The dilemma of negotiating with bandits: A path built on ashes?
By Aliyu Ya’u
His Excellency, Dikko Umar Radda’s position on rural banditry has provoked considerable reactions, with some questioning his resolve to confront bandits rather than seek a peace agreement.
Given that he lacks control over the paramilitary and armed forces present in the state, it is fair to say that he has taken commendable steps by establishing the state’s community policing group and encouraging the civilian population to engage in self-defence.
I fully empathise with his frustration, especially in light of the constant criticisms and pleas from victims suffering due to the terror of rural banditry. Understandably, his excellency may feel disheartened and powerless to prevent these criminals from continuing their activities.
Further, everyone, especially the civilian population, would welcome a peace accord in a real conflict situation. In such situations, all parties’ demands are tabled and deliberated, and sustainable solutions are found and implemented.
However, in the case of an unorganised and unregulated group like rural bandits of the North-western and North-central Nigeria, who wreak havoc daily without reasonable justification.
The question lies not in the society respecting the peace accord, but in the modalities employed to guide the peace settlement. Another question is whether the peace accord is sustainable, using historical parameters to assess the credibility and reliability of the commitment of the violent party involved.
Any peace accord between a government, society, and an armed group should be based on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR).
According to the United Nations Peacekeeping operation unit, DDR is “a process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society.”
The question is whether the militias or bandits are ready to surrender all their weapons, demobilise from their dens, and reintegrate into the larger society. Unless the government can confirm these terms with the bandits’ leaders, mediators, and sureties, it will not be obligated to build a wall of ash blocks.
Other questions include, How strong and convincing are the commitments laid down or presented by the militias? How committed is the leadership to the pact? What are the demands? How cogent and soluble are they? Do they have a unified command structure? Is the command structure capable of issuing an effective directive that will be respected by various dens and groups committing heinous bandit crimes?
These armed groups are often small; in most cases, a group comprises 10 or fewer bandits who act autonomously, unless they need to cooperate against a sedentary enemy community. The absence of a centralised governing body makes it difficult to build an effective peace agreement with the groups. How could a peace accord with hundreds of bandit groups roaming the regions’ thick and interconnected forests that span hundreds of kilometres and access many states be possible?
Another aspect deserving the government’s focus is the scope of Katsina state’s peace accord. What areas will it encompass? Will the armed bandits responsible for heinous crimes in Katsina state prevent others from neighbouring states from crossing into the area to commit banditry? It’s crucial to recognise that we are not dealing with an insurgent group, a separatist movement, or an ideological terror organisation; rather, the state is confronting multiple disorganised criminal entities.
The focus should be on the following: The state’s primary concern is achieving lasting peace, not a temporary ceasefire. The bandits should establish a reliable leadership structure that is known and accessible, and willing to take full responsibility if they breach the agreement. They should clearly specify what sets their current commitments apart from those made with previous governments. Additionally, they should submit their complaints for the state’s review and assessment. The sureties must first confiscate or disarm the bandits before any peace accord is signed.
Aliyu Yau holds an M.Sc. in Defence and Strategic Studies and is a public policy and conflict analyst based in Kaduna.








