inheritance. The Sahelian empires were governed through Mālikī fiqh and Ashʿarī creed. These frameworks enabled our communities to transition into the modern Nigerian state without collapse. Resident colonial and post-colonial scholars such as Shaykh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, drawing on Mālikī usūl, issued fatwas that justified the abolition of slavery, the acceptance of modern banking, the embrace of Western education, and participation in political, military, and democratic institutions. His rulings were not departures but faithful applications of classical principles to new circumstances.

What To Do With a Troubling Hadith

Still, an ordinary believer may encounter a hadith that feels alien or offensive. The tradition offers a compass:

1. Verify authenticity, for many reports are weak or fabricated.

2. Read it alongside the Qur’an’s universals of justice, mercy, and tawḥīd.

3. Ask which domain it addresses: creed, law, or character, each with its own thresholds.

4. Probe its context: was it aimed at a specific abuse?

5. If two sound readings remain, prefer the one that safeguards the Prophet’s dignity and the Qur’an’s objectives.

That preference is not modern softness but classical orthodoxy.

 Continuity, Not Collapse

The so-called “Hadith problem” is not an unsolved crisis but a well-worked conversation. Classical Islam built methods strong enough to filter and contextualise reports, intellectual diversity broad enough to hold multiple paradigms, and social institutions durable enough to withstand colonial dislocation. Today, as Muslim societies grapple with modern institutions, these frameworks continue to guide us.

To imagine that the hadith undermines the Qur’an is to misread the tradition. To treat hadith as above the Qur’an is equally mistaken. The truth lies in the system: Qur’an as charter, Sunnah as manual, and juristic tools as governance.

The Messenger is trustworthy. The methods used to preserve his words are reliable. Our task is not to discard them under modern doubt, nor to exalt them beyond their station, but to apply them with the seriousness that once gave our civilisations their strength.

Ibraheem A. Waziri wrote from Zaria. He can be reached via iawaziri@gmail.com.

By Suleiman Usman Yusuf

In view of the recent surge in car thefts across Kaduna State, particularly along Isa Kaita Road from the evening hours onward, it has become necessary to raise public awareness and caution all vehicle owners.

A few days ago, a brother of mine, who is a senior military officer, visited Kaduna and stopped at Corporate Plaza on Isa Kaita Road to run a few errands. Unfortunately, his car, a Pontiac Vibe, was stolen within minutes of parking it around 8:00 p.m.

Shockingly, his younger brother had experienced a similar incident some months earlier at almost the exact location (near Video Max) around 8:30 p.m., when his Toyota Corolla was stolen barely three minutes after stopping to buy shawarma.

About two months ago, I was on the same street around 9:00 p.m. and met a man whose Honda EOD had just been stolen moments before I arrived. While we were still discussing the issue, another person joined and narrated how two cars had been stolen along the same street not long before.

Sadly, this problem is not limited to Isa Kaita Road alone. Other incidents have occurred across Kaduna Metropolis. For instance, about a year ago, one of my elders had his Honda Civic stolen at Sultan Bello Mosque during Friday prayers. Around the same time, my uncle’s Toyota was also stolen at the Dan Fodio Mosque during Juma’at prayers.

A few months ago, a friend who owns a shop at Kaduna Central Market had his Honda Civic stolen from the KASUPDA Car Park. Another friend’s Toyota was taken from Barau Dikko Hospital’s parking area, despite the exit-card security system meant to prevent such occurrences.

I have personally witnessed the trauma many of these victims went through, including how their daily routines and family lives were disrupted. I have accompanied some of them to various police stations to report these incidents, yet none of the cases have yielded any feedback or results.

Please note: no matter the value or condition of your car, it can be a target. These criminals are always on the lookout, and it is important to take every possible precaution to secure your vehicle.

I am not certain how much the Kaduna State Government and relevant security agencies, including the NPF Kaduna and the Nigeria Police Force, are aware of these disturbing trends. Still, I am using this medium to draw their attention to the growing threat. I also urge His Excellency, the Governor of Kaduna State, Uba Sani, to take swift and decisive action to address this alarming situation.

It is worth noting that, in the first two incidents mentioned above, the victims received calls within 12 hours stating that some of their personal identification items (such as ID cards and national ID cards) had been found at Kwanar Dangora. This suggests that many of these stolen vehicles are quickly transported out of Kaduna shortly after the theft.

ADVICE TO CAR OWNERS 

To reduce your risk of becoming a victim, kindly consider the following preventive measures (though not exhaustive):

 1. Install a reliable car tracker if you can afford one.

 2. If not, use mechanical or pedal locks or other simple devices to reinforce your vehicle’s security.

 3. Avoid parking in dark or isolated areas, especially at night.

 4. Do not leave your car engine running while stepping out, even briefly.

 5. Even when your car is properly locked, take extra steps such as locking your steering wheel, using pedal or gear locks, and installing security alarms or tracking devices. Locking alone is often not enough.

 6. When visiting crowded public places such as mosques, markets, or hospitals, try to park in well-secured and well-lit spaces.

DISCLAIMER (PLEASE READ)

This message is not intended to cause fear or panic, but to create awareness and promote vigilance. The rate of car theft in Kaduna is alarming, and the more we discuss it openly, the better our chances are of prompting action from the authorities and encouraging citizens to be more careful.

Let us all remain alert, report suspicious movements, and look out for one another. Together, we can make our communities safer.

Stay vigilant, stay safe.

Suleiman writes from Kaduna and can be reached via suleimanusmanbac@gmail.com.

By Muhammad Abubakar

The 207th monthly seminar of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Nigeria Office, Kano, was held on Sunday, October 26, 2025, featuring a thought-provoking paper titled “Belief and Doubt: Understanding the Rise of Atheism among Muslim Youth in Northern Nigeria.” The paper was presented by Dr Aliyu Alhaji Rabiu of Gombe State University.

Although attendance at the seminar was modest, the session drew keen interest from both onsite participants and others who joined virtually via Zoom. 

The presentation examined the growing trend of atheism among Muslim youth in Northern Nigeria, exploring its historical roots, contemporary drivers, and the challenges it poses to Islamic identity.

The paper generated lively engagement during the question-and-answer session, where participants raised critical theological and social questions. The session chairman, Dr Ibrahim Ilyasu Adam, and other discussants commended the presenter for addressing a sensitive yet timely subject with intellectual depth and clarity.

The IIIT monthly seminar series continues to provide an important forum for reflective discussion and scholarly exchange on issues shaping Muslim thought and society.