State of Emergency

Tinubu’s assault on Rivers and Democracy: which state will be next?

Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu

With a single stroke, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has upended Nigeria’s constitutional order, suspending Rivers State Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his deputy, and the state legislature under the guise of a state of emergency.

This unprecedented and legally questionable move raises urgent questions: Has Nigeria’s democracy just been hijacked? If a sitting president can summarily remove elected state officials without due process, what stops Abuja from toppling any governor who falls out of favor?

The political crisis in Rivers has been simmering for months, with intense factional battles within the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) leading to threats of impeachment against the governor. But was the situation truly dire enough to warrant a presidential intervention of this magnitude?

Under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, a state of emergency can only be declared in cases of war, imminent danger of invasion, total breakdown of public order, or natural disasters. Even then, such a declaration requires National Assembly approval.

More importantly, the Constitution does not grant the President the power to suspend a sitting governor, deputy governor, or members of the state legislature.

By single-handedly ousting a duly elected state government and replacing it with a military figure, Tinubu has overstepped his constitutional bounds, effectively staging what many legal experts are calling a “constitutional coup.”

If this move is allowed to stand, it raises a troubling question: which state is next? Today, it is Rivers; tomorrow, it could be any other state where the President or ruling party faces political opposition. The implications are chilling—no governor, regardless of electoral mandate, would be safe from federal interference.

Would this have happened in Lagos or Kano? Would a northern state be subjected to such federal strong-arming? The answer is clear. Rivers, an oil-rich and politically volatile state, is an attractive target.

But what happens when this dangerous game of executive overreach extends beyond Rivers? If Tinubu can remove Fubara this easily, then Nigeria’s entire federal structure is under threat.

Beyond the political chaos, a more pressing question emerges: Is this really about governance, or is it about controlling Rivers’ oil wealth? History has shown the federal government’s keen interest in oil-producing states—from the militarization of the Niger Delta under past administrations to the strategic placement of federal loyalists in key oil-rich states.

The pattern is all too familiar. Could this move be less about political stability and more about tightening Abuja’s grip on Rivers’ vast economic resources?

With the Constitution clearly violated, all eyes now turn to the judiciary. Will the Supreme Court rise to the occasion and declare this move unconstitutional? Or will the courts bow to political pressure, allowing a dangerous precedent to take root?

The judiciary must recognize that this is not just about Rivers—it is about safeguarding Nigeria’s fragile democracy from the creeping shadows of authoritarianism. If this unconstitutional takeover is not reversed, no state governor in Nigeria will ever govern with full confidence in their electoral mandate again.

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Governor Siminalayi Fubara is now the third sitting governor to be suspended by a Nigerian President under a democratic setting. In 2004, former President Olusegun Obasanjo suspended Plateau State Governor Joshua Dariye and the State Assembly over ethno-religious violence in Jos and other parts of the state, appointing Maj. Gen. Chris Alli (rtd.) to take charge.

Two years later, Obasanjo removed Ekiti State Governor Ayo Fayose and his deputy over political crises and impeachment controversies, installing Brig. Gen. Tunji Olurin (rtd.) as the new head of the state.

In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States in response to Boko Haram’s escalating insurgency. However, unlike his predecessors, Jonathan did not suspend the sitting governors; instead, he allowed state governments to continue operating alongside increased federal military intervention.

Now, in 2025, Tinubu has declared a state of emergency in Rivers State, citing political crisis and governance breakdown. But his move goes even further—suspending Governor Fubara, his deputy, and all members of the House of Assembly for six months.

While past interventions were carried out under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, the legality and necessity of removing elected officials have always been controversial. The Constitution outlines a clear procedure for declaring a state of emergency: the President must issue a proclamation, publish it in the official Gazette, and submit it to the National Assembly for approval.

Yet, in Rivers, Tinubu has acted unilaterally, preempting legislative approval and exceeding constitutional limits by removing elected officials.

As these events unfold, one thing is certain—2027 is shaping up to be a defining moment for Nigeria’s democracy. Will the courts uphold the rule of law, or will this be remembered as the moment Nigeria’s democracy took a dangerous turn?

The Nigerian people, civil society, and democratic institutions must resist this unconstitutional move by all legitimate means. If left unchecked, this will mark the moment when the line between democracy and dictatorship in Nigeria blurred beyond recognition.

Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu- an NYSC serving corps member, writes from Center for Crisis Communication (CCC) in Abuja.

Inadequacies in Section 305 of 1999 Constitution (as amended): Dealing with declaration of state of emergency

By Shamsi Ubale Jibril

State of emergency mainly entails the suspension of normal law and order procedures and the introduction of strict controls of the population, usually involving armed forces, so that a crisis or some other factors out of the ordinary can be contained.

Ignoring variations in nomenclature, nations are empowered either by their constitutions or some other national legislations to declare state of emergency when the country or any part thereof is at war, there is breakdown of public order, imminent fear of breakdown of law and order, occurrence or imminent danger of natural disaster or some other danger which clearly constitute a threat to the existence of the Federation.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), as well as its predecessors have clearly laid down the conditions under which state of emergency can be declared, as well as the detailed procedure of the declaration.

By Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, the President may by instrument published in the official Gazette of the Government of the Federation issue a proclamation of a state of emergency in the Federation or any part thereof, subject to 2/3 majority resolution of the senate and House of Representatives approving such measures.

The President is empowered to make such declaration where:

a.the Federation is at war;

b.the Federation is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war;

c.there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security;

d. there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert such danger;

e.there is an occurrence or imminent danger, or the occurrence of any disaster or natural calamity, affecting the community or a section of the community in the Federation;

f. there is any other public danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of the Federation; or

g.the President receives a request to do so in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4) of this section.

The determination of the existence of any of the above circumstances is left to the President to decide, and he may not face any form of restriction in making the declaration. The only possible limitation is where the National Assembly refuses to approve of the declaration, which is quite inlikely under the current settings.

However, none of the Nigerian Constitutions state the extent of the powers of the Federal Government in administering the affected constituent part (State or Region).

Prior to 2011, the Federal Government after declaring state of emergency, went ahead to displace state government institutions/functionaries of the affected state/region. In 1962, Dr Majekudomi was appointed administrator in the Western Region, while during the President Obasanjo era, General Chris Ali and Tunji Olurin were appointed administrators of Plateau and Ekiti States respectively.

However, in 2011 and 2014 when President Goodluck Jonathan declared state of emergency in some parts of the federation, he departed from this precedent and retained the State Governors and Houses of Assembly. This was criticized as not being far reaching enough.

An opportunity to resolve the dispute as to whether the President could replace state functionaries during state of emergency arose in the Supreme Court in the case of Plateau State of Nigeria & Ano v Attorney General of the Federation (2006) NWLR pt 968 p. 346, but the court avoided pronouncement on this live issue on technical g round.

There is therefore a huge gap on the extent of the powers of the President during period of state of emergency. With its chequared history on state of emergency implementation, the USA passed the National Emergency Act 1976, which clearly provide in detail, how the President could implement State of Emergency.

Nobody is in doubt as to the extent of the President’s power during state of emergency in USA.On the 18th March, 2025, the President of the federal Republic of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Rivers State suspending the Governor of the State, the Deputy Governor and the State House of Assembly for an initial period of 6 months.

There is no doubt that the President has the power to declare a state of emergency in Rivers state if any of the conditions highlighted above exists. However, in the exercise of this declaration, does the President have the power to suspend a democratically elected governor, deputy governor and a whole house od assembly of a state and replace them with a sole administrator appointed by the President?

It should not be forgotten that section 1 (2) of the Constitution provides:The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.In the absence of clear provisions of the Constitution validating the suspensions and how the state can be democratically governed within this period, I am of the firm view that this declaration can challenged in court, and be set aside.

This will put to rest the profound uncertainty in the import and effects of declaration of state of emergency under Nigerian law, and to obviate the tendency using such declaration to score a political goal, no matter how obscure.

Shamsi Ubale Jibril can be reached via danjaji2020@yahoo.com.