Muslims

By Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido

The history of Islam – and religion in general – in post-colonial Nigeria is incomplete without a detailed analysis of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN). All the important Muslim figures, including politicians like Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna and MKO Abiola; scholars like Sheikh Mahmud Gummi, Sheikh Sherif Ibrahim Saleh and Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Lemu; intellectuals like Professor Oloyede, Dr. Usman Bugaje, Malam Ibrahim Sulaiman and Prof. Salisu Shehu; traditional leaders like Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II of Kano, Emir Maigwari of Birnin Gwari; Aree Musulmi Abdul Azeez Arisekola Alao; accomplished Muslim women like Alhaja Latifat Okunnu and Hajiya Aisha B. Lemu or distinguished business persons and technocrats; will all have a mutilated history of religious engagement if the chapter of their engagement with the MSSN is removed from their biographies.

These people (mentioned above) interacted with the MSSN as mentors, some as members, some as patrons, others as leaders, and so on. However, their relationship with the MSSN is vital because it is direct, mutually beneficial, and socio-religiously impactful. In case you did not know, the MSSN nominated Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gummi for the prestigious King Faisal International Award. When Hajiya Aisha Lemu came to Nigeria, she asked her husband, Sheikh Lemu, to link her up with the MSSN. And so is the story with almost every educated Muslim in Nigeria.

As an intellectual, reformist, ideological, moderate and resilient Islamic movement, the MSSN, in the last 70 years, remained the primary engineroom of Muslim intellectual development and the religious focus for Muslims. MSSN promotes the pursuit of Western-style education without compromising the Islamic faith. It encourages Muslims to learn from the West without being Westernized, to pursue “secular” education without embracing secularism, and to excel in all specializations without deviation. In MSSN, people learn how to learn, plan, earn, and live a life of faith, health, and wealth. It strikes a balance between the spiritual and the mundane, the worldly and the otherworldly. MSSN, in short, is a blessing to the Muslim Ummah and the entire Nigeria.

The primary operational arena of the MSSN has always been the academic institutions. While secondary schools are the recruitment centres of new members and the place where they are vaccinated with a sufficient dosage of spiritual, ideological and moral training, the higher institutions, particularly Universities, have remained the bastions of advancing the intellectual capacity, religious consciousness, leadership acumen and civilizational alertness of Muslim students. The Universities, in particular, have been the arenas where the philosophy of MSSN is built, its vision formulated, its projects designed, its programmes implemented, its members developed, its objectives pursued, its impact felt, and its strength consolidated. This has been the case since the 1960s when it was only about a decade old.

In this regard, three universities in particular distinguished themselves as the strongholds of the MSSN in its early history (especially from the 1970s to the 1980s): Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), University of Ibadan (UI) and Bayero University Kano (BUK). Details of how this happened are beyond this piece. But what suffices here is the fact that ABU and BUK took centre stage as the rallying point of young MSSN intellectuals, especially those who grew to be (among) the topmost Muslim intellectuals of the North, especially from the 1970s, at the peak of the booming days of communism and Marxism on Nigerian university campuses. It was then that emerging scholars like Malam Ibrahim Sulaiman, Dr Hamid Bobboyi, Prof. Auwal Yadudu, Dr Usman Bugaje, Prof. Ibrahim Naiya Sada, and a host of other MSSN leaders took the pen and the pain to counter the bane of the Ummah: they faced the challenge posed by the anti-religious radical left-wing Marxist socialist intellectuals. They wrote papers, presented lectures, engaged in debates, published magazines, made press releases and participated in on-campus and off-campus national discourses.

At the peak of the intellectual engagements of the MSSN in the late 70s came the Iranian Revolution. Since MSSN is an Islamic reformist movement, it was easy for it to join the global Muslim community in celebrating the emergence of the Iranian Revolution spearheaded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 while the first generation of the MSSN intellectuals had graduated from the universities, even as they maintained contact with the Society’s leaders and members.

When Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, who was then the Vice President (International) of the society and among the few remaining older members on campus, represented it at an event in Iran, little did anyone know that the visit would open a new chapter not only in the MSSN movement but in the entire history of Islam in Nigeria. What did he do in Iran? How was he received? How did he receive their reception? What did he do after his return home? How, when, where did he start promoting Shiism? What was the reaction of the MSSN intellectuals? What then happened? The answers to these and many related questions are still scantly discussed, even in the highly scanty historical documentation of the MSSN itself. This is despite the importance of that discourse in the history of MSSN and Islam in Northern Nigeria.

By April 18 2024, MSSN had turned 70 years in its history. As part of the celebration of the Platinum Jubilee, a book was launched with the title MSSN @ 70: The Evolution, Success and Challenges of the “A” Zone, Northern States and the FCT. In this book, many actors like Dr. Usman Bugaje, Prof. Idris Bugaje, Barr. Muzammil Hanga, Alahaji Babagana Aji, etcetera shared illuminating perspectives about the MSSN in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The book provides valuable insights into the events that culminated in El-Zakzaky’s embracing Shiism and his subsequent everlastingly irrevocable divorce from the MSSN. The book contains a rich rendition of events in the MSSN. Due to this, I wrote its review (on June 6 2024) on Facebook, mainly referring to El-Zakzaky’s Shi’ism-MSSN matter.

In the review, I referred to “how El-Zakzaky clandestinely planned to divert the MSSN to Shiism and how men like Dr. Bugaje and others were able to tackle him and save the Society from his sinister objectives”. But that led to a fascinating written conversation with Dr Abdulbasit Kassim; that bookworm was highly prolific and inquisitive but often interpreted by some as a “controversial” emerging Nigerian intellectual. Dr. Kassim is interested in African Islamic movements and has written extensively on important contemporary topics like Boko Haram, Salafism, Arabic manuscripts, Islamic intellectual developments in sub-Saharan Africa, and other issues. He raised questions. Our elder scholar-intellectual, Malam Ibrahim Ado-Kurawa, made clarifications. I responded. And the conversation continued. I share the interesting scholarly engagement with you here verbatim.

Dr. Abdulbasit Kassim wrote:

“Brilliant and timely! This book is an excellent sequel to Professor Siraj Abdulkarim’s “Religion and Development: The Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria and its Contribution to National Development,” published in 2014. I highly recommend that MSSN A Zone create a digital archive of all the issues of Radiance Magazine and other publications published throughout the 80s and ’90s. If digitized, this repository would be a vital primary source collection for those seeking to learn more about the evolution of the organization and the ebbs and flows of ideational shifts of its leaders. 

“While I wait to read this book, I have a brief comment about the oft-repeated attempt to single out Zakzaky for his supposed “clandestine role of smuggling Shiism into MSSN.” This framing of Zakzaky, in my opinion, is a half-truth. A close reading of all the catalogue of articles our fathers published in the 80s and 90s about the Islamic Revolution in Iran belie the narrative they sometimes portray about their ignorance of the creedal orientation of the Iranian government. 

“Zakzaky was not a lone actor in that milieu. Several leaders of the MSSN, including my honoured father, Mallam Ibraheem Suleiman, wrote articles in New Nigerian, Triumph Newspaper, and Radiance magazine that were covertly and overtly sympathetic to Shiism. On March 3 1989, Dr Aliyu Tilde wrote “On the Path,” praising Zakzaky for leading the Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Nigeria. Dr Tilde wrote this letter nine years after Zakzaky publicly espoused his Shii affiliation at the Funtua Declaration on May 5 1980. Inayat Ittihad, the spokesman of the Iranian Revolution, was a regular keynote speaker at the International Islamic Seminar on Muslim Movements organized by MSSN at BUK in the early 80s. Inayat was public about his Shii creedal orientation. He preached the “Khomeini Model” to the MSSN members. At the same time, Sayyid Sadiq Al-Mahdi advocated for the Mahdiyya model in the struggle to achieve Islamic change.

“Although most MSSN leaders have embraced new ideological currents, it is important for our fathers to be honest in acknowledging their transitional phases and the seismic shifts in their orientations rather than scapegoating Zakzaky alone. The ebb and flow of ideations was not limited to Pantami alone. The ‎التراجعات was a common feature of all the prominent Muslim figures in the 80s and 90s, including Mallam Ibrahim Ado, whose translator’s introduction of Jihad in Kano captured the prevalent thought in that milieu. Even Zakzaky has passed through different ideological phases, such as Mallam Abubakar Mujahid et al. It is important to tell the complete story and explain the nitty-gritty nuances.

“I hope this book sheds light on the relationship between MSSN and IIFSO. I am also quite curious to read what the MSSN leaders wrote about the ideological proteges of Aminu Kano and the firebrand radicals who inherited the radical struggle against the feudal rulership in northern Nigeria, the likes of Balarabe Musa, Abubakar Rimi, Gambo Sawaba, Bala Muhammad, Sule Lamido, Ayesha Imam, Bala Takaya, Shehu Umar Abdullahi, Bala Usman and Yohanna Madaki. Some of these figures were the ideological adversaries of the MSSN leaders. 

“Congratulations to you, Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward all the contributors who have documented the history of MSSN.

The following is my repose: 

Dr. Abdulbasit Kassim!  

Thank you for this intervention. As always, I like your consistency in trying to checkmate our intellectuals, especially what you see as their “methodology” of rendering historical narratives, which often presents “half-truth” and “belied” narratives. I believe your intervention is a continuation of your championing of suppressed history. Of course, just as you question these scholars and activists for always trying to give “half-truth” or one-sided aspects of history, so are others quick to read the same bias in virtually all your interventions on such matters. But that is what perspectives always mean.

You see, while I like us always to try to query narratives and ensure we get all the bits of it to have a comprehensive, nuanced reading of history, I doubt if defending the supposed “other side” at all costs will help us either. What seems clear is that you mistake being “sympathetic” to the Iranian Revolution or the “Khomeini Model” as being the same as accepting the “creedal orientation” of Iran. This, indeed, is misleading. Again, what escapes you is that Zakzaky never agreed to accept that he was Shia at that early time. He, in fact, “overtly and covertly” rejected being associated with Shi’ism. He was always quick to insist he was Sunni, Maliki. You can check that. However, even the Iranians who kept sending books to the students only sent books on Revolution, governance, justice, civilization, etc. 

By the way, I have not seen in your intervention here any substantial evidence to support your claim that “a close reading of all the catalogue of articles our farmers published in the 80s and 90s belie the narrative they sometimes portray about their ignorance of the creedal orientation of the Iranian government”. What I expected to see was where Malam Ibraheem Suleiman, Dr Tilde or any one of them declared or promoted the Shiite creed, not just showing sympathy to Iran. And I still need evidence to understand how “Zakzaky was not alone in that milieu”. Who and who were with him in promoting Shi’ism at that early stage? At least those “our fathers” have told us that not sooner than Zakzaky returned from his visit to Iran did they realize he had shifted from only romancing the Iranian Revolution to promoting strange ideologies. Immediately, people close to him started to caution the younger ones. And what I found in the narrative of Malam Baba Gana Aji in the MSSN @ 70 book is how Zakzaky got the opportunity, after most elders had left campus, to be virtually the only elder around and, therefore, take total control of contact with the younger ones.

Now, is it also part of the “belied” narratives that El-Zakzaky was alone when he started organizing what came to be known as “extension” after the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC)? Who was with him, please? Is it also “half-truth” that people like Dr Bugaje and others who later formed the Muslim Ummah were against him immediately after Zakzaky started his Shi’ism? Any evidence to the contrary? Is it also not true that people like Ustaz Abubakar Mujahid only continued to be with Zakzaky for some time because they liked the Iranian Revolution even as they disliked the Iranian Ccreed Are you saying there were no people who followed Zakzaky for some time while insisting they were Sunnis? Why were some people called yan karangiya by those in Zakzaky’s camp due to their anti-Shiism-pro-revolution posture even later? 

It is good that we study the issues and learn more about history than our assumption of reading “all the catalogue of articles” from the 80s and 90s. When we do so, perhaps we will be more educated about the matters and then see the apparent difference between sympathizing with the Iranian Revolution and embracing Shi’ism, especially at that time. 

But the fact that the MSSN was a group of people trying to bring societal change based on Islam, it should not be difficult for one to understand how easy it was for the MSSN to sympathize with whoever declared an Islamic Revolution at that time. By the way, praising and sympathizing with the Iranian Revolution was a common thing in the Muslim world, even among the global Sunni population. Even Azhar scholars could agree to work with Iran to unite Muslims and many of them after the Revolution. Scholars like Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi also joined their call for taqreeb. They only abandoned that project and often declared them hypocrites or so after discovering that they were using that to spread their Shiite creed. Could these scholars accept the “creedal orientation of the Iranian government”? 

You see, to date, some of the older MSSN people will still insist that they like the “Khomeini Model” of establishing an Islamic government, but they never like his creedal “model”. At least you have read one from one of our elders here. 

So, please, let’s expand our reading of the issues and understand them more.

Mal Ibrahim Ado Kurawa wrote:

“Professor Abdulbasit Kassim, I agree with you entirely, even though I haven’t been privileged to see the MSSN book. It is not unusual for people to follow different trajectories. I visited Iran in 1983. I didn’t like their Shiism but still respect their Muslim solidarity, so we indeed need a complete story. When the Iranians came to Nigeria, they didn’t begin by openly preaching Shiism. They even promised to translate the books of the Sokoto Jihad leaders, which they had never done then. They began propagating Shiism after Zakzaky accepted to become one. My last physical encounter with Zakzaky was in Makkah in 1984. Some of us left him to seek knowledge in Egypt and Saudi. Therefore, I cannot recall what transpired thereafter.”

After the above intervention by our elder brother, Dr. Abdulbasit Kasim wrote 

“Jazakallahu Khairan Amir Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward you for your intervention and continue to guide and direct our affairs. Amīn. There is a famous saying that فللسؤال أهمية كبرى في طلب العلم فالأسئلة مفاتيح العلم (questioning is of great importance in seeking knowledge, for questions are the keys to knowledge.). This phrase is similar to what Imam al-Bāqillānī said العلم قفل ومفتاحه المسألة (Knowledge is a lock. And its key is questioning) and the well-known saying of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī العلم سؤال وجواب (Knowledge is question and answer). The key to knowing for a seeker of knowledge is to ask questions with بلسان سؤول وقلب عقول (the tongue of a questioner and the heart of a thinker).”

My previous submission is devoid of malicious intent (an apology for the use of the word “belie” or “half-truth”) or an attempt to validate predetermined frames and outcomes. Instead, it is solely aimed at reconciling competing and sometimes contradictory interpretations of events that took place in the past. Alhamdulillah, no figures in MSSN I described as honoured fathers have ever ascribed ulterior motives to my questions. Since 2006, they have continuously accommodated the micro-details I pick up on and the torrent of questions I submit. I am indebted to them for granting me access to their libraries, encouraging critical historical questions, and helping me and other younger folks better understand where we are coming from and how we got where we are now. May Allah reward them abundantly in this world and the hereafter. Amīn. 

”How do we know what happened in the past? This mutual exchange is aimed at reading against the grain, reading between the lines, paying attention to what is not said, and listening to silences and absences by carefully engaging in comprehensive evaluation and chronological interrogation of a portfolio of primary sources generated contemporaneously that provide evidence or first-hand testimonies about the events in the 80s and 90s. While we respect our honoured fathers for their service to Islam, we must ask questions and subject the verbal and written testimony of events they present to us to thorough scrutiny by weighing, cross-referencing, or bringing their accounts into conversation with other disparate source materials and distinct authorial perspectives. This was the intent of my submission.

”The 11th February Revolution of Khomeini had a global appeal in the Muslim world. It had the Bin-Laden effect. What started as hysteria over the successful defeat of the Western colonial powers and their Arab secular puppet (the Shah regime) later transitioned into disillusionment after the creedal orientation of Khomeini became self-evident despite his call for Islamic unity. In Nigeria, the timeline of events could be traced from January 1980, when Zakzaky visited Iran and was reported to have personally met Imam Khomeini on his sickbed, to July 10 1994, when Shaykh Abubakar Mujahid and his followers in JTI successfully broke away from Zakzaky. 

“There was clear opposition from the MSSN leaders towards Zakzaky’s attempt to spread Shiism. This position was made clear by Shaykh Abubakar Mujahid during his 1998 interview when he said:“When he (Zakzaky) started he had not got any feeling towards Shiism. But at one point, when he started collecting money from Iran, they started bringing Shiism. What we did, we said no. Their beliefs and our beliefs are not the same. We operate the Mālikī School of Thought. They operate the Jaʿfarī School of Thought, so a clash will occur. Why don’t we go on with our revolutionary zeal, which was gaining momentum at the time, rather than bring this Shia? The people at the beginning were accusing us of being Shia, which we were not. Then they understood we weren’t so they started joining, and if we turned around and became Shia, we would be deceiving them. In 1989, he came back from prison in Port Harcourt. When we saw these moves in Shiism, we started to preach against them. That is, the members of the group who were entering Shiism, we preached against them, saying we are not Shia. We will not do Shiism, we will do the Maliki School of Thought.” [End of Quote]

“Before gaining further clarity from you, Amir, and our honored father, Mallam Ibrahim Ado, I struggled to reconcile the clear oppositional stance of the MSSN leaders towards Zakzaky’s Shiism with their admiration and reproduction of articles on the central tenet of the “Khomeini Model of Islamic Governance,” which revolved around the concept of “Wilāyat al-Faqīh.” My brain could not process why MSSN leaders would preach against Shiism yet write editorials and articles on Wilāyat al-Faqīh – a political theology Khomeini popularized in Iran with copious citations from the works of Shi’i theologians, including Mullah Ahmad Naraqi, Muhammad Hussain Naini, and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. If I could recall accurately, Mallam Ibraheem A. Waziri and Dr. Muhammad S Balogun once had an exchange about this subject in the past. 

“No doubt, our honored fathers yearned for Islamic models for societal change. They read and learned about Muslim movements across different historical periods, seeking a common method of formation, mobilization, and strategy that Muslims could utilize in the struggle to achieve Islamic change. The Khomeini, Fodiawa, and Mahdiyya models were some of the models they wrote about in the 1980s and 90s in their attempt to awaken the Muslim population to Islamic societal change. 

“What I learned from this exchange is that even when the MSSN leaders wrote about the “Khomeini Model of Islamic Governance” and the concept of “Wilāyat al-Faqīh,” they approached the idea as a political model without embracing the Shi’i creedal component Khomeini deployed to legitimize the concept as a political theology. 

“Let me conclude by saying once again Jazakallahu Khairan for providing safe spaces of dialogue and intellectual engagement where curious seekers of knowledge can ask the who, what, where, when, why, and how historical questions without invoking the binary of he belongs to “our side vs. their side” or “us vs. them” dichotomies. As Ibn Hazm said صفة سؤال المُتعلِّم هو أن تسأل عمَّا لا تدري لا عمَّا تدري (The characteristic of a learner’s question is to ask about what they do not know, not about what they do know.) The more we ask questions and try to reconcile competing ideas and narratives, the more we gain a comprehensive picture of the past.

Abdullahi Lamido responded 

Abdulbasit Kassim Masha Allah Prof. May Allah reward us all and bless our little efforts. You know, we are all passengers in the train of never-ending learning or what is called life-long learning. Interestingly, that is the first thing we learnt from the MSSN; that learning begins from the cradle and only ends in the grave. So, we always pray to Allah for more knowledge using the “And say O Lord increase me in knowledge” formula. We “ask those who know” so as to unlearn, learn and relearn.  

Through our usual lengthy, fruitful phone engagements with you (which often take us between two and four hours), I know that you are not only a scholar but one who is serious about learning. I have also understood that your questions are born out of an insatiable curiosity, a burning desire to know more and more and more. And I understand this further through your acceptance of every single issue where stronger evidence becomes clear to you. Unfortunately, not every social media friend of yours has the opportunity to have such heart-to-heart, deep, mutual scholarly engagements with you. 

However, the more interesting thing to me is the quantum of knowledge I gain from you via such amicable, mutual exchanges. I often deliberately bombard you with questions to trigger powerful, fact-supported responses that are usually backed by numerous references from books I have never read. I do not even have the time and energy to read them. You read too much!

Back to the “Khomeini Model” and the “Wilayat al-Faqih” question. As you rightly said, Wilayat al-Faqih is essentially a political concept and a convenient political instrument Khomeini used to establish the legitimacy of his Revolution and government. It is not fundamentally a theological concept. That is why he was comfortable spreading it even before starting to export his Shiite creed. And by the way he needed it at that time… 

Secondly, you seem to think that our fathers who were in the MSSN at that time had a prior sufficient knowledge of what Shi’ism entailed. No. Shi’ism had never been present in our community. So, nobody knew it. After all, those our fathers were not even necessarily deep in the knowledge of Sunnah and even the dominant Maliki jurisprudence back then. Their main sources of Islamic knowledge were the English translations of ikhwan books coming from Egypt and those coming from Pakistan. You should not expect them to just easily detect the traces of Shi’ism by mere reading a seemingly innocent political concept even when it was supported by Shiite authorities who, by the way, were not known here. 

I thank you very much and pray that this useful intellectual discussion will continue. And I look forward to reading your review of the MSSN @70 Book Insha Allah. 

Greetings to the family. 

Wasallam 

Finally, Dr. Abdulbasit Wrote

“Jazakallahu Khairan Amir Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward you for helping me and other young folks to better understand the complexities of the history of Islamic thought. 

“Thank you for being generous with your time. I appreciate your patience and willingness to clarify all the torrent of questions on Wilāyat al-Faqīh that came up during our lengthy phone conversation. 

“May Allah reward you and all our fathers at MSSN who served the organization with the sole aim of uplifting the Dīn. May Allah bless the publisher, editors and contributors who worked on the book project. In sha Allah, I look forward to learning more from you and all our honoured fathers. 

“As promised, In sha Allah, once I receive the copies of the MSSN @70, I will distribute the book to different libraries where more people can access, read, and cite it in their research and writing. 

“Extend my Salam to the family. 

Wa Alaykum Salam.”

Conclusion

I have learned from the above engagement that there is a need to write more about the MSSN and its evolution and contributions to national development. A lot is missing and in need regarding the written history of MSSN and other Islamic organizations in Nigeria. May Allah bless our little efforts and grant us enormous rewards for them.

 Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido can be contacted via lamidomabudi@gmail.com.

By Abdulrazak Iliyasu Sansani

I had not written anything for publication in a while. I had been occupied with things that reduced my little intervention on critical issues, which I have done over the years. However, I believe it won’t be right if I do not express myself and forward my position at this material time for posterity. This may be misconstrued or rightly received as my little contribution to the progress of our beloved state.

Governor Agbu Kefas’s administration has started on a good footing based on the yardstick of development in nature’s gift to the nation. The last few years have been extremely tough for Nigeria as a nation. This was compounded in the state by how the previous administration had handled the affairs of the state.

Hence, it is a complete deviation from the recent past and a potentially breakthrough moment for the state that has everything to be one of the most developed states, with years of constant progress judging by how endowed the state is.

However, despite modest attempts by successive administrations, the state has not sailed through.  Thus, it is yet to prevail over the tempestuous murky waters of politics, let alone be set for developmental strides worthy of the state’s potentialities.

Governor Agbu Kefas came into power at the most polarised moment in our history. The state was sharply divided along religious, toxic partisan, and ethnic lines. All those in the state during the electioneering period witnessed it as akin to a war. The worst of Tarabans came to bear most glaringly. The quest for power destroyed relationships that had taken decades to build.

Therefore, the next governor of Taraba would meet strenuous tasks and a problematic start that could threaten to crumble what was left of the state. It would take extraordinary leadership acumen to overcome those things that have characteristically held up the state.

On 29 May 2023, Gov. Agbu Kefas assumed office as the governor of Taraba State, having been declared the winner of the 18 March 2023 Gubernatorial election. Legal battles ensued, and questions were raised about the credibility of the electoral victory. This is a major blame game point for leaders who do not want to work.

One that could be used as an excuse to cover for incompetence and outright leadership failure.  However, the governor chose otherwise to lessen the heated polity and unite the people by inclusion. This resolve to give Tarabans a sense of belonging by appointing more diverse Tarabans into various offices across the state has given Tarabans a new lease of life to participate more in acts that move the state forward.  Of course, the hitherto neglected have every reason to believe things can improve.

This ushered in an era when abandoned projects like the modern abattoir in Wuro Sembe, the most sought-after minimum wage that some states had implemented, and Taraba joined that masses-centred list with the governor’s pronouncement on the implementation of minimum wage.

The removal of the Petroleum Subsidy by Mr President, a single decision that has had far-reaching consequences on our economy, the people of Taraba state received the news of the implementation of the minimum wage with utter joy， as it would help in cushioning the effects of the hardship， pending on the completion of discussion on a new minimum wage to meet the realities of the moment by the Federal government and the labour union.

Governor Dantala Kefas has done relatively well in so many sectors that I am brimming with hope of a new, better, more inclusive Taraba where every  Taraban can aspire to become anything and live in an atmosphere conducive to their personal growth and collective development. This is most apparent in the education sector, where I am most concerned.

The Kefas administration has made education the cornerstone of its agenda. This has proved not mere rhetoric, as primary and secondary education have been free. This has drastically reduced the number of out-of-school children, reducing the likelihood of having children who could constitute a nuisance to society and fundamentally helping the state’s security. The administration has slashed a whopping 50℅ of the tuition fees in the state-owned tertiary institutions, reducing the financial burden on the parents in this cash-strapped country.

The administration has gone ahead to effect some major infrastructure changes, renovating and building infrastructures in the state’s owned institutions: Taraba State University,  College of Nursing and Midwifery, and College of Agriculture, which had yarned for development for decades, with little executed. Education is the bedrock of all development, as it is widely known and accepted. The Kefas administration has gotten it right by making it a core part of its administration agenda and going ahead and walking the talk.

Recently, the governor decided that all government principals would be given official cars. I have seen some objecting to it. I think it is the right step in the right direction. Teachers are nation builders and deserve to be treated as such. If elected and appointed government officials are given official vehicles, and we see nothing wrong with that, we should see nothing wrong with the same treatment to provide principals, who toil to pass knowledge and incalculate morals that build students who shape the destiny of our nation.

For Gov. Agbu Kefas, he has started well, given our history as a state, the state’s debt profile and the nation’s economic challenges. I can only employ him to do more, especially in areas of rural roads. This will open up the state more, allowing local farmers to sell their farm produce without much hassle. This singular effort will create room for more investors to come in. Agriculture alone can change the economic narrative of our state, let alone combined with other sectors, such as tourism and mining, to mention a few.

I come from a farming community, Sansani, Wuro Jam Ward, Gassol Local government, which has an unmotorable road. A deathtrap has hindered the village’s substantial Agricultural potential and denied so many farmers an opportunity to enjoy their hard-earned money. Massive amounts are always kept to pay exorbitant fares to transport their produce to the nearest big market.

Taraba is an Agrarian state. Farming communities like Sansani, Gassol, Wuro Jam, Sendirde, Takalafiya, Sheka, Dakka, Karim Lamido, and Kurmi, to mention a few, deserve to have good and qualitative roads that open up the state for more economic activities and accelerated economic growth， which translate to actual economic development.  Governor Kefas has started well. He should not deviate. I admonish him to keep increasing the tempo; he will leave a good legacy. Power is transient.

Abdulrazak Iliyasu Sansani is a former TV Presenter and producer at Haske TV， Jalingo， Taraba State.

By Aisha Mohammed Danpullo

 We were sent to get cooking oil from a house nearby. My cousin and I wore a popular Malaysian Hijab with trimmed lace at the edges and a rope around the back. We were so excited to have a ram that year (I come from a humble background). 

We were eager to watch the ram we had crowded around for days, feeding, watering and cleaning its poo. Finally, we were going to watch as it got slaughtered. I, for one, was most excited for the blood that would come gushing out as it took its last breath.

We went to the oil merchant’s house and met the husband, the head of the house with his kids around him, about to make his sacrifice. He was about to slaughter three fat fish. He had it held down by his eldest son as it squirmed just the way one would slaughter a ram.

The kids were all excited; the wife was humbled and a little bit ashamed, probably because of our presence, spilling the oil she measured with beer bottles serving as a measurement for a litre. It’s quite ironic because beers are banned in our part of the country, but somehow, the bottles are always found in every oil merchant’s shop, and their origin is never questioned.

The family generously offered us some, but we wouldn’t take it because there wasn’t enough for them to share.

Every year during Eid, I think of that family, wondering how they are doing and hoping life has become better for them and that they get to eat ram some year.

Aisha Danpullo wrote from Kano via aishamohammaddanpullo@gmail.com.

By Abdullahi Khairallah

Vice President of Nigeria, Sen. Kashim Shettima; Borno State Acting Governor, Hon. Umar Usman Kadafur; and the Shehu of Borno, HRH Dr. Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai Elkanemi, led thousands of Muslim faithful to observe Eid prayers in Maiduguri.

The two raka’at prayers were led by the Chief Imam of Borno, Imam Shettima Saleh, at Ramat Square, Borno’s central Eid ground.

Other dignitaries include Senator representing Borno North, Sen. MT Monguno; Speaker of the Borno State House of Assembly, Rt. Hon. Abdulkareem Lawan; Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, Sen. Abubakar Kyari; former Deputy Governor, Hon. Usman Mamman Durkwa; Members of the State House of Assembly; Hon. Commissioners and Members of the State Executive Council; Special Advisers; Senior Special Assistants; and Special Assistants.

Delivering his Eid sermon, Imam Shettima reiterated the importance of peaceful coexistence and prayed for a bountiful harvest as the cropping season begins.

Shortly after the prayer, the Acting Governor thanked Almighty Allah for making it possible to witness yet another Eidul Adha while congratulating the Muslim Ummah for the successful Eid prayer.

“Secondly, we want to wish all those who traveled to Saudi Arabia a successful and rewarding Hajj exercise. May Allah accept all their prayers,” Kadafur said.

He further urged Muslims to be law-abiding, peace-loving, and enjoined them to use this occasion for sober reflection and prayer for lasting peace in the state.

Prayers were offered for the restoration of total peace in Borno, the northeast, and the entire country.

By Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu

Recently, an extremely prestigious academic journal requested that I review a film made by a Nigerian. I was surprised, as that is Muhsin Ibrahim’s forte. Further, I really don’t watch Nigerian films, aka Nollywood, personally preferring African Francophone directors. Nevertheless, I agreed to do the review. 

However, the link they sent for the film was password-protected. I informed them, and they requested the filmmaker to send the password. Being a request from a highly prestigious journal, he sent the code, and I was able to get on the site and watch the film online. I was surprised at what I saw and decided to delve further into these issues. Before doing that, I wrote my review and sent it off. The film, however, set me thinking. 

Like a creeping malaise, Nollywood directors are rearing their cameras into the northern Nigerian cultural spaces. Again. The film I reviewed for the journal was “A Delivery Boy” (dir. Adekunle Adejuyigbe, 2018). It was in the Hausa language. None of the actors, however, was Hausa, although the lead actor seems to be a northerner (at least from his name since an online search failed to reveal any personal details about him). 

Nothing wrong with that. Some of the best films about a particular culture were made by those outside the culture. Being ‘outliers’, it often gave them an opportunity to provide a more or less balanced and objective ‘outsider’s perspective’ of the culture. Alfonso Cuarón, a Mexican, successfully directed “Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban” (2004), while Taiwanese director Ang Lee did the same with “ Brokeback Mountain” (2005), even earning him an Oscar. 

In 2006 Clint Eastwood, an American, directed “Letters From Iwo Jima.” The cast was almost entirely Japanese, and almost all of the dialogue was in Japanese. It was very well-received in Japan, and in fact, some critics in Japan wondered why a non-Japanese director was able to make one of the best war movies about World War II from the Japanese perspective. Abbas Kiarostami, an Iranian filmmaker, directed his film, “Certified Copy” (2020) in Italy, which contained French, Italian, and English dialogue starring French and British actors. 

British director Richard Attenborough successfully directed Ben Kingsley in the Indian biopic Gandhi (1982). The film was praised for providing a historically accurate portrayal of the life of Gandhi, the Indian independence movement and the deleterious results of British colonization of India. It took away eight Oscars. American director Steven Spielberg’s “Schindler’s List” (1993) on a German, Oskar Schindler, was equally a powerful portrayal of an auteur genius by a “non-native”. The film won seven Oscars. 

In each of these examples, the directors approached their subject matter with a clean, fresh and open mind that acknowledges the cultural sensitivities of the subject matter. My point is that a person, outside of a particular cultural context, can make sensitive films that portray the culture to his own culture as well as other cultures. That is not, however, how Nollywood plays when it focuses its cameras on northern Nigerian social culture. Specifically Muslims. 

I just can’t understand why they are so fixated on Muslims and the North. If the purpose of the ‘crossover’ films (as they are labelled) they make is to create an understanding of the North for their predominantly Southern audiences, they need not bother. Social media alone is awash with all the information one needs about Nigeria—the good, the bad and the ugly. You don’t need a big-budget film for that. Or actors trying and failing to convey ‘Aboki’ accents in stilted dialogues that lack grammatical context. 

Yet, they insist on producing films about Muslim northern Nigeria from a jaundiced, bigoted perspective, often couched with pseudo-intellectual veneer. To sweeten the bad taste of such distasteful films, they pick up one or two northern actors (who genuinely speak the Hausa language, even if not mainstream ethnic Hausa) and add them to the mix, believing that this will buy them salvation. For southern Nigerians, anyone above the River Niger is ‘Hausa’. 

They started in the early 2000s, and people just ignored them. The directors then included Oskar Baker (Ɗan Adamu Butulu, Abdulmalik), Yemi Laniyan (Makiyi, Uwar Gida), Tunji Agesin (Halin Kishiya), Matt Dadzie (Zuwaira), I. Nwankwo (Macijiya) and many others. These came on the heels of the massive success of “Sangaya” (dir. Aminu Muhammad Sabo, 1999) when this particular film opened up the northern Nigerian film market. 

Those Nollywood producers jumped into cash on the popularity of Hausa films and made their own for northern markets. For the most part, these early ‘crossover’ films that I refer to as ‘Northern Nollywood’ were fairly mild and evoked no reaction. They were still rejected, as the Hausa can be the most discriminatory people you can come across. If you are outside their cultural universe, you remain there. Forever. 

The few Kannywood actors eager to be seen on the ‘national stage’ allowed themselves to be used to deconstruct Islam and Muslims on the altar of filmmaking in subsequent Northern Nollywood films. Let’s not even talk about character misrepresentation, which Muhsin Ibrahim has written extensively about. In these scenarios, the usual tropes for northerners in Nollywood films is that of ‘Aboki’ (a term southern Nigerians believe is an insult to northerners, without knowing what it means), ‘maigad’ (security), generally a beggar. If they value an actor, they assign them an instantly forgettable role rather than a lead. Granted, this might be more astute and realistic marketing than ethnicity because it would be risky to give an unknown Hausa actor a significant role in a film aimed at southern Nigerians. 

A few of these types of portrayals in Nollywood included Hausa-speaking actors in films such as The Senator, The Stubborn Grasshopper, The World is Mine, Osama Bin La, Across the Border and The Police Officer. 

When Shari’a was relaunched from 1999 in many northern Nigerian States, it became an instant filmic focus for Nollywood. A film, “Holy Law: Shari’a” (dir. Ejike Asiegbu, 2001) drew such a barrage of criticism among Hausa Muslims due to its portrayal of Shari’a laws then being implemented in northern Nigeria that it caused credibility problems for the few Hausa actors that appeared in it. With neither understanding of Islam nor its context, the director ploughed on in his own distorted interpretation of the Shari’a as only a punitive justice system of chopping hands, floggings, and killings through foul-mouthed dialogue. As Nasiru Wada Khalil noted in his brilliant essay on the film (“Perception and Reaction: The Representation of the Shari’a in Nollywood and Kanywood Films”, SSRN, 2016) “the whole story of Holy Law is in itself flogged, amputated and killed right from the storyline.”

“Osama bin La” (dir. MacCollins Chidebe, 2001) was supposed to be a comedy. No one found it funny in Kano. Despite not featuring any northern actor, it was banned in Kano due to its portrayal of Osama bn Ladan, then considered a folk hero. The film was banned to avoid a reaction against Igbo merchants marketing the film. I was actually present in the congregation at a Friday sermon at Kundila Friday mosque in Kano when a ‘fatwa’ was issued on the film. Even a similar comedy, “Ibro Usama” (dir. Auwalu Dare, 2002), a chamama genre Hausa film, was banned in Kano, showing sensitivity to the subject matter. 

The reactions against crossover films seemed to have discouraged Nollywood producers from forging ahead. They returned in the 2010s. By then, northern Nigeria had entered a new phase of social disruption, and Nollywood took every opportunity to film its understanding of the issues—sometimes couched in simpering distorted narrative masquerading as social commentary—on society and culture it has absolutely no understanding of. 

In “Dry” (dir. Stephanie Linus, 2014), the director developed a sudden concern about ‘child marriage’ and its consequences. Naturally, the culprits of such marriage, as depicted in the film, are sixty-year-old men who marry girls young enough to be their granddaughters. The director’s qualification to talk about the issue (which was already being framed by child marriage controversy in the north) was that she has ‘visited the north’ a couple of times. With the film, if she could get at least “one girl free and open the minds of the people, and also instruct different bodies and individuals to take action, then the movie would have served its purpose.” The ‘north’ was living in darkness, and it required Stephanie Linus to shed light on ‘civilization’. 

 “A Delivery Boy” (dir. Adekunle Adejuyigbe, 2018) that I reviewed was about an ‘almajiri’ in an Islamic school who was kidnapped from the school, to begin with and repeatedly raped by his ‘Alamaramma’ (teacher). The almajiri somehow acquired sticks of dynamite to create a suicide vest and vowed to blow himself up—together with the teacher. The Alaramma in the film lives in an opulent mansion, far away from the ‘almajirai’. In this narrative universe, the ‘almajiri’ do not learn anything and are unwilling rape victims of their teaches who actually kidnapped them and forced them into the schools. 

“The Milkmaid” (dir. Desmond Ovbiagele, 2020) evokes the idealistic picture of a Fulani milkmaid and became a basis for a Nollywood film. Instead of focusing on the political economy of the Fulani milk trade, the film focused on the trope of terrorism. “The Black Book” (dir. Editi Effiong, 2023), touted as ‘Nigeria’s John Wick’ shoots a significant portion in ‘the north’ – with ‘Islamist’ hijab-wearing females touting assault rifles hidden underneath their hijab. “Jalil” (dir. Leslie Dapwatda, 2020) visits the recurrent theme of kidnapping for ransom. In the north, of course. 

Then came the latest, “Almajiri” (dir. Toka McBaror, 2022). Claimed to be a true-life story (although it is not clear whether it happened to specific people or based on what the director believed to be a common event), it featured muscle-bound badass types of thugs with guns and dreadlocks as Almajirai. The film reinforces the southern Nigerian trope of any beggar in the north being an Almajiri. Such ‘almajiris’ are kidnapped and sold into virtual slavery and horribly abused. The idea is to blame the parental irresponsibility of northerners. 

For southern Nigerians, especially the Nollywood crowd, an ‘Almajiri’ is a beggar, a product of a failed education system, a terrorist, a bandit, and an ‘aboki’. They use concocted figures bandied about by alphabet soup agencies to proclaim ‘over 10 million almajiri are out of school’ and, therefore, twigs of the terrorism inferno. How can someone who has been part of a system of education for over half a century be considered out of school? But for Nollywood, if it is not ABCD, then it is not education. 

“Northern Nollywood” films are the precise reasons why there will ALWAYS be different film cultures in Nigeria. Kannywood talks to its publics, happily churning out now TV shows that address issues it deems relevant—in its own way. Both the northern and southern parts of the country (covering the three major languages) were actively engaged. However, they were mutually non-legible to each other. This was essential because they operate on virtually opposing cultural mindsets – making the emergence of a truly “Nigerian cultural film” impossible. 

Quite a few writers seem to suggest that Kannywood is a ‘subset of Nollywood’, and indeed, many would prefer for the term Kannywood (created in 1999 by a Hausa writer) to be dispensed with and replaced with Nollywood (created in 2002 by a Japanese Canadian writer). It is to protect our cultural representation in films that I stand as a lone voice in advocating for a ‘Hausa Cinema’ to reflect the cultural universe of the Hausa.

Professor Abdalla Uba Adamu can be reached via auadamu@yahoo.com.

Isma’il Hashim Abubakar, PhD

Being one of the followers and now among proponents (perhaps pioneers) of Jafarology, an ongoing hypothetical intellectual formulation of a school of thought that seeks to document, survey and study the scholarly legacies of Shaykh Ja’far Mahmud Adam from multiple angles and diverse approaches, I ought to blindly oppose, like many fellows, anything favourable connected to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. The reason for this is apparent: Shaykh Ja’far, my favourite scholar, had a bitter polemical engagement with Sanusi, and the duo exchanged hot tirades that escalated to the use of deregulatory labels and scathing monikers to attack each other. 

As someone who always aspires to operate objectively and dispassionately, in addition to having conducted a broad investigation on the pros and cons of the dispute between the two prominent figures, I feel it a duty-bound and personal responsibility to reveal what many people are oblivious of, mainly as thousands of people rely on the recorded and widely circulated sermons of the late Shaykh Ja’far against Sanusi to not only point to the latter’s lack of competence to rule the Islamic society of Kano but to go to the extent of excommunicating him.  

My decision to join issues with Sanusi’s critics on this saga, most of whom I believe are sincere, was informed by the desire to clear many misconceptions and set the record straight. Perhaps it will sound shocking if I boldly suggest that were Shaykh Ja’far alive today, having witnessed the many transformations in Sanusi’s career and the onerous memorable developments witnessed as a result of his adventurous capacity in the various roles he served, including as the 14th Emir of Kano, the late prominent cleric would have hailed and applauded Emir Sanusi in the same degree, if not higher than, he praised a few traditional figures. 

During his reign before the government of the day’s interruption, Emir Sanusi presided over a lively empire that revived, to a greater degree, the culture of intellectual debate and involvement of scholars and luminaries in various fields in the decision-making exercise. Sanusi’s leadership in prayer, his daily free-feeding scheme for the poor and regular comments on the goings-on, which were sometimes controversial, were all rendered dormant by his dethronement. Therefore, in as much an admirer of Shaykh Ja’far criticises Sanusi relying on the positions of Shaykh Ja’far on the former in some respects, one cannot help but align with Sanusi for epitomising what Shaykh Ja’far had been preaching, perhaps more than many of his peers who served similar roles as his. 

Having conducted my PhD research and written the thesis on the career, thoughts and ideas of Shaykh Ja’far and awarded a doctoral degree in July 2023 by Mohammed V University, Rabat, I present below a section in which I examine the engagement between the cleric and Sanusi, a social analyst by then. Enjoy.

Ja‘far had a bitter engagement with Sanusi Lamido Sanusi for the latter‘s critical view of the Shari‘ah project and other issues associated with Islam and Muslims in Nigeria. In one Friday sermon, the content of which was partly reflected in a newspaper interview by the Weekly Trust with the late Shaykh, Ja‘far depicted Sanusi as (a nominal) Muslim who imbibed some features of hypocrisy, which then informed his criticism of Islamic values and Shari‘ah, while attacking Muslim governors who were committed to the return and implementation of Shari‘ah. Ja‘far argued that Sanusi, who was then residing in Lagos, did not, conversely, pen a single essay to condemn the massacres of Muslims by the OPC in the Southwest. Ja‘far further expressed disappointment over what he regarded as a brazen act of Sanusi, who paraded himself as a social critic and intellectual, only to rubbish northern Muslim leaders who, in their effort to resist the marginalisation of Muslims by President Obasanjo, held meetings in Kaduna on the issue.

Ja‘far‘s dismay over Sanusi‘s rubbishing of Muslim leaders who complained of marginalisation of Muslims by the Obasanjo administration was a reference to Sanusi‘s article in which he argued that having fewer Muslims in the executive arm of the federal government was nothing scary, as scholars like Ja‘far and the northern leaders were ―needlessly – crying out. In the words of Sanusi, to reduce Obasanjo‘s crime to the number of members of the Muslim elite he has appointed-or rather not appointed – to key positions and to pretend that if we had more Muslim appointees,then Muslims would be better off automatically, to say this, is to speak from an ethically blind perspective (https://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi48.htm).

Sanusi‘s concern that there was virtually no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of performance and citizen-concerned leadership was, to a large extent, correct. Ja‘far himself mostly criticised Muslim politicians who, in some regimes, dominated the echelons of power but failed to solve the myriad problems of their people, while in some occasions, he indirectly upheld the records of some non-Muslims who did better than their Muslim counterparts in some capacities. Nevertheless, equitable representation and centralisation of power are important ingredients of democratic dispensation, the absence of which has the potential of throwing political entities into chaos. Sanusi‘s criticism came at a time when sentiments among Muslims over marginalisation were heightening. Not only that, but it came at a time.

Obasanjo was convening a national constitutional review conference, which was seen as a robust chance to further shut out Muslims in the scheme of things. After all, despite being in the minority, Christians were given slots for delegation,which outnumbered Muslim delegates, hence the too much anxiety from the Muslim quarters.

When he took a swipe at Sanusi about Shari‘ah, Ja‘far was obviously referring to Sanusi‘s arguments in some of his writings where he portrayed the Shari‘ah as a tool for politicians to promote their popularity, while in essence, not applying the Shari‘ah to themselves but limiting it to the poor. Similarly, Sanusi had intensely criticised some rulings of Shari‘ah courts, which passed hudud verdicts over convicted criminal cases like flogging in the case of fornication, stoning for adultery and amputation for thievery. This had, at the time, led many Muslims in the country to conclude that Sanusi was a secularist Muslim or even a Marxist pursuing an anti-Shari‘ah agenda. But at the same time, he earned accolades and commendations from the Southern press and intellectuals who hailed him as an enlightened, progressive, reformist, modernist Muslim, etc. 

Ja‘far‘s Friday sermon and newspaper interview were greeted with Sanusi‘s ripostes in which he challenged Ja‘far‘s view of him and descended on the Kano-based scholar‘s personality. Sanusi dismissed Ja‘far as “an unknown quantity that rides on the back of religious fundamentalism to gain social relevancy” but also described him as “a Nigerian who was educated on the charity of Saudi Arabia and whose mosque and school – his source of livelihood – are funded by Arabs (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi49.htm). 

This attack opened floodgates of defensive rejoinders from supporters of both Ja‘far and Sanusi, with some accusing the latter of pontificating about his “privileged background” and someone who “can tangle with the Karl Marx‘s of this world but not Qur‘an and Sunnah”, hence he “could not contribute to his society and religion as Sheikh Ja‘far does”. Although he admitted that Sanusi‘s response was too offensive for a respected scholar like Shaykh Ja‘far, one defender of the then-Kano prince observed that Sanusi‘s arguments were “not entirely bereft of its merit and sound judgment”, particularly his call for the adoption of “national identity”, rather than clinging onto ethnic and geographic proclivities.

Whatever the case, Sanusi seems to have developed an ambivalent position toward the Shari‘ah project in Nigeria, either because of the persons involved in the project or due to some personal interpretations of his on the Shari‘ah codes which might differ from the mainstream conception of Shari‘ah. As an independent thinker and intellectual, a quasi-Islam scholar, Sanusi is sometimes a complex person who is too difficult to predict. As opposed to Ja‘far‘s allegation that there was not a single instance in which Sanusi mounted a public discourse in defence of Islam, some other developments showcased Sanusi siding with Shari‘ah and championing the cause of some 

fundamental aspects related to it. In one conference held in London in 2005, Sanusi not only defended the Shari‘ah but also juxtaposed it against Western legal values, pointing out the defects and hypocrisy in the normalisation of free sexual relationships with multiple women while ridiculing polygamy, the myopic legal protection of a murderer by not subjecting him to the same death process, etc (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi51.htm).

Similarly, in one other article, Sanusi countered the growing sentiments from Christian quarters about the potential of Shari‘ah controversy to plunge Nigeria into crisis, arguing that it was the portrayal of Shari‘ah in a bad light, that was an “attribute of injustice, this tendency to give a dog a bad name in order to hang it that will destabilise Nigeria, and not introduction of sharia”. Exonerating the Zamfara State government from some unfounded stories related to Shari‘ah implementation, Sanusi accused Christian leaders of threatening peace in the country by convening conferences to propagate anti-Shari‘ah rumours, calling on Christians to “judge Shari‘ah by what the Shari‘ah is” while arguing that “the historical church is no yardstick for measuring Islam”. Sanusi boldly declared that if “Christians fear intolerance from Shari‘ah, or accuse Islamic law of being barbaric, therefore, it is because their knowledge of Shari‘ah is limited to the bible and their experience under catholic popes which led to rebellion and secularism” (http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi8.htm).

 Therefore, Sanusi advised one Christian-owned newspaper, the Guardian, to listen to the Zamfara state government. It is time to know that the Qur’an and Sunnah enjoin creating a just and honest society and protecting freedom of religion and conscience. It is time to ask those who feel there are legal problems to go to a court of competent jurisdiction. Alhaji Ahmed Sani has repeatedly said his priorities are good government, education, poverty alleviation, and moral rebirth. He has assured non-Muslims of the full protection of their rights. He has never declared Zamfara an Islamic state (see http://www.gamji.com/sanusi/sanusi8.htm).

Above all this, as detailed in chapter two, it was when Sanusi served as the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria that Muslims finally got the approval for non-interest banking and financial transactions, otherwise known as the Islamic banking system, to operate despite the vehement rejection by Nigerian Christians. Sanusi, who was once hailed by Christians and upheld as “progressive” in the Southern press, had quickly transformed into an agent of Islamization of Nigeria and was labelled with different dismissive names. Sanusi was subsequently promoted in the Muslim milieus as a hero and champion for Muslims and Islam, particularly as Christians united against him, calling for his removal from his post as CBN governor.

Interestingly, although this development was realised in 2012, five years after Ja‘far‘s assassination, Ja‘far‘s public discourses were full of advocacy and agitation as early as the late 1990s for the introduction of interest-free, Islamic-compliant banking and financial transactions.

Furthermore, when Sanusi became the emir of Kano in 2014, he transformed into a religious scholar who not only closely related with scholars, some of whom were members of Ja‘far‘s circle, but he uniquely led religious functions like serving as an imam and giving a weekly sermon, addressing the topic of public concern, much tallying with the way Ja‘far had been advocating for Muslims rulers. Sanusi built a reputation as one of the few traditional chiefs who used to boldly challenge the policies of governments, a move that largely contributed to his deposition in 2020 by the Kano State Government. As shown elsewhere in this chapter, Ja‘far gave special emphasis on the role he envisaged Muslim rulers to play in defending the interests of their subjects and uplifting them in multidimensional spheres of life, and this seemed to be one of Sanusi‘s priorities as the emir of Kano. It is safe, therefore, to trace some fundamental areas of convergences between the two fearless figures, born nearly the same year and at some point both went to Sudan and studied at the OIC-funded International University of Africa, Khartoum. 

If Ja‘far were alive when Sanusi navigated the later developments that catapulted his prestige among religious leaders and ordinary Nigerian Muslims, Ja‘far would have been most outspoken in celebrating the achievements recorded by Muslims through Sanusi. Interestingly, as two informants have revealed to me and later confirmed to me by Sanusi himself, before Ja‘far died, a meeting was arranged by Sanusi‘s mother where the duo had reconciled, understood each other and sheathed their swords.

Isma’il writes from Rabat and is reachable via ismailiiit18@gmail.com.

Author: Richard Eaton

Number of Pages: 489

Date of Publication: 2019

Publisher: University of California Press

In case you’re too lazy to read the book, it is all about the time when Islam was the dominant ruling religion in the Indian subcontinent from the sociopolitical, economic and military perspectives.

This is a very interesting book that, according to the author, challenges some preconceived narratives and stereotypes on the complex interactions between India and the Persian-speaking world during the medieval period.

The book takes a long view of the political dynamics of the Persianate age, discussing the emergence of the Mughal empire, its spread and culmination, and its interplay with other contemporary gunpowder empires: the Ottoman and the Safavid.

Naturally, any discussion on the emergence of the Mughal Empire must include a historical look at Timur, a controversial figure whom I believe many Western authors, unfairly criticize. Of course, there was an entire chapter dedicated to Abu al-Muzaffar Muhi-ad-Din Muhammad Bahadur Alamgir Aurangzeb Badshah al-Ghazi, under whose 49-year reign the Mughal empire reached its peak in terms of glory and geographical extent.

The author builds the bulk of his arguments upon a very deep historical background, and he closely examines the role of Persianate age in shaping religious and intellectual developments in India.

He also discusses the impact of Sufism on Indian society and explores how Persian texts played a crucial role in the spread of Islamic mysticism across the subcontinent. This way, the book provides insights into the assimilation of Persianate cultural practices into Indian religious traditions, such as the development of Persian-influenced styles of devotional poetry in languages like Urdu.

The author, Richard Eaton is an American historian at the University of Arizona.

Shamsuddeen Sani wrote from Kano, Nigeria.

By Rabiu Isah Hassan

Citing the killing of an army officer by bandits in Katsina recently, Sheikh Musa Yusuf Assadussunnah shows the futility of military measures in resolving the pastoralist-peasant conflict in northern Nigeria. By this daring act, the insurgents have demonstrated that the military, much less the vigilante, cannot end the insurgency. According to him, the only solution is a truce. From other sermons by clerics and numerous online items from the conflict area, it appears Assadussunnah is misreading the situation. Not only are the insurgents receiving severe setbacks, but the signs are also ominous. 

The army officer might have been killed not because the troops were weak or ill-equipped but because he exposed himself to unnecessary danger. The way the vigilante and locals praise his determination and commitment suggests he might have been motivated to sacrifice himself for Nigeria and significantly for a Hausa cause. In a way, the prolongation and viciousness of the conflict have started affecting the soldiers on the ground; as in any internal crisis, the armed forces, which are supposed to be neutral, are gradually and inexorably drawn into its vortex.

No group has drawn the wrath of most Nigerian groups, perhaps except for the Igbo during the Nigerian crisis of 1966-1970, like the ethnic Fulani presently. Anti-Fulani sentiments, always simmering below the surface mainly due to perceived historical wrongs, are now erupting due to the current widespread atrocities of mostly pastoral Fulani. An inchoate coalition of mostly Hausa youths and northern minorities is emerging based on shared grievances against the Fulani. Their violent rhetoric, both online and offline, reflects the extent to which the Fulani have slipped down from decent beings and citizens to savages and aliens. No amount of infractions against the ethnic Fulani is seen as grotesque or repugnant.

The troops on the ground and the Hausa vigilante have fused into a hardened armed fist against their perceived enemy. From diverse reports, a discernible pattern is emerging. As the soldiers attack the bandits, the vigilante form their rear, mopping up any stragglers and often dispersing or exterminating ethnic Fulani along their path. The vigilante are also at liberty to arrest, detain, and kill any ethnic Fulani or Hausa informers in an attempt to root out collaborators or destroy the bandits’ supply channels. When the bandits feel the heat, they attack, maim, and kill Hausa peasants randomly. They threaten to stop farming this season, forcing the government and the sedentary population into another truce. This only inflames the soldiers and the vigilante, resulting in more indiscriminate attacks against ethnic Fulani.

Some Islamic clerics still maintain that military operations will not end the insurgency and that the government should negotiate with the bandits to end the bloodletting. These statements make the bandits believe in their invincibility anddangerously encourage them to see their actions as serving an ethnic cause. In a bizarre twist, the bandits have come to link their survival with that of the ethnic Fulani. Since they no longer see themselves as the cause of the Fulani predicament, their removal from the scene is out of the question. This intransigence is further fueling the binary that currently pits the Fulani against the Hausa. Thus, instead of viewing the conflict as occupational and the bandits as criminals, some sections of the ulema have come to regard it as communal, with the insurgents seen as activists.

What some clerics and others fail to appreciate is that both the Hausa-speaking sedentary population of the Northwest and the pastoral Fulani have become one community through centuries of exchange. The pastoral Fulani are essentially an occupational and remnant group continuously absorbed into the general Hausa population. In other words, they do not exist as separate and closed groups. Like similar groups throughout history, the bandits are deviants that have emerged due to internal crises. They need to be tamed or destroyed, not hailed as vanguards of any ethnic group.

With the bandits vowing to fight to the bitter end, they risk dragging the rest of the ethnic Fulani into the abyss with them. The intensity and randomness of their attacks testify to this deranged stance. The indiscriminate reprisals from the other side are making life unbearable for the ethnic Fulani. As the noose tightens around them, there is little chance for their offspring to continue the fight as they hope. A war of attrition would only lead to their decimation; they cannot withstand the combined strength of the Nigerian state and the Nigerian masses. 

Unlike the Igbo, who returned to their homeland following the pogroms in Northern Nigeria, the ethnic Fulani are losing their remaining sanctuaries. If the war becomes protracted or its viciousness intensifies, the country risks sliding into the fate of Mali and Burkina Faso. With the bandits terrorising almost half of the country and the army engaged in fighting them in about a quarter of it, hatred against the Fulani is increasing among the soldiers. 

Like the inchoate movement developing among the ethnic Hausa and northern minorities online, a conspiratorial group with similar configuration and motivation could develop within the army. Given the toxicity across the land and the increasing hardship, they might attempt a putsch. As in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the raison d’être of the juntas is the containment of the Fulani in the case of the former and their destruction in the latter’s case, an idealistic junta in Nigeria would unleash its reign of terror not only against the ethnic Fulani but also against their symbols.

There is only one possible way to avert this Armageddon. Many groups before them have avoided this ruinous outcome. Recently, the Kanuri, who formed the bulk of the supporters of Boko Haram, quietly abandoned their weapons and dispersed among the general population as the magnitude of the catastrophe loomed. The followers of Maitatsine had followed the same course after realising the folly of confronting the state. After valiant resistance against Rabeh at the end of the nineteenth century, many Kanuri surrendered, and others fled. The leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate retreated in the face of superior arms. After their defeat at Burmi, a few withdrew from the territory and eventually submitted to the British authorities in Sudan. At the same time, the majority reconciled themselves to the new order in Northern Nigeria. When the Biafran secessionists realised that their intransigence would only lead to more destruction of the Igbo, they removed themselves from the scene to pave the way for surrender. These were the practical and noble paths taken in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War and countless previous conflicts. 

The preservation of the ethnic Fulani must supersede the bandits’ ego, and only surrender would spare their kinsmen from possible destruction. They should give themselves up and be tried in a military tribunal. Like the Nuremberg trials at the end of the Second World War, they must be sentenced based on the gravity of their offences. The minors could be assembled and enrolled in a rehabilitation program. A bold resettlement and integration plan must be rolled out for the pastoral Fulani. Parallel communities should not be allowed to resurface; the pastoralists should be settled among the sedentary population to end mistrust and bigotry. The homogeneous, stable, and prosperous nation that would emerge would be the compensation for these painful sacrifices. 

Rabiu Isah Hassan wrote from the Arewa House/Department of History, ABU Zaria. He can be contacted at rabiurafani@gmail.com.

By Isma’il Hashim Abubakar

Schools established, owned and run by non-state actors and private institutions have, no one doubts, been providing a veritable substitute to the dilapidated public schools which have been suffering from wanton neglect by governments at various levels in Nigeria. Private schools have successfully, though not completely, reduced the burdens on governments to supply basic education for children in their public schools, which have been perpetually operating under the shadows of existential threat.

Although people of all social strata now have more faith in private schools and parents with even the meanest incomes and most fledgling source of earning, who always struggle to make ends meet, prefer to take their children to commercial schools at the behest of other life comforts, public schools, which serve as the last option for the extremely downtrodden, still seem to get congested due to the high number of enrollments of children from low-income families. If this indicates anything at all, it shows that people have now fully embraced modern education, and they can sacrifice the expensive things they have just to secure a quality formal education for their wards and children. 

While, as everyone knows, public schools tend not to have too many demands apart from the meagre or more affordable tuition fees, their private counterparts, in most cases, operate in such a way that many parents inwardly feel that the system is tilting more toward a business direction in an obvious capitalist fashion, despite that the dominant pretension of both parents and school managers is that of purely imparting knowledge and building sound character to the young and upcoming generation.

Many schools are extraordinarily excellent in both transmitting sound knowledge and instilling good morals in pupils, and as such, no material gratification can remunerate their work or compensate the teachers for their hard work, dedication and commitment toward discharging their duties and keeping good custody of what has been entrusted to them. In fact, some well-to-do parents often give gifts to teachers as an expression of gratitude for feeding their children with sound knowledge, which is primarily the responsibility of the parents but perfectly undertaken by the teachers on their behalf. As such, many parents may not bother with and will gently turn blind eyes to some straitjacketed and arbitrary financial demands that most commercial schools are now introducing day in and day out.

Some schools go beyond decorum and do not, in the least, pretend to be shy to depict their operation as a purely extortionate venture, deemphasizing the moral and instructional dimensions which their institutions are set upon. Parents now no longer feel at ease after having settled school fees which are the most basic financial burden that comes to everyone’s minds once private schools are mentioned. Not only do textbooks and instruction materials represent the source of anxiety that parents grapple with, but virtually everything which a school stipulates, largely with a marketing mindset. While most schools impose decrees that make it binding upon parents to buy textbooks, stationeries and all other instructional materials from the schools, some schools turn it into a rule that pupils and students must never be allowed into schools wearing uniforms supplied to them by their parents through all other channels apart from the tailoring unit of the schools.

Schools do complain that external tailors often violate dress codes and principles earmarked by the schools, including non-compliance with size, width and length but above all, the lack of authority to manufacture and issue official badges that are glued to uniforms. Hiding behind this pretext, schools have seized the free will of parents to transact with tailors of their choice, and because they aspire for their children to acquire quality education, they relinquish their right and bow down to the pressure of the schools. 

There is, however, no guarantee that the tailoring units of schools themselves are perfect for designing the most fitting and immaculate school attire for pupils. Having taught at both primary and secondary schools (as well as university), I have personally seen pupils wearing school-supplied uniforms that never matched or fully fitted the bodily structures of the pupils. If this is the case, this particular rule might have been informed more by a business instinct and less by a concern to preserve institutional dress codes. Parents of final year students who could only afford to pay for either WAEC or NECO exams for their children, which by the way, is better than missing both of them at once, are coerced by some schools to move heavens and earth to pay for the two exams or risk having their children removed from the list of graduating students. When they could not settle for the fees of the two exams and require the refunds of their money, they hardly recuperate more than half of what they have paid. 

Perhaps the most brazen example of such pecuniary impositions manifests in the demands of some schools on parents to pay internet charges, which would have been understandable and justified if pupils or students were engaged in regular computer lessons that are punctuated at close intervals by visits to websites. Alas! There are schools which extort this surcharge even from parents of nursery pupils, and the only justification for it is the data consumed by Whatsapp groups of parents initiated by the schools on which an administrator often sends announcements.

Many parents relate with schools while they are inwardly burnt due to how things have become in private schools, but because they envisage a better future for their children, they prefer to remain mute and only murmur their complaints on the rarest occasions or when they meet with fellow parents by the roadsides. The best opportunity for them to communicate or even express their squawks loudly to the schools is during periodic parents-teachers meetings, but the schools have been, paradoxically, hijacking and making platforms to further advocate their fiendish and self-aggrandizing policies. Their covert strategy is to appoint a loyal, docile and exceedingly compliant head of Parent-Teachers’ Association (PTA), and to gag his mouth for fear of being influenced by nonconformist parents, the schools bribe him with some free scholarship slots for his children. As a result, he weakens and sabotages any attempts by the parents to rise and challenge arbitrary extortions they suffer from these schools. 

Other schools have different, perhaps more treacherous strategies of navigating intricacies and tackling eventualities that may come up owing to this venture, such as giving undertaking papers for parents to sign before the children are accepted at the stage of enrollment, and many parents are carried away by the desire for the admission of their children and often don’t pay commensurate attention to these documents or mull over their future implications. The question that, however, is seldom asked, what is the legality of these modes of institutional marketing practices that have become norms in not only purely western-style schools but also model Islamic schools? To what extent do these operations comply with Islamic teachings and principles, and what are the business dimensions of these dealings which should then ideally be done and looked at from the viewpoint of Islamic commercial and financial regulations?

First of all, everyone knows what schools are primarily meant for, which is imparting knowledge and this should be the apex among all the operations that are expected to exist in the schools. Hence, from this prism, school fees are the most obligatory financial demands that parents are, by default, owed to schools and upon which any compromise will be a favour that the schools could grant or deny at will. Any other charge or tax is secondary and gains its legitimacy according to how it complements the primary function of schools, but, above all, it should be done in a transparent atmosphere defined by mutual agreement and understanding. In other words, selling textbooks, stationery and instructional materials at schools should be governed by Islamic commercial laws, without discrimination or thinking that schools could do as they will without referring to Islamic stipulations. If this is the case, then these materials sold to parents must be on the basis of freewill and agreement and not impositions that may result in penalties. 

Of course, many schools publish exercises and textbooks with their names and logos finely inscribed, which then makes it compulsory for parents to obtain the materials in no other places but the schools. Many other schools, meanwhile, retail the materials from markets and sell them to parents at exorbitant prices that at times double or triple the normal market prices. All these are normal and should be considered lawful businesses if only it is done with a mutual agreement such that parents have the liberty to buy either from the schools or at markets, or in the former case, if the materials are not sold arbitrarily at unimaginable prices just because of the inscriptions of logos and names. 

The general Islamic principle that confers legitimacy or otherwise to any business venture is free will and mutual agreement, and interestingly, this is explicitly postulated by the Qur’anic verse and Hadith, the two most fundamental sources of Islamic law. Allah says:

“Yā ayyuha alladhīna āmanū lā ta’kulū amwālakum bainakum bi al-bāṭil illā an takūna tijāratan ‘an tarāḍin minkum. Wa lā taqtulū anfusakum. Inna Allaha kāna bikum Raḥīma”.

“O you who believe! Eat not up your wealth among yourselves unjustly except it be a trade by mutual good-will: Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah has been to you Most Merciful!” [Sūrat al-Nisā’: 29].

In his groundbreaking exegetical work al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr, the prolific commentator of the Qur’an, Muḥammad Ṭāhir Ibn ‘Āshūr posits that the prohibition to eat up people’s wealth without mutual agreement is paired with the crime of murder in the verse to draw Muslims’ attention on the gravity and heinousness of such a practice. He argues that it is emphasized because people do not largely consider it something significant and the victim is usually powerless and could hardly resist (as it occurs in private schools).

Moreover, in an authentic Ḥadith narrated by Anas bin Mālik, the Prophet (SAW) says, “lā yaḥillu mālu imri’in Muslimin illā ‘an ṭībi nafsin”. (It is unlawful to take a Muslim’s wealth except with his goodwill). [Dāru Qutnī, 3/26].

As asserted earlier, a lot of transactions in private schools are imposed upon parents, and school authorities often warn parents and even threaten to apply penalties when these marketing ventures are observed in the breach, leaving no room for a bargain and mutual consent that would ordinarily prevail in open transactions. Since this is the case, only a few people will contest the illegality of this practice. Needless to say, some officials and authorities, including ironically, of schools paraded as Islamic models, are, to some extent, oblivious of the legal status of their policies, although this is not a valid, genuine and acceptable reason. A Muslim is, after all, and before anything else, principally required to be fully conversant with the pros and cons of any action he undertakes.

One of the easiest ways to make amends and rectify this wrong tradition, irrespective of how well consolidated it is, how difficult it may be to refrain from or how odd our argument may sound to some, is to be so transparent and open to parents and gear the deal to be dictated by consent and mutual agreement. Freewill and mutual agreement are pivotal in any financial dealing and they determine whether it is done lawfully or unlawfully. 

And since schools, especially the religious ones, enjoy respect from parents, it will hardly be burdensome to mutually arrive at some understanding, and this, as beautifully ratiocinated by Ibn ‘Āshūr, could lead to the implementation of the divine principle that “if they give up willingly to you anything of it, then take it in satisfaction and ease” (fa in ṭibna lakum an shai’in minhu nafsan fakulūhu hanī’an marī’a) [Sūrat al-Nisā’, 4].

Indeed there is a need for governments to intervene and reintroduce guidelines that will neither oppress the schools nor allow them to do as they like, pertaining to their financial dealings with parents. Parents in Kano, for instance, will certainly look back with nostalgia at the era of Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, who laid down modalities that checkmated arbitrary extortions of parents by commercial schools. He formed a formidable committee that regularly went around schools and observed their operations to ensure they complied with state regulations, most of which were meant to shield masses from further extortions.

Unfortunately, Kwankwaso’s successors did not maintain the tempo, and now things are, to say the least, almost getting out of control. School authorities would increase school fees at will and would rush to mention inflation as a cause and the need to better the condition of their staff, while in essence, it is the proprietor and a few notable among his cliques that would end up enjoying while flowing pittance to and leaving the majority of staff to keep on wallowing in despondency.

Ismail writes from Rabat, the Kingdom of Morocco and can be reached via ismailiiit18@gmail.com.

By Dr Musa Ibrahim

The popular Facebook user claiming intellectuals hardly watch Kannywood films and his supporters should understand 1) the need to ensure they conduct proper research on any subject matter or study the existing literature before speaking about it; 2) they could benefit from some guidance on critical engagement with terms, even if they are in our mother tongues, such as ‘wayewa.’ This would help them understand the concept from multifaceted perspectives and know how to use it when referring to ‘self’ and ‘other’ people’s ‘lifeworlds.’ 

When engaging with the Hausa terms ‘wayewa’ and ‘wayayyu’ (intellectualism and intellectuals, although the translations are subject to discussions), the critical questions we should ask about these terms in relation to Kannywood are: what is ‘wayewa’ (intellectualism)? Who exactly are ‘wayayyu’ (intellectuals)? Can we really know all ‘wayayyun mutane’ (intellectuals) and what they do in private and make sweeping statements about all of them without conducting thought research?

For me, it’s difficult to say who ‘wayayyu’ are because it’s subjective and varies from person to person. I mean, who someone regards as wayyaye might not be considered one by others and vice versa. Therefore, it appears to me that the person who made such a claim and their supporters may be ‘unintelligent/unintellectual’ (lacking in intelligence and intellectual approaches) or ignorant about the subjects they are referring to, especially since they ‘speculate’ about the so-called ‘wayyayun mutane’ without considering the diversity of the group. 

As a researcher of popular cultures in Africa, I can report as a fact that all categories of people in northern Nigeria and beyond watch Kannywood films. In the qualitative research we conducted, we interviewed academics, high-profile ‘ulama (Muslim clerics), lawyers, politicians, public workers (some of whom are highly placed decision-makers at various government levels), traders, and various categories of Western and/or Islamic-educated individuals who have been watching Kannywood films.

Ordinarily (if not because of our research), many of our interlocutors may not just openly admit to watching Kannywood films because of the unnecessary stereotypes associated with them. However, some of them go to the extent of referencing specific scenes from the movies they had watched to either illustrate their points or make comparisons with other films. Some influential people and their family members personally communicate with Kannywood stars they know from movies and spend millions to have them perform at their ceremonies. 

So, if we were to believe the claim that ‘intellectuals’ don’t watch Kannywood films, then we would have to say that all those who control the affairs of the region (in which the person making the claim probably lives) are not ‘wayyayu.’ However, regardless of the complexity of the terms wayewa and wayayyau, many would agree that people in the categories mentioned above, including our revered Muslim scholars who participated in the research, could fit into the ‘wayewa’ category or one of its categories (if there are many). Ba za mu ce dukkan su ba wayayyau bane.

So, the person making the claim and the bunch of uncritical minds who agreed with it have just succeeded in portraying themselves as lacking intelligence and critical thinking skills (which is synonymous to wayewa) to engage with the same concept, ‘wayewa,’ at least in this case. This is because they seem not to know ‘how’ and ‘when’ to speak for themselves and ‘how’ and ‘when’ to speak for others from an informed perspective (based on outcomes of scientific research). This also includes avoiding generalisations.

Despite politically motivated censorship from the 2000s to today, Kannywood has survived and thrived. This resilience is a testament to the support it receives from the silent majority, including highly influential individuals who appreciate its cultural significance and work behind the scenes to maintain its popularity and diffuse unnecessary tensions. This inspiring resilience assures us that Kannywood will continue to thrive in the face of differing opinions. 

To close my remarks, regardless of differing opinions about Kannywood, the cultural industry will continue to thrive in different forms. This sustained success should inspire confidence and optimism in the future of Kannywood and those who aspire to participate in the phenomenon, either indirectly as cultural studies scholars or directly as actors, directors, producers, scriptwriters, and associated roles.

Musa Ibrahim, PhD, can be reached via abbadanauta@gmail.com.