By Rabiu Isah Hassan
Citing the killing of an army officer by bandits in Katsina recently, Sheikh Musa Yusuf Assadussunnah shows the futility of military measures in resolving the pastoralist-peasant conflict in northern Nigeria. By this daring act, the insurgents have demonstrated that the military, much less the vigilante, cannot end the insurgency. According to him, the only solution is a truce. From other sermons by clerics and numerous online items from the conflict area, it appears Assadussunnah is misreading the situation. Not only are the insurgents receiving severe setbacks, but the signs are also ominous.
The army officer might have been killed not because the troops were weak or ill-equipped but because he exposed himself to unnecessary danger. The way the vigilante and locals praise his determination and commitment suggests he might have been motivated to sacrifice himself for Nigeria and significantly for a Hausa cause. In a way, the prolongation and viciousness of the conflict have started affecting the soldiers on the ground; as in any internal crisis, the armed forces, which are supposed to be neutral, are gradually and inexorably drawn into its vortex.
No group has drawn the wrath of most Nigerian groups, perhaps except for the Igbo during the Nigerian crisis of 1966-1970, like the ethnic Fulani presently. Anti-Fulani sentiments, always simmering below the surface mainly due to perceived historical wrongs, are now erupting due to the current widespread atrocities of mostly pastoral Fulani. An inchoate coalition of mostly Hausa youths and northern minorities is emerging based on shared grievances against the Fulani. Their violent rhetoric, both online and offline, reflects the extent to which the Fulani have slipped down from decent beings and citizens to savages and aliens. No amount of infractions against the ethnic Fulani is seen as grotesque or repugnant.
The troops on the ground and the Hausa vigilante have fused into a hardened armed fist against their perceived enemy. From diverse reports, a discernible pattern is emerging. As the soldiers attack the bandits, the vigilante form their rear, mopping up any stragglers and often dispersing or exterminating ethnic Fulani along their path. The vigilante are also at liberty to arrest, detain, and kill any ethnic Fulani or Hausa informers in an attempt to root out collaborators or destroy the bandits’ supply channels. When the bandits feel the heat, they attack, maim, and kill Hausa peasants randomly. They threaten to stop farming this season, forcing the government and the sedentary population into another truce. This only inflames the soldiers and the vigilante, resulting in more indiscriminate attacks against ethnic Fulani.
Some Islamic clerics still maintain that military operations will not end the insurgency and that the government should negotiate with the bandits to end the bloodletting. These statements make the bandits believe in their invincibility anddangerously encourage them to see their actions as serving an ethnic cause. In a bizarre twist, the bandits have come to link their survival with that of the ethnic Fulani. Since they no longer see themselves as the cause of the Fulani predicament, their removal from the scene is out of the question. This intransigence is further fueling the binary that currently pits the Fulani against the Hausa. Thus, instead of viewing the conflict as occupational and the bandits as criminals, some sections of the ulema have come to regard it as communal, with the insurgents seen as activists.
What some clerics and others fail to appreciate is that both the Hausa-speaking sedentary population of the Northwest and the pastoral Fulani have become one community through centuries of exchange. The pastoral Fulani are essentially an occupational and remnant group continuously absorbed into the general Hausa population. In other words, they do not exist as separate and closed groups. Like similar groups throughout history, the bandits are deviants that have emerged due to internal crises. They need to be tamed or destroyed, not hailed as vanguards of any ethnic group.
With the bandits vowing to fight to the bitter end, they risk dragging the rest of the ethnic Fulani into the abyss with them. The intensity and randomness of their attacks testify to this deranged stance. The indiscriminate reprisals from the other side are making life unbearable for the ethnic Fulani. As the noose tightens around them, there is little chance for their offspring to continue the fight as they hope. A war of attrition would only lead to their decimation; they cannot withstand the combined strength of the Nigerian state and the Nigerian masses.
Unlike the Igbo, who returned to their homeland following the pogroms in Northern Nigeria, the ethnic Fulani are losing their remaining sanctuaries. If the war becomes protracted or its viciousness intensifies, the country risks sliding into the fate of Mali and Burkina Faso. With the bandits terrorising almost half of the country and the army engaged in fighting them in about a quarter of it, hatred against the Fulani is increasing among the soldiers.
Like the inchoate movement developing among the ethnic Hausa and northern minorities online, a conspiratorial group with similar configuration and motivation could develop within the army. Given the toxicity across the land and the increasing hardship, they might attempt a putsch. As in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the raison d’être of the juntas is the containment of the Fulani in the case of the former and their destruction in the latter’s case, an idealistic junta in Nigeria would unleash its reign of terror not only against the ethnic Fulani but also against their symbols.
There is only one possible way to avert this Armageddon. Many groups before them have avoided this ruinous outcome. Recently, the Kanuri, who formed the bulk of the supporters of Boko Haram, quietly abandoned their weapons and dispersed among the general population as the magnitude of the catastrophe loomed. The followers of Maitatsine had followed the same course after realising the folly of confronting the state. After valiant resistance against Rabeh at the end of the nineteenth century, many Kanuri surrendered, and others fled. The leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate retreated in the face of superior arms. After their defeat at Burmi, a few withdrew from the territory and eventually submitted to the British authorities in Sudan. At the same time, the majority reconciled themselves to the new order in Northern Nigeria. When the Biafran secessionists realised that their intransigence would only lead to more destruction of the Igbo, they removed themselves from the scene to pave the way for surrender. These were the practical and noble paths taken in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War and countless previous conflicts.
The preservation of the ethnic Fulani must supersede the bandits’ ego, and only surrender would spare their kinsmen from possible destruction. They should give themselves up and be tried in a military tribunal. Like the Nuremberg trials at the end of the Second World War, they must be sentenced based on the gravity of their offences. The minors could be assembled and enrolled in a rehabilitation program. A bold resettlement and integration plan must be rolled out for the pastoral Fulani. Parallel communities should not be allowed to resurface; the pastoralists should be settled among the sedentary population to end mistrust and bigotry. The homogeneous, stable, and prosperous nation that would emerge would be the compensation for these painful sacrifices.
Rabiu Isah Hassan wrote from the Arewa House/Department of History, ABU Zaria. He can be contacted at rabiurafani@gmail.com.
