Islam

By Abubakar Suleiman 

1. The 7 pm national broadcast by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on the 31st of July 2023 was timely, especially as many Nigerians are still trying to pick up the pieces of their lives necessitated by the country’s current economic realities and hardship. The removal of oil subsidy and redressing of the multiple exchange rate system are undoubtedly the major causes of this new current of hardship and inflation. 

2. There is seemingly no love lost between the government and the hoi polloi; hence Nigeria’s presidential speeches or live chats are not accorded due relevance. The masses see them as the old regurgitated rhetorics or decoys used to sway them from nagging realities. 

3. However, no matter how much we have lost confidence in the government’s promises, we still need to give it the benefit of the doubt and allow it to test-run its policies and strategies. At the same time, critical stakeholders hold it as responsible and accountable as is humanly possible. 

4. The little over 1700 words speech tagged “After Darkness Comes The Glorious Dawn” sounds promising and reassuring that Mr President’s removal of the subsidy and his intention or action plan to cushion the effect of its removal are noble. However, the noblest of plans might still fail if the economic and even cultural behaviours of the actual or direct beneficiaries of lofty government interventions are not considered. 

5. Therefore, it is against this backdrop that I wish to interrogate some aspects of the government interventions in the broadcast speech that have hugely and negatively affected many practising Muslims in the past and will invariably have the same effect in the coming months. 

6. In his speech, Mr President rightly emphasised that his economic interventions will drive financial inclusion by onboarding beneficiaries into the formal sector, but I think this inclusion did not take into cognisance many practising Muslims’ behavioural approach towards accessing loan facilities as it contravenes a delicate aspect of our religious dictates – usury. 

7. For instance, the economic intervention with the noble, planned scheme of funding 100,000 MSMEs and start-ups with N75 billion, whereby promoters will access between N500,000 and N1million, is laced with 9% interest per annum and a repayment period of 36 months. Despite the loan’s appealing single-digit interest rate, many practising Muslims who want to venture into start-ups have been shortchanged because a “non-interest” model seems not to have been incorporated into this scheme. 

8. Plus, the aforementioned is also the case with interventions in the manufacturing sector that is aimed at funding 75 enterprises that have the potential to “kick-start sustainable economic growth, accelerate structural transformation and improve productivity.” President Tinubu earmarked N75 billion between July 2023 and March 2024 for this promising purpose. Still, the “9% interest per annum” is a huge stumbling block for practising Muslims. 

9. In the twenty-third paragraph of the text speech, Mr President hinted that the know-how of Development Finance Institutions and commercial and microfinance banks would be tapped for a viable and appropriate transactional structure for all stakeholders. 

10. Therefore, an encompassing financial inclusion plan that carries all members of social strata (especially practising Muslims) bearing the brunt occasioned by oil subsidy removal and the eradication of multiple exchange rates is feasible and should also be implemented. And this should be quickly considered to bring business ideas to fruition, resurrect dying businesses and lift millions from among the Muslim populace above the poverty line. 

11. If there is one thing Tinubu’s presidency should help the Muslim Ummah with, then it should be financial inclusion through non-interest loans and financing of businesses. 

12. As a matter of necessity, the National Assembly shouldered with the responsibility of making laws should look into the Acts of Banks and other financial institutions and tweak certain provisions that impede the development of viable and encompassing solutions around non-interest loans and financing of businesses. 

13. Consequently, the likes of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Bank of Industry, the Development Bank of Nigeria, the Bank of Agriculture, the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria and other financial institutions should have workable solutions around non-interest issues to bring a significant chunk of the Muslim population on board government’s socioeconomic interventions. It is a gateway to take many Muslims out of poverty, in sha Allah. 

14. Again, the other thing Muslims would find useful from this presidency is collaborating with state governments to find a way around street begging and almajiranci – reformation or whatever works. 

15.  As a matter of urgency, Ulamas or faith-based organisations should make these demands as bargains for the 2027 presidential and National Assembly elections, for it will indeed augur well for Muslims going forward. These demands need nagging, strategic campaigns, and comprehensive media coverage. And immediate, mid and long-term results should be attached to these demands.

Abubakar Suleiman writes from Kaduna and can be reached via abusuleiman06@yahoo.com.

By Zaharaddeen Muhammad Azare

Years back, people saw it as taboo to question or criticise what religious scholars said, regardless of how illogical it sounded. However, as people started becoming wiser and more educated, they discovered that religious scholars, as fellow human beings, can understand and misunderstand laws, ministerial statements and concepts. Thus their comments are subject to verification, reconstruction and even falsification.

What happened to Sheikh Abduljabbar Nasiru Kabara that led to his imprisonment in Kano due to his inability to defend his speeches that were considered blasphemous serves as a motivative factor for holding religious scholars accountable for their actions and inaction.

Many people see the case of a known Bauchi-based Islamic scholar Sheikh Idris Abdulazeez as similar to Sheikh Abduljabbar’s, which led to the imprisonment of Sheikh Idris too. But is Sheikh Idris indeed being imprisoned for blasphemy or political reasons?

To answer this question, I take us back to some historical antecedents. Sheikh Idris Abdulazeez is a religious scholar who sees himself as a representative of his people and believes that as a citizen of Nigeria should be politically active to improve efficiency in governance and promote the welfare of the citizenry.

Sheikh Idris supported and criticised political leaders, which seems to be for the public good; the scholar condemned the state government’s actions when Barr. Mohammed Abdullahi Abubakar SAN who believed in the constitution, the application of the rule of law and the whole exercise and grant of human rights, was the state’s governor from 2015-2019.

The  Sheikh saw the then leadership as dust to the people of the state, thus needing elimination. And the then governor allowed him to voice out his opinions as an indigene of the state; the scholar condemned the ruled APC government and endorsed the incumbent state’s governor under the platform of PDP.

After the victory of the incumbent governor of the state Sen. Bala Mohammed Abdulkadir, in the 2019 general election, the government started doing activities contrary to what the scholar believed to be right; for this, he began criticising the government and was tagged as an enemy. In the recent 2023 general elections, the scholar directed his followers to vote for the former Nigerian Chief Of Air Staff Baba Sadiq (Air Marshall) of the All progressive congress (APC), against his counterpart Sen. Bala Mohammed of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Bala Mohammed got re-elected.

Some see the case which led to the imprisonment of the religious scholar as revenge for he was not allowed to defend his statements, like what happened to Sheikh Abduljabbar in Kano, where Islamic scholars of different sects were gathered for him to intellectually defend himself in a public which failure to do so bagged his imprisonment.

Most people believe that not allowing Sheikh Idris Abdulazeez to defend himself originated from the fact that he has legal evidence for his statement and how deeply educated religious scholars influx into Bauchi from several states to attest to his statement before the organised debate was cancelled due to these reasons which could set the scholar free. He was later taken to court and got jailed. Not Sheikh Idris alone, who is in jail for nearly a month over the so-called public disturbance. This week, Some traditional rulers have been dethroned by the state governor for what he describes as  “involvement in partisan politics” during the 2023 general election.

Someone who can’t endure opposition shouldn’t go into politics in a democratic state.

Zaharaddeen Muhammad Azare writes from Bauchi state and can be reached via zahmuhaza@gmail.com.

By Muhammad Abdurrahman

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu offered some palliatives in his address to the nation yesterday, 31^st July 2023. Among the palliatives were interest loans of about N75b at 9% interest, N500,000 loan to N1 million at 9% and another N100 billion transportation loan also at 9%. However, an Islamic human rights organisation, the Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC), has requested soft loans for Nigerian Muslims instead of interest loans.

In a statement circulated among journalists on Tuesday, 1^st August 2023, by the group’s Executive Director, Professor Ishaq Akintola, the group explained that it is haram (forbidden) for Muslims to receive or give interest on loans.

Akintola spoke further :

“President Bola Ahmed Tinubu offered some palliatives in his address to the nation yesterday, 31^st July 2023. Among the palliatives were interest loans of about N75b at 9% interest, N500,000 to N1 million loan at 9% and another N100 billion transportation loan also at 9%.

“We appreciate the concern of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for Nigerians, particularly in these difficult times. The offer of loans to cushion the effect of the withdrawal of oil subsidy shows that the president cares about the citizenry.

“However, Nigerian Muslims cannot and will not take interest loans as the latter is capable of constituting a wedge between Nigerian Muslims and their Creator (Almighty Allah). We prefer the everlasting peace of al-akhirah (the Hereafter) to the material gains of this world.

“Interest is haram, and Allah explicitly forbids it when He said, “Oh you who believe, fear Allah and give up that interest which is still due to you if you are true believers. But if you do not desist, then you are warned of the declaration of war against you by Allah and His Messenger….” (Glorious Qur’an 2:278 – 279).

“The interest loan being offered by President Tinubu cannot benefit Muslims in this country. We, therefore, suggest that the Federal Government (FG) should arrange soft loans for the Muslim population in particular and any other citizens who may desire it.

“One of the problems with Nigeria is that the system bequeathed to us by the colonial master is not Islam-compliant. It, therefore, conflicts very often with the Islamic way of life. This is why FG needs to prepare alternatives for Muslims,who are more than 130 million in the country, in the name of fairness, equity and justice.

“We reiterate that interest loan is haram, and Muslims will not touch it with a long pole. FG should therefore expedite action on introducing Islam-compliant palliatives such that it is made available for Muslims at the same time that interest loans are accessible to others because hunger is spreading fast among the populace as prices sky-rocket daily.

“We advise FG to consult Islamic scholars regularly, particularly on policy issues, in order not to cause misunderstanding between the government and Nigerian Muslims. We also suggest that an expert in Islamic finance should be a member of the National Economic Council (NEC).”

By Muhammad Abdurrahman

In this interview with The Daily Reality, Ismail Hashim Abubakar, who finished his doctoral program at Mohammed V University, Rabat, in the Kingdom of Morocco, gives a synoptic picture of his PhD thesis titled “Contemporary Islamic Thought in Northern Nigeria: Shaykh Ja’far Mahmud Adam as a Case Study”. The thesis, which appears in 4 volumes, was written in both Arabic and English. Enjoy: 

At the beginning and as a background, the reader would like to know what propelled you to embark on academic research in this area and to select this topic with the personality of Shaykh Ja’afar as your case study.

I was propelled to undertake this research by many factors. Perhaps the most current and academically engaging factor was the aftermath of the 2009 Boko Haram uprisings when documentation of the saga started outflowing in different forms, including academic studies and media reportage. I observed that the Boko Haram saga was used by many writers – local and international – to, in the process of researching the evolution, growth, ideological base and all other issues associated with the insurgency, direct their attention on the late Shaykh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam and devote some portions in their works on the relationship between Shaykh Ja’afar and the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf.

While I acknowledge that these writers have relevant information and facts regarding this dynamic, I can confidently assert that many facts have been twisted, distorted and misrepresented. In fact, too much attention on Ja’far’s interaction with the leader of Boko Haram would certainly swerve readers’ attention to the grand reform mission Ja’afar had carried out in his career that spanned about two decades.

Furthermore, some writers made absurd and explicit allegations that should not be allowed to pass without a solid, verifiably intellectual response. Besides, the career of Shaykh Ja’afar was full of captivating and interesting episodes that would add up to the history of postcolonial Islam, contemporary religious movements, the interplay of Ulama with civil society and authorities in northern Nigeria and the Hausa-speaking world in general. In other words, if you like, confining the career of Shaykh Ja’afar to an engagement with an estranged disciple is an act of cruelty and tyranny to history.

If this is the case, how does your work differ from the previous works on Boko Haram, and what do you particularly object in them?

In my thesis, I review the representation of Ja’afar and his engagement with Boko Haram as cited in studies and reportages. I endorse what appears to be true and verifiable, while I counter what is a distortion of facts. For example, I tackle the question of Muhammad Yusuf’s studentship and mentorship under Ja’afar; here, there are two visible opinions. One opinion suggests that Yusuf was the mentee, star, protege and possible successor of Ja’afar, while the other view objects to the point of almost debunking any teacher-student relationship between the two men. I seek to stand in between these positions. Based on fieldwork I carried out in Maiduguri in 2019 and in addition to the literature I consulted, I draw a conclusion that Yusuf had, of course, studied under Ja’afar.

Nonetheless, as confirmed by several informants, Yusuf was never punctual during Ja’afar’s lessons; in fact, he did not study a complete book under Ja’afar. Consequently, I re-examined the assertion of the closeness of the two men; it manifested to me that Yusuf was never formally or informally considered Ja’afar’s heir, nor was he considered intellectually capable of taking over from Ja’afar.

Meanwhile, I make reference to Yusuf’s ideological trajectories and terminals of religious activism, starting as an ambitious young man looking for fame. As such, he took a leading position in Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’atu Tajdid al-Islam, before finally joining the Izala, which he would also break from within a couple of years. Finally, on this point, I compare Ja’afar and Yusuf, what the two figures represent to Nigerians and the legacies each one has left behind. 

What else do you address besides the Boko Haram phenomenon in your project?

Hmmm. Like I said initially, Boko Haram is a small (though most popularised) aspect of Ja’far’s career. I set a background where I give a snapshot of the state of Islam and Muslims in postcolonial Northern Nigeria, highlighting the engagement of Muslims in politics and governance while appraising the debates of Shari’ah implementation and discourse on secularism which characterised the Nigerian public sphere after the turn of the 21st century.

I also look at the relations between Muslims and Christians, pointing to the areas of divergence, which are quite many, but also the few areas where Muslims and Christians united in pursuit of a common goal. I also survey the fragmentation of Islamic society along sectarian lines by first tracing the emergence of major and minor religious sects, groups and movements and their major views and arguments. I also illuminate the interplays between these two groups and what brings/brought them together to speak in one voice. All these are meant to give much insight into the religious and landscape sociopolitical contexts in which the figure of my study lived and conducted his mission. This represents the first significant section of the work, which, as you can see, represents the first epithet in the thesis title. 

I supply a relatively detailed biography of Ja’afar, focusing on his family background, the phases of his knowledge acquisition and the factors that contributed to his public visibility as a young man, all before his sojourn to the Islamic University of Madina. 

The work dwells on Ja’afar’s reunion with the Da’awah arena after his study at Madina and how unlike before, he concentrated on the transmission of knowledge and cultivation of disciples while minimising open-air preaching. In this regard, I supply comprehensive information on the major sites and centres of Da’wah, which used to host and coordinate Ja’far’s public engagement and private study circles.

In Kano, for instance, I reserve sections in which I discuss in detail the majalis of Ja’afar, such as the Triumph Mosque in Fagge, the Beirut Road Mosque, Usman Bin Affan Mosque, Gadon Kaya, Almuntada Mosque in Dorayi and the majlis in Ungogo Road. I explicate all the activities Ja’afar conducted, such as leading prayer, teaching for open and private audiences and presentations of sermons, lectures and seminars.

In Bauchi, I make reference to sites that hosted Ja’far’s mission, such as Gwallaga Jumaat mosque, Shaykh Awaq mosque at Old GRA, Baban Godi Mosque in Mallam Goje Street and Women Centre of Bauchi located at Gombe Road. Moreover, in about thirty pages, the thesis unpacks the mission of Ja’afar in Maiduguri, with a particular reference to the activities he conducted within the Indimi Mosque, hinting at the challenges Ja’afar confronted at the beginning and the strategies he adopted in the process of consolidating his Da’wah. The work here emphasises the Qur’anic interpretation exercise Ja’afar led during Ramadan at the mosque and how it became an annual conference that attracted audiences from different parts of northern Nigeria.

But Ja’far’s mission was also characterised by other features: teaching, presenting lectures and seminars and rigorous engagements in civil and political issues. Does your work take a look at this also?

Yeah, of course. I dedicate a full and lengthy chapter that surveys and appraises Ja’far’s interactions and engagements with some events that affected Nigerian contemporary developments, Islam and Muslims, and Ja’afar’s relations with various government and public figures, religious groups and individuals. It focuses on Ja’afar’s role in the return of Shari’ah in northern Nigeria, how he collaborated with religious leaders of other groups, and how this resulted in the implementation of Shari’ah in some northern states. It also refers to Ja’far’s participation in the implementation of the Shari’ah process in Kano.

The chapter further lays bare Ja’far’s engagement with Nigerian politics, governance, politicians and public figures, taking a look at his criticism of General Obasanjo’s administration and different political and government institutions, including Kano state, his base, but also figures such as Muhammadu Buhari, Atiku Abubakar, Ahmed Yarima, Ibrahim Shekarau, Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso, Ahmed Adamu Muazu, Ahmed Makarfi, Abubakar Habu Hashidu, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Baba Impossible, among others.

The work also relates Ja’afar’s interplay with traditional institutions, which connects to his position on the royal fathers of the northern emirates and how they disagreed with some and collaborated and had cordial relationships with others. Still in the chapter, Ja’afar’s engagement with religious groups is narrated, beginning with Salafi networks to which he belonged, the Sufi brotherhoods with whom he disagreed most of the time and the peripheral groups like the Shia, Boko Haram and others. 

As a complement to a cleric biography, the chapter categorises Ja’far’s disciples and followers into four tabaqat, just as it mentions some of his colleagues, teachers and role models. It also provides insightful information relating to Ja’afar’s assassination, including the events that preceded the tragedy and what followed it, such as the posthumous attraction of the Muslim public toward the legacy and mission of the murdered cleric. 

The final chapter in the thesis extracts the thoughts, ideas and philosophical views and visions of Ja’afar on a plethora of issues such as education, economy, sociocultural topics, marriage and women issues, politics, global politics and international affairs, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and the prospects of peaceful coexistence. The chapter presents at the end what the researcher believes is the central position of Ja’afar on Jihad, which further unravels the extent to which he conceived violent extremism in a world and time when Islamophobia was rising high.

But how have you encountered all this stuff, which appears to involve huge materials you had to engage?

Yes, I gathered my data through multiple sources. First, I laid my hands on the available recordings of Shaykh Ja’afar, including cassettes and online content. I listened to his entire Tafsir tapes, available Friday sermons, and many of his lectures and public and private lessons on Islamic texts. I also conducted fieldwork where I travelled to many states in Northern Nigeria and met about a hundred informants. Needless to say, I consulted a great deal of literature that ranged from published books, journals, newspapers and magazines, and reliable internet pages.

What challenges did you face while undertaking this research?

A lot of daunting challenges, but a researcher must always be ready to confront them. It suffices to say that one has to be away from family to a distant land to carry out this task. But before then, I faced challenges as regards accessing some informants. For example, although the work discusses Boko Haram, I could not interview any Boko Haram members to hear some things from him directly. But the most appalling of all the challenges was the lack of positive cooperation from some of Ja’afar’s colleagues and disciples. While some of them delayed, procrastinated and even cancelled my appointments with them, some of them even avoided me and refused to give me any audience at all. Paradoxically, I got positive responses and warm accommodation from personalities who might be well counted among Ja’afar’s rivals and competitors, including Sufis and Shiites.

Which plan do you have now for this work after you have been awarded a doctoral degree?

I just remembered that the work is bilingual and in four volumes, or if you like, two volumes in Arabic and two in English. My ambition is to publish it as a book or as two books. I will be glad to edit the Arabic version and publish it in a press in an Arab world like Egypt, Lebanon, Qatar or any other country, while the English version is to be hopefully published by a Western (preferably university) press.

Is there any point you disagree with Shaykh Ja’afar in your work?

Of course, there are. I can count almost ten. 

Can you give an example?

Certainly! During one of his lessons to women at Gadon Kaya, a woman asked if it was permissible for her to make a supplication – a prayer – to ask God to prevent her husband from marrying a second wife. Shaykh Ja’afar answered that it was not permissible since marriage is lawful, and no one has the power to make unlawful something that was made lawful by God. My argument here is that in a situation where women have turned adding a second wife into their earthly hell, so much so that they go to any extent, including dangerously deadly means to thwart their husbands from the second marriage, giving a fatwa with the permissibility of praying against this wish seems to be safer for all the parties involved. If God wishes, he would answer, and if He doesn’t answer, the woman would accept fate like that. 

Are there journal articles that have been published out of this thesis?

Yes, two articles have been published so far. One was published in a journal at an Islamic University in Uganda. I examined the thoughts and ideas of Shaykh Ja’afar on education. It is available here.

The second one was published in an Indonesian journal, and it talks about Ja’far’s views on women, marriage and family institutions. It can be accessed via this link.

I expect to publish two more before the end of the year, in sha Allah. One of them presents a contextual analysis of a sermon that Ja’afar delivered at Almuntada Mosque in Kano in the aftermath of the OPC massacre of northerners in Southwestern Nigeria. In the essay, I argue that the sermon, despite its strident nature and use of highly harsh language, served as one of the rhetorical instruments that calmed frayed nerves and tensions amid the possibility of reprisal attacks. The second essay examines Ja’afar’s engagement with Boko Haram and violent extremism. 

What are your concluding remarks?

I will conclude by stressing that the clerical career of Shaykh Ja’afar has provided one of the most interesting and attractive pages in the history of Islamic activism in contemporary Nigeria and Hausa speaking world. With millions of followers and his ideas circulating within public domains, Ja’afar’s mission is worth reading and researching. I proposed in my work what I call “Jafarology”, which refers to the process of studying the legacies of Ja’afar in different dimensions and from different perspectives.

I will close by expressing my immense gratitude to all the people who supported me in one way or the other. I must thank my parents for putting me through this path early. I thank my mentor Professor Salisu Shehu, to whom I dedicate this work. I still recall his visit to Morocco in June 2022 and consider it a fatherly concern that gave some moral comfort to a son away from home. In the same vein, I thank Professor Alexander Thurston, who read my chapters and offered me invaluable suggestions and recommendations. My success in this work owes greatly to his mentorship. The same gratitude goes to Dr Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido, whose mentorship and frank counsel encouraged and motivated me to delve into this research area. I also thank a colleague of mine here, Osho Iskil Kehinde, who has greatly supported me.

I also use the medium to appreciate the Federal University Gusau management for releasing me to undergo this program. In this vein, I must thank Dr Abubakar Masama, the Dean, Faculty of Arts; Dr Qasim Badamasi, the former HOD, Islamic Studies; Malam Abdallah Bashir Bakori, Dr Ja’far Agaji, the present HOD, and all the colleagues within the Department of Islamic Studies and Faculty of Arts of the University.

Last, I must reiterate my thanks to Dr Anas al-Shaykh Ali, the Director of the IIIT London Office. Sister Shiraz Khan, a coordinator at the Office, the Director of the Institute of Epistemological Studies Europe (IESE) in Brussels, Dr Beddy Ebnou al-Murabity and Dr Naima Daoudi for being of great help to me. It was these institutions that sponsored my entire studies here in Morocco.

By Muhammad Ubale Kiru

I am glad it happened. I am talking about the controversy around a video song of people dancing in front of a mosque on their praying mats soon after they supposedly finish their prayers. And, Davido shared the offensive video on his timeline on Twitter.

Some individuals mindlessly follow these singers, imitating their style of dressing, adopting their haircuts, imitating their mannerisms, and even trying to talk and walk like them. This has been an issue we have repeatedly addressed.

These musicians often lack respect for your culture and faith; their apparent affection towards their fans is often just a façade. Despite the video causing an uproar on the internet, Davido has refused to take it down, showing how far some of these artists are willing to go to offend others.

Mocking Islam in the manner Davido did is the last thing he should have done. As I have always said, there seems to be a tendency to test the limits of our tolerance. If he faces no consequences this time, he may repeat such actions in the future, and others might follow suit.

I must point out that our Yoruba brothers are not doing justice to Islam either. Many Yoruba comedians also indulge in mocking Islam in similar ways. One example is the well-known comedian Aisha Ibrahim, who partakes in blasphemous shows for entertainment. Regrettably, her Yoruba elders are doing nothing about it. There must be a clear distinction between cultural expression and religious beliefs.

On the other hand, our Christian counterparts must understand that not everything falls under the category of freedom of speech, and not all forms of expression are acceptable. We are often accused of religious intolerance, but how can we be expected to tolerate disrespect towards our faith?

For instance, if a film producer were to create a movie disrespectfully portraying Jesus, such as Jesus being depicted as gay or as a masquerade, that may be a concern for the Christian community, as it may not show proper respect for Jesus (peace be upon him). In Islam, we take such matters very seriously, as our faith prohibits the mockery of other religions.

Let us all strive to stay within the limits of decency and respect. Honouring and respecting other people’s faiths and cultures is crucial, even as we express our own beliefs.

Muhammad Ubale Kiru is a tech enthusiast, social activist and freelancer. He can be reached via muhdujkiru@gmail.com.

By Aisha Musa Auyo

One thing everyone wishes for and works towards is to succeed in life. From infancy to adulthood, up to old age, we aim to succeed in every part of our lives. But what we fail to do is also to prepare ourselves for failure. Yes, because it’s inevitable. 

One of the pillars of the Islamic faith is the belief in qadr (divine will and decree), good or bad. This means that good and bad will surely ensue in life, success and otherwise. It’s how life is designed. But why do we do nothing or very little in preparing ourselves and our wards for failure? Why are we shielding ourselves and wards from the reality of life? 

This may be why people cheat, as they cannot afford to fail. They just have to win at all costs. Others commit suicide. Some go on drugs because they have been unable in certain expectations or tasks.

So as parents and teachers or elders, we need to let ourselves and our wards know that failure, not consistently winning, or not being at the top is okay. It is acceptable, and life does not end there. We can always try later and do better. 

Let’s show our wards and significant others they can trust us to be there for them whenever they fail. Just as they will want to come to us with success stories, they should be free to do that with failure stories. This is what unconditional support is all about. We should be a shoulder to cry on. 

We should also, as parents, accept that we sometimes fail and let our kids see how we feel and how we are going about it. The norm is to show the kids that we are always succeeding and doing great, just so they can be inspired, but we are not helping them by doing so. 

In summary, these are the points I want us to reflect on and ponder. 

1. Prepare your child for failure. We will always have good and bad days. Let them know they cannot always win, and it’s okay.

2. Let us always put in the back of our minds and theirs that “Over every possessor of knowledge is one [more] knowing”. Qur’an 12:76 

Regardless of one’s intelligence, hard work, and luck, we will surely meet others who are better than us. Let us know that we are better than others too.

3. Failure is a learning process to know what to do and what to avoid in the future. If one fails in a certain task, one may succeed in another task.

4. We should learn to compete with ourselves, not others. Set a target for yourself, and work towards achieving it.

5. Life doesn’t end or begin with school grades, work promotions, or huge profits. There’s more to life than these.

6. Good relationships, emotional intelligence, compassion, contentment, and adaptability guarantee success in every life situation.

8. It’s lonely up there: If you cheat your way up or compete to be better than everyone else, people will leave you with your success. No one wants to be with someone who always wants to be on the top by hook or crook. Cheating often backfires. And if it doesn’t, the people who made it to the top by defrauding others end up very lonely and have no genuine person to share the success with. 

9. Healthy competition is okay. Being motivated by other people’s success stories is okay, but we should not cheat or compete. We are made differently.

10. Avoid social media attention or fame: The pursuit of likes, followers, and validation has led to detrimental effects on mental health, values, and overall well-being. The obsession with social media fame has resulted in a culture of superficiality, narcissism, and moral erosion, hindering the progress and development of society as a whole.

Parents and teachers must take responsibility and invest in youth development, focusing on their holistic growth, character development, and real-world contributions. By doing so, we can create a future where youth can realise their full potential and social media platforms can be used for positive change rather than as a means of self-promotion and validation.

11. School, parental, and peer pressure

School positions are not necessary; Those numbers instil unhealthy competition among students. Instead of children competing against themselves, they are pushed to compete with each other. 

A student should be encouraged to push himself harder to get better grades, not in comparison with another student. Teachers should do as much as possible to adopt learner-centred teaching so that each student receives the attention they crave.

Parents should learn to accept their children when they fail. We should know our capabilities and not push ourselves and our wards to be what we can’t be. I know it’s hard to accept defeat or reward failure, but that is the moment when self-love and support are needed most. If we know we did our best, we should not be disappointed. 

Parents should stop comparing siblings. Each child has his/her unique quality. A child lacking intellectual intelligence may score higher in emotional or social intelligence. Let’s focus on our highs instead of our lows.

When the storm is over, parents or guardians can discuss with the kids how to do better, with a reward or promise that will make the kid want to do better. We elders must learn to discourage cheating and encourage integrity and self-acceptance.

Aisha Musa Auyo is a Doctorate researcher in Educational Psychology, a wife, a mother of three, a Home Maker, a caterer and a parenting/ relationship coach.

By Uzair Adam Imam

The Kano State Govenor, Abba Kabir Yusuf, has declared tomorrow Wednesday as a work-free day in commemoration of the 1445 Islamic new year.

A statement by the Commissioner of Information, Baba Halilu Dantiye, disclosed this on Tuesday.

The statement read in part ‘’The Governor who congratulated Muslims around the world on the dawn of the new Islamic year, enjoined the civil servants and the people in the state to pray for peace and tranquility as well as economic development of our dear state and the country at large.’’

According to Dantiye, the govenor also called on the good people of Kano state to live in accordance with the teachings of prophet Muhammad (SAW).

He added that, “The Governor also called on people to live their lives based on the teachings of Islam and practice the virtues of kindness, love and tolerance as exemplified by our Holy prophet Muhammad peace be upon him.”

By Ibraheem A. Waziri

1. As against the postulations of some, who think Nigeria to be a fantastic, British-contrived social experiment. Many believe it to be purely a product of inevitable historical processes that ordinary mortals should only play along with. So, it is said that statesmen and cultural priests cum social philosophers must – by the spirit of the time, fair universal human values and exigencies of frequent unassailable moments – always create and promote a narrative of a reasonable sociocultural balance for the country to continue to thrive.

2. In this, since religion is adjudged, by scholars of identity in history, to be the strongest factor in social mobilisation. It is safe to assume that the crème de la crème of the Nigerian military, who ruled the nation between 1983-1998, although mostly Northerners and Muslims, had good intentions; to have worked hard to ensure the provision of religious balance, between mainly Muslims and Christians, in the general administration of the national and sub-national units of the country.

The Justification

3. A casual review of both the 1st and 2nd Republic is enough to show tendencies to Muslims’ domination of the Nigerian political space. Also, since Islam is consistently found to be deeply expressive in the discourses and practices of its adherents daily, especially in Northern Nigeria, non-Muslims may not help but feel threatened – even if only imagined, not real – with marginalisation when individual Muslims are in power. This, regardless of whether their predilections do not suggest inclinations to any assumed extremist tendencies. Because often politics and politicians ride on only prevailing narratives and popular sentiments as major currencies during elections and subsequently in forming finer details of general governance policy direction!

4. This may have been why people like the late Capt. Ben Gbulie would maintain this in his book, Nigeria’s Five Majors, and much later when he responded to questions by late Barrister Yahaya Mahmood SAN during a session at the Oputa Panel. That one of their reasons for staging the January 1966 coup d’état that killed mostly Northerners Muslims in power was intel, they got and rigorously verified to confirm, by some standard, that the then Nigerian government, led by mainly Northern People’s Congress (NPC), was clandestinely planning a Jihad with the hope of Islamising the country.

5. The measures of balancing taken by the military may not be favourably viewed by modern reviewers, depending on the angle of vision one takes. But it is unmistakably clear that had the prevailing rhetoric of the Nigerian Muslim communities of the late 80s and 90s – that were even celebrating as heroes on various pulpits, figures and ideals of contemporary Islamist movements in Egypt, Iran, Algeria, Afghanistan and Sudan – met with a popular narrative of Muslim majority populated Nigerian state, the results would have been better imagined now. 

6. Thus, during both the two aborted electioneering processes of 1992 and 1993, to usher in a democratic government, General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB), the Head of the Nigerian state, deliberately tried to ensure political parties presented bi-religious tickets for elections into offices of governors, everywhere there is a significant population of people of differing faith, and ultimately that of the Presidency.

7. Many scholars and pundits alike have concluded that it was the failure of the southern Muslim, Moshood Abioĺa, Social Democratic Party’s candidate, who is said to have won the election, to respect IBB’s wish to select Paschal Bapyau, a northern Christian, as Vice Presidential candidate that led to the annulment of June 12 1993 elections! The Quest for such religious balance was that important to IBB, as we can conveniently presume it to be part of his insight and blessed wisdom clinging to higher moral flanks, advancing the standard of a fair, indivisible Nigerian nation.

8. Fast forward to the events preparatory to ushering in the fourth republic in 1999. It was the same cream of former Northern Nigerian top military generals who insisted on a power shift to the South, particularly to a Christian president, who would, in turn, have a Muslim running mate from the North. Thus, Northerners or Muslims from the South were cajoled to stand down their ambitions in the name of peaceful, regional and religious balance!

To Every Action…

9. Yet, as the timeless law of physics stipulates, there is an equal and opposite reaction to every action taken. So also the decision to premise all the sociocultural discourses on Nigeria on the narrative of religious balancing. Religion as a determinant of who gets what, in the string of the political equation, and ultimately down the line on the food chain of the country’s rentier economy, also became the cheap tool providing the impetus for persistent conflicts and unending violence, particularly in some subnational units in Northern Nigeria.

10. In Kaduna, my state, there has been a wave of religiously motivated crises, coupled with agitation for territorialism and territorial expansion, more resource allocation and political representation, since 1987. After the ushering in of the fourth republic in 1999, it continued assuming an alarming direction, characterising every aspect of the policy discussion in the state. Every single appointment, political or otherwise, must factor in religion. Yet the wave of the crisis did not show any sign of going away. It kept consuming many lives and properties, casting a blight on every possible future of progress and development. Refugee camps became a distinct feature of satellite towns in the state.

11. Government, civil society and faith-based organisations became very busy and active daily on the issues of conflict resolution and rehabilitation and resettling of refugees more than any other thing. From 2013 to 2014, Reverend Joseph Hayeb, the present Kaduna State Christian Association of Nigeria’s Chairman and a Muslim cleric, Shaykh Haliru Maraya, served as Special Advisers to the then Kaduna State governor, Mal. Mukhtar Yero on Christianity and Islam, respectively. They partnered with an international peace promotion non-governmental organisation, Global Peace Foundation, in a state-wide campaign for peace and conflict resolution in the state. Malam Samuel Aruwan, who was to become the first Commissioner of Internal Security and Home Affairs in Kaduna 2019 – 2023, and I joined them on the invitation. We wrote essays and appeared with them at conferences, engaging in the discourses of why Muslims and Christians must find ways to live in peace!

2015!

12. the deployment of superior vigilance technology, by the Independent National Electoral Commission, in the conduct of the 2015 elections exposed the fallacy of the premise ascribed to the religious balancing narrative that has lasted for 30 years in Kaduna. Instead of the entrenched assumption that the religious demographic spread in the state is almost 50-50 between Christians and Muslims, it was realised that it was at most 30 – 70 in favour of Muslims!

13. This, unfailingly, was to give room to so much reflection, on the utility of the religious balancing narrative, in providing the needed peace and stability for the general administration of the state. In that, a fair and dispassionate assessment could be said that over the years, it has proven to be a burden to the state and is threatening the overall peace and stability of the Nigerian Nation! Even if it has once been useful in keeping peace and maintaining justice, providing stability and strengthening the foundation of the Nigerian Nation.

14. More so, the assumed justifiable reasons that made the northern military elite deploy it then can be said to be no longer there now. As Samuel Huntington projected in his 1993 seminal work, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, the appeal of the universal call to Jihad among Muslims would lose its popularity in about 25-30 years. That Muslims world over would gradually appreciate and align with the values of democracy and its prescriptions in the rule of law and freedom of expression.

15. Global war on terror and the experience of the Muslims here, home to Boko Haram, has helped make Huntington’s prophecy real. It significantly changed the perspectives and disposition of the Muslim elites in the country. Many scholars and clerics have stopped identifying with Jihadi rhetoric and, in many cases, withdrawn or dissociated themselves from the earlier ones they once made. There has been a wide-ranging consensus among a larger section of them to work with the present multi-religious composition of Nigeria and support its established institutions!

16. Also, the era now is not a military era, where the earlier conceived balancing narrative can be sustained by fiat nationally and sub-nationally. Democracy is here, and its promises, based on the premise of popular participation and will, are bound to force the hands of society in a particular direction.

17 In 2019, the Pew Research Centre, an independent American think tank that specialises in social sciences, demographic research and analysis, published that, in 2015, Muslims in Nigeria constituted 50% of the population as against Christians who are less. And by 2050, Muslims will constitute about 60% of the people, while Christians will be less than 40%. 

18. When I wrote about this on the 11th of July 2022, in a message wishing fellow Muslims well during Sallah celebrations, I also called them out to reflect on what Nigeria they would want. Many experienced pundits and senior citizens in my list submitted that the 60% per cent figure is most likely the population of Nigerian Muslims now. We are only hindered from knowing that for a fact because the past Nigerian military leaders had struck out religion as a variable in all official national headcounts. They believe that by 2015, Nigeria’s Muslim population will likely be 70 – 75%. 

19. All these should point to the reality of the futility of struggle, for a just social order, in Nigeria while clinging to the religious balancing narrative. 

The El-Rufai Example of 2019!

20. Malam Nasiru El-Rufai was elected into the leadership of Kaduna State on top of events significant to unravelling the wave of fallacies that made operational in the state, the religious balancing narrative. He was equally confronted with the reality of the non-viability or even risks associated with any attempt to perpetuate it.

21. In 2019, he won the election after confronting the operational, religious balancing narrative and crushing it. Amid cheers by the Muslim community, who are excitedly displaying an air of triumphalism, some of us must have assumed that the winner takes all maxim will be deployed. Yet Malam Nasiru went ahead in his acceptance speech on the 11th March 2019 to state: _“Let us all see and value each other as human beings descended from Adam and Eve. Let us end the misuse, abuse and manipulation of religion for personal gains. Religion should be a private matter. Our identities should not become barriers to common humanity. Our doors are open to a new chapter of concord.”

22. Subsequently, appointments and responsibilities were allocated based on merit, trust, commitment, party loyalty, and clearly outlined cause. Thus, many so-called sensitive positions, like the Accountant General, Commissioner of Internal Security and Home Affairs, and many others, go to non-Muslims!

23. In this, as an independent observer not speaking for Mal. Nasiru, I will say that one can see that if the Muslim-Muslim ticket has any purpose, it is only for burying the religious balancing narrative, which has proven to be cancer, in the body of our journey of development, into a just and prosperous society. It is also to serve as a teachable moment, to Muslim leaders, politicians, and the teaming youthful population, on operationalising the new narrative of the Muslim majority Kaduna and Nigeria, which is soon to be the new order of the day.

The Controversial Speech of 28th May 2023!

24. Nigeria’s 2023 elections, which saw the much-maligned success of a Muslim-Muslim ticket at the national level, had reasons to give Nigerian Muslims a feeling of triumphalism again. It has confirmed their numerical superiority and harbours the tendency of permanently killing the religious balancing narrative in our national politics. It also came with the risk of making some elements among Muslim politicians, clerics, and scholars alike start using it, in future, in a manner that would be inimical to the interest of their fellow Muslims, non-Muslims and the idea of the Nigerian nation.

25. The farewell dinner, Imams, clerics and Islamic scholars organised for Mal. Nasiru Elrufai, the 28th of May, 2019, in my opinion, was the best place for him to kick start the conversation about what the victory of the Muslim‐Muslim ticket should mean to the Muslims and the country in general. Both mark the end of the religious balancing narrative, religious politics and what future clear Muslim dominance or leadership should mean. 

26. From the clips of the recordings circulating in social media and the translation of the entire speech by various news outlets. It is clear that though Elrufai spoke appealing to his audience’s sentiments and good feelings, he was also unequivocal that the Muslim leadership across history and his, in Kaduna, did not and shall not try to discriminate against non-Muslims. This is a call and a subtle cautionary appeal to those who may think otherwise to reflect and reconsider as an exemplary guide in future.

The Ways Forward

27. Nigeria has moved into a new era in its history and evolution. Not that it has only seen the futility and, ultimately, the end of the religious balancing narrative; it has also come to the era where the influence and wisdom of its retired military generals in its democracy is about to cease altogether. All hands must be on deck to help chart a new cause and craft a fresh narrative for its sustenance and maintenance on a just and equitable pedigree.

 28. The country’s new reality of a sociocultural composition needs the attention of scholars, pundits and policymakers to ensure that the nation moves with reasonable speed on the lane of development. And this is what that speech by El-Rufai on that day should be seen to have helped to transit the national conversation quickly!

Ibraheem A. Waziri wrote from Zaria, Kaduna State. He can be reached via iawaziri@gmail.com.

By Dr Shamsuddeen Sani

It’s very easy to ignore this book. Underrate it even. I found myself rereading it for many days, given the enormous importance of the topic, especially in the contemporary discourse in Muslim-majority countries about woman’s leadership. Being a recent publication in 2020, and although the author didn’t explicitly state it, it appears to be building to improve upon earlier work by the late Moroccan feminist writer and sociologist Fatima Mernessi with her book, The Forgotten Queens of Islam.

Shahla Haeri embarks on a journey of gendering the historical narrative of sovereignty and political authority in the Muslim world, shedding light on the lives of Muslim women leaders who defied the norms of dynastic and political power to rise as sovereigns in their deeply patriarchal societies.

The author’s usage of the term “queen” is not meant to be taken literally for all six prominent figures discussed in the book but rather to signify their immensely influential leadership roles during their respective eras. While recognising the significant impact of numerous women in Islamic history who exerted influence behind the scenes, Haeri emphasises those women who stood at the forefront of the political machinery, actively engaging with the structures of authority and power.

She doesn’t just relay the historical milestones of these great women in historical Islam but brings in a fresh perspective on how we look at the concept of women’s leadership in the Islamic tradition. The author situates women rulers’ rise to power within three interrelated domains: kinship and marriage, patriarchal rules of succession, and individual women’s charisma and popular appeal.

This book prompts deep contemplation on patriarchy within the pre-modern normative Islamic tradition. But one needs to be careful because the author appears to be overly problematising patriarchy in some instances significantly beyond what we consider as would have been normal in pre-modern Islam. She did allude, however, to the critical role of men in women ascending to positions of political authority. 

Structurally, this book has a Preface and Introduction and is broken into three main parts with two body chapters. Part I, Sacred Sources of Authority: The Qurʾan and the Hadith, lays the background for her accounts, with a deep examination of the primary sources of the Qurʾan and hadith, through the Qurʾanic story of the Queen of Sheba and the biography of the Sayyida Aisha (RA). Haeri relays the Quranic account of the dramatic encounter between King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, popularly known as Bilqis. Drawing primarily from Tha’alabi and al-Tabari, the book cross-examines the sovereignty of Bilqis and connects the Quranic revelations with what she believes was the exegetes’ medieval patriarchal reconstructions.

Part II of the book is about Medieval Queens: Dynasty and Descent. In Chapter 3, the book explores the leadership life of the long reign of the Ismaili Shiite Yemeni queen. It examines Queen Arwa’s fascinating political acumen and how she survived the political and power succession tussle dealing with the 3 Fatimid caliphs of Cairo. Chapter 4 examines the short sovereign rule of the only female sultan of the 13th century Delhi Sultanate, Razia Sultan: ‘Queen of the World Bilqis-i Jihan. 

The 3rd part of the book, which explores the contemporary Queens and examines the institutionalisation of succession, provides an in-depth look at Benazir Bhutto and Megawati Sukarnoputri but will not spoil more here for the interesting details in the book.

Haeri concludes this work of ethnohistory which is deeply personal as she peppers in the concept of the “paradox of patriarchy,” which refers to the historical tradition of power succession among men, particularly fathers and sons, or even brothers, whose family ties legitimise the customary transfer of power. She quickly alludes that the relationship between fathers and sons can be a source of tension and rivalry, where they may fear, resent, or even seek to eliminate each other. In contrast, father-daughter relationships tend to be more personally fulfilling and have fewer political consequences for the father. The preference of patriarchs for their daughters is not only driven by self-preservation but also by their recognition of their daughters’ talents and political astuteness.

Dr Shamsuddeen Sani wrote from Kano. He can be reached via deensani@yahoo.com.

By Muhammad Abdurrahman

Pope Francis expressed his strong disapproval of the burning of the Quran, stating that he was both angry and disgusted by the act. He rejected any notion that this action could be considered a form of freedom of speech.

Recently, there was an incident of Quran’s desecration in Sweden where a man burned a copy of the sacred book outside a mosque in the country’s capital city. The Pope has made remarks in response to this event.

On Sunday, 57 Muslim states — under the banner of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation — said that collective measures are needed to prevent acts of desecration of the Quran and that international law should be used to stop religious hatred.

Swedish police had granted Momika a permit in line with free speech protections, but authorities later said they had opened an investigation over “agitation against an ethnic group”, noting that Momika had burnt pages from the Islamic holy book very close to the mosque.

Sweden’s government condemned Momika’s actions on Sunday, calling them “Islamophobic”.