2023 Elections: Kano politics so far…
By Salisu Uba Kofar-Wambai
By Salisu Uba Kofar-Wambai
By Mohammed Zayyad
The debate that the presidency moves to the South in 2023 has gained momentum. Also, presidential hopefuls from the North, like Atiku Abukar, Sule Lamido, Senator Bala Mohammed, Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, are also effectively playing their games.
The calls for power to shift to the South have further triggered permutations and realignments in the polity. Both the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) have strong candidates from the South. But these candidates have their respective baggage, and the parties have internal squabbles that must be resolved.
The APC has its stronghold in the Northwest, Southwest, Northeast and Northcentral – four of the nation’s six geopolitical zones. The PDP has strong structures in the six zones with a stronghold in the Southeast and Southsouth. However, the APC has moved into the Southeast in full force. Before the 2015 elections, nobody had ever thought that the APC would someday have even a ward councillor in the Southeast. But, today, the party has two state governors, senators, House of Representatives members, state house of assembly members, local council chairmen, councillors and formidable party structures in all the five southeastern states.
Come 2023, the APC has no reasons to retain power in the North, but there is strong politicking by some governors and other bigwigs to maintain power. This will mean the APC contravening the unwritten agreement between the North and the South on power rotation. In any case, the APC does not have a strong presidential candidate from the North. This is a big plus to the presidential hopefuls from the South, or Southeast, in particular. Furthermore, the Southeast has a strong case to present based on a plank that the Southeast is the only geopolitical zone in the South that has not produced a President or vice president on any political party platform since 1999.
If APC picks its presidential candidate from the South, especially Southwest, the PDP may attempt to outwit this by looking to the North for its presidential candidate. This, as well, will put the PDP in a catch-22 situation on how to explain this to the South, especially the Southeast and the South-South, why the North again, after eight years of the North being in power.
PDP has good candidates in their own ‘rights’ from the Southeast and South-South. Enugu State Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, Peter Obi from Southeast and Governor Nyesom Wike from the South-South. Obi does not have friends in the North and has never tried to pull an appeal from the region, directly or by proxy. His deportation of other Nigerians to their states when he was governor of Anambra state was used against him in the North during the 2019 campaign, and it worked.
For Wike, his words, ‘Rivers is a Christian state’ will be used against him in the North like Governor El-Rufai’s Muslim-Muslim ticket in Kaduna can be used against him (El-Rufai). This is how local politics impact a candidate’s wider political opportunities. Some young people in the north are also campaigning for Enugu State Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi. Still, the IPOB issue will be a significant hindrance in the North, but it is not insurmountable. Advocates of secession appear not to understand Nigeria. There are massive inter-marriage, friendships, business links and political alliances, among other ties, between many northerners and many Igbos.
Some nationalistic politicians from the Southeast have started to convince other Nigerians to support the region to produce the Nigeria president of Southeast extraction in 2023. The bigwigs’ forefront presidential hopefuls are Governor David Umahi, Orji Uzor Kalu, Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, Rochas Okorocha, Chris Baywood Ibe, Ken Nnamani, Minister of State for Education, Dr Chinedu Nwajiuba, Sen Osita Izunaso and many others. Of course, these politicians have their political baggage and controversies. However, people like Chris Baywood Ibe are new faces without any political baggage and controversy-free.
A thorough understanding of how Nigerian politics works is paramount in achieving the political goals of a group, a region, or individuals. There are so many conflicting interests in Nigeria. Still, there are always windows for alliances, give-and-take, a hand of friendship, and convincing others to support a particular political cause or an individual’s.
For the 2023 presidency, the Southeast should present a candidate with a new face, no controversies, no political baggage and who has friends and is well-known across the Niger. For both the APC and the PDP, it will be an opportunity to reunite Nigeria and rekindle the historical political alliance between the north and the southeast while maintaining the partys’ current national. The Igbo presidency is possible through the spirit of one Nigeria.
Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja. He can be reached via zaymohd@yahoo.com.
By Aminu Nuru
“The most dangerous untruths are truths moderately distorted”. – George Lichtenberg
It is not uncommon that some public commentators and analysts could be mischievously deceptive in their narratives and analyses of history to accomplish an end. They could quote historical facts, mix them with fiction, and frame narratives to promote a single story. In some cases, they deliberately relegate and ignore some significant events or points to suit the writer’s bias. Recent writings on the origin and rise of Boko Haram demonstrate how some writers distort facts to frame narrative and promote bigotry.
For instance, if one can closely study the framing of Boko Haram and how it is brazenly becoming one-sided, then one can say that the whole history is rewritten to massage and satisfy the ego of some group’s bigotry. It is not farfetched to say that some of these bigots will soon claim that the generality of the Muslim North endorsed and supported Boko Haram and Nigerian Christians were the only targets and victims of the group’s deadly attacks. Why would I make such a sweeping projection with every sense of finality? To respond to this question, let’s go back to 2013.
While speaking at the 14th meeting of the Honorary International Investor Council (HIIC) held at the Banquet Hall of the Presidential Villa on June 22, 2013, former Nigeria’s President, Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, disclosed that the Boko Haram sect had killed more Muslims than Christians in Nigeria. This is not just hearsay but a verifiable fact that is naked in vision to people that are not be-clothed with hatred, ethnic and religious jingoism.
However, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) couldn’t swallow this fact and, therefore, issued a statement to disagree with him vehemently. In a press statement credited to the Northern chapter spokesperson, Elder Sunday Oibe, CAN said that Jonathan’s assertion was “misleading and unacceptable”. They further stated that,
“We want to believe that the president was misquoted; we don’t want to believe that with the security apparatus and report from security intelligence network at his disposal, he made this assertion. If it is true that Mr President actually made this assertion, then, we are highly disappointed and sad at this veiled attempt to distort the fact as it concerns the activities of the Boko Haram sect. The purported statement by the President is highly disappointing considering the facts that Christians, churches and their businesses have been the major targets of Boko Haram” (Sahara Reporters, June 23, 2013. http://saharareporters.com/2013/06/23/northern-can-disagrees-jonathan-says-boko-haram-has-killed-more-christians-muslims)
For CAN, the Boko Haram crisis was/is “religious by nature” – the familiar we-versus-them religious clashes and conflicts in Nigeria, although in different outlooks and techniques; it is a plot by some Muslims to reduce the populations of Christians in Nigeria and crackdown their businesses. Since then, CAN sympathisers subsequently frame their narrative of Boko Haram from this angle. An article titled “Cornflakes for Jihad: The Boko Haram Origin Story” by David Hundeyin, widely shared on social media in the last few days, aimed to promote this kind of narrative. Unfortunately, the author skillfully filled the article with half-truths and a mixture of facts and fiction to push the CAN’s sentiment. Hundeyin is practically siding with his former religion.
Firstly, Hundeyin makes an effort to link Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi with the origin of Boko Haram. Many people think that Hundeyin’s “Cornflakes for Jihad” is the first futile effort by an “investigative” journalist, analyst, historian or whatever to make this manipulative effort. However, Andrew Walker’s thesis, “Eat the Heart of the Infidels: The Harrowing of Nigeria and the Rise of Boko Haram” (Oxford University Press, 2016), preceded it in that exercise. Therefore, it is not likely to be a false accusation if it is argued that Hundeyin copied the idea of featuring Gumi in discussing Boko Haram, almost verbatim, from Walker. From the arguments of Sheikh Gumi’s “influence” in the “political” realm of Nigeria to his “friendship with Ahmadu Bello”, to pioneering the “propagation of Wahabism” in post-independent Nigeria, to his contribution in the creation of Izala and his “Saudi connection” are equally and loudly echoed in Walker’s thesis.

For both Walker and Hundeyin, Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi championed the Sunni/Salafi/Izala movement in Nigeria. Therefore, any account of the origin and rise of Boko Haram – a so-called Sunni/Salafi-fundamentalist terrorist group – must be traced back to him. Albeit impliedly, their submissions suggest that there would be no Boko Haram if Gumi did not “disrupt” the Sufi order and influence of Qadiriyya and Tijjaniya in Northern Nigeria. They claim that Gumi’s campaign of a corrupt-free practice of Islam inevitably gave birth to the radical movements in Northern Nigeria. This is to say, although without explicitly stating it in their works, every Sunni/Salafi-based movement in Nigeria, whether moderate or violent, must have had their inspirational source from Gumi. On the link between Boko Haram founder, Muhammed Yusuf, and Sheikh Gumi, Walker writes: “The title of Yusuf’s book deliberately echoes the titles of similar treatises by Sunni preachers, like Sheikh Gumi’s “The Right Faith According to the Sharia”, perhaps in order to lend his ideas credence…the two clerics share a revulsion for secularism..” (Walker, 2016:144).
This line of argument is even less faulty in logic and spirit of “balanced story” than what Hundeyin further orchestrated in his article. According to Hundeyin, Sheikh Gumi admonished Muslims, particularly his Sunni/Salafi followers, to reject a non-Muslim as a leader and advocated “for insurrection against a Christian Nigerian President” and, of course, his Christian followers. In the successive paragraphs that supported this claim, Hundeyin apprises his readers on the “consequence” of Gumi’s propagation; he states that after Gumi’s death, a Sunni/Salafi-indoctrinated group, which bears the name “Boko Haram”, toed to the path of his admonishment to carry weapons against Nigerian Christians, killing and bombing them in their churches. He wittingly makes reference to the bomb blast at “St. Theresa Catholic Church”, Madalla that “killed 37 people”, and other subsequent “killings of Christians” in Jos and Damaturu.
The implication of this narrative on an outsider, who does not know the context of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, is that s/he would begin to see Sheikh Gumi as “problematic” and a source of Boko Haram’s inspiration and violent extremism. Secondly, a non-pragmatic reader may also assume that the group only targets Nigerian Christians in their series of attacks in the country. Hundeyin’s article aims to peddle that twisted narrative for no reason other than the writer’s hatred for the Muslim North (Arewa) and their Islamic culture. In one of his previous tweets, he heedlessly says that: “The world will be a significantly better place when Arewa culture completely dies off and is replaced with something fit for human civilisation” (David Hundeyin/Twitter, November 29, 2020).
In the spirit of fair analysis, it is expected that an impartial analyst would compare the socio-religious ideas Gumi propagated in his lifetime and the ideologies of Boko Haram. But this would not sell out Hundeyin’s bigotry, and so he ignored that vital aspect. The core centre of Boko Haram dogmatic tenets is a war against “western-styled” education, democracy and civil service. On the other hand, Sheikh Gumi was both a product and proponent of western-styled education; he worked with the government as a civil servant and received salaries from the state resources. As he proudly opined in his autobiography, “among [his] children were army officers, civil servants, medical doctors, an engineer…lawyers, teachers and workers in finance houses and private businesses. There was hardly any profession in which [he] did not have representation from [his] family” (Gumi with Tsiga, 1991:202).
Gumi was also pro-democrat, as evidence from his recorded preaching suggested so. He is famously quoted to have said, “siyasa tafi sallah”, which could loosely mean “politics is more significant than prayers”. This was the extent Gumi had gone to support democracy in Nigeria, and believe me, Shekau would not hesitate to call him “taghut” – an idolatrous tyrant. He had also worked closely with the Christian Head of States. They had a cordial relationship and respect for each other: Ironsi invited him to lead a delegation to North Africa and the Middle East to carry goodwill messages of his new regime; Gowon appointed him Chairman of the Nigerian Pilgrims Board and gave him “all the necessary support, although he himself was a Christian”; with Obasanjo, he could “freely talk” and express his mind on relevant socio-political issues (Gumi with Tsiga, 1991:203). However, Hundeyin willfully refuses to draw this analogy to give a sense of what Achebe called “a balanced story”. Instead, he purposely portrays Sheikh Gumi on the wrong page in the book of terrorist origin in Nigeria.
Contrary to the insinuation of Hundeyin moreover, the truth of the story is that Boko Haram did/do not target Christians only. In fact. Nigerian Muslims suffer(ed) more causalities than Christians in the Boko Haram conflict. Hundeyin refuses to mention the main enclaves of Boko Haram activities and the population ratio of Muslims and Christians there. Stating this factual data will indeed not favour his intended, warped story. The reality is that Muslims have the predominant population in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Arguably, the cumulative of all Boko Haram killings of innocent people would show nothing less than 70% of Muslim casualties.
On a specific, direct attack on religions, Hundeyin only mentions the bomb blast at St. Theresa Catholic Church, ignoring similar incidents on August 11, 2013, at a mosque in Konduga where 44 people were killed and on November 28, 2014, at the central mosque in Kano where 120 people were killed (BBC Hausa, 2013, 2014). It is understandable if Hundeyin re-echoes the bomb blast at St. Theresa Catholic Church in his article; it is a show of solidarity to his ex-religion. However, what is faulty and even worrisome is the selective exemplification of the direct attacks on religions by the Boko Haram insurgents. A reader who is unacquainted with the details of Boko Haram attacks on places of public worship would feel that churches and Christians were the only victims.

To further promote this half-truth, Hundeyin moves on to tell us how a Salafi/Sunni preacher was directly linked with the funding of Boko Haram. I will neither attempt to exonerate Sheikh Yakubu Musa nor believe those serious allegations in toto without reading or hearing the Sheikh’s version of the story. However, my problem here is with Hundeyin’s failure, which is intentional, to mention the Salafi/Sunni preachers that fought Boko Haram vehemently and even paid the ultimate price with their lives. It is on record that at the early stage of the Boko Haram crusade, Salafi scholars debated Mohammed Yusuf. In Bauchi, for instance, Ustaz Idris Abdulaziz Dutsen-Tanshi, a Salafist to the core, invited and challenged Muhammed Yusuf at his mosque and in the presence of his followers; so also a young Isa Ali Pantami – the then Imam of ATBU Juma’at mosque.


These Salafists continued to be critical of Muhammed Yusuf and his sect. They consistently delivered lectures to denounce his fatwa. Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam, an unapologetic Salafist, was particularly vocal in his public censure and condemnation of Boko Haram. Unlike Hundeyin, Walker states this fact in his book:
“In 2007, Yusuf ’s former teacher, Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, himself an ardent Salafist, had gone on record to denounce the group and warn that these ideologues were heading for a violent confrontation with the state” (Walker, 2016:148).
For many, Sheikh Ja’afar was the spiritual successor of Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi. Some influential people requested and later attempted to transfer his annual Ramadan Tafseer to Gumi’s preaching base, Sultan Bello Mosque, Kaduna. He conducted his annual Ramadan Tafseer in Maiduguri, the early and central territory of Boko Haram terrorism. During his Tafseer sessions, Sheikh Ja’afar was not reluctant to criticise Yusuf and his new sect. On April 13, 2007, a day to general elections in Nigeria, and barely 48 hours after delivering a talk in Bauchi on Islamic views on thuggery, violence and widespread killing of innocent souls, Sheikh Ja’afar was murdered in Kano while observing Subh prayer and “it is thought to be members of Yusuf’s sect” (Walker, 2016:148).
Another prominent voice among Salafists in the fight against Boko Haram was Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani, Zaria. But, unfortunately, he was also killed in cold blood. In a video released to the public, Muhammed Yusuf successor, Abubakar Shekau, took responsibility for the assassination (Sahara Reporters, February 20, 2014, http://saharareporters.com/2014/02/20/bo-haram-leader-claims-responsibity-killing-kaduna-cleric-sheikh-albani-threatens).
Hundeyin has ignored all these facts about Salafi preachers in Northern Nigeria but brought a single dubious claim to frame a narrative that would deceive an uncritical, vulnerable audience. His motive is clear: he wants to rebrand the entire population of Salaaf and the Muslim North as pro-terrorist, supporting the killings of Christians in Nigeria. It is rather unfortunate that this is where the discussion is heading, and it is a wake-up call to those of us that witnessed and had a first-hand experience of the Boko Haram crisis to begin to write our counter-narrative. If we don’t write it, others will write for us. And before we retrieve our consciousness, we will be afloat in a sea of half-truths and stereotypes on Boko Haram, Islam and the North.
Aminu Nuru wrote from Bauchi. He can be contacted via aminuahmednuru@gmail.com.
By Tahir Ibrahim Tahir (Talban Bauchi)

By Ahmadu Shehu, PhD.
My previous article titled If there was Biafra generated debates around Biafra’s disadvantages (and advantages) to the Igbo people. Many of these comments were very insightful, and in line with the thoughts I presented. While I cannot respond to all the commentators, I will briefly address the most salient rejoinders. But, once again, let me quickly state that this conversation does not target the Igbo as an ethnic group. Instead, I aim to provide an outsider view to these pressing issues of national unity on which all Nigerians share equal rights and responsibilities to tell ourselves the home truth.
Some commentators say that the article was biased as I only focused on the disadvantages and neglected the “obvious” advantages the Igbo will gain from Biafra. However, I do not see a single demographic, economic, geographical or even political advantage the Igbo will gain by simply seceding from Nigeria. That is the thesis of the previous article. In fact, the post-exile writings of Odumegwu Ojukwu, the architect of Biafra himself, buttress this point.
The most critical observations from many prominent Igbo elites and friends claim that as much as the Igbo people enjoy Nigeria’s unity from both economic and political perspectives, we should equally be thankful to the southeasterners for the jobs they create for other Nigerians. In other words, the Nigerian market saturated by Igbo traders is also lucky to have the Igbo money as capital for the employment of other Nigerians.
Well, this claim might seem valid at face value. Still, it may not be entirely accurate when Igbonomics – a term I use here to refer to the economic strategy of the Igbo people – is subjected to a critical view. In the said article, I noted that one of the weaknesses of the southeastern economic model is that it is closed to other Nigerians. The resentment the Igbo folks have against the majority of Nigerians do not allow “strangers” from any region of the country to freely establish or run businesses in Igboland. That is why most Igbo billionaires today were made one hundred per cent in and by other regions of this country, but not the other way round. There is hardly a non-Igbo billionaire made by or in the southeast.
This xenophobia is not only applied against the Hausa-Fulani northerners or the Yoruba south-westerns but also their closest cousins, the Niger-Deltans. This approach is based on three exclusionist strategies of Igbonomics: First, the market and product, and indeed the value-chain must strictly remain an Igbo affair. Second, other regions’ markets, their products and value-chains must be proportionately shared with the Igbos. Third, to drift public attention from this ongoing reality, maintain the victim card by crying louder than the bereaved – the real victims of marginalization. While the first two tenets are lawful but greedy, the third is a clear case of hypocrisy. Here is a simple example to foreground this scenario.
The Igbo form the largest group of Nigerians in the diaspora. Since Nigeria is an import economy, the Igbo people in diaspora serve as business agents for their brethren in Nigeria. Therefore, the import business is basically an Igbo – Igbo transaction. Here in Nigeria, these goods are transported mainly to the southeastern markets, such as Abba and Onitsha. Instead of Lagos or Port Harcourt, most Igbo traders, who are widely dispersed across the nooks and crannies of this country, buy their goods mostly from Igbo distributors in the southeast. Another Igbo – Igbo transaction.
Up here in the north and other parts of the country, the Igbo employ strictly Igbo artisans, mostly from their own villages or communities in the east, and in some cases, the so-called northern Igbos. From sales girls and boys to messengers, marketers and suppliers, the Igbos domiciled in the north only trust their own ethnic brothers regardless of the opportunities employing locals might portend to their businesses.
For instance, you find a single Igbo shop owner in a village. By the following year, s/he has brought two, three or four Igbo artisans, thereby growing in population, manipulating the resources and seizing the business opportunities further away from the local people.
In most cases, the deal is that a separate business in the same line is established for the younger artisan, expanding further the grip of the Igbos in that line of business in the communities they are domiciled. Thus, the profits, gains and resources of the business in any of these communities become an Igbo affair entirely. Therefore, in this arrangement, the Igbo create jobs primarily for themselves while other sections of Nigeria serve as their consumers.
While the Igbos living in the north own properties and investments in the region, they return their proceeds to their homelands. Thus, I can bet my last penny that Igboland has more properties and investments built from profits and wealth acquired outside the Igboland than those made from the businesses run within the Igboland. Moreover, I had said earlier that businesses domiciled in the southeast largely depend on the larger Nigerian market to thrive.
Therefore, it should be clear from the foregoing that Igbonomics in the north is an Igbo economic affair that largely – if not only – benefits the Igbos. The brutal truth is that the Igbo are NOT marginalized in Nigeria. Instead, they are playing a victim card to maintain the economic status quo. While the various sections of this great country have a lot to thank one another for, none of these sections should claim any superiority. Neither should any of these play a gimmick of marginalization. We are equals in the hands of God and our country.
Dr Ahmadu Shehu is a nomad cum herdsman, an Assistant Professor at the American University of Nigeria, Yola, and is passionate about the Nigerian project. You can reach him via ahmadsheehu@yahoo.com.
By Ibrahim A. Waziri
To most non-Muslims researching and writing about Boko Haram, the problem generally begins with Muslims and Islam in Northern Nigeria and, to some degree, across the globe.
To them, BokoHaram is synonymous with the issues of ontology and epistemology of Islam. That is why their narrative of it can encircle Shehu Dan Fodio, Late Sheikh Mahmud Gumi or even Ahmadu Bello Sardauna, the Premiere of Northern Region, during Nigeria’s first republic. They also do find its bits of ideological nuggets in the earliest of the Islamic literature!
By Mujahid Ameen Lilo
When in 2015, the then incumbent president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, called to congratulate his opponent ahead of the announcement of the election winner, it was hailed as a heroic act. The act further cemented the country’s democratic maturation and avoided the imminent disintegration of the country had the president not accepted defeat. Moreover, it ensured a stable and successful government transition in a country on the brink of war.
The former president of the Niger Republic got the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership because he respected term limits. Yet, nobody was found worthy of the award for eight years, which points to African leaders’ disgraceful culture of disregard for term limits and bastardising of democracy. What’s more annoying, though, is the culture of celebrating the few ones that respect the term limits.
When we understand that it’s the moral imperative of our leaders to bow to the people’s will, to respect the constitutional authority that put them there and dictate their term limits. Until then, we wouldn’t rush to make a big deal of it and lionise them, present them with awards, among other things. We tend to forget and forgive their misrule. The great disenchantment with the previous administration’s sadistic leadership style made Nigerians ready to go to any lengths to vote out that party. People were prepared for war if the election got twisted. So it’s the morally and politically correct thing to do, that is, handover. Most of these leaders leave behind enormous debts, worsening insecurity, cases of corruption and so on.
The recent coups in Guinea and Chad and the foiled one in Niger indicate the frightening facts that the West African countries are far from political stability. Military intervention hardly change matters. It shouldn’t be the response to a faulty democracy. The West African subregion should thoroughly shake itself off the yoke of any military powers. The democratisation of the whole subregion would go a long way in stabilising it. Not that democracy is perfect per se (what with her so-called upholders violating one of the fundamentals: periodic election), but that we can and should practice it most purely, quite distinct from the military system. There should be an atmosphere that’ll facilitate proper reforms of democracy. A stable system of government will guarantee peace and also bring about the desired developments.
It’s on this premise that I’d now address another factor that is damaging to our democracy, threatening what little peace and stability is left in the region: electoral processes. In my country Nigeria, once it’s time for elections, people who live away from their states of origin start rushing back to their hometowns because elections have been synonymous with violence leading to the death of many people. There should be peace for people to exercise their fundamental right of voting. Instead, thugs are paid to violate the process. Many people believe in the quote that ‘our votes do not count; otherwise, they wouldn’t let us vote’. However, that is not where the problem lies. I believe that we’re capable of holding free and fair elections as we’ve done in the past. We can cite many examples with Nigeria as a case study. The fourth republic election in Nigeria that put Chief Obasanjo into power was relatively free and fair. The two elections that put Buhari into power were also pretty free and fair. We cannot forget the annulled election of June 12, 1993.
I was born in the early 2000s. My generation is called the ‘golden generation’ because the Nigeria we’re born in is democratic, free from colonial and military powers. But my generation suffers from a collapsing education system (most have to attend private schools because the government ones are total craps), from frequent strikes in universities to insecurity devouring our lands like an inferno. This semester, I was looking forward to fieldwork we are supposed to go on in a literature course but have to resort to what our lecturer calls ‘mental research’ because nowhere is safe. This generation is so angry – a wave of anger manifested in the Endsars protests.
On days like this, independence day, I sit and reflect on the happenings in my nation while my fellow teenagers are out having fun, draping their bodies in the country’s colours and posting things like ‘happy independence’ on social media. Yet, the ghost of Achebe and Gimba surrounds me as I struggle to intellectualise my thoughts, building it on Achebe’s dictum (the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership) and the Gimba’s theory that differs from Achebe’s.
I am a lover of columns. As a child, I was very socially and culturally conscious, reading my dad’s dailies. On my shelf, I have a collection of columns: Gimba’s Why am I Doing This, Tundes’s Nigeria: A Thousand Cries, A Thousand Laughs, Nda Isiah’s Nigeria: Full Disclosure, and Victor’s Excuse Me. The writings there span Nigeria from Obasanjo’s first tenure to the eventful short tenure of Yar’adua and Goodluck’s tenure. Presently, I read Kakanda, Bulama and Abubakar, whose columns are about the present administration. All through, there is rage. There is a disappointment. These essays echo in my conscience, making it hard for me to celebrate not only Nigeria’s birthday but those supposed champions of democracy, that after much damage, step aside and respect term limits. Like Jonathan. Like Niger’s Muhammdou, winner of Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership.
Mujahid Ameen Lilo is a winner of the Wole Soyinka Essay Competition and a student at the Department of English, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.