By Siddiq Oyelami
Two days ago, I made two brief WhatsApp posts reacting to Ahmed Salkida’s recent piece on Shekau. Since then, some brothers have approached me privately, prompting this response… It’s lengthy!
Prior to HumAngle releasing the so-called exposé, I saw Salkida on X warning against misinformation during this tense period. Because of that, I genuinely expected something rigorous, especially from a journalist I admire for his work. Instead, the article left me bewildered by its carelessness.
Many have questioned both the timing and intention behind the publication. If the goal was to help us understand Shekau to close ranks and strengthen unity, then it was poorly executed. If, however, the aim was to sensationalise a “sweet” story, regardless of the divisions it might inflame, then the timing is deeply unfortunate. The piece is riddled with inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and self-serving undertones.
Below are the key issues I find most troubling.
1. Shekau and the “Christian Genocide” Narrative: Based on the promotional posts, I expected an analysis that foregrounds unity and avoids inflammatory framings. Instead, the article uncritically adopts the term “Christian Genocide” (without even quotation marks). It asserts that Shekau’s “long war of mass abductions, executions, and persecution of Christians” is his primary legacy. The choice of words in the concluding paragraph even makes it worse, because according to it, Christians were “hunted” and Muslims “who dissented” were “condemned.”
Although Salkida briefly notes that Boko Haram targeted “the vast majority of Muslims,” he misses an important historical point: Boko Haram itself emerged from a narrative of “Muslim genocide.” Muhammad Yusuf repeatedly claimed that the Nigerian state existed to kill Muslims, citing events in Kafanchan, Zangon-Kataf, Tafawa Balewa, and Plateau as evidence. These claims were deeply woven into the group’s early worldview.I am not endorsing these sentiments. However, in the background of some of these thoughts and the implications of narratives being pushed today, we need to know and teach them. In fact, I will leave a reference to Rev. Matthew Kukah’s work: Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria (184–206). My point is simply that Salkida re-opens old wounds without offering the complete historical framing needed to neutralise them. In doing so, he leaves readers with a lopsided narrative.
FYI: When questioned on why he later turned his guns on the same Muslims he claimed to defend, Shekau reportedly replied that he “did not know they were kafir all along.”
2. The Ibn Taymiyyah Question and Salafi Scapegoating: This is where most people have raised objections. The article casually throws Salafis under the bus, echoing shallow talking points common among poorly informed “jihadism experts.” Salkida later came out to defend himself, citing Muhammad Yusuf’s book. Yes, he is correct that MY cited Ibn Taymiyyah in Hādhihi Aqīdatunā. However, this is neither new nor surprising. But it is misleading to suggest that Ibn Taymiyyah taught that “the corruption of rulers justifies rebellion,” and even more misleading to give the impression that Yusuf cited him for that purpose. Yusuf’s citations are not about rebellion, but rather on definitions of iman, kufr and governance, and even those are often selective or decontextualised. None of this is uniquely “Taymiyyan.” For proper analysis, one may consider the work of Prof. Jabir Sani Maihula, who treated Ibn Taymiyya in Jihadi works and especially engaged with the so-called Hādhihi Aqīdatunā as well. The attempt to smuggle “Salafism” wholesale into Boko Haram discourse betrays a lack of understanding of both. Yes, Boko Haram drew from Salafi creeds, but its legal methodology, political theory, and violent praxis diverge sharply from mainstream Salafism—so much so that Boko Haram declared Salafi scholars apostates and killed several.To understand the complex ideological framing of Boko Haram, let’s take this brief genealogy:
• Yusuf’s father was a Sufi mallam opposed to conventional education. He migrated from Yobe to avoid sending his children to school when the government introduced compulsory education.
• Yusuf absorbed anti-state activism from being Zakzaky’s student before leaving IMN in 1994 for Izala when he was warned of the shism of Zakzaky.
• Izala might have introduced MY to Ibn Taymiyyah’s works, but lacked the radical thrust he sought, prompting him to establish the “Ibn Taymiyya Centre.”As Dr. Bukarti and Shaykh Nurudeen Lemu have noted, Boko Haram took the extremes of every group it encountered.
Regarding Shekau specifically: in his last treatise, Risālat Maʿnā al-Islām, he did not cite Ibn Taymiyyah at all. However, he cited Uthman b. Fodio, a reformer and Qadiri sufi, a group that Shekau considered kafir even before the uprising. Meanwhile, even Uthman’s brother Abdullah b. Fodio criticised him on the issues that Shekau would quote him on. But then, Shekau’s master ideology that made him kill carelessly was heavily drawn on Ibn Hazm’s views on Muslims living under non-Muslim rule. Even this was repudiated by Mamman Nur and others, who argued that Ibn Hazm did not support the reckless conclusions Shekau drew. Reading the Mahalla of Ibn Hazm, any sane person will see that Shekau cherry-picked the quotations.
3. The Alhaji Garba Account: The section on Alhaji Garba is new to me, and I appreciate the detail. But the narrative is blurry and comes across as an attempt to villainise state agencies by describing Shekau “trading pleasantries at checkpoints.” At that point, Shekau was deeply embedded in regional networks and making deals across the Sahara through proxies. Isolating such moments without context misrepresents the comeback of BH and the making as many know him. 4. Mamman Nur and the Claim of “Shekau’s Generosity”Salkida creates an interesting contrast in his story by humanising Shekau and highlighting his generosity toward his obedient servants. However, these accounts do not align with documented reality or the group’s own testimonies. Salkida suggests that Mamman Nur “abandoned the group before the July 2009 uprising.” But this vague statement can be countered by videos of Nur before the uprising, he used some of the strongest words to incite the congregation at the Ibn Taymiyya centre. Dr. Abdulbasit Kasim documented his March 2009 video as his last appearance before years later. However, Jacob Zenn cites a June 2009 video in which Nur discussed the helmet crisis and incited the congregation. The helmet crisis occurred on 11 June, and it was lectures like Nur’s that ultimately led to the uprising. Does it even make sense that he stirred up everything and “abandoned” the group? Truly, Nur did not re-emerge in Borno in 2010 like most of the group’s bigwigs, but whether this was an ideological break from Shekau or simply a tactical decision is unclear. In fact, many researchers have stated that he underwent military training, citing different locations, but definitely not Cameroon. Salkida’s okada in Cameroon story could be true, though, but he was wrong with saying he “abandoned” the group “before the uprising.”As for Shekau’s “generosity,” testimonies from Abu Musab and others say otherwise. Shekau is known to hold resources (generators, fuels, and even food), and he reportedly noted that providing for dependents was not the emir’s duty. Worthy of note is that one of the reasons they turned against him was this selfishness.
5. The “Useful Infidel” Label: To reinforce his authority, Salkida introduces the label kāfiri mai fa’ida (useful infidel) narrative. Shekau was indeed narcissistic and obsessed with appearing on camera, especially after 2012 when he replaced the spokesman Abu Qaqa as the face of Boko Haram. But Salkida’s chronology is inconsistent, because “2009-2015” raises questions about how often he had access to the group’s materials. Meanwhile, trying to smuggle his own authority into the story of Shekau was uncalled for. Shekau was not the face of the group till 2012, and after that, Salkida was not the only link between the group and the world.
Conclusion
Salkida remains one of the most knowledgeable journalists on Boko Haram’s early history. But this particular article is weakened by sensational framings! It failed to clarify Shekau’s ideological journey while successfully reopening old divisions and presents a distorted picture that serves neither scholarship nor social cohesion.