Northern Nigeria

By Abdullahi Mukhtar Algasgaini 

The governor of Kebbi State, Nasir Idris, has declared Monday, July 8, a public holiday to mark the beginning of the new Islamic calendar, 1st Muharram 1446 AH.

The state commissioner for establishment, Auwal Dogondaji, made this known in a statement issued to newsmen in Birnin Kebbi, the state capital, on Friday.

According to him, the 1st of Muharram is July 7, citing its importance, the government attributes it to the Islamic new year and has decided to shift the public holiday from July 7 to July 8. 

Manu-Dogondaji congratulated the Muslim Ummah on the advent of the new Islamic calendar, urging the Muslims to sustain fervent prayers for peace, security, and prosperity for Kebbi and the nation as a whole. 

“I extend the congratulation of the governor to the entire Muslim Ummah across the globe,” the commissioner said.

By Abba Sadauki

Introduction

There comes a time when the world’s weight seems unbearable, making each breath a struggle. Like a midlife crisis, this pivotal moment is when one confronts the reality of their material existence. It’s a stark realisation that all the goals and aspirations pursued were essentially economic activities aimed at providing for oneself and loved ones. 

Another revelation compounds the gravity of this understanding – the fact that these efforts have primarily served to enrich others. Despite all the hard work, one finds themselves barely making ends meet, with the prospect of accumulating enough wealth for a comfortable life or pursuing truly fulfilling endeavours seeming increasingly elusive. 

The weight of economic struggle is a universal experience shared by countless individuals across the globe. This article aims to shed light on the historical journey that has shaped this experience, particularly within the context of Northern Nigeria. 

We will explore, starting from the feudal reigns of the Sarkis (Kings) and Amirs (Emirs), delving into the transformative impact of British imperialism. Our journey will culminate in an analysis of post-colonial governance and the pervasive influence of global capitalism, painting a picture of our present reality. 

Through this, we will uncover the roots of the stark wealth inequality that pervades our society, understand the purpose and implications of debt, and confront the enduring reality of class struggle. 

As we navigate through the complexities of these issues, we will question the viability of our current system in the face of 21st-century challenges. The 2008 economic crisis is a stark reminder of these challenges, prompting us to reevaluate and rethink our economic structures. 

The Emergence of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria: Pre-capitalist Economic Systems

The Emergence of Market Societies

As in the bible, we will start at Genesis, to the very inception of our economic systems. In the beginning, there were no economies, only markets. But what exactly are markets? They are places where a willing buyer and a willing seller meet to exchange goods or services. Here, we encounter the first myth that capitalism propagates – the notion that markets did not exist before its advent. However, markets existed long before capitalism emerged as a system during the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 18th century.

You might wonder, what do I mean by “there was no economy”? The answer lies in a simple yet crucial condition for markets to evolve into an economy – the existence of a “surplus”. A surplus refers to the excess resources that can be accumulated and utilised.

When our ancestors first tilled the land and initiated the process we now know as agriculture, they created resources that exceeded immediate needs. This surplus transformed markets into an economy – a complex network of relationships that emerges in societies with a surplus.

This economy enabled us to produce food and, more importantly for this discussion, tools and instruments that wouldn’t exist with labour alone. The first instrument of this system was likely writing, used to account for the units of agricultural produce stored by an individual in the communal granary. These units were probably represented by engravings on shells, signifying the value of the stored produce.

These shells could be exchanged between individuals for goods or services. If this concept sounds familiar, it’s the precursor to what we know as money today. Instead of shells, we now use pieces of paper or digital representations.You could also borrow these shells or promise a specific amount in the future in exchange for immediate service. This is the concept we now understand as debt.

Someone had to ensure the value of these shells was guaranteed, often through force. In today’s terms, this individual might be known as a king, whose domain of influence is a state. The king would have people managing the accounting and others enforcing his guarantee, akin to modern-day police.

As we can see, a “surplus” led to a radical societal transformation. However, this transformation was not without its adverse side effects. One of these was that the king and his bureaucracy accumulated a surplus, leading to an overconcentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few. This process, which we now call inequality, is still a pressing issue in our modern society.

Now, let’s dive into the heart of our economic systems, armed with conceptual toolboxes that will guide us through its intricate workings. Our first concept is a ‘commodity’. Simply put, commodities are goods produced to be sold. Each of these goods has a market price reflecting its exchange value.

Next, we explore ‘production’, the transformative process that turns raw materials into components or finished goods. This production journey begins with the first factor, the raw materials and the infrastructure used to extract them, such as tools and machines. These are what we refer to as ‘capital goods’.

To carry out this process, we need a location—land or space—our second factor of production. Lastly, we require human labour to transform these raw materials into finished goods. This production process forms the bedrock of an economy, making it tick and thrive. 

The Hausa Feudal Society

The early days of the Hausa kingdoms are shrouded in various myths used to legitimise their existence; the most plausible scenario of how they came to be is that diverse ethnic groups cohabited in the same area, known as Kasar Hausa. These groups were often embroiled in relentless resource conflicts, leading to chiefdoms composed of dominant families.

As time unfolded, the chiefdoms with superior military prowess and organisational structures absorbed the weaker ones, giving rise to kingdoms. The less powerful chiefdoms gradually became vassals, paying tribute to a king or Sarki.

The kingdom’s population began to stratify. The most influential family head ascended to the position of Sarki, distributing offices among his followers from other families. The lineages of these followers evolved into Sarakuna, the aristocracy. These Sarakuna integrated into Sarki’s military organisation, acting as vanguards in establishing dominance over weaker groups and compelling them to pay tribute.

Over time, the Sarki and Sarakuna transformed into the leisure class, while the rest of society, forming the base of economic production, became subordinate to them. Within the broader Hausa society, another stratification layer emerged based on the economic services offered. Free peasants, serfs, and enslaved people emerged as the new classifications of the labour class.

Each kingdom mentioned earlier was divided into administrative units (fiefs) by its ruling class, with a titled lord or his representative serving as its overseer. The kingdom’s capital depended on the resources sent from the labour class in the fiefs and political power in the form of laws, and their enforcers came from the capital to enforce them in the kingdom’s territory.

Society was broadly divided into two distinct classes. The’ Isarakim’ ruling class comprised the king and his officials. On the other hand, the ‘Talakawa’, or the ruled class, consisted of peasants, serfs, and enslaved people.

As we’ve observed, the ruled class formed the backbone of the economy. The ruling class appropriated their labour and the fruits of their production through tribute, taxes, special levies, and forced labour. This arrangement, where the ruling class expropriated labour at the expense of the commoner, is a characteristic feature of all feudal societies

Rise of Merchant Class and Beginnings of Capitalist Spirit

Trade in the Hausa states was determined by the basic facts of geography and communication, the primary routes linking the area to the rest of the world being the trans-Saharan caravan routes. The main imports from Europe and North Africa were cotton and calicoes from Lancashire, cotton and sugar loaves from France, red cloth from Saxony, beads from Venice, needles, mirrors, and paper from Nuremberg, sword-blades from Solingen, razors from Styria, fine silks from Lyons, coarse silks from Trieste and Tripoli, red fezzes from Leghorn, and all kinds of Arab dress from North Africa. In contrast, the main commodities the Hausa exported to balance its trade with the outside world were cotton, goatskins, leather goods, and slaves.

The acquisition of wealth from these ventures eventually led to new values within the ruling class and new members of that class—the merchants. These emerging values played a crucial role in shaping modern social stratification and the formation of nation-states.

The merchants and their heirs, often referred to as the “nouveaux riches,” found themselves beyond the control of the aristocracy. With the support of imperialists, they absorbed ancient traditional kingdoms, uniting them into regional and national entities under their control. In the following discussion, we’ll explore the process by which this transformation occurred.

The Creation and Evolution of Capitalism and Its Effects in Colonial Northern Nigeria

1. The Birth of Capitalism

In the earlier societies we explored, none of the factors of production were treated as commodities. For instance, consider labour: throughout history, people worked, but during feudal times, this labour was not sold or rented to the aristocrats. Instead, a portion of the talakawa’s harvests was forcibly taken. The tools of production—such as hoes and cutlasses—were often crafted by the talakawa themselves or by craftsmen from the same fief. In exchange for these tools, the talakawa provided food to the craftsmen. Land, too, was never treated as a commodity. The sarakuna never sold it; such an idea would have been unthinkable. Land ownership was either inherited or forever out of reach.

The process by which these factors became commodities began with the development of shipbuilding in Europe and advancements in sea navigation. European merchants traded vast distances, shipping wool from England to places like Shanghai in exchange for silk and other Asian goods. Upon returning to England, they exchanged these acquired goods for even more wool than they had initially started with. The traded products gained international value through these exchanges, and those involved in their production or sale amassed significant wealth.

By observing these nouveau riche individuals—whom they considered social inferiors—amassing fortunes that threatened to overshadow their own, English aristocrats adopted a classic strategy: “If you can’t beat them, join them.” They disrupted the existing system built by their ancestors. They uprooted perishable crops that lacked international value and fenced off their land. Peasants who had lived on that land for generations were evicted and replaced with sheep, whose wool could fetch a healthy price in international markets. It is estimated that around 70 per cent of the peasants were displaced during this transformation. Ultimately, this process turned Britain from a society with markets into a market society, effectively commodifying land and labour.

Indeed, the commodification of labour emerged from the basic human need to survive. As the newly evicted peasants wandered from village to village, desperate for sustenance and shelter, they knocked on countless doors, willing to do anything in exchange for those necessities. In this process, they unwittingly auctioned their labour, transforming themselves into the precursors of modern workers—the very traders of their own toil.

The land was commodified when aristocrats decided to lease it rather than directly oversee wool production. They set rental prices based on international market conditions. Some former serfs accepted these offers, as it was a choice between that or poverty. They signed leases hoping that selling wool in the market would cover rent and wages for other serfs working under them, with any leftover funds going toward their families’ sustenance. These transformations, coupled with the invention of the steam engine, eventually gave rise to what we now refer to as industrial society. This development reinforced the Great Contradiction: the simultaneous existence of unimaginable new wealth and unspeakable suffering. As a result, the inequalities that originated during the agricultural revolution, which we encountered previously, increased dramatically.

New creations also came about due to the birth of this new system, and the concept of debt has existed throughout human history. In simpler times, it might manifest as a neighbour helping another in need, with the recipient expressing gratitude by saying, “I owe you one.” No formal contract was necessary; both parties understood that the favour would eventually be repaid, settling their moral debt. However, with the advent of capitalism, this moral obligation became legal. Debt now comes with terms—precisely, exchange values. When a debtor borrows money, they agree to repay the original sum plus a little extra to compensate the creditor for granting the loan. This additional amount is known as interest.

Another new creation was the subversion of production by distribution; in the feudal system, the production process followed a specific order: serfs worked the land (production), feudal lords dispatched agents to collect rents (distribution), and any surplus from rent collection was converted into money. This allowed the lords to purchase, offer loans, and pay for services (credit-debit).

 However, under the new capitalist system, distribution began before production. Former serfs, now renting land from landowners, supervised the production of wool and crops for profit. But they needed capital upfront—for wages, seeds, and rent—before producing any goods. To acquire this capital, they turned to debt. Those who lent them money naturally expected interest as profit. Since all the production processes (wage payments, rent to the landowner, procurement of raw materials and tools) occurred before actual production commenced, distribution now preceded production, and debt became the primary lubricant driving the capitalist machine.

2. Capitalism and Imperialism in Northern Nigeria 

We previously touched upon the collaboration between imperialists and the nouveau riche, which is pivotal in shaping today’s social stratification and nation-states. The process unfolded through a series of significant events.

Firstly, colonial assaults weakened the power and economic position of the feudal aristocracy. Territorial fiefdoms were abolished, along with the economic foundations of feudalism—such as tribute, taxes, levies, tolls, and forced labour. The military hierarchy was dismantled, and the judicial powers of the feudal class were curtailed. These measures effectively stripped the feudal class of its political influence.

Subsequently, during independence movements, the imperialists lost ground to the merchant class. As political power shifted, so did economic power. The traditional elites—the former ruling class—also experienced this loss.

The new elites, primarily merchants, leveraged the state’s economic structure to accumulate wealth. They secured loans from state banks and participated in emerging enterprises. However, they didn’t entirely abandon the traditional aristocracy. Instead, they strategically married into feudal families, accepting honorific titles from kings. This move allowed them to invoke an ethnocentric ideology reminiscent of feudalism, defending the unity of the now-defunct feudal kingdoms and their values.

For instance, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was entangled with the emirs—a metamorphosis of feudal society in a new guise. Yet, the forces of modern capitalism compelled this new ruling class to target vital vantage points of feudal state power, which they perceived as impediments to the evolution of capitalism.

“All these forces transformed the merchant class into the new bourgeoisie in modern capitalist Northern Nigeria. This class spans both the public and large-scale, foreign-controlled capitalist sectors. Its dominant elements include administrative, managerial, and supervisory roles alongside local private capital and professional groups.

The arrival of oil revenue further strengthened the federal drive at the centre, led by the federal bureaucracy. This allowed the state to play a crucial role in creating a national base for capital accumulation. The state achieved this through infrastructure expansion, the development of a local financial system, the growth of state capital in industry and agriculture, and measures to increase local ownership and control.

Conclusion

The Nature of Capitalism

Throughout this journey, I have aimed to demonstrate that capitalism is not a natural system, as some claim, but rather a created system that evolved and transformed through historical conditions and forces. While capable of generating immense wealth and development, capitalism also bears the responsibility of allowing a select few to accumulate wealth at the expense of the majority, pushing the system to its limits.

Capitalism has historically experienced periods of crisis, but the current crisis extends beyond mere stagnation in productive forces. It encompasses a broader cultural, moral, political, and religious turmoil. The 2008 financial crisis marked a significant turning point. World capitalism has never fully recovered from that shock; massive government interventions were necessary to prevent total catastrophe. However, these measures led to uncontrolled inflation and substantial public, corporate, and private debt. 

Now, the entire process must reverse. The world hurtles toward an uncertain future marked by perpetual cycles of war, economic collapse, and increasing suffering. Even in the wealthiest nations, rising prices erode wages, while cuts to public services like healthcare and education exacerbate social inequalities. In poorer countries, millions face slow starvation, trapped by the grip of imperialist moneylenders.

The comforting myth of equal opportunity for every citizen has shattered. Obscene wealth flaunted alongside poverty, unemployment, and homelessness highlights the stark contrast. Capital increasingly concentrates in the hands of a few billionaires, giant banks, and corporations. We must seek a new system that acknowledges the unsustainable status quo and upholds the sanctity of life. The era of the sarakuna has ended, and the time has come for a new bourgeoisie to emerge. The shifting sands of the North must transform into an oasis of new ideas and a system dedicated to uplifting all.

By Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido

The history of Islam – and religion in general – in post-colonial Nigeria is incomplete without a detailed analysis of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN). All the important Muslim figures, including politicians like Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna and MKO Abiola; scholars like Sheikh Mahmud Gummi, Sheikh Sherif Ibrahim Saleh and Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Lemu; intellectuals like Professor Oloyede, Dr. Usman Bugaje, Malam Ibrahim Sulaiman and Prof. Salisu Shehu; traditional leaders like Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II of Kano, Emir Maigwari of Birnin Gwari; Aree Musulmi Abdul Azeez Arisekola Alao; accomplished Muslim women like Alhaja Latifat Okunnu and Hajiya Aisha B. Lemu or distinguished business persons and technocrats; will all have a mutilated history of religious engagement if the chapter of their engagement with the MSSN is removed from their biographies.

These people (mentioned above) interacted with the MSSN as mentors, some as members, some as patrons, others as leaders, and so on. However, their relationship with the MSSN is vital because it is direct, mutually beneficial, and socio-religiously impactful. In case you did not know, the MSSN nominated Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gummi for the prestigious King Faisal International Award. When Hajiya Aisha Lemu came to Nigeria, she asked her husband, Sheikh Lemu, to link her up with the MSSN. And so is the story with almost every educated Muslim in Nigeria.

As an intellectual, reformist, ideological, moderate and resilient Islamic movement, the MSSN, in the last 70 years, remained the primary engineroom of Muslim intellectual development and the religious focus for Muslims. MSSN promotes the pursuit of Western-style education without compromising the Islamic faith. It encourages Muslims to learn from the West without being Westernized, to pursue “secular” education without embracing secularism, and to excel in all specializations without deviation. In MSSN, people learn how to learn, plan, earn, and live a life of faith, health, and wealth. It strikes a balance between the spiritual and the mundane, the worldly and the otherworldly. MSSN, in short, is a blessing to the Muslim Ummah and the entire Nigeria.

The primary operational arena of the MSSN has always been the academic institutions. While secondary schools are the recruitment centres of new members and the place where they are vaccinated with a sufficient dosage of spiritual, ideological and moral training, the higher institutions, particularly Universities, have remained the bastions of advancing the intellectual capacity, religious consciousness, leadership acumen and civilizational alertness of Muslim students. The Universities, in particular, have been the arenas where the philosophy of MSSN is built, its vision formulated, its projects designed, its programmes implemented, its members developed, its objectives pursued, its impact felt, and its strength consolidated. This has been the case since the 1960s when it was only about a decade old.

In this regard, three universities in particular distinguished themselves as the strongholds of the MSSN in its early history (especially from the 1970s to the 1980s): Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), University of Ibadan (UI) and Bayero University Kano (BUK). Details of how this happened are beyond this piece. But what suffices here is the fact that ABU and BUK took centre stage as the rallying point of young MSSN intellectuals, especially those who grew to be (among) the topmost Muslim intellectuals of the North, especially from the 1970s, at the peak of the booming days of communism and Marxism on Nigerian university campuses. It was then that emerging scholars like Malam Ibrahim Sulaiman, Dr Hamid Bobboyi, Prof. Auwal Yadudu, Dr Usman Bugaje, Prof. Ibrahim Naiya Sada, and a host of other MSSN leaders took the pen and the pain to counter the bane of the Ummah: they faced the challenge posed by the anti-religious radical left-wing Marxist socialist intellectuals. They wrote papers, presented lectures, engaged in debates, published magazines, made press releases and participated in on-campus and off-campus national discourses.

At the peak of the intellectual engagements of the MSSN in the late 70s came the Iranian Revolution. Since MSSN is an Islamic reformist movement, it was easy for it to join the global Muslim community in celebrating the emergence of the Iranian Revolution spearheaded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 while the first generation of the MSSN intellectuals had graduated from the universities, even as they maintained contact with the Society’s leaders and members.

When Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, who was then the Vice President (International) of the society and among the few remaining older members on campus, represented it at an event in Iran, little did anyone know that the visit would open a new chapter not only in the MSSN movement but in the entire history of Islam in Nigeria. What did he do in Iran? How was he received? How did he receive their reception? What did he do after his return home? How, when, where did he start promoting Shiism? What was the reaction of the MSSN intellectuals? What then happened? The answers to these and many related questions are still scantly discussed, even in the highly scanty historical documentation of the MSSN itself. This is despite the importance of that discourse in the history of MSSN and Islam in Northern Nigeria.

By April 18 2024, MSSN had turned 70 years in its history. As part of the celebration of the Platinum Jubilee, a book was launched with the title MSSN @ 70: The Evolution, Success and Challenges of the “A” Zone, Northern States and the FCT. In this book, many actors like Dr. Usman Bugaje, Prof. Idris Bugaje, Barr. Muzammil Hanga, Alahaji Babagana Aji, etcetera shared illuminating perspectives about the MSSN in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The book provides valuable insights into the events that culminated in El-Zakzaky’s embracing Shiism and his subsequent everlastingly irrevocable divorce from the MSSN. The book contains a rich rendition of events in the MSSN. Due to this, I wrote its review (on June 6 2024) on Facebook, mainly referring to El-Zakzaky’s Shi’ism-MSSN matter.

In the review, I referred to “how El-Zakzaky clandestinely planned to divert the MSSN to Shiism and how men like Dr. Bugaje and others were able to tackle him and save the Society from his sinister objectives”. But that led to a fascinating written conversation with Dr Abdulbasit Kassim; that bookworm was highly prolific and inquisitive but often interpreted by some as a “controversial” emerging Nigerian intellectual. Dr. Kassim is interested in African Islamic movements and has written extensively on important contemporary topics like Boko Haram, Salafism, Arabic manuscripts, Islamic intellectual developments in sub-Saharan Africa, and other issues. He raised questions. Our elder scholar-intellectual, Malam Ibrahim Ado-Kurawa, made clarifications. I responded. And the conversation continued. I share the interesting scholarly engagement with you here verbatim.

Dr. Abdulbasit Kassim wrote:

“Brilliant and timely! This book is an excellent sequel to Professor Siraj Abdulkarim’s “Religion and Development: The Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria and its Contribution to National Development,” published in 2014. I highly recommend that MSSN A Zone create a digital archive of all the issues of Radiance Magazine and other publications published throughout the 80s and ’90s. If digitized, this repository would be a vital primary source collection for those seeking to learn more about the evolution of the organization and the ebbs and flows of ideational shifts of its leaders. 

“While I wait to read this book, I have a brief comment about the oft-repeated attempt to single out Zakzaky for his supposed “clandestine role of smuggling Shiism into MSSN.” This framing of Zakzaky, in my opinion, is a half-truth. A close reading of all the catalogue of articles our fathers published in the 80s and 90s about the Islamic Revolution in Iran belie the narrative they sometimes portray about their ignorance of the creedal orientation of the Iranian government. 

“Zakzaky was not a lone actor in that milieu. Several leaders of the MSSN, including my honoured father, Mallam Ibraheem Suleiman, wrote articles in New Nigerian, Triumph Newspaper, and Radiance magazine that were covertly and overtly sympathetic to Shiism. On March 3 1989, Dr Aliyu Tilde wrote “On the Path,” praising Zakzaky for leading the Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Nigeria. Dr Tilde wrote this letter nine years after Zakzaky publicly espoused his Shii affiliation at the Funtua Declaration on May 5 1980. Inayat Ittihad, the spokesman of the Iranian Revolution, was a regular keynote speaker at the International Islamic Seminar on Muslim Movements organized by MSSN at BUK in the early 80s. Inayat was public about his Shii creedal orientation. He preached the “Khomeini Model” to the MSSN members. At the same time, Sayyid Sadiq Al-Mahdi advocated for the Mahdiyya model in the struggle to achieve Islamic change.

“Although most MSSN leaders have embraced new ideological currents, it is important for our fathers to be honest in acknowledging their transitional phases and the seismic shifts in their orientations rather than scapegoating Zakzaky alone. The ebb and flow of ideations was not limited to Pantami alone. The ‎التراجعات was a common feature of all the prominent Muslim figures in the 80s and 90s, including Mallam Ibrahim Ado, whose translator’s introduction of Jihad in Kano captured the prevalent thought in that milieu. Even Zakzaky has passed through different ideological phases, such as Mallam Abubakar Mujahid et al. It is important to tell the complete story and explain the nitty-gritty nuances.

“I hope this book sheds light on the relationship between MSSN and IIFSO. I am also quite curious to read what the MSSN leaders wrote about the ideological proteges of Aminu Kano and the firebrand radicals who inherited the radical struggle against the feudal rulership in northern Nigeria, the likes of Balarabe Musa, Abubakar Rimi, Gambo Sawaba, Bala Muhammad, Sule Lamido, Ayesha Imam, Bala Takaya, Shehu Umar Abdullahi, Bala Usman and Yohanna Madaki. Some of these figures were the ideological adversaries of the MSSN leaders. 

“Congratulations to you, Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward all the contributors who have documented the history of MSSN.

The following is my repose: 

Dr. Abdulbasit Kassim!  

Thank you for this intervention. As always, I like your consistency in trying to checkmate our intellectuals, especially what you see as their “methodology” of rendering historical narratives, which often presents “half-truth” and “belied” narratives. I believe your intervention is a continuation of your championing of suppressed history. Of course, just as you question these scholars and activists for always trying to give “half-truth” or one-sided aspects of history, so are others quick to read the same bias in virtually all your interventions on such matters. But that is what perspectives always mean.

You see, while I like us always to try to query narratives and ensure we get all the bits of it to have a comprehensive, nuanced reading of history, I doubt if defending the supposed “other side” at all costs will help us either. What seems clear is that you mistake being “sympathetic” to the Iranian Revolution or the “Khomeini Model” as being the same as accepting the “creedal orientation” of Iran. This, indeed, is misleading. Again, what escapes you is that Zakzaky never agreed to accept that he was Shia at that early time. He, in fact, “overtly and covertly” rejected being associated with Shi’ism. He was always quick to insist he was Sunni, Maliki. You can check that. However, even the Iranians who kept sending books to the students only sent books on Revolution, governance, justice, civilization, etc. 

By the way, I have not seen in your intervention here any substantial evidence to support your claim that “a close reading of all the catalogue of articles our farmers published in the 80s and 90s belie the narrative they sometimes portray about their ignorance of the creedal orientation of the Iranian government”. What I expected to see was where Malam Ibraheem Suleiman, Dr Tilde or any one of them declared or promoted the Shiite creed, not just showing sympathy to Iran. And I still need evidence to understand how “Zakzaky was not alone in that milieu”. Who and who were with him in promoting Shi’ism at that early stage? At least those “our fathers” have told us that not sooner than Zakzaky returned from his visit to Iran did they realize he had shifted from only romancing the Iranian Revolution to promoting strange ideologies. Immediately, people close to him started to caution the younger ones. And what I found in the narrative of Malam Baba Gana Aji in the MSSN @ 70 book is how Zakzaky got the opportunity, after most elders had left campus, to be virtually the only elder around and, therefore, take total control of contact with the younger ones.

Now, is it also part of the “belied” narratives that El-Zakzaky was alone when he started organizing what came to be known as “extension” after the Islamic Vacation Course (IVC)? Who was with him, please? Is it also “half-truth” that people like Dr Bugaje and others who later formed the Muslim Ummah were against him immediately after Zakzaky started his Shi’ism? Any evidence to the contrary? Is it also not true that people like Ustaz Abubakar Mujahid only continued to be with Zakzaky for some time because they liked the Iranian Revolution even as they disliked the Iranian Ccreed Are you saying there were no people who followed Zakzaky for some time while insisting they were Sunnis? Why were some people called yan karangiya by those in Zakzaky’s camp due to their anti-Shiism-pro-revolution posture even later? 

It is good that we study the issues and learn more about history than our assumption of reading “all the catalogue of articles” from the 80s and 90s. When we do so, perhaps we will be more educated about the matters and then see the apparent difference between sympathizing with the Iranian Revolution and embracing Shi’ism, especially at that time. 

But the fact that the MSSN was a group of people trying to bring societal change based on Islam, it should not be difficult for one to understand how easy it was for the MSSN to sympathize with whoever declared an Islamic Revolution at that time. By the way, praising and sympathizing with the Iranian Revolution was a common thing in the Muslim world, even among the global Sunni population. Even Azhar scholars could agree to work with Iran to unite Muslims and many of them after the Revolution. Scholars like Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi also joined their call for taqreeb. They only abandoned that project and often declared them hypocrites or so after discovering that they were using that to spread their Shiite creed. Could these scholars accept the “creedal orientation of the Iranian government”? 

You see, to date, some of the older MSSN people will still insist that they like the “Khomeini Model” of establishing an Islamic government, but they never like his creedal “model”. At least you have read one from one of our elders here. 

So, please, let’s expand our reading of the issues and understand them more.

Mal Ibrahim Ado Kurawa wrote:

“Professor Abdulbasit Kassim, I agree with you entirely, even though I haven’t been privileged to see the MSSN book. It is not unusual for people to follow different trajectories. I visited Iran in 1983. I didn’t like their Shiism but still respect their Muslim solidarity, so we indeed need a complete story. When the Iranians came to Nigeria, they didn’t begin by openly preaching Shiism. They even promised to translate the books of the Sokoto Jihad leaders, which they had never done then. They began propagating Shiism after Zakzaky accepted to become one. My last physical encounter with Zakzaky was in Makkah in 1984. Some of us left him to seek knowledge in Egypt and Saudi. Therefore, I cannot recall what transpired thereafter.”

After the above intervention by our elder brother, Dr. Abdulbasit Kasim wrote 

“Jazakallahu Khairan Amir Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward you for your intervention and continue to guide and direct our affairs. Amīn. There is a famous saying that فللسؤال أهمية كبرى في طلب العلم فالأسئلة مفاتيح العلم (questioning is of great importance in seeking knowledge, for questions are the keys to knowledge.). This phrase is similar to what Imam al-Bāqillānī said العلم قفل ومفتاحه المسألة (Knowledge is a lock. And its key is questioning) and the well-known saying of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī العلم سؤال وجواب (Knowledge is question and answer). The key to knowing for a seeker of knowledge is to ask questions with بلسان سؤول وقلب عقول (the tongue of a questioner and the heart of a thinker).”

My previous submission is devoid of malicious intent (an apology for the use of the word “belie” or “half-truth”) or an attempt to validate predetermined frames and outcomes. Instead, it is solely aimed at reconciling competing and sometimes contradictory interpretations of events that took place in the past. Alhamdulillah, no figures in MSSN I described as honoured fathers have ever ascribed ulterior motives to my questions. Since 2006, they have continuously accommodated the micro-details I pick up on and the torrent of questions I submit. I am indebted to them for granting me access to their libraries, encouraging critical historical questions, and helping me and other younger folks better understand where we are coming from and how we got where we are now. May Allah reward them abundantly in this world and the hereafter. Amīn. 

”How do we know what happened in the past? This mutual exchange is aimed at reading against the grain, reading between the lines, paying attention to what is not said, and listening to silences and absences by carefully engaging in comprehensive evaluation and chronological interrogation of a portfolio of primary sources generated contemporaneously that provide evidence or first-hand testimonies about the events in the 80s and 90s. While we respect our honoured fathers for their service to Islam, we must ask questions and subject the verbal and written testimony of events they present to us to thorough scrutiny by weighing, cross-referencing, or bringing their accounts into conversation with other disparate source materials and distinct authorial perspectives. This was the intent of my submission.

”The 11th February Revolution of Khomeini had a global appeal in the Muslim world. It had the Bin-Laden effect. What started as hysteria over the successful defeat of the Western colonial powers and their Arab secular puppet (the Shah regime) later transitioned into disillusionment after the creedal orientation of Khomeini became self-evident despite his call for Islamic unity. In Nigeria, the timeline of events could be traced from January 1980, when Zakzaky visited Iran and was reported to have personally met Imam Khomeini on his sickbed, to July 10 1994, when Shaykh Abubakar Mujahid and his followers in JTI successfully broke away from Zakzaky. 

“There was clear opposition from the MSSN leaders towards Zakzaky’s attempt to spread Shiism. This position was made clear by Shaykh Abubakar Mujahid during his 1998 interview when he said:“When he (Zakzaky) started he had not got any feeling towards Shiism. But at one point, when he started collecting money from Iran, they started bringing Shiism. What we did, we said no. Their beliefs and our beliefs are not the same. We operate the Mālikī School of Thought. They operate the Jaʿfarī School of Thought, so a clash will occur. Why don’t we go on with our revolutionary zeal, which was gaining momentum at the time, rather than bring this Shia? The people at the beginning were accusing us of being Shia, which we were not. Then they understood we weren’t so they started joining, and if we turned around and became Shia, we would be deceiving them. In 1989, he came back from prison in Port Harcourt. When we saw these moves in Shiism, we started to preach against them. That is, the members of the group who were entering Shiism, we preached against them, saying we are not Shia. We will not do Shiism, we will do the Maliki School of Thought.” [End of Quote]

“Before gaining further clarity from you, Amir, and our honored father, Mallam Ibrahim Ado, I struggled to reconcile the clear oppositional stance of the MSSN leaders towards Zakzaky’s Shiism with their admiration and reproduction of articles on the central tenet of the “Khomeini Model of Islamic Governance,” which revolved around the concept of “Wilāyat al-Faqīh.” My brain could not process why MSSN leaders would preach against Shiism yet write editorials and articles on Wilāyat al-Faqīh – a political theology Khomeini popularized in Iran with copious citations from the works of Shi’i theologians, including Mullah Ahmad Naraqi, Muhammad Hussain Naini, and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. If I could recall accurately, Mallam Ibraheem A. Waziri and Dr. Muhammad S Balogun once had an exchange about this subject in the past. 

“No doubt, our honored fathers yearned for Islamic models for societal change. They read and learned about Muslim movements across different historical periods, seeking a common method of formation, mobilization, and strategy that Muslims could utilize in the struggle to achieve Islamic change. The Khomeini, Fodiawa, and Mahdiyya models were some of the models they wrote about in the 1980s and 90s in their attempt to awaken the Muslim population to Islamic societal change. 

“What I learned from this exchange is that even when the MSSN leaders wrote about the “Khomeini Model of Islamic Governance” and the concept of “Wilāyat al-Faqīh,” they approached the idea as a political model without embracing the Shi’i creedal component Khomeini deployed to legitimize the concept as a political theology. 

“Let me conclude by saying once again Jazakallahu Khairan for providing safe spaces of dialogue and intellectual engagement where curious seekers of knowledge can ask the who, what, where, when, why, and how historical questions without invoking the binary of he belongs to “our side vs. their side” or “us vs. them” dichotomies. As Ibn Hazm said صفة سؤال المُتعلِّم هو أن تسأل عمَّا لا تدري لا عمَّا تدري (The characteristic of a learner’s question is to ask about what they do not know, not about what they do know.) The more we ask questions and try to reconcile competing ideas and narratives, the more we gain a comprehensive picture of the past.

Abdullahi Lamido responded 

Abdulbasit Kassim Masha Allah Prof. May Allah reward us all and bless our little efforts. You know, we are all passengers in the train of never-ending learning or what is called life-long learning. Interestingly, that is the first thing we learnt from the MSSN; that learning begins from the cradle and only ends in the grave. So, we always pray to Allah for more knowledge using the “And say O Lord increase me in knowledge” formula. We “ask those who know” so as to unlearn, learn and relearn.  

Through our usual lengthy, fruitful phone engagements with you (which often take us between two and four hours), I know that you are not only a scholar but one who is serious about learning. I have also understood that your questions are born out of an insatiable curiosity, a burning desire to know more and more and more. And I understand this further through your acceptance of every single issue where stronger evidence becomes clear to you. Unfortunately, not every social media friend of yours has the opportunity to have such heart-to-heart, deep, mutual scholarly engagements with you. 

However, the more interesting thing to me is the quantum of knowledge I gain from you via such amicable, mutual exchanges. I often deliberately bombard you with questions to trigger powerful, fact-supported responses that are usually backed by numerous references from books I have never read. I do not even have the time and energy to read them. You read too much!

Back to the “Khomeini Model” and the “Wilayat al-Faqih” question. As you rightly said, Wilayat al-Faqih is essentially a political concept and a convenient political instrument Khomeini used to establish the legitimacy of his Revolution and government. It is not fundamentally a theological concept. That is why he was comfortable spreading it even before starting to export his Shiite creed. And by the way he needed it at that time… 

Secondly, you seem to think that our fathers who were in the MSSN at that time had a prior sufficient knowledge of what Shi’ism entailed. No. Shi’ism had never been present in our community. So, nobody knew it. After all, those our fathers were not even necessarily deep in the knowledge of Sunnah and even the dominant Maliki jurisprudence back then. Their main sources of Islamic knowledge were the English translations of ikhwan books coming from Egypt and those coming from Pakistan. You should not expect them to just easily detect the traces of Shi’ism by mere reading a seemingly innocent political concept even when it was supported by Shiite authorities who, by the way, were not known here. 

I thank you very much and pray that this useful intellectual discussion will continue. And I look forward to reading your review of the MSSN @70 Book Insha Allah. 

Greetings to the family. 

Wasallam 

Finally, Dr. Abdulbasit Wrote

“Jazakallahu Khairan Amir Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido. May Allah reward you for helping me and other young folks to better understand the complexities of the history of Islamic thought. 

“Thank you for being generous with your time. I appreciate your patience and willingness to clarify all the torrent of questions on Wilāyat al-Faqīh that came up during our lengthy phone conversation. 

“May Allah reward you and all our fathers at MSSN who served the organization with the sole aim of uplifting the Dīn. May Allah bless the publisher, editors and contributors who worked on the book project. In sha Allah, I look forward to learning more from you and all our honoured fathers. 

“As promised, In sha Allah, once I receive the copies of the MSSN @70, I will distribute the book to different libraries where more people can access, read, and cite it in their research and writing. 

“Extend my Salam to the family. 

Wa Alaykum Salam.”

Conclusion

I have learned from the above engagement that there is a need to write more about the MSSN and its evolution and contributions to national development. A lot is missing and in need regarding the written history of MSSN and other Islamic organizations in Nigeria. May Allah bless our little efforts and grant us enormous rewards for them.

 Abdullahi Abubakar Lamido can be contacted via lamidomabudi@gmail.com.

By Jamilu M. Magaji

In the weaving of life, exceptional individuals leave a lasting impression on the hearts and minds of those they meet. Today, I grieve the loss of a truly extraordinary person who exemplified greatness through his steadfast dedication to his beliefs, compassion for humanity, and inspiring leadership that influenced many lives.

I was tidying up titbits for the June issue of FUBK Chronicle Magazine when I received a call from my former senior colleague, Mal. Abubakar Adamu recently retired from Federal University Birnin Kebbi (FUBK). He delivered the shocking news that prevented me from continuing my work until the following day. Social media was flooded with continuous updates on the tragic event. I hurried to pick up my children from school and return home, filled with sorrow and dismay.

When I joined the services of FUBK in 2014, I questioned the future of my career progression in the newly established institution. I pondered the obstacles of starting a new department, particularly as a founding staff member. My encounter with Prof. Yusuf Saidu proved to be fruitful. I worked closely with him for nearly seven years, serving as Chairman and Secretary of various committees. He was crucial in establishing the Federal University Birnin Kebbi Seminar Series as the founding Chairman in 2015.

Prof. Yusuf Saidu exemplified integrity and exceptional qualities. His extensive administrative and professional expertise positively influenced my professional development and the institution we both served. I believed he was destined for greater achievements. His diligent work ethic and inspiring nature served as a beacon of motivation for many. His leadership approach was exceptional, earning trust in carrying out demanding tasks assigned to him.

Yusuf Saidu is a Professor of Nutritional Biochemistry at the Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto (UDUS), Nigeria. He graduated in 1990 with a B.Sc. degree in Biochemistry from UDUS, winning the Northco Holdings prize for the best-graduating student in Biochemistry. He obtained an M.Sc. in Biochemistry from the University of Jos in 1994 with distinction and had his PhD in Biochemistry from the UDUS in 2005. 

Bandits killed Prof. Yusuf Saidu on June 24, 2024, en route to Kaduna for an official engagement. Until his sudden death, Prof. Saidu was the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research, Innovation and Development of UDUS. He was the Director Research, Innovation and Development, UDUS and the University Governing Council member representing Convocation. He served as a member of the TETFUND Standing Committee on Research and Development and a member of the National Research Fund Screening and Monitoring Committee. He was equally a member of the Education and Training Committee of the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology. Prof. Saidu was the Head, Department of Biochemistry, UDUS (2018-2020) and the pioneer Head of the Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Federal University Birnin Kebbi. He also led many other ad-hoc and standing committees at UDUS and FUBK.

Prof. Saidu, a Fellow of the Nigerian Society of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (FNSBMB), was widely published with over 100 papers and three (3) patents to his credit. He attracted research grants from the Education Trust Fund (now Tertiary Education Trust Fund), Abuja, Nigeria; the International Foundation for Science (IFS), Sweden; Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) and Science and Technology Education Post Basic (STEP-B). His research interests are in oxidative stress and pathogenesis of diabetes mellitus/hypertension, as well as the elucidation of the mechanism of action of medicinal plants used to manage diabetes mellitus and infant and preschool children.

As a visionary leader, Prof. Yusuf Saidu motivated others to achieve their full potential and strive for excellence in all their endeavours. He set a remarkable example, guiding them with wisdom, patience, and unwavering support. His ability to lead with integrity and humility earned him the respect and admiration of all his colleagues, leaving behind a legacy of empowerment and growth that continues to influence those he mentored.

In 2021, I paid tribute to his appointment as the pioneer Deputy Vice Chancellor of Research, Innovation, and Development at UDUS. I recalled a citation from Prof. Sahabi Danladi Mahuta during Prof. Yusuf Saidu’s inaugural lecture in 2017, where he boasted of having a great friend in Prof. Saidu. I, too, celebrated and acknowledged him as a remarkable mentor. Today, with a sense of longing, I mourn the loss of my esteemed mentor.

Prof. Saidu was a leader, mentor and guiding light in a world often clouded by darkness. His remarkable attributes, profound religious dedication, compassionate qualities, and forward-thinking leadership have had a lasting impact on all who know him. As we say goodbye to a cherished mentor and father, let us carry on his legacy of love, empathy, and leadership, ensuring that his memory remains alive in those he influenced and guided.

I express my sincere condolences to the immediate family of the deceased. I also sympathise with all his extended family members in the academic community at UDUS, UNIJOS, FUBK and the entire country.

May his spirit continue to inspire us, his light keep shining brightly, and his legacy of exceptionalism always be cherished in our hearts. May Allah (SWT) grant him eternal bliss in Aljannah. Ameen

Malam Jamilu Magaji, Head of Information and Public Relations at Federal University Birnin Kebbi, wrote via mjmagaji@gmail.com.

By Jamilu Uba Adamu

It’s impossible to start this column without some reflection, especially with my interest in Kano football history.

After holding its AGM meeting last week, the Kano State Football Association (KSFA) organised an award night to honour the achievement of some truly deserving individuals. 

For some reason, I have not been able to attend the event, but from the videos and the pictures I saw, the award night was a resounding success and full of important guests. 

The venue was beautifully decorated, and a giant screen was mounted on the stage with a background picture of each recipient of the award playing, just like we usually see at international events. 

It was top-notch, from the meeting to the plaque award presentation to the awardees. The awards themselves were a fitting tribute to the outstanding contributions of the honorees. 

It was a night to remember, and the Kano State Football Association, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Sharu Rabiu Inuwa Ahlan, has set a high standard. It deserves a standing ovation for organising an outstanding event. The efforts have made a significant impact.

Aside from all that, after going through the list of the award categories that include NLO Kano State Football Association Best Player, NPFL Best Player and SWAN Kano Chapter Award, a reflection that comes to my mind, especially considering my interest in the history aspect of sports, I observed that there is no inclusion of posthumous award category among the list. 

This means that as laudable as the award event is, there is no recognition for a posthumous award to those who deserved to be honoured for planting the seeds of the game of football in Kano long ago. It continues growing as we have it today. 

Those individuals are worth mentioning for special recognition for their contributions to nurturing the game and setting the pace we are following today. 

On such award occasions, the KSFA ought to create a posthumous award category for people like the Late Muhammadu Ɗanwawu Fagge, the man who led the legendary Kano XI to win the 1953 Challenge Cup and the sponsor of the defunct Ɗanwawu cup.

Pioneer Kano Pillars FC Chairman late Alh Isiyaku Muhammad (whom his blossom friend, Alh. Isiyaku Umar Tofa, on so many occasions, used to say it was him that convinced him to be sponsoring the Tofa Cup back then). 

Also, former Kano Pillars FC Chairman’s Late Alhaji Hassan Na-Abba, late ACP Sabo Abdullahi, Late Hon. Ɗanlami Hamza, Late Sani Muhammed Usman, and late Alh Kabiru Waya or even the famous legendary Kano XI squad, that consists of the Late Sidi Coach, Maxwell, and Okoh brothers, that won the first Kano state football trophy in far away Lagos in 1953, the list goes on.

Each of those mentioned above-listed individuals deserves to be posthumously awarded. I am sure honouring them this way can be an opportunity to celebrate a legacy, inspire others, and preserve history because omitting posthumous recognition can lead to forgotten legacies and leave a legacy uncelebrated.

With this, I urge the Kano State Football Association to, in the future event, seriously consider bestowing posthumous awards to these deserving historical individuals who put not only   Kano State but the whole of Northern Nigeria on a football map. 

Let me close by extending my wholehearted congratulations to Kano State Football Association and the awardees.

Jamilu Uba Adamu is a freelance sports writer and can be reached via jameelubaadamu@yahoo.com.

By Zayyad I. Muhammad 

Emir Muhammadu Sanusi’s two ascensions to the throne of the ancient Kano Emirate have been deeply intertwined with local and national politics. On June 9, 2014, Sanusi was installed as the 14th Emir of Kano by then-Governor Rabiyu Musa Kwankwaso, seemingly to spite former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. Earlier that year, on February 2, Sanusi had been dismissed from his position as the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria for alleging that the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) had failed to remit a $20 billion statutory fund to the federal government—a claim denied by Jonathan’s administration.

On March 9, 2020, Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje removed Sanusi from the throne, citing his alleged disregard for lawful directives. However, the primary motive behind Sanusi’s dethronement was political, as he had been openly critical of several policies and projects of the Ganduje administration. Ganduje was angered by Sanusi’s penchant to play a dual role as a revered Emir and a social critic, an untenable combination in the Nigerian context.

On May 23, 2024, Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf reinstated Sanusi as the Emir of Kano after signing a state assembly bill that dissolved the five emirates created by the Ganduje administration and dethroned the 15th Emir of Kano, Aminu Ado Bayero. Governor Yusuf’s decision to reinstate Sanusi Lamido Sanusi was also politically motivated, aimed at reversing Governor Ganduje’s actions and continuing the supremacy battle between former Governors Abdullahi Ganduje and Rabiyu Musa Kwankwaso.

Sanusi’s journey from being the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to his dismissal, his installation as the Emir of Kano, his subsequent dethronement, and finally, his reinstatement is marked by political intrigue. It begins with confusion and ends in confusion. His return as Emir of Kano on May 23, 2024, might seem straightforward, but it is anything but simple. It’s akin to a complex mathematical equation that appears simple on the surface but requires the application of numerous mathematical laws to solve. Sanusi’s reinstatement is a product of intricate local and national political manoeuvring, with an eye towards the 2027 elections from all the actors.

Senator Rabiyu Musa Kwankwaso is determined to erase any traces of Ganduje’s influence in Kano politics. Initially, this strategy worked for Kwankwaso without significant interference from the centre. However, it has now dawned on Tinubu and his handlers that allowing the Kwankwasiyya group to operate unhindered could lead to the loss of Ganduje’s group support without gaining substantial assurance from the Kwankwasiyya group. In the 2023 presidential and governorship elections, Kwankwaso garnered 997,279 votes, while Tinubu received 517,341 votes.

In the gubernatorial race, Abba Yusuf Kabir of the Kwankwasiyya group obtained 1,019,602 votes, whereas Nasir Yusuf Gawuna of the Ganduje group secured 890,705 votes, a difference of 188,897 votes. Maintaining this voting pattern is crucial for Tinubu and his team heading into 2027. Some members of the Ganduje group are discontent with the centre after narrowly losing the gubernatorial seat at the Supreme Court. If they continue to feel unprotected despite their connections at the centre, Tinubu’s prospects in Kano for 2027 could be jeopardized. Thus, the centre’s support for Aminu Ado Bayero is not surprising.

The calculations in Abuja, though not overtly confirmed, seem poised to influence Kano’s political landscape at a critical juncture. Giving the Kwankwasiyya group free hands to operate as they wish would be politically risky for the centre. Abuja needs to have some strong feet on the ground in Kano. Kano votes are crucial in the north.

The ongoing power struggle in Kano is straightforward: it’s an attempt to balance interests, strike a political equilibrium, and prepare the ground for future battles. For the common man, the advice is clear: do not take sides, as these are political manoeuvres made with future gains in mind. However, the implementation of these decisions will inevitably have collateral damage. In politics, there is no provision for a collateral damage estimate (CDE)—becoming collateral damage means being in the wrong place at the wrong time. No harm is intended personally.

What’s happening in Kano? It’s a fascinating and high-stakes game—a zero-sum game, to be precise. The same thing happened. On October 22, 1983, Governor Abubakar Rimi established four new emirates in Kano State to diminish Emir Ado Bayero’s power and influence. After his inauguration, his successor, Governor Sabo Bakinzuwo, revoked the law and restored the emirs to their previous positions as district heads.

Zayyad I. Muhammad writes from Abuja via zaymohd@yahoo.com.

By Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu

Recently, an extremely prestigious academic journal requested that I review a film made by a Nigerian. I was surprised, as that is Muhsin Ibrahim’s forte. Further, I really don’t watch Nigerian films, aka Nollywood, personally preferring African Francophone directors. Nevertheless, I agreed to do the review. 

However, the link they sent for the film was password-protected. I informed them, and they requested the filmmaker to send the password. Being a request from a highly prestigious journal, he sent the code, and I was able to get on the site and watch the film online. I was surprised at what I saw and decided to delve further into these issues. Before doing that, I wrote my review and sent it off. The film, however, set me thinking. 

Like a creeping malaise, Nollywood directors are rearing their cameras into the northern Nigerian cultural spaces. Again. The film I reviewed for the journal was “A Delivery Boy” (dir. Adekunle Adejuyigbe, 2018). It was in the Hausa language. None of the actors, however, was Hausa, although the lead actor seems to be a northerner (at least from his name since an online search failed to reveal any personal details about him). 

Nothing wrong with that. Some of the best films about a particular culture were made by those outside the culture. Being ‘outliers’, it often gave them an opportunity to provide a more or less balanced and objective ‘outsider’s perspective’ of the culture. Alfonso Cuarón, a Mexican, successfully directed “Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban” (2004), while Taiwanese director Ang Lee did the same with “ Brokeback Mountain” (2005), even earning him an Oscar. 

In 2006 Clint Eastwood, an American, directed “Letters From Iwo Jima.” The cast was almost entirely Japanese, and almost all of the dialogue was in Japanese. It was very well-received in Japan, and in fact, some critics in Japan wondered why a non-Japanese director was able to make one of the best war movies about World War II from the Japanese perspective. Abbas Kiarostami, an Iranian filmmaker, directed his film, “Certified Copy” (2020) in Italy, which contained French, Italian, and English dialogue starring French and British actors. 

British director Richard Attenborough successfully directed Ben Kingsley in the Indian biopic Gandhi (1982). The film was praised for providing a historically accurate portrayal of the life of Gandhi, the Indian independence movement and the deleterious results of British colonization of India. It took away eight Oscars. American director Steven Spielberg’s “Schindler’s List” (1993) on a German, Oskar Schindler, was equally a powerful portrayal of an auteur genius by a “non-native”. The film won seven Oscars. 

In each of these examples, the directors approached their subject matter with a clean, fresh and open mind that acknowledges the cultural sensitivities of the subject matter. My point is that a person, outside of a particular cultural context, can make sensitive films that portray the culture to his own culture as well as other cultures. That is not, however, how Nollywood plays when it focuses its cameras on northern Nigerian social culture. Specifically Muslims. 

I just can’t understand why they are so fixated on Muslims and the North. If the purpose of the ‘crossover’ films (as they are labelled) they make is to create an understanding of the North for their predominantly Southern audiences, they need not bother. Social media alone is awash with all the information one needs about Nigeria—the good, the bad and the ugly. You don’t need a big-budget film for that. Or actors trying and failing to convey ‘Aboki’ accents in stilted dialogues that lack grammatical context. 

Yet, they insist on producing films about Muslim northern Nigeria from a jaundiced, bigoted perspective, often couched with pseudo-intellectual veneer. To sweeten the bad taste of such distasteful films, they pick up one or two northern actors (who genuinely speak the Hausa language, even if not mainstream ethnic Hausa) and add them to the mix, believing that this will buy them salvation. For southern Nigerians, anyone above the River Niger is ‘Hausa’. 

They started in the early 2000s, and people just ignored them. The directors then included Oskar Baker (Ɗan Adamu Butulu, Abdulmalik), Yemi Laniyan (Makiyi, Uwar Gida), Tunji Agesin (Halin Kishiya), Matt Dadzie (Zuwaira), I. Nwankwo (Macijiya) and many others. These came on the heels of the massive success of “Sangaya” (dir. Aminu Muhammad Sabo, 1999) when this particular film opened up the northern Nigerian film market. 

Those Nollywood producers jumped into cash on the popularity of Hausa films and made their own for northern markets. For the most part, these early ‘crossover’ films that I refer to as ‘Northern Nollywood’ were fairly mild and evoked no reaction. They were still rejected, as the Hausa can be the most discriminatory people you can come across. If you are outside their cultural universe, you remain there. Forever. 

The few Kannywood actors eager to be seen on the ‘national stage’ allowed themselves to be used to deconstruct Islam and Muslims on the altar of filmmaking in subsequent Northern Nollywood films. Let’s not even talk about character misrepresentation, which Muhsin Ibrahim has written extensively about. In these scenarios, the usual tropes for northerners in Nollywood films is that of ‘Aboki’ (a term southern Nigerians believe is an insult to northerners, without knowing what it means), ‘maigad’ (security), generally a beggar. If they value an actor, they assign them an instantly forgettable role rather than a lead. Granted, this might be more astute and realistic marketing than ethnicity because it would be risky to give an unknown Hausa actor a significant role in a film aimed at southern Nigerians. 

A few of these types of portrayals in Nollywood included Hausa-speaking actors in films such as The Senator, The Stubborn Grasshopper, The World is Mine, Osama Bin La, Across the Border and The Police Officer. 

When Shari’a was relaunched from 1999 in many northern Nigerian States, it became an instant filmic focus for Nollywood. A film, “Holy Law: Shari’a” (dir. Ejike Asiegbu, 2001) drew such a barrage of criticism among Hausa Muslims due to its portrayal of Shari’a laws then being implemented in northern Nigeria that it caused credibility problems for the few Hausa actors that appeared in it. With neither understanding of Islam nor its context, the director ploughed on in his own distorted interpretation of the Shari’a as only a punitive justice system of chopping hands, floggings, and killings through foul-mouthed dialogue. As Nasiru Wada Khalil noted in his brilliant essay on the film (“Perception and Reaction: The Representation of the Shari’a in Nollywood and Kanywood Films”, SSRN, 2016) “the whole story of Holy Law is in itself flogged, amputated and killed right from the storyline.”

“Osama bin La” (dir. MacCollins Chidebe, 2001) was supposed to be a comedy. No one found it funny in Kano. Despite not featuring any northern actor, it was banned in Kano due to its portrayal of Osama bn Ladan, then considered a folk hero. The film was banned to avoid a reaction against Igbo merchants marketing the film. I was actually present in the congregation at a Friday sermon at Kundila Friday mosque in Kano when a ‘fatwa’ was issued on the film. Even a similar comedy, “Ibro Usama” (dir. Auwalu Dare, 2002), a chamama genre Hausa film, was banned in Kano, showing sensitivity to the subject matter. 

The reactions against crossover films seemed to have discouraged Nollywood producers from forging ahead. They returned in the 2010s. By then, northern Nigeria had entered a new phase of social disruption, and Nollywood took every opportunity to film its understanding of the issues—sometimes couched in simpering distorted narrative masquerading as social commentary—on society and culture it has absolutely no understanding of. 

In “Dry” (dir. Stephanie Linus, 2014), the director developed a sudden concern about ‘child marriage’ and its consequences. Naturally, the culprits of such marriage, as depicted in the film, are sixty-year-old men who marry girls young enough to be their granddaughters. The director’s qualification to talk about the issue (which was already being framed by child marriage controversy in the north) was that she has ‘visited the north’ a couple of times. With the film, if she could get at least “one girl free and open the minds of the people, and also instruct different bodies and individuals to take action, then the movie would have served its purpose.” The ‘north’ was living in darkness, and it required Stephanie Linus to shed light on ‘civilization’. 

 “A Delivery Boy” (dir. Adekunle Adejuyigbe, 2018) that I reviewed was about an ‘almajiri’ in an Islamic school who was kidnapped from the school, to begin with and repeatedly raped by his ‘Alamaramma’ (teacher). The almajiri somehow acquired sticks of dynamite to create a suicide vest and vowed to blow himself up—together with the teacher. The Alaramma in the film lives in an opulent mansion, far away from the ‘almajirai’. In this narrative universe, the ‘almajiri’ do not learn anything and are unwilling rape victims of their teaches who actually kidnapped them and forced them into the schools. 

“The Milkmaid” (dir. Desmond Ovbiagele, 2020) evokes the idealistic picture of a Fulani milkmaid and became a basis for a Nollywood film. Instead of focusing on the political economy of the Fulani milk trade, the film focused on the trope of terrorism. “The Black Book” (dir. Editi Effiong, 2023), touted as ‘Nigeria’s John Wick’ shoots a significant portion in ‘the north’ – with ‘Islamist’ hijab-wearing females touting assault rifles hidden underneath their hijab. “Jalil” (dir. Leslie Dapwatda, 2020) visits the recurrent theme of kidnapping for ransom. In the north, of course. 

Then came the latest, “Almajiri” (dir. Toka McBaror, 2022). Claimed to be a true-life story (although it is not clear whether it happened to specific people or based on what the director believed to be a common event), it featured muscle-bound badass types of thugs with guns and dreadlocks as Almajirai. The film reinforces the southern Nigerian trope of any beggar in the north being an Almajiri. Such ‘almajiris’ are kidnapped and sold into virtual slavery and horribly abused. The idea is to blame the parental irresponsibility of northerners. 

For southern Nigerians, especially the Nollywood crowd, an ‘Almajiri’ is a beggar, a product of a failed education system, a terrorist, a bandit, and an ‘aboki’. They use concocted figures bandied about by alphabet soup agencies to proclaim ‘over 10 million almajiri are out of school’ and, therefore, twigs of the terrorism inferno. How can someone who has been part of a system of education for over half a century be considered out of school? But for Nollywood, if it is not ABCD, then it is not education. 

“Northern Nollywood” films are the precise reasons why there will ALWAYS be different film cultures in Nigeria. Kannywood talks to its publics, happily churning out now TV shows that address issues it deems relevant—in its own way. Both the northern and southern parts of the country (covering the three major languages) were actively engaged. However, they were mutually non-legible to each other. This was essential because they operate on virtually opposing cultural mindsets – making the emergence of a truly “Nigerian cultural film” impossible. 

Quite a few writers seem to suggest that Kannywood is a ‘subset of Nollywood’, and indeed, many would prefer for the term Kannywood (created in 1999 by a Hausa writer) to be dispensed with and replaced with Nollywood (created in 2002 by a Japanese Canadian writer). It is to protect our cultural representation in films that I stand as a lone voice in advocating for a ‘Hausa Cinema’ to reflect the cultural universe of the Hausa.

Professor Abdalla Uba Adamu can be reached via auadamu@yahoo.com.

By Dr Raji Bello

Following encouragement from some friends, let me say what I’ve been a bit reluctant to say. It is based on my conviction as a dispassionate and non-partisan observer and of course, as a non-indigene of Kano State.

The root cause of the emirship imbroglio in Kano, in my view, was the inability of Muhammadu Sanusi II to subordinate himself and his office to the Ganduje administration as required by the terms of his appointment. This is essentially what triggered every other thing that has happened and which has led us to where we are today. To correct any problem permanently, we need to examine its root cause.

I am not saying that Sanusi is not an emir of high intellect who is enormously popular among the people. This assessment of mine is based on only one criterion — his willingness or ability to comply with the terms of his appointment — and it is made without prejudice to his qualities, endowments and accomplishments as an individual, technocrat and emir. Like other human beings, the emir is not perfect. He might have excelled in 9 out of 10 criteria but his failure in the 10th is the cause of the emirship crisis because it happened to be a very important criterion.

All post-colonial emirs and traditional rulers have been obligated to demonstrate loyalty and due courtesy to government be it colonial, democratic or military. History is replete with examples of the huge price that was exacted each time an emir fell short on loyalty towards government.

As an intellectual of high standing, the emir must have been aware of that history. When he set out to be emir, he should have been conscious of the terms of appointment and should have fully reflected on whether it was the appropriate platform for someone of his disposition or not. The emir seems to want the Kano emirship in its pristine 19th century form when it didn’t answer to a non-traditional authority. This betrays a lack of situational awareness and good judgement because the reality is that the 19th century is long gone and can never be brought back. So if anyone is interested in becoming emir in the 21st century, it has to be under 21st century terms.

The Ganduje administration had accused the emir of multiple infractions from political partisanship, insurbordination and failure to demonstrate courtesy towards it. Some of these infractions had played out in public for all to see and hear which means that they were not false accusations. I do not fully endorse the former government’s actions (which bore traces of the usual Nigerian impunity) but it is clear that it was provoked into taking actions against the emir. I believe that all state governments are inclined by default to respect the traditional institutions within their states and hostilities only break out when there is a breach of the terms of appointment (usually, but not always) on the part of the traditional rulers.

There is no individual who is so important or popular that they would enjoy exemptions from complying with the terms of their appointment. This is an incontrovertible fact. A friend told me that the emirship style of Aminu Ado Bayero is a bit bland compared to that of Muhammadu Sanusi II. I replied that this is true but the Aminu style is actually the correct one.

Post-colonial emirship is not a radical or revolutionary platform and, after the 1976 Local Government Reforms, the traditional institutions in northern Nigeria lost all the vestiges of authority that were previously delegated to them under the Native Authority system. The post of traditional ruler is now just a custodianship of heritage whose essential features are loyalty, co-operation and circumspection.

Yes, Sanusi is wildly popular, has a deeper intellect, a gifted oratory and displays a higher sartorial elegance but it was Aminu Bayero who was doing the emirship correctly under its current terms. Those who cheered Sanusi as he breached the terms of his appointment were not helping him or the Kano emirship institution.

By Muhammad Suleiman Yobe 

The Chairman of the technical committee on the mini sports festival, Alhaji Musa Muhammad Yaalleman, also the chairman of the Jigawa State Badminton Association, went around to supervise the preparations to kick off the Jigawa State Mini Sports Festival 2024 across the five selected participating associations.

During the supervision, the chairman was accompanied by the senior special assistant on sports and other members of the technical committee. He commended the executive governor of the state, Mallam Umar Namadi, for approving the conduct of the festival for the teeming youths in the state.

He said the state has many potential and talented youths, which, if properly utilised, will make the state more productive in all sporting activities.

He equally appreciates the efforts of the state commissioner of sports, Hon. Sagir Ahmad, for giving all associations the necessary support directly to organise their program and selecting the experienced team to handle the successful conduct of the program.

He said that these initiatives have immensely benefited the association in terms of court repair, sporting equipment purchases, and the rest.

He thanked the governor and Commissioner for sports for fulfilling their promise about the conduct of this festival.

He also appealed to the Commissioner to make this program quarterly, as this would help reduce tension and crime and increase revenue and employment for the state.

By Sabiu Abdullahi 

The Flame Tree Writers’ Project, in partnership with the Heinrich Böll Foundation, has announced a call for applications for a writers’ workshop targeting emerging writers from Northern Nigeria.

The initiative aims to support young writers in honing their craft and envisioning a more democratic and peaceful Nigeria.

According to Abubakar Adam Ibrahim, founder of the Flame Tree Writers’ Project, “This has been a passion project of mine for so long, and I am excited that, with the support of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, it is coming to fruition.”

The workshop, scheduled for June 24–28, 2024, in Abuja, will be co-facilitated by NLNG Nigeria Prize–winning authors Abubakar Adam Ibrahim and Chika Unigwe.

Participants will receive guidance in writing a short story suitable for publication in an anthology. 

Ere Amachree, Program Manager at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, noted, “The foundation is excited about the Flame Tree Writers’ Project, as it advances our vision of promoting writing as a means of political expression, just like Heinrich Böll, the German writer after whom our foundation is named.” 

The call for applications is exclusively for writers from the 19 Northern States of Nigeria, aged between 18 and 35. Female emerging writers are strongly encouraged to apply. 

Interested participants must meet the eligibility criteria and submit their applications to flametreewritersproject@gmail.com by June 1, 2024. 

Encouraging writers to apply, Mr. Abubakar said, “It’s not just a workshop but a project that will publish the stories from the workshop in an anthology of new writing and get them into institutions of learning, where they will be taught as part of the growing and exciting corpus of literature from this part of the country.”