Insecurity

By Aminu Babayo Shehu

Nigeria is facing one of its toughest internal security battles in decades. From the kidnapping of schoolchildren in Kebbi and Niger states to the killing of senior military officers, including a Brigadier General, criminal groups continue to operate with increasing boldness. Bandits, kidnappers and terror cells now openly upload videos on platforms like TikTok and WhatsApp, displaying weapons, hostages and propaganda with little fear of consequences.

This is no longer an era where outdated tactics can secure the nation. Criminal groups are becoming more technologically aware, while the state still relies heavily on manual intelligence and slow-response systems. Countries facing similar threats have adopted advanced tools and strategies. Nigeria must follow the same path.

The United States and Israel use drones, satellite intelligence and geolocation trackers to disrupt hostile organisations long before they strike. Rwanda has established a modern drone command system to enhance surveillance and national security. India employs mobile tracing, SIM mapping and digital pattern analysis to dismantle kidnapping networks. These examples show that even in challenging environments, technology can expose criminal movements, reduce their operational freedom and strengthen national response.

Nigeria can apply the same approach effectively.

Real-time aerial surveillance remains one of the most critical gaps in Nigeria’s security architecture. High-altitude drones equipped with night-vision cameras and thermal sensors can monitor large forest areas where bandits hide. Such drones transmit live data to command centres, enabling tracking of movements and coordination of precision strikes. In many cases, soldiers need not be deployed on foot into ambush-prone areas; operations can be guided or executed remotely.

Mobile intelligence is another powerful asset. Every phone, even when switched off, leaves digital traces. With firm collaboration between telecom operators and security agencies, criminals can be located through cell-site analysis, call patterns and movement anomalies. India has successfully used these tools to reduce large-scale kidnapping syndicates.

Satellite imaging, when paired with artificial intelligence, can detect camps, vehicles, and human movement in remote areas. Modern software can analyse thousands of images within minutes and flag suspicious activity such as heat signatures, makeshift shelters, or recently cleared land. This drastically improves early detection and reduces operational delays.

State governments can also invest in early-warning technologies. Community CCTV networks, automated alarm systems and remote-sensor alerts can shorten response times. Local initiatives that once existed in a few states need consistent funding and national integration.

At the federal level, the Presidency should coordinate a national security technology blueprint. This would bring together drones, cyber-intelligence tools, biometric systems, satellite monitoring, and geospatial-analysis platforms into a single central command. Strategic partnerships with technologically advanced nations can reduce costs and strengthen capacity.

Nigeria’s security forces have courage and dedication, but courage alone cannot defeat modern criminals who rely on speed, shock and terrain mastery. Technology is the equaliser. It exposes hideouts, cuts communication lines and allows the state to strike before criminals mobilise.

The tools exist. They are affordable. They have worked in other nations. What Nigeria needs now is clear political will, long-term investment and an understanding that 21st-century threats demand 21st-century solutions.

If embraced, technology can save lives, disrupt kidnappers and terrorists, and restore the confidence of millions of Nigerians who deserve safety.

Aminu Babayo Shehu is a Software Engineer and Mobile Developer with experience building technology-driven solutions, including systems for logistics, telecommunications, e-commerce, and security-focused applications. He writes on technology, national development and digital transformation.

By Suleiman Usman Yusuf 

Right now, I am deeply pained and genuinely confused, perhaps like many other well-meaning Nigerians who still believe this country can rise above its failures. If all I have to offer is my voice and my pen, then I will continue writing about Nigeria’s lingering security crisis until my last strength fades. Silence is no longer an option when the nation is bleeding this profusely.

This country is bruised. Every week, the news reminds us that Nigeria is fighting for its own life, not in theory but in blood and dust. Yet we move on too quickly, as if these tragedies belong to someone else.

The death of Brigadier General M. Uba should stop us in our tracks.

Not just because he was a senior officer. Not because his story is more important than the stories of countless others who fell before him. But because his final hours reveal both the extraordinary courage of the men defending this country and the painful weaknesses of the institutions meant to protect them.

Two days ago, Nigerians were told he was alive and safe. Today, the truth arrived from insurgent propaganda channels rather than from the State he served. That alone should trouble every citizen who still believes this country can be redeemed.

But beyond the misinformation, beyond the chaos of battle and the failures of communication, there was a man. A man who fought through one ambush, shielded his men, and kept talking on the radio even as danger closed in from every direction. A man who understood the terrain, the risks, and the meaning of service in a way many of us never will.

His killers did not find him by magic. They found him because insurgent groups in the North-East have evolved into highly adaptive, intelligence-driven networks. They have spotters, informants, trackers, and a familiarity with the terrain that gives them dangerous advantages. Our troops face that reality every day with limited resources and uneven institutional support. Yet they still go out, still patrol, still hold their ground.

Brigadier General Uba died in uniform, under a harsh Borno sky, in the service of a country that has not yet learned how to protect its defenders fully. His death is not just a battlefield loss. It is a national failure.

But this is where our story must change.

Nigeria cannot survive if we continue pretending that insecurity is a Northern problem, or a Christian problem, or a Muslim problem, or a regional competition in suffering. Nigeria is bleeding in too many places for that false comfort.

This is a Nigerian problem. All of us are inside this fire.

If we want to save this country, we must begin by admitting the truth.

We have an overburdened military fighting a war that politicians treat like background noise. We have intelligence agencies that do not always speak to each other. We have a society more invested in ethnic debates than national survival. We have families quietly burying soldiers while the rest of us argue online. We have institutions that hide failures rather than learn from them.

But we also have something else. We have citizens who still believe in Nigeria. We have communities ready to cooperate when trust is restored. We have young officers and men who refuse to give up on this country, even when this country sometimes gives up on them. We have people like Brigadier General Uba, whose courage reminds us of the Nigeria that is still possible.

If his death is to mean anything, it must push us toward a national rebuilding rooted in truth, accountability, and collective responsibility. It must force us to demand better communication protocols, better extraction procedures, better intelligence coordination, and better welfare for every man and woman who carries a rifle for this country.

Saving Nigeria is not a slogan. It is a long, disciplined, painful process that requires leadership, honesty, citizen cooperation, and institutional courage.

Brigadier General Uba has paid his share in full. The account is now with us.

Suleiman Usman Yusuf, a Governance, Security, and Development Consultant, AI Policy and Governance Advocate, and a Shaper of Africa’s Tech Future, wrote via suleimanusmanbac@gmail.com.

By Hadiza Abdulkadir

Prominent Islamic scholar, Sheikh Ahmad Mahmud Abubakar Gumi, has publicly endorsed the appointment of former Zamfara State governor Bello Muhammad Matawalle as Minister of State for Defence, arguing that his approach to insecurity prioritises dialogue and community engagement over purely military solutions.

In a post shared on his Facebook page, Gumi said security experts have long maintained that communal conflicts cannot be resolved through force alone, noting that military action accounts for “only about 25 per cent” of effective conflict resolution. He described Matawalle as one of the few political leaders who recognised this reality during his tenure as Zamfara governor.

According to Gumi, Matawalle’s outreach to aggrieved groups significantly reduced banditry in the state at the time, reopening major roads and markets that had been shut for years due to insecurity. He cited personal travel experiences along routes such as Gusau–Anka–Gummi and Wurno–Isa–Shinkafi–Gusau, which he said had become safe during that period.

“Cattle markets were opened, and life was returning to normal,” Gumi wrote, adding that the gains were later reversed following what he described as “military non-cooperation,” which led to renewed hostilities.

The cleric argued that Matawalle’s current role at the Ministry of Defence places “round pegs into round holes,” urging Nigerians to set aside “petty local politics” in support of what he called a new federal government paradigm shift in addressing insecurity. He concluded by praying for unity, peace, and progress for the country.

Gumi’s intervention has once again sparked debate, given his controversial role in public discussions on banditry and insecurity in northern Nigeria. While some supporters credit him with advocating dialogue as a pathway to peace, critics have accused him of being sympathetic to armed bandits—allegations he has repeatedly denied.

Security analysts remain divided on the effectiveness of non-kinetic strategies, with many arguing that dialogue must be carefully balanced with law enforcement and accountability. The federal government has yet to officially respond to Gumi’s remarks, but officials have consistently maintained that Nigeria’s security challenges require a mix of military action, intelligence-led policing, and community-based initiatives.

As the administration continues to recalibrate its security strategy, Gumi’s comments contribute to the ongoing national conversation on how best to end violence and restore stability across conflict-affected regions.

By Iranloye Sofiu Taiye

The crackle of gunfire shattered the night’s calm in Patigi Local Government Area last August. For hours, residents hid in terror as militants believed to be linked to the Mahmuda terrorist faction ransacked homes and farms, leaving behind a trail of displacement and despair. This wasn’t in conflict-ridden Zamfara or Borno. This was Kwara State, Nigeria’s so-called “State of Harmony”, now facing the brutal reality of spillover violence from neighbouring conflicts.

For years, Kwara has been regarded as an oasis of peace. While northern states battled insurgencies and northwestern states negotiated with bandits, Kwara’s security strategy primarily relied on these measures. This complacency is now our greatest vulnerability. As armed groups face increasing pressure in Nigeria’s northwest and the Sahel, they are seeking new territories and routes, and Kwara’s under-protected border communities present the perfect opportunity.

The data reveals an alarming trend: while Kwara recorded 70 violent incidents in 2024, representing a sharp increase from previous years, with ACLED data showing 21 fatalities signalling emerging threats. Meanwhile, neighbouring Niger State suffered 179 incidents with 514 deaths, over 2.5 times Kwara’s rate. This disparity highlights both Kwara’s relative peace and its growing exposure. Nigeria’s overall security situation has deteriorated dramatically, with the country dropping to 148th on the 2025 Global Peace Index and suffering over 2,266 deaths from banditry and insurgency in just the first half of 2025, exceeding the entire 2024 total.

The False Comfort of “Relative Peace”

Kwara’s peaceful reputation has created a dangerous paradox: the state appears secure compared to Nigeria’s raging conflicts, yet this very perception has led to critical underinvestment in security preparedness. With a meagre ₦350 million (approximately $230,000) security vote in its 2025 budget, Kwara has insufficient resources for basic border surveillance, let alone comprehensive counterinsurgency measures. This budgetary neglect reflects a fundamental misreading of the evolving threat landscape.

The nature of modern conflict doesn’t respect artificial boundaries. Militant groups operate across porous borders, exploiting governance vacuums and ethnic kinship. The emergence of groups like Mahmuda around the Kainji Lake area demonstrates how terrorist organisations establish footholds in perceived “safe havens” before expanding their operations. As security reports have noted, there have been at least 13 ISIS-Sahel-linked attacks in central Nigeria in 2025 alone, indicating a strategic southward expansion.

The situation mirrors concerning patterns elsewhere in West Africa, where jihadist insurgency has spread from the Sahel toward coastal states. The southward spillover alarmingly threatens countries like Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, which until recently had been mostly spared jihadist violence. Kwara now faces precisely this dynamic, compounded by the added vulnerability of having dismissed the threat until it arrived at its doorstep.

Recommendation: A Community-Based Solution

Some advocate for a traditional security response: deploying additional military forces along border areas, establishing checkpoints, and implementing drone surveillance. While these measures have short-term deterrent effects, they come with significant tradeoffs: escalating tensions with communities, straining federal-state relations, and diverting scarce resources from development needs.

A more effective approach combines strategic security presence with community empowerment. I recommend that Kwara State immediately establish a Community-Led Early Warning and Resilience Program (CLEWRP) to train and equip more than 5,000 local volunteers in conflict mediation, digital reporting, and response coordination. This approach recognises that security is not merely about repelling attacks but about building resilient communities capable of preventing, withstanding, and recovering from violence.

The evidence supporting community-based security is compelling. When local populations are empowered as first responders, they provide hyperlocal intelligence that external forces cannot access. They understand the terrain, recognise outsiders, and can distinguish between legitimate herders and criminal elements. As the tragic incidents in Kwara’s south communities have shown, top-down security responses often arrive too late after attacks have occurred and perpetrators have vanished into the forest corridors connecting Kwara, Niger, and Kogi states.

The proposed CLEWRP program would unfold in three phases: planning and stakeholder consultations across Kwara’s 16 LGAs; pilot implementation in high-risk areas; and statewide scaling, with continuous evaluation. The Kwara State Ministry of Homeland Security and Vigilante Affairs would lead implementation, partnering with the National Emergency Management Agency for federal coordination, local governments for ground implementation, and international organisations for training expertise.

Financing the $3-5 million USD program would require a blended approach: 60% from the state budget and 40% from federal security grants and humanitarian NGO partnerships.

A National Security Imperative

Kwara’s security crisis represents a microcosm of Nigeria’s broader challenges. The federal government’s 2025 budget allocated ₦4.91 trillion to defence and security, about 8.9% of total expenditure, recognising that without security, economic development is impossible.

The national security strategy must therefore prioritise preventing the southward spread of violence in states such as Kwara. This requires both regional cooperation and smarter resource allocation. The Accra Initiative, which promotes intelligence-sharing among coastal West African states, offers a promising model that should be expanded to include central Nigerian states facing spillover threats.

Furthermore, security funding should incentivise preventive approaches rather than merely funding reactive measures. The federal government could establish a matching-grant program for states that develop community-based security initiatives, thereby encouraging locally adapted solutions rather than one-size-fits-all approaches.

The Time for Action Is Now

Kwara stands at a precipice. The state can continue its complacent approach, hoping that violence will spare its territories, or it can acknowledge the changing threat environment and build resilient systems before the crisis becomes a catastrophe. The choice is stark: invest modestly in prevention now, or pay enormously for response later.

The CLEWRP program offers a practical, cost-effective solution that aligns with Kwara’s cultural traditions of community cooperation while incorporating modern technology and coordination methods. It acknowledges that security is not solely the government’s responsibility but a shared undertaking between authorities and citizens.

History shows that complacency amid spreading instability is a recipe for disaster. West Africa’s security landscape has deteriorated dramatically in recent years, with jihadist groups expanding their operations. Kwara cannot assume it will remain immune.

The phrase “State of Harmony” should not be a relic of Kwara’s past but a promise for its future. Preserving this harmony requires honest acknowledgement of emerging threats, courageous investment in preventive measures, and collaborative implementation across government and communities. The time for action is now, before the next attack becomes a full-blown crisis.

Iranloye Sofiu Taiye is a Policy Analyst specialising in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution, Digital Governance, and Service Delivery, and can be contacted via iranloye100@gmail.com.

By Hadiza Abdulkadir

The Nigerian government has secured the release of 100 schoolchildren abducted last month from St. Mary’s School, a Catholic boarding institution in the Papiri community of Niger State.

The attack, which occurred on November 21, saw armed men take 303 students and 12 teachers hostage. In the days following the abduction, 50 pupils managed to escape and were reunited with their families.

According to officials, the rescued children are expected to be handed over to Niger State authorities for medical and psychological evaluation. Government sources confirmed the release but did not disclose whether it resulted from negotiations, military operations, or other interventions.

Despite the successful rescue, concerns remain high. More than 160 students and staff members are still unaccounted for, leaving many families anxiously awaiting news of their loved ones.

Child-protection advocates and community leaders have renewed calls for stronger security measures around schools, stressing that the safety of students must be a national priority as mass abductions continue to plague parts of the country.

By Aliyu Ya’u

His Excellency, Dikko Umar Radda’s position on rural banditry has provoked considerable reactions, with some questioning his resolve to confront bandits rather than seek a peace agreement.

Given that he lacks control over the paramilitary and armed forces present in the state, it is fair to say that he has taken commendable steps by establishing the state’s community policing group and encouraging the civilian population to engage in self-defence. 

I fully empathise with his frustration, especially in light of the constant criticisms and pleas from victims suffering due to the terror of rural banditry. Understandably, his excellency may feel disheartened and powerless to prevent these criminals from continuing their activities. 

Further, everyone, especially the civilian population, would welcome a peace accord in a real conflict situation. In such situations, all parties’ demands are tabled and deliberated, and sustainable solutions are found and implemented. 

However, in the case of an unorganised and unregulated group like rural bandits of the North-western and North-central Nigeria, who wreak havoc daily without reasonable justification. 

The question lies not in the society respecting the peace accord, but in the modalities employed to guide the peace settlement. Another question is whether the peace accord is sustainable, using historical parameters to assess the credibility and reliability of the commitment of the violent party involved. 

Any peace accord between a government, society, and an armed group should be based on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). 

According to the United Nations Peacekeeping operation unit, DDR is “a process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society.”

The question is whether the militias or bandits are ready to surrender all their weapons, demobilise from their dens, and reintegrate into the larger society. Unless the government can confirm these terms with the bandits’ leaders, mediators, and sureties, it will not be obligated to build a wall of ash blocks. 

Other questions include, How strong and convincing are the commitments laid down or presented by the militias? How committed is the leadership to the pact? What are the demands? How cogent and soluble are they? Do they have a unified command structure? Is the command structure capable of issuing an effective directive that will be respected by various dens and groups committing heinous bandit crimes? 

These armed groups are often small; in most cases, a group comprises 10 or fewer bandits who act autonomously, unless they need to cooperate against a sedentary enemy community. The absence of a centralised governing body makes it difficult to build an effective peace agreement with the groups. How could a peace accord with hundreds of bandit groups roaming the regions’ thick and interconnected forests that span hundreds of kilometres and access many states be possible? 

Another aspect deserving the government’s focus is the scope of Katsina state’s peace accord. What areas will it encompass? Will the armed bandits responsible for heinous crimes in Katsina state prevent others from neighbouring states from crossing into the area to commit banditry? It’s crucial to recognise that we are not dealing with an insurgent group, a separatist movement, or an ideological terror organisation; rather, the state is confronting multiple disorganised criminal entities. 

The focus should be on the following: The state’s primary concern is achieving lasting peace, not a temporary ceasefire. The bandits should establish a reliable leadership structure that is known and accessible, and willing to take full responsibility if they breach the agreement. They should clearly specify what sets their current commitments apart from those made with previous governments. Additionally, they should submit their complaints for the state’s review and assessment. The sureties must first confiscate or disarm the bandits before any peace accord is signed.

Aliyu Yau holds an M.Sc. in Defence and Strategic Studies and is a public policy and conflict analyst based in Kaduna.

By Zayyad I. Muhammad

On Saturday, November 1, 2025, U.S. President Donald J. Trump made his famous “guns-a-blazing” remark and described Nigeria as “the now disgraced country.”

On Sunday, November 2, he repeated that the United States could deploy troops to Nigeria or launch airstrikes to stop alleged killings.

In what appears to be a reaction to Trump’s comments, terrorists and bandits in Nigeria have intensified attacks, especially the mass abduction of pupils, students, and worshippers.

On November 17, bandits abducted 25 female students from Government Girls’ Comprehensive Secondary School, Maga, Kebbi State.

On November 18, daredevil gunmen attacked Christ Apostolic Church, Oke-Isegba, Eruku, kidnapping 38 worshippers during an evening service.

On Friday, November 21, gunmen raided St. Mary’s School in the Papiri community of Niger State’s Agwara District, abducting 215 pupils and 12 teachers.

That same day, after Trump appeared on Fox News and declared, “I think Nigeria is a disgrace,” reports emerged that ISWAP fighters had abducted 13 teenage girls working on farmlands in Askira-Uba, Borno State.

Armed groups across Nigeria have long understood the symbolic power of their targets. But the timing and composition of these attacks suggest deeper motives:

Three separate days. Four mass kidnappings. Hundreds of victims. Mostly female victims. This is not a coincidence. This is a strategy.

Observers cite four major reasons:

1.  To escalate the situation and attract international attention. Nothing provokes global outrage like the mass abduction of schoolgirls or worshippers. Terrorists crave visibility, especially when a powerful international figure has threatened intervention.

2.  To instil fear and embarrass the government , psychological warfare, so to speak. Targeting female students and worshippers strikes directly at the heart of communities. Schools and places of worship are supposed to be sanctuaries; when they are violated, society trembles.

3.  To use abducted victims, especially girls, as human shields. If the U.S. were ever to conduct air strikes, the bandits and terrorists understand the protective value of having dozens of young female hostages in their custody.

4.  Ransom opportunities: To exploit heightened international interest as leverage for ransom or negotiation. Heightened American interest increases the “value” of hostages. Criminal groups see an opportunity to negotiate for large payouts.

President Trump’s threats have become a local weapon for the terrorists. To be fair to President Trump, he may not intend it, but his sensational remarks have become ammunition in the arsenal of Nigeria’s armed groups. They interpret his words as an opportunity or a provocation and recalibrate their tactics accordingly.

Also, to be fair to President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, he or his government cannot control the statements made by foreign leaders. Still, they can control how prepared the country is for the consequences. This moment demands urgency. The Nigerian delegation to the US, led by Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, is engaged in sterling diplomatic work. Thus, apart from local efforts, this visit indicates to the Nigerian leadership that a well-planned diplomatic strategy can prevent reckless foreign commentary from escalating domestic crises.

Local and international efforts must work together!

Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja via zaymohd@yahoo.com.

By Abdullahi Mukhtar Algasgaini

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has issued an immediate order for the withdrawal of all police officers assigned as personal security guards to Very Important Persons (VIPs) across the country.

The directive, announced on Sunday, aims to redeploy these officers to their core duties of frontline policing and public security.

The order was issued following a security meeting in Abuja, which was attended by the heads of the nation’s security agencies, including the Army, Air Force, the Department of State Services (DSS), and the Inspector-General of Police.

According to the new directive, any VIP requiring personal protection must now seek such services from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), which will be responsible for providing armed guards.

This move comes as many regions of the country, particularly rural and remote areas, suffer from a severe shortage of police personnel.

This deficit has hampered the force’s ability to effectively protect lives and property.

President Tinubu stated his administration’s commitment to increasing police presence nationwide to tackle the security challenges plaguing the nation.

This initiative aligns with the federal government’s earlier approval to recruit 30,000 new police officers, alongside a partnership with state governments to enhance police training facilities across Nigeria.

By Umar Sani Adamu, 

For a long time, Western media outlets, foreign politicians, and advocacy groups have repeatedly described Nigeria as the scene of an ongoing “Christian genocide” at the hands of Muslims, particularly Fulani herdsmen. The charge is serious, emotional, and widely circulated. However, a closer examination of the facts on the ground reveals a much more complex and painful truth: the primary victims of the country’s deadliest insecurity crisis, armed banditry, are overwhelmingly northern Muslims.

Multiple independent investigations have found no evidence of a systematic, religiously motivated campaign to exterminate Christians. A 2024 BBC Global Disinformation Unit report, fact-checks by AFP and Al Jazeera, and even cautious statements from Open Doors, the Christian persecution monitor frequently quoted by genocide advocates, have all warned that the term “genocide” is being misused and exaggerated in the Nigerian context.

The violence plaguing the country is real, but it is predominantly criminal, not confessional. Since 2015, armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, village raids and mass killings have turned Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto and parts of Niger State into killing fields. These states are 90–98 per cent Muslim. Most bandits are ethnic Fulani Muslims who prey primarily on Hausa Muslim farming communities.

Complex numbers tell the story that western headlines rarely do:  

– Zamfara State alone recorded over 1,200 banditry-related deaths in 2023,  almost all Muslim.  

– In the first nine months of 2025, more than 2,800 people were killed by bandits across the North West, according to the Nigerian Atrocities Documentation Project. The vast majority were Muslim.  

– The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom stated in its 2025 report that banditry “disproportionately affects Muslim-majority areas”.

While Christians have suffered real losses in Middle Belt farmer-herder clashes and church attacks, the scale and frequency pale in comparison to the daily carnage in the Muslim North West.

 When the clergy cross the line

This month, Plateau State Police Command arrested a Catholic priest for allegedly supplying AK-47 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition to bandit gangs operating across Plateau, Kaduna and Bauchi. Weapons recovered from the cleric have reportedly been linked to recent deadly raids. He was paraded on November 12.

It is not an isolated case. In February 2025, another Reverend Father, a deaconess and several church members were arrested in Taraba for allegedly running arms to both Boko Haram and bandit groups. Similar arrests of Christian clergy and lay workers have occurred in Benue and Nasarawa.

Social media reaction was swift and furious: “They label every Fulani man a terrorist, yet a Reverend Father is caught red-handed arming the same killers,” wrote one widely shared post.

Why the false narrative endures

Images of burnt churches and grieving Christian widows travel fast on global networks. Footage of torched Muslim villages in remote Zurmi or Tsafe rarely does. Poor, Hausa-speaking northerners lack the lobbying machinery that amplifies Middle Belt voices in Washington and London.

As one northern governor privately admitted: “When they shout ‘Christian genocide’ abroad, the grants go to NGOs in Jos and Enugu — never to the millions of displaced Muslims rotting in camps in Gusau and Birnin Gwari.”

The way forward

Nigeria’s crisis is one of state failure, poverty, climate stress and organised crime not a holy war. Treating banditry as jihad only deepens division and delays solutions. Community policing, economic revival in the rural North, and ruthless prosecution of arms suppliers regardless of collar or turban offer the only realistic path to peace.

Until the world stops peddling a convenient myth, the people bearing the heaviest burden — ordinary Muslim farmers, women and children of the North West — will continue to bleed in silence.

There is no Christian genocide in Nigeria. There is, however, a predominantly Muslim tragedy that the world has chosen not to see.

Umar Sani Adamu can be reached via umarhashidu1994@gmail.com.

By Muhammad Sulaiman

Security experts have long warned that Nigeria’s porous borders are a major threat to national stability. This concern was echoed again when Dr Bulama Bukarti, a security researcher, lamented how almost anything can be smuggled into the country due to ineffective border control.

In reaction to Bukarti’s remarks, Dr Aliyu Yakubu Yusuf of Bayero University, Kano, shared a firsthand account that underscores the depth of the problem.

Dr Yusuf narrated that on a trip from Damagaran in the Niger Republic to Kano earlier this week, he sat in the front seat of a commercial bus and witnessed what he described as “a chain of extortion masquerading as security.”

According to him, as the bus approached the Babban Mutum border on the way to Ɓaɓura, he observed “so many annoying checkpoints,” sometimes only a few meters apart. Police officers, soldiers, immigration officials, road safety personnel, and customs operatives were all stationed along the route. Yet, none conducted any meaningful inspection.

“Each time we reached a checkpoint, the driver would simply pull out a one-thousand-naira note and hand it to an officer, then we would move on,” he said. Some officers even addressed the driver by name, apparently familiar with him as a regular traveller.

Dr Yusuf said the driver disclosed that there are 35 checkpoints between Damagaran and Kano, and at each one, he must part with between ₦500 and ₦2000, depending on the officials present. He estimated that drivers spend at least ₦30,000 during a single trip.

“Throughout the four-hour journey, not a single officer asked the driver to open his boot,” he added, expressing disbelief that such laxity exists despite Nigeria’s ongoing fight against insecurity.

His account reinforces concerns that many checkpoints serve as avenues for bribe collection rather than effective security screening—leaving the country vulnerable while motorists bear the financial burden.

“We are jokers, wallahi,” Dr. Yusuf concluded.