Isma’il Hashim Abubakar, PhD
If there is one government institution that citizens of Shari’a states in Northern Nigeria ought to regard as their personal property which cannot be politicised and subjected to jeopardy and machination due to its direct relevance and importance in preserving Muslim norms and values, that institution will undoubtedly be the Hisbah Board.
In other words, by virtue of being Muslims, all Muslims in these states and, of course, in the rest of northern Nigeria are expected to regard themselves as natural and bona fide members of Hisbah, even if they do not wear the Board’s uniform, are not participating in its anti-immorality patrol and of course not in the payroll of government. This, therefore, underscores the collective and societal support and endorsement that Hisbah is supposed to enjoy since its creation and transformation during the tenures of Engineer Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (1999-2003 and 2011-2015) and Malam Ibrahim Shekarau (2003-2011).
During the administration of Shekarau, the time when Hisbah was entirely transformed and formally mainstreamed into government bureaucracy, representing one of the major arms of Shari’a implementation agencies established by the state government, Hisbah Board confronted daunting challenges and opposition from all angles that only a sincere political will, uncommon determination and superior commitment would have saved it from being scrapped.
Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s President (1999-2007) who opposed the transformation of Hisbah, sought to use all the presidential powers at his disposal to not only thwart the Hisbah from undertaking its task of sanitising the moral climate of Kano but also to proscribe it and mischievously label it as a terrorist organisation. Obasanjo’s wrath on Hisbah was merely a manifestation of his unsuccessful struggle to sabotage the implementation of Shari’a, whose winds had blown with an unprecedented force in 12 northern states. Even Obasanjo’s resort to legal machinery could not abort the Shari’a project. He, willy nilly, oversaw a federal government that had to allocate grants to states whose main priority was to promote moral values and eradicate vices that bedevilled the society, the hallmarks of the Shari’ah program as advocated by its proponents at the turn of the 21st century.
Obasanjo ultimately banned Hisbah through an announcement by his Inspector General of Police, who also shamelessly alleged that Hisbah guards were trained in Libya, and ordered the arrest of the Hisbah commandant, the late Shaykh Yahaya Farouk Chadi and his deputy Malam Rabo Abdulkarim. The Kano State Government headed by Shekarau gathered all its strength and entered into a decisive battle with the federal government, irrespective of whether this could culminate into a funny, fruitless and audacious fight between a rat and an elephant, leaving no one with a doubt as to where the victory and defeat ordinarily lied.
After all, Shekarau was pushing for his second term as general elections were approaching, which explains how the attention of Shekarau and his government would be divided. This scenario could be juxtaposed with the climate of anxiety that befell the current governor, Abba Kabir Yusuf, who almost lost hope after the first and second rulings of the tribunal and appeal courts in favour of his opponent, Nasiru Yusuf Gawuna. The development necessitated a momentary pause in regular government activities. It brought about a wild and arbitrary push of things that could be interpreted as valedictory stages of a short-lived tenure. Stability was restored in the psyche of the government and its supporters only after the Supreme Court issued a final verdict that annulled the rulings of both the tribunal and appeal courts and affirmed victory for Abba Kabir Yusuf.
The Shekarau-led government, which, before institutionalising Hisbah, had followed the legislative procedures to get the Board appropriately legalised and signed into law, summoned enough courage to sue the federal government in court. The legal battle ended in favour of the Kano State Government after the court, in March 2007, a few weeks before the elections, described the arrest of the two top heads of Hisbah as illegal and forced the federal government to pay them damages. Nonetheless, allegations had gained currency in Kano by that time that Farouk Chedi, who died in 2010 after a protracted illness that made him look too frail and emaciated, was a consequence of an intravenous poisoning applied to him while in detention. This gradually ravaged him and eventually took his life.
Like Chedi, Chedi’s successor, Shaykh Ibrahim Maibushra, was also a professor at Bayero University, Kano. He built on the intrepid pedestal chartered by his predecessor and the government that recruited him. Maibushra displayed extreme gallantry by, as I was told by a Hisbah guard, going to the extreme of jeopardising his job when he detained an elite belonging to a royal family who was caught committing a crime.
Maibushra’s zealousness to discharge his duty was, as evidenced by the report above, not limited to the poor whom his guards frequently chased but rather knew no discrimination between the poor and the elite or between the weak and the strong. The suspect remained in Hisbah’s custody, and even after the interference of bigwigs within and outside the royal family, Maibushra stood on his ground and refused to release the man. With the endorsement of the then patriarch and the most respectful royal figure within Nigeria and beyond, Maibushra continued to retain his detainee and treated him the way every Tom, Dick or Harry was ideally treated once he fell into the hands of Hisbah.
Maibushra, I was told, was so fearlessly courageous to chase and catch not only low-ranking soldiers but also high-ranking officers like army colonels. Of course, needless to say, without the support of the government of the day, the Hisbah commandant would have been in greater trouble. However, it was likely that Maibushra would not have performed contrarily, regardless of whoever held the reins of power at the time.
When Shaykh Aminu Daurawa emerged as the new commandant of Hisbah after the election of Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso in 2011, only ‘pessimistic’ people would doubt his competence and preparedness to at least show equal sacrifice, even if not outshine his predecessors. After all, Daurawa was one of the most outspoken voices who denounced their membership in Shekarau’s Sharia-related committees, criticised the mode of Shari’a implementation of the Shekarau administration and rallied around Kwankwaso, culminating in the latter’s victory against Salihu Sagir Takai, the candidate of the then ruling ANPP.
There were high hopes that Daurawa would build on Hisbah’s achievements and improve in the areas he criticised in the past administration. Interestingly, although Kwankwaso did not primarily campaign on the Shari’a mantra, the Islamic clerics within his circles, including Daurawa himself, had assured electorates that Kwankwaso would be more forthrightly supportive toward Shari’a implementation since he was believed to be more no-nonsense, fearless and invincible than his predecessor.
Although there was a relative shortage in the money allocated to Hisbah for running costs and operations, Kwankwaso deserved commendation for reportedly giving Hisbah’s leadership adequate autonomy to carry out operations with little interference. A source from Hisbah confided in me that Kwankwaso admitted being callow about Shariah and Islamic knowledge in general and, as such, gave Islamic clerics within his circle enormous power to decide on any matter relating to religion, including issues affecting public religious institutions to whose leaderships Kwankwaso assigned the various clerics who campaigned for, supported or backed his election bid. With an intrepid head of government like Kwankwaso and with zero challenge from either the federal government or any other visible quarters, Daurawa was expected to leverage the available power and resources of government to improve in areas he unleashed censures on the past administration.
Of course, mass wedding (auren zawarawa) was one of the main notable projects and inputs which Daurawa’s Hisbah championed. At the same time, all other ground operations and patrols were conducted not better than what was obtained in the Hisbah under the leadership he inherited. Meanwhile, Daurawa was behind the decline in sacrifice in the model of Chedi’s leadership or Maibushra’s flat and indiscriminate approach toward criminals and their cronies among influential partners.
It was Daurawa who appeared in one video, which still circulates on social media and confessed that as Hisbah commandant, he deliberately avoided arresting the elite and concentrated on the poor because, according to him, the poor are powerless and easy to deal with, unlike the elite who could use their influence to manipulate his sack from the job. In my opinion, this public confession of weakness and a thirst to remain politically relevant, which Daurawa made, partly set the foundations of what Hisbah is going through at this trying moment.
Daurawa has been the longest-serving Hisbah commandant since its institutionalisation. He served between 2011 and 2015 during Kwankwaso and was reappointed by Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje, serving for more than four years. Even as relations between Kwankwaso and Ganduje worsened, Daurawa, who belongs to Kwankwaso’s camp, was retained at the time. Politicians with political loyalty to Kwankwaso were not carried along.
Similarly, after resting for only four years throughout the second tenure of Governor Ganduje, which distanced him from the corridors of power, Daurawa successfully reunited with his seat immediately after the emergence of Abba Kabir Yusuf as Ganduje’s successor in May 2023. Although it is an uncomfortable truth that cannot be denied, Daurawa has got so engrossed with his rank in Hisbah more than being too courageous enough to live by the dictates of his old credentials or even at least to maintain the tempo of his predecessors, one of whom had even lost his life in the cause of his Hisbah. In contrast, the second would have lost the job entirely had he not got a superior intervention.
It is precisely this stand and posture that Daurawa is expected to display when tired of the massive campaigns to turn the Muslim north immoral by impolite TikTokers, the Hisbah resorted to preaching and interacting with TikTokers a few months ago with the hope that they shun promoting lewdness and vices which contribute to moral degeneration of northern Muslim society. That was a good move since it would serve as a warning that would justify applying force in bringing TikTokers to order and sanitising the too much spoiled social media space.
The recent arrest by Hisbah of Murja Ibrahim Kunya, a prominent TikToker, had restored some hope that Hisbah leadership did not only want to, at the time its activities are most needed, remain a timid institution principally different from how it used to be 20 or so years ago. Murja Kunya was taken and presented before the court. It was a relatively good move. Still, it would have been safer and better if she was presented to the court within Hisbah, and of course, this would have saved Hisbah from further disgrace and wanton defeat that resulted from what unfolded later. People woke up on a certain morning in February 2024 with the news that Murja, who was detained in prison and awaiting trial, was arbitrarily released in mysterious circumstances.
Whatever the case and whoever was responsible for her release, someone with even the slightest inkling of the sensitivity of the Hisbah Board and the foundations upon which the institution was set up would never expect a mere arrest of an immoral TikToker would attract the interest of some influential figures within the circle of Kano State Government. Most people rejoiced after Murja’s arrest that the development would mark the end of the ascendance of an empire of vulgarity and obscenity that has taken the grip of northern Muslim social media. 15 or 10-year jail term for Murja, which religiously inclined and Islamic-compliant people prayed Murja would be served with, would have deterred hundreds of TikTokers receiving inspiration from her from treading along her path.
The release of Murja represents one of the most shameful artificial calamities that Hisbah would witness in its two decades of operation; unless all stakeholders, including the remaining figures in the past administrations and all concerned Muslims, have risen to this big challenge, the decline of Hisbah would be one of the last phases of the fall of Shari’a which started at the turn of the century and reached peak, only to fall to this too low level. Who is Murja Kunya, and how can one ever imagine that she would be an obstacle to Hisbah? It is disheartening and regrettable that a responsible government in the past would challenge, fight and successfully defeat the Obasanjo-led federal government in a legal battle on Hisbah, but a different, less committed Hisbah leadership cannot fight a mere gullible TikToker.
Daurawa has, during one of his interviews with the press in the aftermath of Murja’s illegal escape from prison, commented that Hisbah has done all within its power, implying that it has no business whatsoever with what transpired afterwards. Although this is partly true, it is altogether unacceptable; Daurawa would have used every means possible to register his protest against the sabotage of Hisbah by a fifth columnist within the government that appointed him.
There are two reasons for Daurawa’s protest, even though a voluntary resignation would have been a decent solution. Daurawa criticised the Shari’ah implementation process in the past because he was dissatisfied with the government attitude of the day. Now that he was put at the helm of affairs, it would only be reasonable if Hisbah’s principles and values were protected or if he took his leave. Secondly, continuing to remain in a government that has less commitment to eradicating immorality and vices, as illustrated by Murja’s release, would be equal to prioritising one’s position over preserving ideals that one has been preaching for decades.
Finally, although the ugly picture of the fate of Hisbah painted in this essay seems to be discouraging, Hisbah is yet the most visible of all government machinery that has been symbolically and, of course, practically reminding Muslims that Kano and other sister states are still legislatively covered by Sharia. A political will, which we hope will be revived by Kano power brokers, can anytime restore the tempo and spirit of Sharia and decisively tackle and fight the social media agents who have been hell-bent on depriving Muslims of their norms and values. Although very painful to admit, one can say that for now, immorality is gradually winning the war against morality in a society that used to prefer death rather than surrender to a violation and corruption of norms and values.
One of the most cogent ways of tackling social media immorality, which I hope relevant government agencies like Hisbah will adopt, is having a unified network of a joint task force within Hisbah and similar institutions in some northern states and, if possible, to sign this into law after passing necessary legislative process. This would make it easy for Hisbah to detain criminals everywhere in these states without struggling with issues of arrest warrants and areas of jurisdiction.
Dr Ismail wrote this piece from Rabat, the Kingdom of Morocco and can be reached via ismailiiit18@gmail.com.
